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Updated March 2009
Chemical Overview
China was a victim of chemical weapons warfare, with some estimates indicating more than 2,000 separate CW attacks by Japanese imperial forces on Chinese territory between 1937 and 1945. The legacy of these attacks continue to linger as a major problem for China, which has an estimated 350,000 abandoned chemical munitions still on its territory, left behind by retreating Japanese forces.
China is a party to most of the major international agreements regulating chemical weapons, including the Geneva Protocol and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). China also supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004, which compels states to prevent non-state actors from acquiring chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). China is currently not a member of the Australia Group (AG), an export control regime focused on chemical and biological weapons; however, since 2006 Beijing has held regular consultation with the AG and China's CW-related export controls are fully in line with AG control lists.
While China declared upon ratification of the CWC in 1997 that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes, it has consistently maintained that the program has since been dismantled. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has conducted over 100 inspections in China to confirm Beijing's declarations and has ruled Beijing as in compliance with its CWC obligations. However, U.S. officials have accused China of not declaring the full extent of its chemical weapons program. Additionally, the United States has expressed concern over the transfer of controlled chemicals from Chinese entities to nations of proliferation concern, most notably Iran.
China's Official Position on Chemical Weapons
Beijing's official declarations have consistently shown support for the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In November 1995, Beijing's White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament stated that China supports, as the ultimate goal of disarmament, "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons)." The document also stated that China "has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons," and that "it does not produce or possess chemical weapons."
China's 2000 national defense white paper
further noted that:
"It is the view of the Chinese government that the
implementation of the CWC has been, on the whole, satisfactory, since it entered
into force three years ago. However, there are problems which should not be
ignored: The universality of the Convention leaves a lot to be desired; a
certain State Party has made de facto reservations regarding the provisions of
the Convention in the form of domestic legislation; and some State Parties have
been very slow in destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. These problems
should be put right as soon as possible."
In the 2005 white paper,
"China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation," China
emphasized the problem of the continued presence of abandoned Japanese chemical
weapons in China:
"China suffered a lot from the use of biological and
chemical weapons by foreign countries in history. The chemical weapons abandoned
by Japan on Chinese soil are still posing a grave and real threat to the lives
and property of the Chinese people, and to the ecological
environment."
As part of its CWC obligations, in 1997 China declared small-scale chemical agent production facilities, which have since been destroyed. These declarations have been verified by on-site inspections carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
China has declared that it has maintained a defensive chemical warfare program to protect itself against chemical attack, which is not in conflict with the CWC. In 1950, China established an anti-chemical warfare school, and in 1956, established the Anti-Chemical Warfare Department with the approval of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Currently, China conducts research on chemical weapons defense at its Research Institute of Chemical Defense and has two schools for its anti-chemical warfare corps. In October 2008, China announced a new training curriculum for its anti-chemical warfare corps, focusing on the dual mission of defending against CW use in a wartime situation, and dealing with domestic chemical incidents and incidents related to chemical weapons abandoned by Japan after World War II.
It is not known publicly whether China declared a chemical weapons stockpile. According to the Chinese white paper "China's National Defense in 2008," since the CWC entered into force, China has had over 170 on-site inspections by OPCW personnel to verify submitted declarations. Additionally, according to the white paper, China has two OPCW-designated laboratories, the Analytical Chemical Research Laboratory of the Institute of Chemical Defense, designated in 1998, and the Toxicant Analysis Laboratory of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, designated 2007. These laboratories assist the OPCW in analyzing samples taken during on-site inspections.
Suspicions about China's CW-Related Activities
Despite China's official position, there have been allegations that the Chinese government is still secretly pursuing chemical weapons programs, in violation of its CWC commitments. These allegations have originated primarily in the United States, though they have not yet led to any official action against China. (Under the provisions of the CWC, allegations of active CW programs can be brought before the OPCW and a challenge inspection can be called.)
In July 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter stated in testimony before the
U.S.-China Commission:
"China's maintenance of a chemical weapons program
is a matter of serious concern to us. We are no less concerned about certain
Chinese entities' continued transfers overseas of dual-use chemical agents and
technologies and equipment that can be used in chemical weapons programs. The
United States believes that, despite being a State Party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), China has an advanced chemical weapons research and
development program. Although China has declared that it does not possess
chemical weapons, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent
of its CW program. We also believe that China possesses an inventory of
traditional CW agents. Moreover, a number of China's chemical industrial
facilities are highly capable - giving it the ability to produce many dual-use
chemicals...The U.S. remains concerned, however, about the role of Chinese
entities providing CW-related equipment, technology, and precursor materials to
Iran. The U.S. continues diplomatic efforts to encourage China to prevent
exports to CW-related end-users, particularly in Iran."
