This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

6 January 1988
India takes possession of a leased nuclear powered submarine from the Soviet Union at the port city of Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East. The Press Trust of India reports that the submarine has been leased for training purposes; there are no nuclear weapons or munitions of any type on board.
—Soviets Lease Nuclear Powered Sub to India," Press Trust of India, 6 January 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 January 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 1988
British Defense Secretary George Younger says Britain is prepared to sell India a wide range of advanced defense equipment, without any preconditions, including jet fighters and a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. During an interview with Press Trust of India, Younger says his discussions with India's military officials have "opened a 'wide scope for further cooperation...in the field of defense'."
—"Britain Ready to Supply India with Advanced Weapons," UPI, 10 January 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 January 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 1988
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi accepts the Soviet nuclear powered submarine at the Visakhapatnam naval base in southern India. The 670A Skat series (NATO-designated Charlie-class) submarine is renamed the INS Chakra. Indian officials say the Soviet Union will be responsible for regular inspections of the submarine's nuclear power generator, supply future fuel needs, and control its spent fuel. The INS Chakra reportedly has two 40MW nuclear reactors.
—Adam Keller, "Gandhi Accepts Soviet Nuclear Sub," UPI, 3 February 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 February 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India Commissions Soviet Sub," Nucleonics Week, 11 February 1988, p. 16.

7 February 1998
Unit 1 of the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS-1) is re-synchronized to the grid after being shut down on 19 October 1987 for annual maintenance. MAPS-2 is still down while technicians replace the turbine first's stage blades.
—"Notes Pertaining to the Generating Table for February 1998: India," Nucleonics Week, 31 March 1988, p. 12.

24 February 1988
India proposes to increase its uranium production capacity to 40,000 tons annually in order to meet the goal of producing 10,000MW of nuclear power by the year 2000. The Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) says it will open two new uranium mines at Narwapahar and Turanmdih where 1,500 tons of uranium ore will be mined daily. Furthermore, UCIL Chairman M.K. Batra states any short fall in uranium resources would be made up by "large deposits of monazite containing thorium, which [is] a potential source of nuclear energy." Thorium is produced from monazite sands in Chavra and Manavalakurchi in Kerala state. It is processed at a thorium facility in Trombay (Maharashtra state) and another facility at Chhatarpur (Orissa state).
—"India Plans to Boost Nuclear Power Capacity," Xinhua (Beijing), 24 February 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 February 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 1988
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reiterates that the recently acquired nuclear-powered submarine from the Soviet Union is for training purposes only and does not carry nuclear weapons. However, some analysts contend that leasing the Soviet submarine shows "India's long-term aim to build a navy capable of projecting its power far beyond its shores."
—Adam Kelliher, "Indian Nuclear Sub; Nuclear Sub Causes Regional Concern," UPI, 28 February 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 28 February 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 March 1988
The Comptroller and Auditor General of India releases a report to parliament criticizing the delays in India's nuclear program and expressing doubts whether it will be able to reach the goal of 10,000MW generating capacity by the year 2000. The report points out that back in 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) set a goal of 8,000MW generating capacity by 1980-81, but in 1968 revised the target to 2,700MW. In 1981, India's total nuclear generating capacity was only 640MW. In 1978-79 the AEC released a four-stage development plan for India's nuclear energy program which called for:

• Establishing natural uranium-fuelled, heavy water-moderated nuclear reactors;
• Building advanced 500MW thermal nuclear reactors;
• Constructing plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactors; and
• Establishing thorium-cycle fast breeder reactors.

In comparison to the AEC's nuclear development plan, India's is far behind in its stated goals. The report says the first stage has only been "partially achieved." The second stage involves more advanced technology and has not been "attempted on the ground, as yet." The third and fourth stages which "involve development of new technologies are at experimental levels and their fructification is very much in the future." The report notes that one of the AEC's goals was to have India's nuclear program "based on self-reliance and indigenous technology." However, the short comings are primarily due to the lack of resources, and a reliance on foreign vendors for spare supplies and components.

