This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

8 January 1965
Prime Minister Shastri attends the annual conference of the Congress Party in Durgapur. He states that while he cannot speak about the future, India's current policy is to develop nuclear energy for "constructive purposes," not to build nuclear weapons. As in 1964, delegates are divided and many urge that the party either support an Indian nuclear weapons program or accept protection from a nuclear umbrella.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 121: George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 88.

19 January 1965
Former US presidential science adviser Jerome Wiesner visits Trombay and meets with Dr. Bhabha. Mr. Wiesner is tasked with influencing Indian nuclear policy away from building and detonating a nuclear weapon in response to China's test. The Department of State asks Mr. Wiesner to elicit Indian ideas for possible cooperative projects in the areas of: "plutonium recycling, thorium recycling, training regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and cooperation in space technology" without indicating that the United States will actually commit to such projects.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 93.

21 January 1965
Mr. Wiesner circulates a report of his visit to the White House and the Secretary of State that reads, "Bhabha is anxious to explore availability of Plowshare with you. He is interested in the possibility of making harbors and water reservoirs." Mr. Wiesner recommends that the United States assist India in devising a more accurate cost estimate because Dr. Bhabha continues to underestimate the amount of time and money required to build a crude nuclear device. He cites that Dr. Bhabha's apparent motivation is "authority and resources to move forward without final decision regarding actual explosion."
—Dr. Wiesner, US Embassy (New Delhi), to Secretary of State, cable no. 2054, 21 January 1965, p. 2, FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 93.

21 January 1965
AEC member John Palfrey visits India for the inauguration of the Trombay plutonium reprocessing plant. In response to the information relayed by Mr. Wiesner, the State Department advises Mr. Palfrey to discuss Plowshares with Dr. Bhabha in a general manner. This cable reiterates US intelligence estimates that India could produce a nuclear weapon in about the one to three years from deciding to do so and that a modest program would cost India "no more than $30-$40 million."
—State Department to John Palfrey at US Embassy (New Delhi), cable, 21 January 1965, in Virginia Foran, US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, no. 01100., cited in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 93.

22 January 1965
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri formally inaugurates India's plutonium reprocessing facility at Trombay (Maharashtra).
—Department of Atomic Energy: Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-1965," p. 1.

22 February 1965
Dr. Bhabha visits Washington, DC for talks on nuclear cooperation and meets with Under Secretary of State George Ball. Dr. Bhabha expresses interest in peaceful nuclear development to counterbalance China's newly found prestige in the region. During these talks, Mr. Ball reiterates the US wish to pursue nonproliferation, whereas, Dr. Bhabha asks for US assistance by way of a plowshare device or a US blue print so that India could produce a device in six months instead of the estimated 18 for a completely indigenous device. To convince the United States to help India in its peaceful nuclear development, Dr. Bhabha explains that the Indian decision against developing nuclear weapons must be supported by gains in peaceful nuclear technology. He indicates that this will be a difficult policy to maintain since India already has the plutonium reprocessing potential to produce "100 nuclear bombs per year" within five years.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 94; US Department of State, memorandum of conversation, 22 February 1965, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 95.

16 March 1965
In a cable to the US Department of State, the US scientific attaché describes the nature of operations at Trombay. He discusses some difficulties the plant has been experiencing with maintenance, noting that the plant has been down for a month due to the length of time required to obtain spare parts from abroad, in particular the United States. He cites that the plant is completely dependent upon imported supplies and that the design of the "dissolving section" was provided by a US firm, despite India's insistence that design was indigenous. The cable also relays information from the plant manager that the plant had likely "experienced an explosion during operation," although this had not been apparent at that time. In addition, the cable calls attention to the change in expectations about the capacity of the plant from "30 tons of rods per year" to five times that amount. The attaché suggests that the United States should not pursue nuclear cooperation and that pursuit of non-nuclear scientific research would better enhance India's scientific reputation.
—Donald Fuller, scientific attaché, US Embassy (New Delhi), to Department of State, Airgram no. A-964, "Trombay and Atomic Energy in India," 16 March 1965, p. 6, Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy, FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 94.

