This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

May 1992
The Agni completes its second successful test-flight.
—"Offensive Weapons, India," Jane's, <http://www.janes.com>.

17 July 1992
The Indian company United Phosphorous sends 45 tons of trimethyl phosphite to Syria. Trimethyl phosphite can be used to make pesticides, but is also a potential precursor for nerve gas.
—Michael Gordon, "US Accuses India on Chemical Arms," New York Times, 21 September 1992, p. 1A.

August 1992
A 45-ton shipment of trimethyl phosphite to Syria from the Indian chemical company United Phosphorus Ltd., of Bombay, is blocked in Cyprus. Raju Scroff, the owner of the company, states that the chemical was to be used to make pesticides. He states that he had an engineer verify that the Syrian company purchasing the chemical was in fact a pesticide plant, and says that he had received a certificate from the Syrian Chamber of Commerce vouching that the chemicals were for civilian use.
—Jackson Diehl, "India to Investigate Chemical Shipment," Washington Post, 22 September 1992, p. A7.

15 August 1992
A United Phosphorous executive states it will continue sending Syria trimethyl phosphite despite warnings that Syria is using the chemical to make weapons.
—Michael Rotem, "Indian Chemical Company Wont Stop Shipment to Syria," Jerusalem Post, 16 August 1992, News.

19 August 1992
India and Pakistan issue the Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The declaration states that each side is not to use, develop, produce, or acquire chemical weapons. Each side is also not to assist, induce, or induce anyone else to engage in these activities. Each side is to also work together in finalizing, adopting, and becoming state parties to the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention. Lastly each side reserves the right to develop their chemical industry and related applications and products for peaceful purposes.
—Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 19 August 1992 (New Delhi), Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/chem.htm>.

21 September 1992
US officials state that in August 1992, they prevented a shipment by the Indian company United Phosphorous Ltd. of 45 tons trimethyl phosphite from reaching the Syrian Setma Ltd. chemical plant. US officials believe that Setma Ltd. is a front company for a nerve gas production firm owned by the Syrian government. India officials state that they have received a certificate from that Syrian Chamber of Commerce stating that the chemicals are to be used for civilian purposes.
—Ruth Sinai, "US Halts Chemicals Shipments from India to Syria," Associated Press, 21 September 1992.

21 September 1992
The Indian Foreign Ministry states that India will investigate and possibly prosecute United Phosphorous for possible violating export laws.
—"India to Investigate Chemical Shipment," Washington Post, 22 September 1992, p. A7.

22 September 1992
An External Affairs Ministry spokesman states that the Indian Government is going to take action against United Phosphorous. The spokesman said that the company did not get permission from the government to sell trimethyl phosphite to Syria.
—"Action Taken Against Firm Exporting Chemical," Hong Kong Agence France Presse, 22 September 1992.

24 September 1992
The Indian government, responding to US protest, states that its export-import office is initiating legal action against the company United Phosphorous Ltd because its sale of 45 tons of trimethyl phosphate to Syria. The company also has its export license suspended for 6 months.
—"India Punishes Firm for Allegedly Selling Syria Weapons-Grade Chemicals," United Press International, 24 September 1992.

2 January 1993
An Indian government spokesman states that 19 chemicals that have both civilian and military use can now only be exported with a license from the federal government.
—Brahma Chellaney, "India Imposes Western-style Export Control on Many Chemicals," United Press International, 2 January 1993.

14 January 1993
India signs the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
—"Parliament Passes Bill Banning Chemical Weapons," Rediff, 16 August 2000, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/16chem.htm>.

14 January 1993
At the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Eduardo Faleiro states that India believes that the agreement was a model for future arms control agreements.
—"Chemical Weapons Convention: India Hails, 'Non-discriminatory' Chemical Weapons Convention," BBC Summary of World Reports, 16 January 1993.

17 February 1993
Minister of State for External Affairs, Eduardo Faleiro, announces that India is beginning to conform to international commitments on chemical weapons and toxic chemicals.
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, June 1993, Issue Number 20.

22 February 1993
During a speech to a joint session of Parliament, President Shankar Dayal Sharma, describes the Chemical Weapons Convention as "a universal and non-discriminatory treaty which should be regarded as a model for future multilateral disarmament negotiations."
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, June 1993, Issue Number 20.

May 1993
An Indian company completes work on poison-gas scrubbing equipment and sends it to Libya.
—"German Businessman Jailed For Aiding Libya Chemical Weapons," AP Worldstream, 1 October 1996.

June 1993
India conducts a Prithvi SS-150 missile test flight from the first production batch.
—"Offensive Weapons, India," Jane's, <http://www.janes.com>.

August 1993
A study by the US Office of Technology Assessment lists India as a country likely to have a secret chemical weapons program.
—"Who has Chemical Weapons, Who Doesn't?" Associated Press, 2 February 1995.