The report also provides details about the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS). The MAPS-1 project took eight years and six months longer than expected to reach criticality, and MAPS-2 took eight years and eight months. The report shows that the DAE blamed the overruns and delays on the nuclear related embargo imposed by the Untied States and Canada after the 1974 nuclear test, cancellation of orders, identification of alternative suppliers, indigenization of nuclear related equipment and organization, and the adoption of a reactor system based on a pressurized water design. The report notes that the DAE made similar excuses prior to the MAPS project, but did not apply any lessons learnt. It states, "MAPS-1 and -2 were also delayed for similar reasons." Fiscally, the cost overruns of the MAPS-1 were nearly 570.50 million rupees (about $43.885 million) and for MAPS-2 was 564.10 million rupees. The report says an analysis of the cost overrun shows that "while there was marginal decrease in the foreign exchange component which is attributed to the Canadian embargo and the subsequent indigenization, the Indian components of the expenditure had registered an increase of more than 100 percent."

Among the report's other findings:

• Despite the long construction period of the MAPS-1 plant, the cost of foreign components did not escalate appreciably, but the cost of indigenous components rose steeply.
• The 1972 projections that heavy water production would out-pace demand by 1979 fell short. The four heavy water plants at Tuticorin, Talcher, Baroda, and Kota all failed to meet stipulated production targets.

14 March 1988
The Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) announces that the 30KW Kamini nuclear reactor, fueled by uranium-233, will be commissioned at Kalpakkam near Madras in southern India. Kamini is the first Indian reactor to "run on fuel derived from beach sands of Kerala and Tamil Nadu," reports Xinhua. Known as the "third fuel," uranium-233 is derived from thorium, found in beach sand, after it is irradiated by neutrons. BARC says that a new facility is also being built to extract uruanium-233 from irradiated thorium rods.
—"India to Commission 'Third Fuel' Atomic Reactor," Xinhua (Beijing), 14 March 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 March 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 March 1988
Minister of State for External Affairs, Natwar Singh tells Rajya Sabha (India's upper house of parliament) that New Delhi has "forcefully" told Pakistan that its "relentless pursuit" of nuclear weapons was "grave and serious." He says, "This will be suitably answered and India will not allow its national or security interests to be jeopardized." Singh's remarks come in the wake of a New York Times article which claims Pakistan "has acquired the capability of manufacturing small nuclear bombs which could be carried on US-made F-16 or French-made Mirage-5 aircraft."
—"India Threats to Review Nuclear Options," Xinhua (Beijing), 17 March 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 March 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 March 1988
The Indian government announces it will budget the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) some 4.6132 billion rupees (about $354.86 million) for the fiscal year 1988-89 for running India's commercial nuclear power stations and for new projects. This is up from 3.75 billion rupees that New Delhi allocated NPCIL the previous year. The government also allocated nuclear related research development projects (R&D) 7.328 billion rupees (about $563.69 million), compared with 6.9602 billion rupees in the 1987-88 budget cycle. NPCIL was established on 17 September 1987 with an initial operating budget of 20-million rupees. It was started to "plan and execute an integrated program" of developing India's commercial nuclear energy capacity.
—India Increases Funding For Nuclear Projects," Nucleonics Week, 17 March 1988, p. 11.

