Background: Nuclear research began in the Sukhumi area shortly after the end of World War II.  German nuclear scientists were brought to two locations, the Sinop sanatorium, designated Laborartory A, and the Agudzheri sanatorium on the outskirts of Sukhumi, designated Laboratory G.  Work at these two locations concentrated on enriching uranium for bomb production, emphasizing diffusion technologies.  Gas centrifuge research was also conducted, particularly in Laboratory A, and this research laid the groundwork for the creation of the Soviet Union's first enrichment centrifuges.  In 1953, after Stalin's death, the German scientists were allowed to return to Germany.[1, 2]  Research at SIPT may have also investigated the effects of radiation on materials and may have been related to military programs.[3]  As a result of the conflict in Abkhazia, about 200 SIPT scientists relocated from Abkhazia to Tbilisi where they continue to work at research centers.[4]
Sources:
[1] A.K. Kruglov, Kak sozdavalas atomnaya promyshlennost v SSSR, (Moscow: TSNIIIATOMINFORM, 1994),  pp. 163-67, 175-76, 192-93.
[2] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 190-91.
[3] Discussions with Russian Nuclear Official, July 1997 and August 1997.  RUS970801.
[4] "Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology - SIPT," Georgian Academy of Sciences Web Site, http://www.acnet.ge/sukhumipt.htm.

Activities: Research topics at SIPT include plasma physics, producing controlled fusion reactions in a tokamak, ion accelerator physics, semiconductors, and thermal emission physics.
["Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology - SIPT," Georgian Academy of Sciences Web Site, http://www.acnet.ge/sukhumipt.htm.]

Fissile Material: There is no fissile material at the facility in Sukhumi.  According to SIPT Director Valter Kashiya, a 1993 inventory of materials at SIPT shows that at the time, 655g of HEU in the form of dioxide tablets were present.  According to Kashiya, the HEU was taken in the mid-1990s from Abkhazia by smugglers.  Reports indicate that the smugglers, the nuclear material, or possibly both were later seized in Poland.[1,2]
 
Other sources indicate that two kilograms of HEU,[3] possibly in the form of icebreaker fuel,[4] were formerly located at SIPT.  The enrichment level of the uranium was estimated at 90 percent.[5]  Unconfirmed allegations reported that the 2kg of HEU located at SIPT might have been stolen or diverted, possibly through Belarus.  For more information see "Less Well-Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in the Former Soviet Union" and "A US NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," by William Potter.
Sources:
[1] "Sotrudniki MAGATE posetyat Sukhumi dlya izucheniya radiatsionnoy obstanovki," Interfax, 21 May 2001.
[2]  Tina Tskhovrebashvili, "Abkhazskiy 'proyekt mankhetten,'" Vremya novostey, 23 May 2001, p. 6; in "Phisical [sic] Protections of N.M.," Yadernyye materialy, No. 21, 31 May 2001.
[3] NISNP Discussion with Georgian Officials, June 1997.
[4] Visit by Dr. William Potter to Russian Nuclear Facilities, May 1996.
[5] William C. Potter, "A US NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," Paper prepared for the 39th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Naples, Florida, 26-30 July 1998.

MPC&A: Well-informed Georgian sources have indicated to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies that 2kg of HEU were present at the SIPT in the early 1990s.[1]  Despite plans for cooperation between Russia's Kurchatov Institute and SIPT on an MPC&A program,[2] as of late 1997, no physical inventory of the Institute's fissile material holdings had occurred since 1992.[3]  At the end of 1997, a Minatom team gained access to the facility to conduct an inventory,[7,8]  but the team found a deserted facility with no HEU.  The whereabouts of the HEU remain unknown.[9] 
 
SIPT is located in Abkhazia, a region of Georgia which claims independence.  A fierce civil war erupted in the region in 1992-1993, and Georgian government troops were routed from Sukhumi in September 1993.  Since then, a ceasefire, enforced by Russian troops acting under a Commonwealth of Independent States mandate, has prevailed, under which Abkhazia has enjoyed de-facto independence from Georgia.  Progress towards a negotiated solution to the problem has been slow.[4]
 