30 April 1965
Chairman of the US AEC, Glenn Seaborg, writes a letter to the Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy discussing the possibility of fulfilling Dr. Bhabha's request for a moderate amount of plutonium from the United States for the purposes of research and development.
—AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Chairman Chet Holifield, correspondence, 30 April 1965, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy files, International Affairs, India, National Archives, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 94.

4 May 1965
The Indian delegate to the UN Disarmament Commission elucidates India's five requirements for acceptance of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty: promise by nuclear powers to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or technology to others; promise by nuclear powers to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states; guarantee from UN to protect states threatened by nuclear weapons states; "tangible progress" toward nuclear disarmament including a test ban treaty, halting production of weapons and means of delivery and cutting existing stockpiles; and promise by non-nuclear states not to obtain or produce nuclear weapons. Indian recommendations juxtaposed with more minimalist US proposals came to shape the debate on the issue within the Committee.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 103.

August-September 1965
India and Pakistan fight a short war over Kashmir. China pledges support to Pakistan but does not engage in military action. Pakistan uses US-supplied weapons against India, despite prior promises not to do so. During the war, the United States cuts off aid to both countries. Both parties agree to a UN cease-fire that takes effect 23 September.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 109.

22 September 1965
The day before the UN cease-fire takes effect, numerous members of Parliament from various parties write a letter to the prime minister to change the official policy on nuclear weapons. The letter reads "India's survival both as a nation and as a democracy, in the face of the collusion between China and Pakistan, [this] casts a clear and imperative duty on the government to take an immediate decision to develop our nuclear weapons."
—Hari Ram Gupta, India-Pakistan War, 1965, vol. 1, p. 20, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 103; MP letter quoted in G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, p. 39.

Early November 1965
Responding to a question in the Lok Sabha about whether the government had reviewed its non-nuclear posture in light of recent hostilities with Pakistan, Prime Minister Shastri writes that "despite the continued threat of aggression from China, which has developed nuclear weapons, government has continued to adhere to the decision not to go in for nuclear weapons but to work for their elimination. It is hardly necessary to alter this decision in the light of the conflict with Pakistan."
—Quoted in G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), pp. 40-41.

30 November 1965
The New York Times publishes an article based on an interview with the Dr. Bhabha. According to the article, Dr. Bhabha denies that since the war with Pakistan, India has developed nuclear weapons technology to prepare for a nuclear explosion. However, the article also notes that "many observers" expressed their belief that the prime minister may have granted the AEC permission to develop nuclear technology to within three months of an explosion.
—Anthony Lukas, New York Times, 30 Nov. 1965, quoted in G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, (New Delhi: Popular Book Services), pp. 40-41.

10 January 1966
Prime Minister Shastri dies suddenly.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 112.

24 January 1966
Indira Gandhi succeeds Shastri as prime minister. Dr. Bhabha dies in a plane crash on Mont Blanc while in transit to a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Prime Minister Gandhi selects Vikram Sarabhai as his replacement.
—B.V. Sreekantan, Virendra Singh, and B.M. Udgaoankar, eds. Homi Jehangir Bhabha: Collected Scientific Papers (Bombay: Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, 1985), p. 985.

15 February 1966
The Indian representative to the nonproliferation treaty negotiations in Geneva insists on balanced obligations between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. This speech underlines the Indian shift from seeking nuclear guarantees to the desire for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 115.

1 March 1966
Members from India's lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) ask Prime Minister Gandhi if the government intends to seek security guarantees from nuclear weapons states instead of developing nuclear weapons indigenously. She states that India will not seek security assurances because India should not "do anything which will precipitate the crisis and lead to the development of nuclear weapons in many more countries."
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 115.

9 May 1966
China conducts its third nuclear weapon test. Beijing claims that the device contains "thermo-nuclear material." Indian spokesmen denounce the test, saying that China has given "new radioactive evidence of its hostility to peace and disarmament."
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 44.

10 May 1966
A heated debate takes place in the Indian parliament, with many members of parliament calling for a change in government policy. Prime Minister Gandhi intervenes to calm delegates by saying that the government is "building up its atomic power" and "increasing our know-how and other competence," while maintaining its adherence to its policy of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Minister of External Affairs announces that the Indian government knew that China would conduct more tests and that, while this new test should not change India's policy, the policy is under constant review.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), pp. 45-46.