19 March 1988
According to US intelligence sources, former National Security Council officials, and congressional staffers, India currently has "a handful of highly sophisticated low-yield atomic bombs that can be delivered to targets by combat aircraft," reports UPI. US government sources believe that India possess around 20 air-deliverable nuclear devices, which could be carried by India's fleet of MiG-27, Mirage 2000, and Jaguar fighter bombers; Indian Air Force Jaguars have been noticed doing "flip-toss maneuvers," a technique used to deliver nuclear weapons. There is also evidence to suggest that India may have developed a warhead for deployment on a 200-mile range surface-to-surface missile. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) source alleges that "India did not stop in 1974" when it detonated its first nuclear device in May of that year. Furthermore, the number of nuclear devices in India's possession may be higher because New Delhi does not deactivate older weapons.
—Richard Sale, "Exclusive India Said to Upgrade Nuclear Arsenal," UPI, 19 March 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 March 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1988
P.K. Kaul, India's ambassador to the United States, dismisses the UPI report (dated 19 March 1988) that claims India has developed several air deliverable, low-yield nuclear warheads, and a nuclear warhead for a surface-to surface missile. The Press Trust of India reports Kaul as stating, "It is a figment of their imagination, taking peaceful and scientific programs out of context."
—Adam Kelliher, "The government dismissed...," UPI, 21 March 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 March 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 April 1988
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reaffirms India's adherence to a policy of disarmament. He also stresses that "India was not manufacturing nuclear weapons and did not have such a program, despite the fact that the program of the neighboring country put serious pressure on India."
—"Rajiv Gandhi Interview," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11 April 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 April 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1988
The Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang reports that in 1983, 15 tons of Norwegian heavy water was illegally diverted to India while being shipped from Norway to West Germany. The paper alleges that the heavy water was used for the start up of the Kalpakkam nuclear power plant. Under Norwegian law, heavy water cannot be sold to India because it is not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). An official from India's Ministry of Science Technology, while refusing to divulge where India obtained heavy water for the Kalpakkam facility, admits that in the past India has imported heavy water from the Soviet Union to make up for domestic shortfalls in production.
—Dilip Ganguly, "India Needed Heavy Water at Time Norwegian Consignment Vanished," Associated Press, 6 May 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 May 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 April 1988
US defense department officials allege that "India went to more advanced fissile materials 18 months ago and it is producing a great many weapons." US intelligence sources also claim that India has approached the French subsidiary of the Swiss firm Solger Brothers Ltd. to purchase tritium extraction technology. Tritium is used to boost the power of nuclear warheads, and according to one Pentagon official, "India has a warhead it can boost to 200kt." However, a State Department official claims that he is not aware of any Indian attempt to obtain tritium. He also downplayed an earlier UPI report which cited US intelligence and defense officials as claiming that India possessed approximately 20 air-deliverable nuclear bombs. The State Department official says, "I know of no one in the intelligence community who is saying (anything) like that," and cautions against "confusing the stockpiling of nuclear materials" with "the manufacture of nuclear weapons." However, he admits that the State Department does not deal with "raw intelligence data."
—Richard Sale, "India said to be Building 20 Nuclear Weapons a Year," UPI, 23 April 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 April 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 April 1988
Indian Mister of State for Defense Production Shivraj Patil tells parliament that India "is considering the purchase of two light water atomic reactors from the Soviet Union." He says the two reactors will add an additional 2,000MW to India's nuclear generating capacity. According to a Soviet source, the technical and safeguard aspects of the reactors have been finalized. However, the financial details need to be sorted out.
—"India to buy Two Soviet Reactors," Xinhua (Beijing), 27 April 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 April 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 April 1998
India's Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh says, "India's apprehensions on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program had been confirmed by all available evidence."
—"India's Apprehensions about Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons 'Confirmed,'" British Broadcasting Corporation, 29 April 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 29 April 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 May 1998
A report released by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India shows that India's most successful heavy water plant at Tuticorin only averaged one-fifth of its production capacity since it was commissioned in 1978. The highest production level achieved was 42.7 percent of its capacity, while its eight year average was 20.6 percent. This loss of production capacity resulted in financial losses of 1.24 billion rupees ($94 million). Originally in 1971, the cost estimate of indigenously produced heavy water was 500-rupees per kilogram; but it has risen to 13,800 rupees per kilogram. "Coupled with low production, it (repairs and modifications) has changed the economic profile of the plants," says the report. The Tuticorin heavy water facility was built in collaboration with the French consortium M-S Gelpra; it produces sixty percent of India's indigenous heavy water.
—Sheila Tefft, "Government Report Criticizes Tuticorin heavy Water Plant," Nucleonics Week, 5 May 1988, pp. 1, 10.

