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Updated June 2009

Missile Overview

"China has the most active ballistic missile program in the world" cites the Pentagon's 2009 report and is continuing to increase both the quantity and capability of its cruise and ballistic missiles. The vast majority of this arsenal consists of short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) deployed in Fujian province across the Taiwan Straits. The Pentagon's 2009 report on China's military power states that Beijing has seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and is supplementing these forces with conventional medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, and land attack cruise missiles (LACM). This number is still increasing at a rate of approximately 100 per year. Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB), however, believes that China has deployed more than 1,400 DF-11 and DF-15 SRBMs as well as more than 190 cruise missiles targeting Taiwan. Previous Pentagon reports had also argued that China was developing several enhanced variants of its DF-15 missile in order to provide its missile arsenal greater tactical flexibility.

China is actively modernizing its nuclear delivery systems which include ballistic missiles, bombers and new-generation submarines. The 2008 Chinese Defense White Paper outlines China's overall nuclear doctrine, saying: "It [The People's Liberation Army (PLA)] strictly adheres to a position of self-defense, exercises prudence in the use of force, seeks to effectively control war situations, and strives to reduce the risks and costs of war. It [The PLA] calls for the building of a lean and effective deterrent force and the flexible use of different means of deterrence. China remains committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursues a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country." Most of China's existing delivery systems were designed in the 1960s and 1970s and have been in service for decades. In this sense, upgrading its missile force can be seen as a natural evolution and modernization of China's existing arsenals. Analyzing the recent 2008 Defense White Paper, the 2009 Pentagon report also states that "if China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Force will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack against the enemy either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services." This implies that the Chinese leadership may assign nuclear missions to the People's Liberation Army Air force (PLAAF), in addition to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

Beyond the modernization of its missile arsenals, U.S. policymakers have often voiced concern over China's transfers of missile components and related technology to nations of concern, most notably to Iran, Pakistan, and Libya. The U.S. government has imposed a series of sanctions on Chinese entities over the past decade for illicit transfers of these technologies and for violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

In response to U.S. sanctions and diplomatic demarches and as a result of its own changing perceptions on national security and assessment of proliferation risks, China over the past few years has introduced and strengthened domestic regulations on missile-related transfers. It has also engaged in consultation with the MTCR and in 2004 applied to join the regime; however Beijing's application has so far been blocked by current members who believe that China's missile-related export controls are still too weak. While transfers of complete missile systems to nations of concern seem to be a thing of the past, the sale of key missile-related dual-use technologies by entities in China's increasingly privatized economy still raise questions particularly in the U.S. government about Beijing's ability to enforce its export control laws.

China's Ballistic Missile Inventory

China has seven types of operational land-based ballistic missiles that are nuclear-capable: the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5/5A, DF-11, DF-15, DF-21/21X, and China's latest deployed inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-31/31A. Perhaps the most high profile recent Chinese ballistic missile-related incident is the January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test. On 11 January (12 January local time) China successfully tested a direct ascent ASAT weapon. The test raised anxieties within the United States and neighboring Asian countries about China's military intentions with regards to space security. In 5 November 2007, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed his concerns over the test in a meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchun. The ASAT is believed to have employed a KT-1 space launch vehicle (SLV), which is a modified DF-21 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). The missile was launched from Xichang Space Center to destroy, through kinetic impact, an aging Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) polar orbit satellite (launched in 1999) about 865km above the earth and 4 degrees west of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center. China received much criticism for the massive amount of debris the test generated (an estimated 950 pieces at or larger than 4 inches and thousands of smaller pieces as well) which jeopardizes satellites currently in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the International Space Station (ISS).

China flight tested the DF-31 ICBM in August 1999. The Pentagon's 2009 report stated that by 2010 "China's nuclear forces will likely comprise enhanced CSS-4s [DF-5s]; CSS-3s [DF-4s]; CSS-5s [DF-21s]; solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 and DF31A ICBMs, which are being deployed to units of the Second Artillery Corps; and up to five JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each carrying 12 JL-2 SLBM." The report noted that China was already deploying the DF-31 and DF-31A. The DF-41 had been under development but work has reportedly been halted if not completely cancelled, being supplanted by the DF-31A.