24 December 1993
Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao speaking at the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers characterizes the Chemical Weapons Convention as a great step in the direction of disarmament, nondiscriminatory in its approach, and says that it was the most important of any disarmament process in verification. He states that India was not making chemical weapons and has nothing to hide. In addition, he says that India will train its commercial industry to protect its commercial secrets while participating in the inspection process.
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 1994, Issue Number 23.

1994
The Prithvi SS-150 enters service.
—"Offensive Weapons, India," Jane's, <http://www.janes.com>.

February 1994
The Agni missile completes its third successful test-flight.
—"Offensive Weapons, India," Jane's, <http://www.janes.com>.

17 April 1994
Four container loads that were originally labeled for shipment from India to an Egyptian post are detained in Colombo, Sri Lanka on the suspicion that they are destined for Israel to make nerve gas.
—"Four Container Loads of Chemical Detained in Colombo," Xinhua News Agency (PRC), 17 April 1994.

21 April 1994
The Indian Chemical Manufacturers Association (ICMA) denies that an Indian company has sent chemicals used to make nerve gas to Egypt. The ICMA states that the chemical, phosphorous pentasulfide, is not a chemical weapon or dual-use product as defined in the Chemical Weapons Convention. [Phosphorous pentasulfide is a potential precursor of VX nerve agent, and is subject to export control by members of the Australia Group, a consortium in which India does not participate.]
—"India Denies Exporting Toxic Chemical to Egypt," Xinhua News Agency (PRC), 21 April 1994.

3 May 1994
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao hails the Chemical Weapons Convention as a major step towards disarmament, which is universal and nondiscriminatory.
—"Prime Minister Rao Sets Out Defense, Nuclear Policy in Rajya Sabha Debate," BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 4 May 1994.

4 May 1994
The Indian government announces that a shipment of phosphorus pentasulfide will be allowed to leave Colombo, Sri Lanka and proceed to Egypt. A spokesman states, "This chemical is used in civilian chemical industries to make insecticide and lubricant oil additives. It is also not included as a dual-purpose chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention. There are some chemicals which have restrictions on them for military as well as civilian uses. This is not one of them. We took up the matter with the Sri Lankan authorities and the matter has now been satisfactory resolved....We are strictly committed to nonproliferation of chemical weapons and both Sri Lanka and India are original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. We hope that with the coming effect of the CWC, the states who are parties to this will be able to do away with arbitrary and ad hoc trade restrictions on chemicals used for legitimate civilian purposes." [Note: While India is a party to the CWC, Egypt is not.]
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, September 1994, Issue Number 25.

16 May 1994
Indian labs participate in the first inter-laboratory comparison test for the analysis of CWC-relevant chemicals to be organized by the OPCW Provisional Technical Secretariat.
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, September 1994, Issue Number 25.

September 1994
According to Kaleem Siddique, described leader of Hizbul Mujahedeen, a terrorist groub based out of Kashmir, India uses chemical weapons against Kashmiri militants, after it failed to evict them from an area near Srinigar.
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, September 1999, Issue Number 45, p. 29.

17 November 1994
German intelligence papers are quoted as saying that an Indian consortium was building a pesticide plant that could be linked to the production of chemical weapons in Iran.
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 1995, Issue Number 27.

24 November 1994
India publishes the details of the Module One training course it is offering for training OPCW inspectors and inspection assistants. The course is scheduled to take place from 23 January to 5 March 1995 in Gwalior at the CBW Defense Research and Development Establishment.
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 1995, Issue Number 27.

3 January 1995
Indian government officials meet with chemical industry officials to consider the impact of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on India's chemical industry.
—Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 1995, Issue Number 27.

30 January 1995
The German Intelligence Agency, the BND, states that Indian companies are aiding Iran in its development of tabun and sarin. Indian companies state that they have obtained export licenses and told trade authorities. They also say that they were only involved in building a pesticide plant.
—Chronology 1995, The Arms Control Reporter, October 1995; Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 1995, Issue Number 27.

30 January 1995
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that German and Indian firms have provided equipment and raw materials normally used in pesticide plants to Iran. This according to the report this has aided Iran in its development of chemical weapons.
—Chronology 1995, The Arms Control Reporter, October 1995; Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 1995, Issue Number 27.

31 January 1995
India denies reports that it is supplying Iran with equipment and materials to develop chemical weapons. A statement made by the Joint Secretary, External Publicity, of the Government of India states that the pesticide plants were put out to an international tender and companies from around the world competed for the tender. During this time no concerns were ever expressed by the international community. Also the statement continues by saying that India does not have chemical weapons and because of this, there is no way Indian companies have the technology, equipment, or expertise to aid Iran. Also India is an original signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention and because of this has adopted a strict export licensing mechanism to control and monitor the exports of dual use chemicals. [Note: It must be noted that Iran was also a signatory of the CWC at the time these claims were being made.]
—Chronology 1995, The Arms Control Reporter, October 1995; Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 1995, Issue Number 27.

	Updated September 2003