9 June 1988
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi tells CNN, "We've [India] had the means for almost 14 years now" to make nuclear weapons, "but we'll do our best not do so." Gandhi adds, "It is difficult to say what sort of pressure we would come under in case Pakistan did build a [nuclear] weapon." When asked about Pakistan's nuclear program, Gandhi states, "It's very obvious that they [Pakistan] have a nuclear weapons program. They have a program which is based on well-smuggled or stolen technologies. And it's now pretty obvious to the whole world where these technologies are being stolen from. And we're sad that those countries who can control them, put some pressure on them to stop this program, are not doing so."
—Gene Kramer, "Gandhi Says India will 'Do Our Best' Not to Build Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 9 June 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 June 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 June 1988
In speech before the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi equates the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as "the ultimate expression of the philosophy of terrorism." He further blames the international system of "major powers rivalries" as being responsible for smaller countries feeling the need to acquire nuclear arms. On defending India's position on not signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Gandhi states, "Nor is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons are freed of all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against their production."
—"Gandhi Likens Nuclear Deterrence to Terrorism," Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 10 June 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 June 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 June 1988
Pakistani Ambassador Shah Nawaz says Pakistan is willing to sign a bilateral nuclear test ban treaty with New Delhi, as well as issue a joint statement with India renouncing nuclear weapons. Nawaz also says Pakistan is ready to enter into a series of agreements with India including "simultaneous accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty," "simultaneous acceptance of full-scope safeguards to nuclear programs," and "a bilateral agreement for mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities." With regards to defense spending, Pakistan appeals to India to accept Pakistan's proposal for a bilateral agreement "to limit arms and reduce military budgets."
—"Pakistan Urges Bilateral Nuclear Free Accords with India," Xinhua (Beijing), 13 June 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 June 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 June 1988
Indian government sources tell the Press Trust of India that New Delhi will award contracts for two 1,000MW nuclear power stations to the Soviet Union despite opposition form India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The decision by the Gandhi government follows considerable pressure from Moscow, which "is reflected in the fact the original Soviet offer was for one 500MW nuclear power station." The nuclear facilities will probably be located at Tirunelvelli, and will become operational in five or six years. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is expected to travel to India in November 1988 year to sign the agreement.
—"India to Build Nuclear Power Station with Soviet Assistance," Xinhua (Beijing), 15 June 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 June 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; K.K. Sharma, "India Power Orders for Moscow," Financial Times (London), 14 June 1998; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 June 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 July 1988
In reference to newspaper reports alleging that India may have received heavy water illegally in the early 1980s, M.R. Srinivasan, Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), denies that India has illegally imported heavy water for its nuclear plants. Srinivasan says, "There is no question of importing illegally. In fact, at one stage we had exported (heavy water) to Belgium." India currently has six heavy water plants and two more under construction. Two of India's three nuclear power plants require the use of heavy water.
—"India Atomic Energy Chairman Denies Diversion of Heavy Water," Associated Press, 24 July 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 July 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 August 1988
Indian Minister of State for Science and Technology, K.R. Narayanan, reports that "details" have been finalized with the Soviet Union concerning the construction of a nuclear power station by the year 2000. The project consists of two 1,000MW pressurized water reactors which use enriched uranium as fuel. However, the agreement has not been signed.
—"Indo-Soviet Tie-up in Nuclear Power Station," Xinhua (Beijing), 4 August 1988, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 August 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 August 1988
Speaking at a seminar on "Recent Trends in Pakistan and Its Nuclear Program," Indian Minister of State for External Affairs K.K. Tewari says, "We are clear in our mind that Pakistan is fully capable of manufacturing a nuclear bomb – this is a definite threat to our security." He concludes, if Pakistan crosses the nuclear threshold, it "would completely change ... (India's) security environment and force us to review our options."
—"Indian Minister Accuses Pakistan for Its Nuclear Program," Xinhua (Beijing), 6 August 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 August 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 September 1988
India signs an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) placing the two proposed 1,000MW nuclear reactors from the Soviet Union under international safeguards.
—"India's Agreement with IAEA Clears Way for Soviet Reactor Sale," Xinhua (Beijing), 28 October 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 28 October 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 November 1988
Norwegian Trade Minister Jan Balstad confirms that 15 tons of Norwegian heavy water was smuggled to India five year ago. Balstad states, "The (Norwegian) government strongly regrets that Norwegian heavy water seems to have ended up in a country which is not party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." Balstad says that Norway will ask for India's cooperation in the investigation of the shipment (1983) of heavy water that was sold by the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro to the West German firm of Rohstoff-Einfuhr. The Norwegian State Prosecutors office shows that the West German firm of Rohstoff-Einfuhr "handled the Norwegian consignment along with a smaller Soviet consignment of heavy water." The Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Secretary, S. Rajgopal denies India had "secretly imported heavy water from Norway but admit(s) that small quantities were imported from the Soviet Union."
—"Norway Claims Heavy Water Diverted to India," UPI, 2 November 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 November 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 November 1988
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi issue a joint statement calling for the immediate banning of nuclear weapons testing to prevent an arms race in strategic nuclear weapons. Before his departure, Gorbachev and Gandhi also sign the final agreement under which the Soviet Union will sell two 1,000MW VVER light water nuclear power stations to India. The reactors will operate under international safeguards. The Indian foreign minister remarks, "This is an important landmark in the history of cooperation between the two countries. The USSR will supply enriched uranium fuel for the entire operational life of the nuclear power station. The agreement provides for maintenance by India of a mutually agreed minimum quantity of nuclear fuel and control assemblies. The agreement also provides for return of spent fuel."
—"India, Soviet Union Issue Joint Statement," Xinhua (Beijing), 20 November 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 November 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; T.S.K. Lingam, "Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev...," UPI, 20 November 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 November 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Neel Patri, "Gorbachev, Gandhi Sign Pact to Finance VVER-1000s in India," Nucleonics Week, 24 November 1988, p. 3.