Since the Georgian government does not control Sukhumi, it had no access to the facility there and was not able to conduct a physical inventory of the fissile materials.  Nor had the IAEA been able to visit the site and take count.  The Abkhaz government would not recognize Tbilisi's right to allow inspection of a facility located in Abkhazia, while Tbilisi insisted that any visit must recognize Georgia's sovereignty over the region.  Reports indicated that Russian border guards turned back a Russian team sent by Minatom at Abkhazia's request in summer 1997, for not having Georgian government clearance for entry.[5]  Russian sources later noted that the failed mission was a bureaucratic misunderstanding.[6] Unconfirmed allegations reported that the 2kg of HEU located at SIPT might have been stolen or diverted, possibly through Belarus.  For more information see "Less Well-Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in the Former Soviet Union,"and "A US NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," by William Potter.
Sources:
[1] NISNP Discussion with Georgian Officials, June 1997.
[2] Visit by Dr. William Potter to Russian Nuclear Facilities, May 1996.
[3] NISNP Discussion with Georgian Official, October 1997.
[4] Elizabeth Fuller, "Georgia: Search Continues For An End To Abkhazia Conflict," RFE/RL Feature, 29 May 1997,  http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/05/F.RU.970529133623.html
[5] NISNP Discussions with Russian Nuclear Official, July 1997 and August 1997.  RUS970801.
[6] NISNP Discussions with Russian Nuclear Officials, September 1997.
[7] NISNP Discussion with Russian Nuclear Official, April 1998.
[8] NISNP Discussion with Russian Nuclear Scientist, July 1998.
[9] William C. Potter, "A US NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," Paper prepared for the 39th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Naples, Florida, 26-30 July 1998.

Reactors: It was reported that isotope-production reactors with unknown specifications were present at Sukhumi.[1] Other sources, however, refute this.[2]
[1]  Correspondence between Dr. William Potter and Russian nuclear scientist, August 1992.
[2]  Discussions with Russian nuclear official, July 1997 and August 1997, RUS970801.

Archived Developments

7/1/2002: ABKHAZIA DENIES ALLEGATIONS OF SELLING URANIUM TO TERRORISTS
According to Valter Kashia, director of SIPT-Tbilisi, some of the 244 types of radioactive materials, including enriched uranium, stored at SIPT-Sukhumi might have been sold to terrorists or Iraq.[1] Georgian Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Nino Chkhobadze announced that no credible information about the state of radioactive materials stored at SIPT-Sukhumi is available. According to Chkhobadze, Tbilisi offered to set up a monitoring post at SIPT-Sukhumi with help from Georgian specialists and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) representatives, but Sukhumi authorities had not yet replied as of June 2002.[2]  In the meantime, SIPT-Sukhumi Director Anatoliy Markolia and Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba announced that there has never been any uranium in Abkhazia and that radioactive materials stored at SIPT-Sukhumi pose no threat. According to Markolia, Georgia and Abkhazia agreed to transfer radioactive waste remaining in Abkhazia to Georgia for burial. Markolia also confirmed Abkhazia's willingness to allow Institute inspections by IAEA representatives.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Uranium Stored in Abkhazia Might Have Been Sold to Terrorists - Abkhaz Scientist in Georgia," Interfax, 29 June 2002.
[2] Prime-News, 28 June 2002; in "Abkhazia denies possession of uranium-235," FBIS Document CEP20020701000300.
[3] "Direktor issledovatelskogo instituta v Sukhumi oprovergayet soobshcheniya o prodazhe radioaktivnykh materialov," Interfax, 1 July 2002.

2/1/99: SUKHUMI WORKERS TRANSFERRED TO FILL POSTS IN DUBNA
On 1 February 1999, Atompressa reported that 50 skilled personnel from Latvia and Georgia have been transferred to "a newly established institute in Dubna." The specialists from Latvia transferred from the Riga Scientific Research Institute of Radio Instrument Making and the Georgian specialists transferred from Sukhumi Physical and Technical Institute (SFTI). [The Center for Nonproliferation Studies has no further information on this new institute at Dubna and Atompressa did not provide any additional details.]
["The Motto 'Personnel Resolve Everything' Continues to be Important,'" Atompressa, No. 4 (335) February 1999, p. 3; in "Minatom Collegium on Future Direction of Nuclear Sector," FBIS Document FTS19990324001362.] {Entered 11/4/99 SS}
 
1/14/98: VEKUA INSTITUTE CONTRACT WITH MINATOM REPORTED
According to Abkhazian television, the Vekua Physics and Technology Institute has an order from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to produce "a system of reception and transformation of warmth into electric power."  The information agency Sarke reported that one of the laboratories at the Vekua Institute conducts "secret" work.  There are no Georgians working in that particular lab.
["The Sukhumi Physico-Technical Institute Will Celebrate its 50-Years Anniversary at the End of January," Information Agency Sarke, online edition, http://www.sanet.ge/sarke/, 14 January 1998.] 

3/96: ISTC TO FUND 19 PROJECTS ON RADIATION SAFETY
The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow has provided $7.07 million in funding for nineteen safety projects such as decommissioning nuclear reactors, nuclear safety, environmental impact of man-made disasters, and reduction of industrial pollutants. V.G. Kashia of the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology and N.P.Khuchma of the Research Production Complex of Electron Technology at Tbilisi State University will head two of the projects.
["ISTC Funds 19 More Projects; To Approve Additional Projects This Month," Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, 12 March 1996, pp 4-7.]

	Updated March 2007