This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
Late 1989-Early 1990
Scientific Advisor to the Indian government V.S. Arunachalam briefs Prime Minister V.P. Singh on the status of India's nuclear weapons program. Arunachalam tells Singh that India can assemble a nuclear weapon but cannot deliver it. Singh authorizes Arunachalam to continue with the program to "reach a point in the development stage that ensured that the weapons could be assembled in the shortest possible time." However, Prime Minister Singh rules out nuclear tests in view of India's economic difficulties and deteriorating relations with Pakistan.
—Raj Chengappa, "End the Wink and Nudge Approach," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 353-354.
January 1990
Concern rises in the Indian Army high command that a possible motive for Pakistan's Zarb-i-Momin exercise is to exploit Indian vulnerabilities in Punjab and Kashmir. Indian generals speculate that the continued deployment of Pakistani military units in the field beyond the stipulated maneuvers suggests that Pakistan might intervene to support the insurgents fighting the Indian government in both provinces. With the Indian police and paramilitary forces tied down in battling the insurgents, the Indian Army might find its supply lines threatened.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 80-84.
12 January 1990
A Pakistani government official says India and Pakistan have completed "all formalities" with respect to the exchange of ratification instruments to the "Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Facilities" of 1988.
—"Pakistan, India to Exchange Ratification Instruments of Non-Attack on Nuclear Installations Agreement," Xinhua News Agency, 12 January 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 January 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
18-19 January 1990
French Prime Minister Michel Rocard and Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh meet to discuss a French proposal to sell two 1,000MW reactors to India. An Indian foreign ministry spokesperson says that this issue is being discussed with France at the expert level. The reactors offered are pressurized water reactors, similar to the ones Framatome is building at Daya Bay (Guangdong province) in China. Talks with the Soviet Union on a similar proposal for the two reactors to be built in Koodankulam have been stalled due to price issues. India suggests that the scheduled operating dates for the Soviet pressurized water reactors of December 1998 and December 1999 be moved forward. India wants to build 10,000MW of nuclear capacity by the turn of the century. [Note: The original agreement with the USSR for a construction of VVER-1000 reactors was signed in New Delhi on 20 November 1988. Under that agreement, all equipment and sub-systems would be supplied from the Soviet Union in order to minimize the construction period. According to the Minister of State for Science and Technology Professor M. Menon, the agreement is not finalized and its future depends entirely on the economics of the project. The Indian side holds that electricity produced by these plants should be no more expensive than from indigenous plants.]
—"India: Prime Ministers to Discuss French Reactor Sale," Nucleonics Week, 25 January 1990, pp. 15-16; "Indo-Soviet Deal 'Not Final'," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1990, p. 7; "India," Nuclear Engineering International, June 1990, p. 24; "India, France Sign Protocol after Prime Ministers' Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 18 January 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 January 1992, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
21-23 January 1990
Amidst mounting tension in Kashmir, Pakistani foreign minister Sahibzada Yakub Khan visits New Delhi. In his discussions with Indian leaders, Khan refers to the tensions between the two countries in the Kashmir valley. Reading from a prepared script in Urdu, Khan hints at the possibility of a nuclear holocaust if the situation gets out of hand. Prime Minister V.P. Singh informs Khan that Pakistan should not repeat its past mistakes as punishment by India would be much heavier. However, Khan's oblique warning is taken seriously and discussed informally at a meeting of Indian Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA). Subsequent to the CCPA meeting, Indian foreign minister Inder Kumar Gujral is authorized to convey a tough message of India's resolve to Khan.
—"Review of Events Leading up to Kargil," and "Nuclear Backdrop," From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, December 15, 1999), pp. 65, 193.
Early 1990
Prime Minister V.P. Singh seeks to address the issue of India's rudimentary nuclear command and control. Singh discusses the issue with his principal secretary telling him: "This is scary. This matter cannot be just between the prime minister and the scientific advisor. Supposing someone attacks Delhi, there is no formal procedure as to who then decides what to do. We have to institutionalize it." Singh secretly tasks former Minister of State for Defense Arun Singh to carry out a classified review of India's nuclear preparedness and work out parameters of a nuclear command and control structure.
—Raj Chengappa, "End the Wink and Nudge Approach," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), p. 355;
Early 1990
Arun Singh constitutes an informal committee from the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to review India's nuclear preparedness. Other members include former senior government officials such as General K. Sundarji and K. Subrahmanyam. Arun Singh is dismayed to learn that the armed services have still not been briefed about India's nuclear capability. Singh later recalls, "it was clear we had to end the wink and nudge approach. When it is crunch time you just can't ring up the chief of staff and say press the button. The army will not take the scientists' word that it will work. They will want to know if they do have a usable credible deterrent. Otherwise they are likely to say buzz off. It is a significant disadvantage if you don't have a command and control structure." Singh wants the government to overcome its "fear of involving the military structure in the nuclear loop." Singh also finds the lack of coordination between the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and the DRDO disconcerting. He recalls: "I thought it was crazy that BARC didn't know where DRDO stood and vice-versa. Nothing had been worked out as to who would control the weapons and under what circumstances and time frame we would strike back. It was an unacceptable situation. There was just no institutionalized way of doing things."
