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Nuclear Chronology

1984

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1984
Israel reportedly broaches India on plans to strike Pakistan's uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. According to the Israeli proposal, the strike against Kahuta would be conducted using Israeli combat aircraft, with logistical help from India. As a first step, Israeli warplanes would use the Indian Air Force (IAF) base in Jamnagar close to the Kutch coast, from where they would fly off to refuel at a satellite airfield somewhere in northern India. In the final stage, the planes would fly on the lee side of the Himalayas to avoid early radar detection before penetrating Pakistani airspace, thus giving the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) little time to react. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi initially agrees to the plan. But she later vetoes it after being warned of the potential for negative reactions from the United States.
Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 349-350.

4 January 1984
Speaking at the opening meeting of the 71st Session of the Indian Science Congress, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi charges that while the nuclear powers were continually adding to their nuclear weapon stockpiles, they are restricting peaceful nuclear assistance to developing countries. She claims that any assistance in nuclear technology from the West is circumscribed by numerous restrictions and safeguards. "Nuclear safeguards are just a rich nation's bogey," she stresses. For India, Gandhi advises a "self-reliant, home-grown nuclear capability for peaceful and developmental purposes." She describes the Kalpakkam nuclear power facility as a "milestone" of self-reliance.
"Indian Prime Minister Criticizes Some Powers' Nuclear Policy," Xinhua (Beijing), 4 January 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 January 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 January 1984
The first 200MW unit of the Kalpakkam Nuclear Power Station (KAPS) near Madras begins commercial operations.
"Kalpakkam Nuclear Power Station on Load," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 January 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 February 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1984
Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan publicly boasts that Pakistan has acquired the capability to enrich uranium, which means that it can produce a nuclear bomb at short notice.
George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 252-253.

29 March 1984
Indian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Salman Haider denies a report by the Associated Press (AP) in which the Indian foreign secretary is quoted as saying that Pakistan has a nuclear device and may have tested it at a Chinese test site. Haider says, "The foreign secretary categorically denies the remarks attributed to him."
"Indian Foreign Ministry Denies Statement on Pakistani A-Bomb," Xinhua (Beijing), 29 March 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 29 March 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 March 1984
Indian foreign minister Narasimha Rao addresses parliamentary concerns about the progress in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, as well as reports in the United States about alleged Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation. Rao, while rebutting Pakistan's claims that it has self-sufficiency in nuclear technology, assures parliament that "government is vigilant in the matter. Indian scientists are keeping abreast of all aspects of research and development connected with modern and relevant technologies."
Cited in, George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 254.

April 1984
The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project to build a nuclear submarine gets underway; Vice Admiral Mihir Roy is appointed project director. The submarine's original design plans involve two nuclear reactors using enriched uranium to muster surge capacity for maneuver and sustained speeds. However, the design is later dropped for one that involves building the hull around a single reactor. Among reasons cited for changes in the design plan: the inability of the uranium enrichment facility in Mysore to support a fleet of small submarines; a single power plant being simpler to build; and the Navy's eagerness to acquire a nuclear submarine in the shortest time possible. As part of construction plans, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) decides to build a dry dock facility at Kalpakkam to build and test the submarine's reactor.
Raj Chengappa, "Arsenal For The Gods," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), p. 289; Bharat Karnad, "The Perils of Deterrence by Half Measures," Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), p. 651.