In more
recent years, the United States continues to express concern regarding China's
CW program, although it is less certain of the current status of the
program. In August 2005, a report issued by the U.S. Department of State
entitled "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" stated:
"The United States judges
that China maintains a CW production mobilization capability, although there is
insufficient information available to determine whether it maintains an active
offensive CW research and development program. Moreover, in violation of its CWC
obligations, China has not acknowledged past transfers of chemical weapons and
it may not have declared the full extent of its CW-related
facilities."
The United States. has not publicly disclosed specific evidence to support its contentions regarding the Chinese CW program.
China's CW Export Controls
China's chemical industry is large and diffuse, and seen as one of the core industries involved in China's overall economic development. These factors, combined with the fact that export control laws have only come into force in the last few years, has made domestic enforcement of these laws difficult, resulting in inconsistent implementation.
The Chinese government has consistently insisted that it has never violated the CWC, and points out that that the Convention explicitly allows for normal trade and cooperation between State Parties (of which Iran is one) in the chemical industrial field.
China's current chemical export controls consist of five main components:
- December 1995 Regulations on Controlled Chemicals (based on the
regulations contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention);
- March 1997 Supplement to the December 1995 chemical export control regulations,
issued in preparation for China's April 1997 ratification of the CWC;
- June 1998 Decree expanding the scope of its chemical
controls to cover dual-use chemicals not previously controlled by China's
existing laws but which are covered in the guidelines of the Australia Group, of
which China is not a member;
- October 2002
regulations, with corresponding control lists, on chemical and biological agent
related exports, which includes extensive licensing and registration procedures
for CBW-related materials, equipment and technologies; and
- September 2006 Provisions on the Management of the Import and Export of
Precursor Chemicals.
With the 2002 regulations and 2006 provisions, China's export controls fully cover requirements under the CWC, as well as the control lists of the Australia Group. The 2005 white paper on arms control and nonproliferation offered a relatively detailed description of China's export control system. For chemical weapons-related export controls, the export of "certain chemicals" is regulated by the Ministry of Commerce in coordination with the State Development and Reform Commission. The white paper provided an overview of efforts on the part of the Chinese government to further strengthen its export control system and harmonize it with international standards. Among the specific measures cited were: the formulation of measures for export license administration in 2003, a computerized interagency control system, and an interagency contingency mechanism for emergency cases. With respect to the enforcement of export control laws, China claimed to have "dealt with scores of cases...concerning illegal export of sensitive items and technologies" since the implementation of the 2002 regulations. The white paper also highlighted Chinese efforts to train law enforcement officials and private enterprises in Chinese export control policy. As a significant final note, China appeared to acknowledge that its export control system remains a work in progress:
"The nonproliferation export control [sic] is a long-term task. The Chinese government will keep on improving its legislation in this regard, enhancing the capacity-building of law enforcement, setting up and optimizing internal mechanisms, and reinforcing publicity of legislation as well as education and training for enterprises, in a bid to make due contributions to the international nonproliferation endeavor."
Continued Concerns about China's CW-related Exports
Since the early 1990's, China has been repeatedly accused, primarily by the United States, of exporting dual-use chemical weapons-related materials and technology, such as dual-use chemical precursors, vaccines and production equipment, to countries of concern in the developing world, including Iran, Libya, and Iraq. Chinese chemical and biological weapon-related exports to Iran raised particular concerns.
One of the earliest and most controversial incidents involved the 1993 search of the Chinese ship Yinhe (Galaxy). The search came as a result of U.S. intelligence reports, which charged that the ship was carrying chemical precursors to Iran. The search of the ship, however, revealed no such items.
In 1997 and 2001, the United States imposed sanctions on Chinese entities for exporting dual-use chemical precursors and chemical production equipment to Iran in support of Tehran's suspected chemical weapons program. On January 16, 2002, sanctions were again imposed on three Chinese companies by the United States under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000-U.S. legislation that prohibits the sale of chemical and biological weapons components and missile technology to Iran, designed to stop Tehran acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Restrictions were placed on Liyang Chemical Equipment company, the China Precision Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, and an individual broker and agent named as Q.C. Chen for the transfer to Iran of equipment and technology that could be used for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. The equipment was reportedly controlled under the Australia Group.
Since 2002, numerous Chinese entities have been sanctioned by the United States for illicit transfers of controlled goods to third parties, often Iran. While the nature of the goods is frequently undisclosed, many of the entities-such as Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation, Q.C. Chen, Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Company, and Zibo Chemet Equipment Plant-engage primarily in the trade of chemicals, prompting speculation that many of the sanctions were for violations of the parameters of the AG or the CWC.