—Raj Chengappa, "End the Wink and Nudge Approach," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 355-356.
Early 1990
Prime Minister V.P. Singh solicits the views of the armed services and his scientific advisor over the possibility of a nuclear attack by Pakistan. The Indian Air Force (IAF) warns the government of the impossibility of intercepting a surprise Pakistani nuclear air attack. However, the IAF is unsure if Pakistan has reconfigured its F-16 jets to deliver nuclear warheads. The Indian Army expresses concern that Pakistan might explode a nuclear weapon over Pakistani territory to communicate the threat of a nuclear attack. Prime Minister Singh orders his scientific advisor V.S. Arunachalam to undertake contingency planning for a nuclear counterattack. The Indian government uses diplomatic channels to warn Pakistan to desist from making nuclear threats.
—Raj Chengappa, "End the Wink and Nudge Approach," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 357-358.
Early 1990
Indian Air Force MiG-25 reconnaissance missions over Pakistan produce photographic evidence of aircraft taxi-tracks at an Islamabad air base disappearing into forested land. Indian intelligence interprets this evidence as indications of either the existence of a nuclear command post, a nuclear weapons storage depot, or a secure shelter for F-16 combat aircraft. Other reconnaissance flights show a shortfall of F-16 jets at their usual stations as well as the passage of a long convoy on an airbase in Islamabad. The Indian military interprets these signs as evidence of Pakistani nuclear preparations.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security (Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), p. 368.
Late January 1990
The Indian government announces that P.K. Iyengar, director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), will replace M.R. Srinivasan as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) effective from 1 February 1990. He will also become a secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). Iyengar specializes in nuclear physics and is the chairman of the International Radiation Physics Society. He has been a close associate of Dr. Raja Ramanna and helped develop the nuclear device that was tested in May 1974 at Pokhran. Ramanna, who was AEC Chairman before Srinivasan, is appointed a Minister of State for Defense by Prime Minister V.P. Singh. Both Iyengar and Ramanna are known to be nuclear hardliners; they also favor indigenous development of nuclear technologies for India.
—Neel Patri "Iyengar to Succeed Srinivasan in Top Indian Nuclear Posts," Nucleonics Week, 1 February, 1990, p. 13; "India Appoints Top Nuclear Scientist Minister of State for Defense," Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly (Alexandria, VA), 29 January-4 February 1990, p. 1.
February 1990
The appointment of P.K. Iyengar as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) soon after Raja Ramanna's designation as a Minister of State for Defense spurs a wave of comments in India that the new government of V.P. Singh may exercise the option to produce nuclear weapons. In an interview with Hindustan Times, P.K. Iyengar speaks of the need to accelerate the pace of nuclear power development in India in order to reach 10,000MW capacity by the turn of the century. He expresses doubts about light water reactors but says that India might have to opt for these reactors to reach its targeted nuclear power capacity. Iyengar adds that he will insist that the Indian government not accept turnkey plant construction in negotiations with France and the Soviet Union. Iyengar also expresses confidence in India's ability to enrich uranium.
—"Iyengar, Ramanna Appointments Open Bomb Speculation in India," Nucleonics Week, 22 February 1990, p. 14.
February 1990
The Indian Army sends two new tank units for training at its field range at Mahajan near Bikaner in Rajasthan state. Pakistan considers these deployments so close to the international border a threat. India also beefs up its military presence in both Punjab and Kashmir. The government also allows the Air Force to go on alert along the border areas, especially in Rajasthan; radar activities are upgraded.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 84-85.
February 1990
In view of increased tensions in Kashmir, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yakub Khan warns India of "strong retaliation" in case India escalates tensions along the Line of Control.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (University of Illinois at Urbana Campaign, July 2000), p. 58.
February 1990
In view of the mounting tensions with Pakistan, India takes the US Ambassador in New Delhi William Clark into confidence and invites US military attachés to verify that India has not deployed its armored formations along the border. The military attachés confirm that armored formations have not been deployed in the field, and that the training activities at the Mahajan range are normal for this time of the year. The US ambassador also agrees with the assessment of the Indian Chief of Army Staff General Sharma that it would be impossible for India to undertake an armored offensive against Pakistan in the absence of bridging equipment required to cross the Indira Gandhi Canal. The US air attaché in New Delhi also confirms that "build up of forces on the border was to prevent cross-border infiltration and did not constitute a build up of forces preparing for hostile action against Pakistan."
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 90-91.
February 1990
US military attachés undertake a similar confidence building exercise in Pakistan. They confirm that there is nothing unusual in Pakistani military deployments; most significantly, Pakistan's two strike corps are not on the move and its forward air bases, although on a heightened state of alert, have not been activated.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 91.