2 May 1984
The director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) reports that India has constructed its first indigenous nuclear waste disposal plant, named the Nuclear Waste Immobilization Plant (NWIP), at the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant. A second nuclear waste disposal plant is being built at BARC, and will become operational by the end of the year.
"India Builds First Nuclear Waste Disposal Plant," Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 May 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 May 1984
The Dhruva or R-5 research reactor at Trombay is expected to be commissioned in about three months, and the second unit of the Madras nuclear power station will be commissioned in a year's time.
"Atomic Energy," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 May 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 May 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 May 1984
India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Dr. Raja Ramanna says India is considering a Soviet offer of light water nuclear reactors to help India increase it nuclear power generation. Ramanna notes, however, that the Soviet offer of enriched uranium fueled reactors goes against India's planned nuclear program based on natural uranium and heavy water reactors. India plans to have an installed nuclear generation capacity of 10,000MW by the year 2000, equivalent to about 10 percent of the country's total power generating capacity.
"India May Buy Soviet Reactor," Xinhua (Beijing), 8 May 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 May 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 May 1984
The prime ministers of India, Sweden, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece, and Argentina issue a joint declaration calling on the nuclear weapon powers to end the arms race. Issued simultaneously in the six nations' capitals, the declaration states, "We urge, as a necessary first step, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the United Kingdom, France, and China, to halt all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces."
"Nuclear Powers Urged to Halt Nuclear Arms Race," Xinhua (Beijing), 22 May 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 May 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 June 1984
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Dr. Raja Ramanna says India will add 20 nuclear reactors through out the country by the year 2000. Also, Ramanna reports, the country has become self-sufficient in uranium and heavy water production.
"20 Nuclear Power Reactors Proposed for India," Xinhua (Beijing), 5 June 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 June 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 June 1984
Dr. Raja Ramanna, chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), gives a review of India's atomic energy program. He says both 210MW units at the US-built Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) are functioning, although at a reduced capacity of 130-140MW each. Also, Unit 1 at Rajasthan, which has been plagued by coolant leaks, has been out of commission for at least "six months." Unit 2 of the Rajasthan plant is working at "acceptable levels." According to Ramanna, Unit 1 at Kalpakkam near Madras is also working at "acceptable levels." Of India's heavy water plants, four of five are working normally. Presently, India has an installed nuclear generating capacity of 1,200MW, with a further 1,200MW under construction.
Ian Hargreaves, "Skepticism over Ambitions Targets," Financial Times (London), 11 June 1984, p. IX; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 June 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

June 1984
India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) announces the setting up of the Nuclear Power Board (NPB) to oversee the design, construction, operations and maintenance of India's nuclear power stations, as well as personnel training and planning. DAE's current director of the power project engineering division, M.R. Srinivasan, is appointed as the first chairman and chief executive of the NPB. Sources say New Delhi created the NPB in order to channel resources into nuclear power plant construction and operations, now that India has set a goal of reaching a 10,000MW nuclear generating capacity by the year 2000. Until now, the DAE was responsible for all nuclear-related activities. The DAE will still have direct control over nuclear research and development activities.
"India Has Set Up A Nuclear Power Board to Build and Run...," Nucleonics Week, 7 June 1984, pp. 5-6.

2 July 1984
India's new research reactor, Dhruva, is expected to be commissioned on 15 August.
"Nuclear Reactor Development," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 July 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 July 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 August 1984
India's Minister of State for Atomic Energy tells parliament that the Indian government will not agree to any international inspections of India's atomic power plants or other nuclear facilities so long as developed countries do not agree to equivalent inspections. The minister adds that despite difficulties, Indian scientists will ultimately succeed in building atomic power plants and fabricating heavy water to run those plants.
"India Rejects International Inspection of Atomic Power Plants," Xinhua (Beijing), 7 August 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 August 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 August 1984
Shivraj Patil, Minister of State for Science and Technology, tells parliament India has succeeded in developing a mixture of carbide fuel made of plutonium carbide and uranium carbide for use in its fast breeder reactors. The fuel will be available in time for the commissioning of India's first fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam near Madras in December of this year. The commissioning of the Kalpakkam fast breeder reactor will mark the beginning of the second stage of India's nuclear program.
"India Succeeds in Developing Nuclear Fuel," Xinhua (Beijing), 9 August 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 August 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

August 1984
According to K.S.N. Murthy, Project Director, Unit 1 of the 235MW Madras Atomic Power Plant (MAPP-1) has produced a total of 769,000 megawatt-hours of power since it became operational in 1983. From the time when it was declared ready for commercial production in January 1984, Murthy reports it has recorded an average "operational factor" of 76 percent and an average "load factor" of 60 percent. He says the "output has ranged from 86.7MWH in February to 127.5MWH in April to 95.4MWH in June."