China has vigorously protested both U.S. assertions that it engages in or fails to stop WMD proliferation, as well as the recent sanctions imposed by the U.S. on its companies. In January 2007, in response to sanctions imposed on three Chinese companies under the 2005 Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, including the Zibo Chemet Equipment Plant, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated Chinese opposition to the Bush Administration's frequent implementation of sanctions: "It is unreasonable for the American government to invoke its domestic law to sanction Chinese companies without providing any evidence...We express resolute opposition and strongly urge the U.S. to correct its wrong practice."
Since 2006 Chinese authorities have publicly punished three private firms that violated Beijing's CW-related export controls. These companies were Jilin Tumen Chemical Light Manufacturing Company (punished in 2006), Shanghai Smart Chemical Company Ltd (punished in 2006), and Zibo Chemet Equipment Company, Ltd (punished in 2008). Of these three, Zibo Chemet had previously been sanctioned by the U.S. government.
According to a January 2009 Congressional Research Service report, approximately half of Chinese entities that have been sanctioned by the United States could be considered "serial proliferators," that is they have been sanctioned more than once. According to the report this may raise questions about the effectiveness of sanctions against these entities.
Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China
At the end of World War II, the Japanese army abandoned a large amount of chemical weapons on Chinese territory. Current estimates place the number of shells still on Chinese soil at about 350,000. Under the CWC, Japan is responsible for the proper destruction of these abandoned munitions, and both China and Japan were tasked with negotiating the arrangements for destruction. After many years of negotiation, the two governments in July 1999 signed a Memorandum of Understanding that established a "basic framework of the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in China, based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)." Under the agreement, Japan is to provide the necessary facilities, experts, expertise, and funds to complete the destruction of the munitions. It had been intended that the clean-up commence in 2000 and according to CWC guidelines, should have been completed by 2007, 10 years after the convention's entry into force. Due to the immense scale of the operation and problems with agreeing upon disposal methods, China and Japan jointly filed a request with the OPCW for five more years to complete the removal and destruction of the weapons.
Japan estimates that clean-up costs will be around $1.6 billion dollars (200 billion yen). In September 2000, in Bei'an, China, scientists and workmen from both Japan and China conducted the "first large scale joint operation" for the excavation and recovery of abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs). Cooperative efforts have also included joint site investigations, studies on weapon destruction, as well as research on security systems protecting both humans and the environment. In April 2007, China and Japan reached a final agreement on the primary ACW destruction site. The facility is located in Ha'erbaling, in China's northeastern Jilin Province. (Approximately 90 percent of the ACW munitions in China are located in Jilin.) The Ha'erbaling facility is intended to dispose of 330,000 munitions. Japan and China also agreed on the use of a mobile destruction facility for disposal of munitions that cannot be safely transported to Ha'erbaling. In December 2008, a Japanese team under Chinese supervision began test removal of some ACW at Ha'erbaling.
Despite progress, China has shown displeasure in the slow speed of the ACW destruction. In September 2007 during a meeting of the OPCW Executive Council, China's permanent representative to the OPCW noted that Japan had not yet disposed of "a single" ACW. ACWs continue to be unearthed in China with some frequency, and Chinese citizens have sued repeatedly in Japanese courts for compensation for the injuries and associated damages caused by Japanese ACWs, despite several rulings in favor of the Japanese government. In July 2007, for example, the Tokyo High Court overturned a September 2003 lower court ruling which had awarded a $1.6 million settlement to 13 Chinese victims of Japanese ACW exposure and their families.
Most recently, the cleanup effort has been slowed by allegations of corruption on the part of Japanese companies involved in ACW removal. In October 2007, Japanese investigators raided the offices of two companies, Abandoned Chemical Weapons Disposal Corporation and Pacific Consultants International (PCI). In Aprill 2008, four executives of PCI were officially arrested and accused of misusing 300 million yen, allocated by the Japanese government for ACW cleanup and disposal.
Despite these misgivings, joint China-Japan efforts to
locate and recover ACWs continue. In December 2006, China and Japan agreed to
create a joint body, centered in China's Jilin province, to recover and dispose
of Japanese ACWs. China's 2006 national defense white paper states:
"Since
2005, China has assisted Japan in 24 on-site verifications, and recovered over
3,100 chemical weapons abandoned by Japan...These chemical weapons will be
destroyed by Japan in the future."
Sources:
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Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," Organization for the
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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2009 by MIIS.