China is actively modernizing its navy and significantly extending its undersea deterrent. As the 2008 Chinese Defense White Paper outlines "Since the beginning of the new century, in view of the characteristics and laws of local maritime wars in conditions of informationization, the Navy has been striving to improve in an all round way its capabilities of integrated offshore operations, strategic deterrence and strategic counterattacks, and to gradually develop its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters and countering non-traditional security threats, so as to push forward the overall transformation of the service. Through nearly six decades of development, a modern force for maritime operations has taken shape, consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations."

China's first ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) the Xia-class, or Type 092 has never conducted any deterrence patrols. It first became operational and has since then undergone numerous refits. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) reported in 2008 that China's single Xia-class SSBN is believed to have left dry dock at the Jianggezhuang Naval Base where it underwent a multi-year overhaul. However, whether it will finally become operational or function as a test platform remains uncertain. The Xia-class SSBN is equipped with China's first generation of operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Julang-1. Twelve Julang-1s are deployed on China's single Xia-class SSBN. The warheads for the Julang-1 are believed to be stored at the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base. On 3 May 2007 satellite images available on Google Earth showed two Jin-class or Type- 094 SSBNs docked at the Bohai shipyard at Huludao. During the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the PLAN in April 2009, China openly displayed its SSBNs for the first time. At present a total number of five to six Jin-class SSBNs are believed to be under construction. It is believed that the new Jin-class SSBNs have 12 launch tubes each. China is also developing a longer range SLBM known as the JL-2 that is the sea-based version of the DF-31 for its next-generation SSBN. On 16 June 2005, China test fired a long-range SLBM that is believed to be the JL-2. According to various reports, the missile was fired by a nuclear submarine off the coast of Qingdao, and landed in a Chinese desert several thousand kilometers away. However, the JL-2 is not expected to have operational capacity until between 2009 and 2010.

Quantitatively, the development of these systems to carry nuclear warheads is also of concern. For instance four Type 094 carrying 12 JL-2 ballistic missiles armed with three warheads each China's undersea deterrent would boast 144 warheads. Six Jin-Class SSBNs with JL-2 SLBMs carrying six warheads each would boast 432 warheads.

Beijing seeks to increase its capability to shape and respond to the dynamic security environment. It is within this context that the new generation SSBN Jin-Class has entered into Beijing's strategic calculus. A next-generation undersea deterrent would give Beijing the strategic option to hedge against sudden shifts in the international security environment. The survivability of SSBNs reduces the vulnerability of China's limited ICBM capability to preemption. However, it remains uncertain which strategy Chinese leaders will follow regarding the PLAN's future SSBN flotilla. Given the fact that the single Xia-Class SSBN failed to conduct a single deterrent patrol, even a modestly forward-leaning deployment pattern could signal a sea change in Chinese nuclear strategy that might significantly heighten American threat perceptions.

The vast majority of China's nuclear-capable missile force is land-based, and much of China's nuclear delivery system modernization has been in this area. According to the 2009 Pentagon Report on China's Military Power the DF-31 and the DF-31A are intended to replace China's aging DF-3, DF-4 and DF-5/5A missiles. Both are road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles and have shortened launch preparation times. Furthermore, China is developing ballistic missile defense countermeasures including maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and ASAT weapons. In addition, there is speculation that China could use a DF-31-type re-entry vehicle for a MRV payload for the DF-5 sometime in the near future. The DF-31 and JL-2 will also likely employ GPS technology for improved accuracy. This will strengthen China's deterrent and enhance its strategic strike capabilities. Furthermore, the introduction of a more mobile system will create new command and control challenges for China's leadership, which now confronts a different set of variables related to release and deployment authorities. For example, the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea and the PLAN has no experience in managing a SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols.

The following table identifies China's ballistic missiles, both deployed and under development, along with their key characteristics. Due to the secrecy surrounding China's military activities, especially with respect to its ballistic missile program, there is no consensus over the total numbers of some missiles.