Originally scheduled to be commissioned in 1977, construction of MAPP-1 was completed in 1982. Startup was delayed because of a constant shortage of heavy water. MAPP-2 is expected to be commissioned in 1985. The MAPP-1 was built with 90 percent indigenously manufactured components. The reactors were built by the Indian manufacturer Larsen & Toubro, which also supplied Unit 2 for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS). The DAE says India plans on building 10 additional 235MW nuclear power plants, and 12 plants with a 500MW generating capacity are currently under development. Although DAE officials have been pleased with the initial operation of MAPP-1, some sources say the facility has been plagued by the loss of experienced technicians to higher paying construction projects in the Middle East.

India's experience with the MAPP-1 nuclear power plant has strengthened its nuclear program policy of keeping its nuclear power facilities outside of international safeguards. Indian nuclear officials and engineers are also confident of India's capacity to produce sufficient heavy water to support India's expanding program. "Like uranium, heavy water is not always available in the international market without discriminatory safeguards conditions, which we cannot accept for our unsafeguarded power reactors," says an Indian nuclear official. The heavy water plant at Nangal has been in operation for over 20 years, and the plants at Baroda and Tuticorin are working at "quite satisfactory" levels since an explosion at the Baroda plant in 1977. The production capacity of the Kota plant is being "cautiously increased in view of the complex technical problems concerning environmental safety in the process," say nuclear officials. The Kota plant is now producing nuclear grade heavy water and is expected to be operating at full capacity by this October. "It is therefore a matter of some pride for us that today that we have become self-sufficient in the uranium, heavy water, and nuclear power programs," say Indian nuclear officials in a recent report.
James Branscome, "India Reports Good Experience with First Indigenous Reactor," Nucleonics Week, 16 August 1984, p. 9.

Early October 1984
Reports appearing in the US media allege that US intelligence has briefed Congress that Indian military advisors are asking Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for permission to attack Pakistan's uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta. However, US State Department officials downplay the reports as alarmist. The intelligence is apparently based on the inability of US intelligence sources to locate two Jaguar squadrons based at Ambala, Punjab. This leads to speculation that the squadrons could have been relocated in preparation for a possible pre-emptive strike on Pakistan. A senior Indian Air Force officer later discloses that the Jaguars were hidden in the woods adjacent to the airfield in Ambala as part of a passive air defense drill.
George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 258.

10 October 1984
The US Ambassador to Pakistan Dean Hinton publicly warns New Delhi that the United States will be "responsive" if India attacks Pakistan.
George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 258.

11 October 1984
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi tells a gathering of Indian Army commanders that "Pakistan's nuclear program has brought about a qualitative change in our security environment."
George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 258.

23 October 1984
A hydrogen sulfide leak at the heavy water plant at Kota results in the death of one plant engineer and serious injuries to three others. The plant is shut down following the leak.
"A Leak of Hydrogen Sulfide in the Indian Heavy Water Plant at Kota...," Nucleonics Week, 8 November 1984, p. 2.

3 November 1984
Following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India's newly instated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (Indira Gandhi's son) criticizes the United States for its $325 million military aid package to Pakistan. He says, "India is concerned over regional security, reports about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, and the US arms supply to Pakistan." India is also concerned with reports that US President Ronald Reagan has offered to place Pakistan under its nuclear umbrella in return for Pakistan halting its nuclear weapons program. However, Rajiv Gandhi believes Indo-US friendship is still strong and "there is a good base for building it up."
Steve Hagey, "Rajiv Gandhi Criticizes US Policy," UPI, 3 November 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 November 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 November 1984
United States and India sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the sale of high technology products and technology transfers, including supercomputers for civilian use. The agreement also covers defense items such as radars, air navigation systems and other military hardware. The United States has been blocking the sale of computers to India because some in Washington fear the technology would be used to support India's nuclear weapons program or would be transferred to the Soviet Union.
John Elliott, "US Eases Curbs on High Technology Exports to India," Financial Times (London), 20 November 1984, p. I4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 November 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

