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Updated August 2008
Introduction
China possesses nuclear weapons, a range of ballistic missile capabilities, and the ability to develop chemical and biological weapons. A key uncertainty is how aggressive military modernization efforts will ultimately reshape China's strategic nuclear capabilities, but U.S. deployments of missile defenses are likely to be a key variable. Another key concern is the weaponization of space. Though Chinese officials have called for an international treaty to prevent the weaponization of space, China’s ambitious space program (including its Jan. 2007 anti-satellite missile test) has raised doubts about China’s intentions in space. The United State’s willingness to sign a space treaty is likely to be another key variable.
Serious concerns remain about China's proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Chinese companies have been sanctioned by the United States for missile-related exports to Iran as recently at 2007. Concerns also remain about China’s ability to control chemical items that could be used in the production of chemical weapons. Improved export control laws and enforcement have addressed many (but not all) concerns about nuclear and chemical weapons-related proliferation.
China currently participates to some degree in all of the multi-lateral regimes dedicated to the nonproliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. China is a signatory to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWTC), and has joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. Though not members of the following regimes, China maintains a dialogue with and control lists consistent with those of the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
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Nuclear
China's nuclear weapons program began in 1955 and culminated in a successful nuclear test in 1964. Since then, China has conducted 45 nuclear tests, including tests of thermonuclear weapons and a neutron bomb. The series of nuclear tests in 1995-96 prior to China's signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) may have resulted in a smaller and lighter warhead design for the new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) now under development. China is estimated to have about 400 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and stocks of fissile material sufficient to produce a much larger arsenal. China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 but supplied nuclear technology and reactors to several countries of proliferation concern in the 1980s and early 1990s. Most notably, Chinese supplied design information and fissile material reportedly contributed to Pakistan’s achievement of nuclear weapons in 1998.
China acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 as a nuclear weapon state and has since improved its export controls, including the promulgation of regulations on nuclear and nuclear dual-use exports and has pledged to halt exports of nuclear technology to un-safeguarded facilities. In 2002 China ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, the first and only nuclear weapons state to do so. In 2004, China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). To date, China is the only nuclear weapons state to adopt a nuclear "no-first use" policy and an official pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.
Biological
China is a party to most of the major international agreements regulating biological weapons, including the Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC or BTWC). China is not, however, a member of the Australia Group (AG), a voluntary supply-side export control regime focused on chemical and biological weapons, though the issuance of new export control regulations in 2002 has put Beijing's export control policy fully in line with that of the AG. In 2006, China issued an update to its biological control list that reflected an update made to the AG biological control list.
While China has publicly declared to be consistently in compliance with the BTWC, past U.S. government reports have alleged that China not only has a small-scale offensive biological weapons program, but has also transferred controlled biological weapons-related items to nations of proliferation concern such as Iran. Such transfers have resulted in numerous U.S. nonproliferation sanctions being imposed on Chinese entities.
See China Biological Weapons Profile
Chemical
China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in December 1996, declaring two former chemical weapons (CW) production facilities that may have produced mustard gas and Lewisite. Since 1997, China has hosted 14 on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Though not an AG member, China has maintained an AG-consistent chemical control list since 2002. China updated its chemical control list in 2006 to reflect changes made to the AG chemical control list.
Although China claims that it no longer possesses any CW stockpiles, the U.S. government believes that China has not revealed the full scope of its program. China has signed a bilateral agreement with Japan to destroy CW that Japan abandoned in Chinese territory during World War II.
See China Chemical Weapons Profile
Missile
China has produced and deployed a wide range of ballistic missiles, ranging from short-range missiles to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). China's missiles are operated by the Second Artillery Corps, and include about 650 DF-11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9) missiles opposite Taiwan; several dozens of DF-3, DF-4, and DF-21 medium-range missiles that can reach Japan, India, and Russia; and 18-24 DF-5 ICBMs that can reach the United States and Europe. A transition is currently underway from relatively inaccurate, liquid-fueled, silo/cave-based missiles (DF-3, DF-4, DF-5) to more accurate, solid-fueled, mobile missiles (DF-11, DF-15, and DF-21, and a new ICBM [the DF-31] and SLBM [the JL-2], which are currently under development). China is replacing its older DF-5 missiles with new DF-5A variants, which may eventually be equipped with multiple warheads. A key question is how U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defense (formerly known as theater and national missile defense) will affect the pace and scope of Chinese strategic modernization.
Chinese missile exports have been a problem for more than a decade. China transferred 36 DF-3 medium-range missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and supplied Pakistan with 34 M-11 short-range missiles in 1992. China has provided technology and expertise to the missile programs of several countries, including Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. China has not joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but has pledged to abide by its main parameters. In November 2000, China promised not to assist any country in the development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. In August 2002, China issued regulations and a control list restricting the export of missiles and missile technology. Since 2004, China has been engaged in consultation with the MTCR; however, its application for membership has so far not been successful and suspicions, especially in the United States, about Chinese missile technology transfers remain.
China's development of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities has also raised concerns about China's missile and related military space program. On 11 January 2007, China successfully carried out a test of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, by using either a DF-21 medium range solid-fueled ballistic missile or a KT-1 space launch vehicle to destroy an aging Fengyun-1C weather satellite in orbit approximately 500 miles above the Earth's surface. In addition to raising concerns within the United States and neighboring Asian countries about Chinese military intentions, the ASAT test endangers low earth orbit satellites currently in space due to the massive amount of debris the test generated.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