SYSTEM NAMES IN ITALICS ARE NOT CURRENTLY DEPLOYED

Notes:
"DF" stands for "Dong Feng" ("East Wind")
"JL" stands for "Julang" ("Great Wave")
"CSS" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface"
"CSS-N" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface Naval"
"CSST" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface Tactical"
*Under development
**Probably Cancelled Ballistic Missile

Cruise Missiles

China is currently developing and testing several different models of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). However, lack of publicly disclosed information and contradictory reports from various news sources make it difficult to determine whether or not any of these missiles have actually been deployed yet. The Pentagon's 2009 report to Congress on China's military power states that China was developing LACMs, further noting that Beijing has also relied on foreign missile technology to assist with its LACM program. According to Sinodefence.com, China received 18 examples of the 3000km Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) nuclear-capable strategic cruise missiles from Ukraine between 1999 and 2001 and also may have received the design for the shorter range Kh-65SE from Russia as well.

China's first LACM was ground launched. The Hong Niao-1 (HN-1) has a range of 600 km and can carry a 300 to 400 kg conventional warhead or a 90 kT nuclear warhead. The HN-1 is believed to use inertial guidance with terrain comparison or GPS updates. An improved version, the HN-2, is believed to have entered into operational status in 1998 with an increased range of 1,500 to 2,000 km and can be ground or ship launched.

The Dong-Hai-10 (DH-10), the Ying Ji-63 (YJ-63) and the Tianjin-1 are three more types of LACMs that China is believed to be working on. Jane's Missiles and Rockets magazine reported that DH-10 is a second-generation LACM with an integrated inertial navigation system which is supplemented by a terrain contour mapping system and digital scene-matching terminal homing system. The DH-10 has a range of more than 1500km and a circular error probable (CEP) of 10m. The 2009 edition of the Pentagon report to the U.S. Congress on the China's military power indicated that the DH-10 is already in operational service. According to Sinodefence.com 150-350 DH-10 are deployed at present. The YJ-63 will be a first-generation LACM with a range of 400-500km and will have a CEP of 10-15m, though its accuracy may be limited by weather. The YJ-63 will likely have a combined inertial and GPS-midcourse guidance system and some form of electro-optical terminal guidance. Much less detail about the specifications of the Tianjin-1 has been released thus far. It will have a butterfly v-tail with dorsal air intake and extending wings similar to the U.S. Tomahawk. The Tianjin-1 was displayed at the Chinese International Defense Exhibition (CIDEX) in 2006.

With regards to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), the 2009 Pentagon report states that "the PLA Navy and Naval Air Force have or are acquiring nearly a dozen varieties of ASCMs, from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2/STYX to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22/SUNBURN and SS-N-27/SIZZLER." The first lot of 24 SS-N-22/Sunburn ASCM was shipped to China on 16 May 2000. In total, China has purchased over 100 SS-N-22 ASCMs from Russia for their Sovremenny-class destroyers. While the delivered missiles are conventionally equipped, Russia does manufacture nuclear-equipped Sunburn missiles. This has led to some speculation that Russia might supply or China might develop technology that would enable these missiles to deliver a Chinese nuclear warhead.

The PLA recently completed an upgrade to the ground-launched YJ-62 ASCM. The new variant, the YJ-62C, has a range of more than 278km. According to press reports, the PLAN has deployed 120 YJ-62Cs to naval bases in Fujian province, across from Taiwan which is outfitted on the domestically produced LUYANG II-class destroyers.