December 1984
Foreign Report, an intelligence newsletter prepared by the Economist, reports that India can test a nuclear device within two months and Indian scientists are perhaps working on the design of a thermonuclear weapon.
Cited in, George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 259.

17 December 1984
N. Srinivasan, Head of the Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) heavy water division, reports India has reached a breakthrough in research for a new process in producing heavy water. Researchers at the pilot Baroda plant "have succeeded in setting up a new water-ammonia exchange loop capable of transferring deuterium form water to ammonia," reports Nuclear Fuel. According to a DAE report, its primary concern in the field of heavy water production is its dependence on the fertilizer industry. For example, the heavy water plant at Talcher, which uses ammonia-hydrogen exchange principle, has not been operating at full capacity because of production limitations at the neighboring fertilizer plant. Because of these production delays, the fertilizer plant is frequently unable to supply synthesis gas to the heavy water plant. However, the ammonia-hydrogen exchange-based heavy water plant, currently being constructed at Thal-Vaishet, with the help of the Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizer Ltd, is making "considerable progress." To date, the heavy water plants at Talcher, Tuticorin, and Baroda's older facility are using the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. The hydrogen distillation based heavy water plant at Nangal has been plagued by frequent local power outages. From September 1983 to July 1983, the Nangal facility was shut down because of this reason. DAE's heavy water plant at Kota uses the hydrogen-hydrogen sulfide system. India's future heavy water facility at Manuguru (to be commissioned in 1988) will also use the hydrogen-hydrogen sulfide system.
"Indians Announce Breakthrough in Heavy Water," Nuclear Fuel, 17 December 1984, pp. 2-3.

19 December 1984
The Chairman of India's Nuclear Power Board (NPB), M.R. Srinivasan, reports that India has "achieved near self-sufficiency in components of atomic power reactors." He adds, "A majority of the components used at Narora and Kalpakkam atomic power plants were supplied by our own manufacturers." Also, he says that a special team was created to design 235MW and 500MW nuclear power plants. These plants would be placed in different parts of India. Additional heavy water production plants are to be set up in Maharashtra and in Andhra Pradesh, and a proposal to place a plant in south Gujarat is under consideration. Heavy water contains deuterium and is used as a cooling agent in heavy water reactors.
"India Self-Sufficient in Atomic Reactor Components," Xinhua (Beijing), 19 December 1984; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 December 1984, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1984
The Indian Air Force (IAF) begins coordinating activities with the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to weaponize an air-deliverable nuclear device. A team of IAF officers led by the Deputy Air Chief of Staff Johnny Green meets engineers and nuclear scientists to design and test air-droppable canisters capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Certain aircraft from within the IAF's existing Jaguar squadrons are earmarked for test preparations. However, the Mirage 2000 is found more suitable due to the Jaguar's shortcomings with ground-clearance problems.
Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 351.

Late 1984-Early 1985
Speculative West German and US intelligence reports suggest that Indian scientists may have begun working on the design of a thermonuclear device. Among the evidence cited to support this conclusion, is the Indian Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) decision to set up an inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program. An ICF program, the analysts believe, will allow Indian nuclear scientists to study the physics associated with thermonuclear explosions; it will allow them to create computer codes for nuclear weapon designs. In addition, evidence suggests that India is acquiring the technical capability to separate lithium-6, which when mixed with deuterium forms lithium-6 deuteride, used in the secondary of a thermonuclear device.
George Perkovich, "Nuclear Capabilities Grow," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 270-271.



 

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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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