13 May 1966
The US AEC announces that the Chinese did not test a thermonuclear device, but announces that the test used Lithium-6, a thermonuclear material.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 44.

1 June 1966
Vikram Sarabhai holds his first press conference as chairman of the AEC and secretary of the DAE. He announces his support for the prime minister's continuing non-nuclear weapon stance because "an atomic bomb explosion is not going to help our security." He states that for a credible nuclear deterrent, one prototype is not enough. He claims that India does not have the money to devote to the long-range missiles, radar, electronics, or industrial base that would be required to support a nuclear deterrent.
—Virkram Sarabhai, press conference, June 1, 1966, in J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974), p. 179

June 1966
Sarabhai orders confiscation of papers and the end to the peaceful nuclear explosion project currently underway at the AEC.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 122.

Summer 1966
Nuclear weapons opponents in the Lok Sabha rally in support of the government's non-weapons policy. Two hundred thirty-five members of parliament, representing all parties except the Jana Sangh party, sign a memorandum in support of restricting nuclear technology to peaceful uses.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 49.

October 1966
China announces that it has completed a test of a missile carrying a nuclear warhead.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 126.

31 October 1966
Mr. Trivedi addresses the UN First Committee stating that, although India and its fellow countries in the developing world were "nowhere near the nuclear fusion stage" and, therefore, could not yet utilize peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for the purposes of large-scale construction projects, these countries should have the right to do so in the future.
—Statement by the Indian representative in the First Committee of the United Nations, October 31, 1966, in J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974), p. 186.

November 1966
The Indian representative to the Eight Nation Disarmament Committee, Vishnu Trivedi, suggests that the development of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) be permitted for developing countries provided that the explosions be announced and be subject to international observation and inspection.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 130.

November 1966
Major General Son Dutt, director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, publishes a paper for the Institute for Strategic Studies in London in which he argues that India would not stand to gain from developing nuclear weapons at this time. He recognizes that although India does have a nuclear option, it has "no wish to become a nuclear power." He claims that while the threat from China is mostly "psycho-political," India's security is threatened by the increasing ties between China and Pakistan. However, simply developing a rudimentary nuclear capability will not benefit India because it would undermine India's moral stance and irritate the nuclear powers without providing a suitable deterrent. In addition, the annual costs of maintaining a credible arsenal vis-à-vis China would cost about $220 million over ten years. He concludes that India should attempt to stabilize relations with Pakistan instead of opting for nuclear weapons.
—Major General D. Som Dutt, India and the Bomb, Adelphi Paper Series, no. 30 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 1

December 1966
The United States, India, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sign an agreement allowing the United States to supply a small amount of plutonium to India for research purposes.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 131.

16 December 1966
India and Canada sign an agreement under which Canada agrees to extend its assistance granted by the 1965 bilateral agreement to the design and construction of another nuclear power reactor at Rajasthan, known as RAPS-2. Unlike the previous agreement, the safeguards in this agreement apply ad infinitum to the reactor fuel, and they allow IAEA inspectors to verify compliance.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 131; K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980), p. 56.

28 December 1966
China conducts its fifth nuclear test.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 128.

12 January 1967
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi renames the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay the "Bhabha Atomic Research Center" in honor of the late Dr. Bhabha.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 131.

January 1967
Dr. Sarabhai tells the US Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborg that India does not have a program to develop peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) "in progress or contemplated."
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 134.

21 February 1967
US President Lyndon Johnson sends a message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) in which he expresses the necessity of nuclear nonproliferation and equates peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) with nuclear weapons. As a caveat to those states wishing to utilize PNEs for development projects, he states that the United States will be ready to provide PNE services to other nations, under the proper controls and at a reasonable cost.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 134.

March 1967
The DAE proposes a fast breeder reactor program to be located at a new site at Kalpakkam. According to the plans, construction on an experimental fast breeder reactor would begin in July1971 with French assistance. In addition, plans provided for a "zero-energy fast reactor" and a "pulsed fast reactor" to be built at the same site.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 149.