China's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Strategies

China's weapons acquisitions also suggest China is looking beyond Taiwan. New missile units outfitted with conventional theater-range missiles at various locations in China could be used in a variety of non-Taiwan contingencies. Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) and aerial-refueling programs would permit extended air operations into the South China Sea and beyond. Furthermore, advanced destroyers and submarines reflect Beijing's desire to protect and advance its maritime interests up to and beyond the second island chain. As a part of China's anti-access strategy it is also developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the DF-21 MRBM. In a cross-strait conflict this could counter third party intervention. The missile has a range in of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean. In addition, China invests in C4ISR for geo-location and tracking of targets, and onboard guidance systems to hold surface ships at risk. This capability would provide the capability for preemptive and coercive options in a regional scenario. A further aspect of this strategy, the air defense component consists of new surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to continue improving wide-area air control. The PLA deploys the HQ-9, the SA-10, the SA-12, which also have a limited ballistic and cruise missile defense capability, and the extended-range SA-20 PMU2 SAMs. Furthermore, the PLAN equips its new Luyang II-class (Type 052C), Luzhou-class (Type 051C), and Jiangkai II-class (Type 054A) warships with the navy versions of the HHQ-9, SA-N-20, vertically launched HHQ-16 (currently under development) SAMs.

Chinese Missile Exports and the MTCR

While China in the past has transferred missile technology capable of being used by countries of proliferation concern such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, Beijing has taken steps to increase its export control legal infrastructure. Nevertheless concerns still remain about Chinese enforcement of these new rules.

In its missile sales, as with its conventional arms sales in general, China has followed three arms export principles:

(1) The weapons exported must be meant for legitimate self-defense;

(2) The weapons must contribute to regional stability; and

(3) The weapons must not be intended for interference in another country's internal affairs.

In the past, China stated that the focus of nonproliferation efforts should be on the restriction of WMD themselves, not on their delivery systems. China also argued that if one type of delivery system is to be restricted (e.g. ballistic missiles), then other delivery systems, such as combat aircraft, ought to be restricted as well. China previously criticized the MTCR on these grounds.

However, in the 1990's China's views on missile nonproliferation slowly began to change. In response to U.S. pressure, including sanctions imposed in 1991 for alleged agreements to transfer M-11 missiles and technology to Pakistan, as well as M-9 missiles and technology to Syria, China issued a unilateral pledge to abide by MTCR guidelines. This pledge was called into question in 1993, when the United States again imposed MTCR-related sanctions on China for M-11 technology transfers to Pakistan. The United States agreed to lift these sanctions in October 1994, when China reaffirmed and clarified its commitment to MTCR guidelines. However, through the late 1990's reports from the U.S. government continued to allege that China was possibly still involved in certain transfers of missile production technology to countries of proliferation concern.

On 21 November 2000, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a policy statement on missile nonproliferation pledging that new stringent laws would be issued that would include such regulations as license application and review, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. On the same day, the State Department announced that it was waiving sanctions on Chinese entities for the past sales of missile technologies to entities in Iran and Pakistan and resuming discussions with China on extending the 1995 U.S.-China Agreement on International Trade in Commercial Launch Services. Despite the November 2000 pledge, Beijing and Washington continue to have some disagreements. The U.S. government claimed that a Chinese company--China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation--had shipped missile technology to Pakistan in violation of the bilateral agreement. In September 2001, the U.S. government again imposed economic sanctions on the accused Chinese company, which effectively banned new licenses for U.S. companies to put their satellites on Chinese rockets or transfer satellite technology for two years.

In a major policy development, China promulgated the long-awaited regulations on missile-related transfers in August 2002 entitled Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, and Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List. These regulations appeared to demonstrate Beijing's increasing willingness to abide by international norms at controlling missile trade. The 2002 regulations and control list were relatively comprehensive and in some fields are stricter than MTCR guidelines. The regulations also follow the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach, requiring specific approval and an export license for exports to authorized end-users.

In September 2003, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing clearly indicated to the chair of the MTCR that China was ready to positively consider membership in the MTCR. In a statement at the Plenary for the 2004 session of the Conference for Disarmament, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi announced the start of the first round of China-MTCR dialogues in Paris. However, a number of MTCR member states, most notably the United States, have blocked China's entry. Washington's hesitation to admit China to the MTCR stems from anxiety about Beijing's unwillingness or inability to fully enforce their domestic laws. Between 2002 and 2007, the U.S. State Department issued sanctions on numerous Chinese companies on over a dozen occasions. Although few details are publicly released as to the nature of the transfer that was the impetus of the punishment, a number of the sanctions were reportedly brought about by alleged transfers of missile-related items to Iran.

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About This Section

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2009 by MIIS.