December 1988
Rajiv Gandhi travels for a state visit to China, the first since Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited China in the 1950s. During Gandhi's visit, India and China agree that "peace and tranquility" should be maintained on the border as both sides negotiate to resolve the dispute through consultations and dialogues.
—George Perkovich, "The Nuclear Threat Grows Amid Political Uncertainty," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 298-299.

31 December 1988
During the fourth South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto sign a bilateral agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Bhutto says, "A momentum for peace has begun. I think that in both of our countries there is a groundswell for peace. An extremely important step has been taken toward improving relations between India and Pakistan." Gandhi says he hopes this agreement "will help normalize things to come." The agreement states that both sides shall refrain from directly attacking, encouraging, or participating in any action aimed at destroying or damaging any nuclear facility. These facilities include nuclear power and research reactors and fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotope separation and reprocessing facilities, as well as any other facilities containing radioactive material.
—Earleen Fisher, "Pakistan, India Agree Not to Attack Nuclear Plants," Associated Press, 31 December 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 31 December 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pakistan, India Sign 3 Agreements after Talks," Xinhua (Beijing), 31 December 1988; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 31 December 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Shahid Ur-Rehman, "India and Pakistan Pledge No Harm to Nuclear Facilities," Nucleonics Week, 5 January 1989, pp. 8-9.

1988
Scientists at the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) continue to refine nuclear weapon designs, by reducing the size and weight of the fission devices while increasing their explosive yield; they also continue work on boosted-fission and thermonuclear designs. Prominent scientists include, V.S. Arunachalam, P.K. Iyengar, K. Santhanam, Virender Sethi, and A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. Between 1988-1990, India reportedly builds approximately two dozen devices for quick assembly and dispersal to airbases for possible retaliatory attacks against Pakistan. All major steps ranging from preparations for the quick assembly of devices, to the movement of weapon components to different parts of the country, are authorized by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. According to one former Indian official involved in the program, "we were carrying out experiments without deadlines or any commitment that the technologies would be integrated into actual weapons or a full-fledged weapons program. There was no weapon program as such."
—George Perkovich, "The Nuclear Threat Grows Amid Political Uncertainty," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 293-295.

Post-1988
In the absence of direction from India's political and civilian bureaucratic leadership, a group of Air Force officers led by Chief of Air Staff Air Marshall Mehra conducts an internal study on how best to employ aircraft and ballistic missiles for nuclear delivery. The group concludes that India's nuclear capable aircraft and ballistic missiles should be consolidated under a Strategic Air Command, which would develop a doctrine and operational plans for the employment of nuclear weapons. The command is established at the Air Force's Central Command in Central India, far away from Pakistan.
—George Perkovich, "The Nuclear Threat Grows Amid Political Uncertainty," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 296-297.