1 March 1967
A number of "prominent Indian citizens" address a joint statement to the Indian government against signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as it is put forth by the United States and the Soviet Union. The signatories claim that India has already compromised its sovereignty by allowing foreign inspections of Indian nuclear facilities, and that this treaty would increase the constraints on India's options without increasing its security.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), pp. 135-36.

27 March 1967
India's lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) convenes a debate on nuclear policy. Minister of External Affairs Chagla expresses the view that India should not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as it stands because, in addition to failing to provide security for nonaligned states such as India, it would impede future development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Secretaries Committee expresses its hope that the treaty would be improved and that the issue of protection of non-nuclear states would be clarified.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 135-136.

14 April 1967
Dr. Sarabhai and the Indian Ambassador to the United States, B.K. Nehru, propose to the US Atomic Energy Commission Chairman that a joint security guarantee from the United States and the Soviet Union to not attack non-nuclear countries could serve as a suitable alternative to a nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 136.

18 April 1967
In a meeting with the US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Indian emissary L.K. Jha cites two reasons India is reluctant to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). First, India is concerned about its security in regard to China, and second India is apprehensive about the potential curtailment of its development of nuclear technology. Dr. Sarabhai adds that while the NPT is "not salable" at present, he hopes that "Indian recalcitrance would not be seen as hiding a secret desire to build a bomb."
—US Defense Department, memorandum of conversation, "Meeting between the Secretary of Defense and Mr. L.K. Jha, Tuesday, 18 April at 10 a.m.," p. 2 in FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

Late April 1967
Shortly after Mr. Chagla's return from a trip to Geneva, leaders from India's lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) hold a news conference demanding that India refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unless all nuclear powers sign and promise not to produce or test any nuclear devices.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 144.

Late April 1967
The Emergency Committee of the Indian cabinet sends an emissary to Moscow, Paris, Washington and London to express India's concern for greater security assurances under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Prior to the emissary's departure, India receives nearly identical working drafts of the treaty text from Moscow and Washington, intended to underlie the similar positions of the superpowers who are largely unwilling to grant effective security guarantees.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 136.

23 May 1967
Mr. Trivedi addresses the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) on the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). He insinuates that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) contains an inherent nuclear weapons apartheid that would inhibit economic and peaceful development in nations such as India. He acknowledges "that the technology involved in the production of a nuclear weapon is the same as the technology which produces a peaceful nuclear explosive device;" however, he stresses that the intent is more important than the technology and that India's intentions are peaceful. His speech concedes that PNEs must be safeguarded, but that these safeguards should apply equally to all nations.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 136.

June 1967
China tests its first thermonuclear explosive device.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 142.

6 October 1967
India's Defense Minister Swaran Singh announces before the UN General Assembly that India will not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because, "while the Government of India continues to be in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is equally strongly in favor of the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as an essential means by which the developing countries can benefit from the best advances of science an technology in this field."
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 149.

Late 1967 or Early 1968
Dr. Raja Ramanna, leader of the physics group at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), "quietly" asks Rajagopala Chidambaram to "derive the equation of state for plutonium" in order to start work on the development of a nuclear weapon using plutonium. This equation is intended to inform scientists of the amount of high explosives necessary to compress plutonium by describing the compression and the resulting expansion of the plutonium core and the release of fission energy as a function of time. This equation is also vital to determining the proper timing for triggering the neutron initiator for attaining the greatest possible explosive yield.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 125, 140-41, 509.

1968
The process of designing the nuclear explosive device to be used in the Pokhran test explosion is initiated.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 141.

Early 1968
Chidambaram begins recruiting scientists at BARC and in the laboratories of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to design parts for the chemical high-explosive mechanism required to implode the core of a nuclear device.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 141.

24 April 1968
Prime Minister Gandhi makes a speech outlining India's case against the development of nuclear weapons. She states that "nuclear weapons are no substitute for military preparedness, involving conventional weapons. The choice before us involves not only the question of making a few atom bombs, but of engaging in an arms race with sophisticated nuclear warheads and an effective missile delivery system." This, she says, would not enhance national security, but put internal security in jeopardy due to the economic burden it would entail.
—Statement by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Lok Sabha, 24 April 1968 in J.P. Jain Nuclear India, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974), pp. 201-202.

