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Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides

Other Names: AZC, Factory 18, TA'AS 801, Abu Za'abal Company for Specialty Chemicals
Location: Abu Za'abal el Balad, Heliopolis, Cairo, Egypt
30°15'00"N 31°21'00"E (according to the FAS website)
Size: Unknown. Given its alleged activities (outlined below), it is quite conceivable that Abu Za'abal is a relatively large facility, although its exact size is not available in the open sources.
Subordinate to: Associated with the Ministry of Military Production.
Subsidiaries: None known
Primary Function: Production of chemicals and of military products such as explosives, propellants, mortar chargers, and rocket motors. Alleged to be involved in Egypt's covert CW program.

History:
When it was founded in 1950, the company's primary functions were propellant and explosives production. One of Abu Za'abal's major projects was the Aswan High Dam Project, for which the company reportedly supplied 12,000 tons of dynamite. Egypt reportedly opened its first chemical weapons production facility in 1963, and named it Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides, in the Abu Za'abal military industrial complex, located 10 kilometers north of Cairo. Unofficially, this facility is reportedly called Military Plant No. 801.

In the 1970s, Abu Za'abal likely produced sarin, VX, and a glycolate hallucinogen. In the 1980s, the facility underwent a reorganization in order to improve the plant's capabilities, much of which occurred with the help of Western European companies. The updates included improving production lines for nerve agent precursors such as phosphorous trichloride and expanding the nerve agent production facility. To mitigate any suspicions, the improvements were noted as renovations to the neighboring El-Nasr Pharmaceutical Company, when in fact they occurred at Military Plant No. 801. In 1987, the Swiss chemical company Krebs A.G. began helping Egypt build a facility capable of producing phosphorous trichloride. Egyptian officials claimed the facility would be a pesticide manufacturing plant. The Swiss government began to suspect the Krebs' involvement, but lacking definitive proof and effective export control laws, it chose not to act. Phosphorous trichloride is a dual-use chemical that is used in the production of pesticides as well as nerve agents. Some of the designs for building the plant were supplied to Krebs by an US company named Stauffer Chemicals. Two years later, the United States pressured the Swiss government to end the project, a choice made easier when Egypt refused to disclose what chemicals would be manufactured at the facility.

Abu Za'abal Company also reportedly helped Iraq build the Taj al-Ma'arik solid fuel propellant plant in Latifiyah (al Hillah). Although this is not directly CW related, it goes to demonstrate the scientific capability at Abu-Za'abal as well as ties with other countries' weapons programs.

Activities:
The Federation of American Scientists reported in 1999 that the Abu Za'abal Company houses the main chemical weapons production facility in Egypt, known as, TA'AS 801.

This same report indicates that nearby manufacturers of pest control products assist the Abu Za'abal Company in chemical weapons production. One such manufacturer is the Abu Za'abal Company for Pest Control Materials and Chemicals. This is a civilian plant that supports Factory 18 chemical weapons production.

Key Sources: "Egypt Chemical Weapons Facilities," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/facility/abu-zaabal-18.htm>; Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1998, Vol. 5, No. 53, pp.48-58; Stephen Engelberg and Michael R. Gordon, "Poison Gas Fears Lead U.S. To Plan New Export Curbs," New York Times, 27 March 1989, p. A1; "Reference List of Awarded Contracts and Successfully Finished Projects," Devotra References, <http://www.devotra.nl/refer.html>; "Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defense Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid Before The House on 15 February 1996," Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/UK/Scott%20Report/e3.htm>.



 

Updated January 2006



Overview
Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides
Ain-Shams University
Central Military Chemical Laboratories of the Egyptian Army


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The Risks Involved in Egypt's Quest for Nuclear Power (2006)
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The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors (2005)
Nuclear Research Center - Special Weapons Facilities – Egypt (2000)
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Review of Nuclear Efforts (1996)
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Proliferation of WMD: Egypt
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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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