May 1968
The DAE commissions a uranium mine at Jaduguda (Bihar state).
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 77.

12 June 1968
The Indian Parliament vetoes Indian signature of the recently completed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 125.

November 1968
DAE commissions a uranium mill at Jaduguda (Bihar state) to process uranium ore.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 77.

1 February 1969
Reactor No. 1 of TAPS goes critical.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 80.

1 April 1969
Reactor No. 2 of TAPS goes critical.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 80.

1969
AEC leaders decide to build the Purina reactor after Dr. Iyengar visits a fast breeder reactor at Dubna in the Soviet Union. This project goes forward without official approval because it has virtually no budget and is instead made up of materials gathered from various divisions at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC).
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 150.

1969
The plutonium reprocessing plant at Trombay is operated throughout the year for processing plutonium as well as collecting "plant scale data" for the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (PRFRP) at Tarapur. The construction of the PRFRP main building plant is nearly 40 percent complete.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," pp. 15-16.

1969
The Fuel Element Fabrication Facility at Trombay completes 10 years of operations. The facility manufactures "metallic fuel elements, components, and sub-assemblies," as well as fabrication of "half the initial fuel charge for the RAPP-1" reactor.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 20.

1969
ECIL sets up building for manufacturing power reactor instruments, resistors, capacitors, servo controls and allied instruments.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 77.

1969
The DAE specifies that the Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC) under construction in Hyderabad will comprise the following:

• a uranium oxide plant with an initial capacity to produce 125 tons of ceramic- and nuclear-grade uranium oxide from the Jaduguda uranium mines.
• a zirconium plant with an initial capacity to produce 50 tons of finished zircaloy components, required for the fuel element sheathing and the reactor core. The plant will consist of three constituent plants: zirconium oxide plant, zirconium sponge plant, and zircaloy fabrication plant.
• a ceramic fuel fabrication plant to produce 100 tons of finished fuel elements annually for the CANDU-type reactors.
• an enriched uranium oxide plant with a capacity to produce 25 tons of ceramic grade enriched uranium oxide powder from imported enriched uranium hexa-fluoride.
• an enriched uranium fuel fabrication plant with a capacity to produce 20 tons of zircaloy clad enriched uranium oxide fuel elements for TAPS.
• a special materials plant to produce a variety of high purity materials and metals for the electronics industry.
• ancillary facilities to serve the above plants.

The uranium oxide plant, the zirconium oxide plant, the zirconium sponge plant, and the ceramic fuel fabrication plant are scheduled to be completed by the end of 1970; the special materials plant is expected to become operational by mid-1971; and the zircaloy fabrication plant is expected to be commissioned in stages stretching until 1972. The total capital outlay for the complex is estimated at 138.4 million rupees.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," pp. 78-79.

1969
DAE begins work on a 100 tons/year heavy water plant alongside the RAPS-1 plant in Rajasthan. Another plant, based on the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process, with an annual capacity of 67.2 tons is being set up with the help of a French consortium at Baroda. The latter plant is expected to be commissioned in 1973-74.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 80.

1969
Construction of the main plant building of Unit 1 of RAPS complete. Construction of the RAPS-2 unit makes progress.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 81.

1969
DAE acquires land for the construction of the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) and begins construction of the reactor and turbine buildings for the first unit.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 81.

1969
The AEC approves preparation of a detailed project report for the fast breeder reactor in collaboration with the French Commissariat A L'Energie Atomique. As part of the agreement, a team of 30 Indian nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians travels to France for work on the "detailed designs of the prototype reactor," which is expected to be completed within the next 12-18 months. The report is expected to be submitted by June 1970.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," p. 84.

1969
DAE plans to establish a Reactor Research Center at the site of MAPS near Kalpakkam. The Center will have the following facilities:

• heat transfer and liquid metal technology laboratories
• materials research laboratories
• fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities
• zero energy fast reactor facility
• a small fast breeder test reactor incorporating the maximum parameters of a large prototype power reactor

The laboratories are expected to be commissioned by the end of 1970.
—Department of Atomic Energy of India, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1969-1970," pp. 83-84.