Early February 1990
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says India is planning to export research reactors to developing countries. According to Iyengar, the exports will begin soon after India demonstrates the work of the thorium-fueled Kamini reactor at Kalpakkam.
—"India Planning to export research reactors," Xinhua News Agency, 6 February 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 January 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
12 February 1990
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says the AEC has identified four states in the southern state of Kerala for a 1000MW nuclear power plant. Talking to the local press, Iyengar says that the nuclear power is ideal for Kerala since it is "clean and cheaper" than thermal power.
—"Four States for Nuclear Plant Identified in India's Kerala State," 12 February 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 February 1992, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
20 February 1990
Speaking at Rajkot, Prime Minister V.P. Singh says India will have to reconsider its nuclear policy options if Pakistan "employs its nuclear power for military purposes." India will have to "take stock of the situation and act accordingly."
—"Indian Prime Minister on His Country's Nuclear Policy," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 21 February 1990, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 February 1990, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "V.P. Singh on Pakistani Nuclear Weapons, Options," Delhi Domestic Service, 20 February 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-005, 2 March 1990, p. 19.
20 February 1990
Addressing a public meeting in Mumbai, the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Atal Bihari Vajpayee urges the United Front (UF) Government to reconsider India's nuclear options in the light of reports that Pakistan possesses six nuclear devices.
—"Pakistan Nuclear Program of Concern," Delhi Domestic Service, 21 February 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-005, 2 March 1990, p. 19.
21 February 1990
Addressing a news conference in Ahmedabad, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee welcomes the prime minister's statement that it will reconsider its nuclear options in the light of Pakistan producing nuclear devices. Vajpayee asks the government to discuss the issue with the United States to emphasize the need to stop economic and military assistance to Pakistan.
—"Welcomes Premier's Assertion," Delhi Domestic Service, 21 February 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-005, 2 March 1990, p. 19.
23 February 1990
Commenting on a report from Islamabad that France has authorized the sale of a nuclear power plant to Pakistan, an Indian foreign ministry spokesperson says the Indian government has conveyed its concern over the proposed sale to France.
—"Concern Voiced to France over Nuclear Plant Sale," Delhi Domestic Service, 23 February 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-005, 2 March 1990, p. 19.
Late February 1990
The Indian government decides to establish a National Security Council (NSC) by 5 March 1990. The proposed NSC will be responsible "for long term integrated assignments of critical areas in national development such as Indian planning, defense and foreign policies, internal security as well as threats to the economy, nuclear and other hi-tech sectors. However, the council will spend most of its time on defense priorities and measures to tackle domestic discord. [The NSC will have] to estimate the state of defense preparedness and assess the capability of internal security agencies to take care of domestic insurgencies and terrorism." It will also be responsible for coordinating Indian intelligence.
—Rajiv Tiwari "India: Urgent Proposal for National Security Council," Inter Press Service, 28 February 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 February 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Late February 1990
In an interview with Far Eastern Economic Review, India's Prime Minister V.P. Singh says that his government will try to avoid conflict with Pakistan but "if it comes, we have nothing to fear."
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (University of Illinois at Urbana Campaign, July 2000), p. 58.
March 1990
The Minister of State for Defense and former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Raja Ramanna says India will have to reconsider its "self-inflicted" ban on nuclear weapon production depending on the evolving nature of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Ramanna rules out the idea that the sale of 950MW French reactor to Pakistan poses a threat to India since India can also purchase reactors from other countries. However Ramanna adds that India intends to build reactors indigenously.
—"India Could Reconsider Nuclear Weapons 'Option'," Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly (Alexandria, VA), 19-25 March 1990, p. 1.
10 March 1990
At a seminar organized by United Services Institution of India, serving and retired officials of the three armed services, diplomats, and academics discuss whether India should exercise its nuclear option. The Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chairman of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral J.G. Nadkarni, says India should exercise its nuclear option due to three factors: 1) Pakistan might have already achieved nuclear weapons capability; 2) a nuclear arsenal is cheaper than conventional forces in the long-term; and 3) there should be long-term plans to bolster India's status as a major regional power.
—"Officials Comment on India's Nuclear Option: Navy Chief of Staff," Telegraph (Calcutta), 11 March 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-009, 15 May 1990, p. 16.
13 March 1990
Speaking at Muzzafarabad, Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto promises a "thousand-year war" to support Kashmir "freedom fighters" on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Responding to the statement, India's Prime Minister V.P. Singh tells the Indian parliament that such "misadventure" by Pakistan "will not be without cost."
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 74.
26 March 1990
Minister of External Affairs of India I.K. Gujral tells the French Minister of State Madame Avice that the French decision to supply a nuclear power plant to Pakistan will have an adverse effect on Indo-French relations.
—K.K. Katyal "Government Protests French Nuclear Plant to Pakistan," Hindu (Chennai), 27 March 1990, p. 9; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90—010, 12 June 1990, p. 23.
April 1990
A Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) delegation visits Vietnam to study its uranium resources. India informs the Vietnamese delegation that a pilot plan for monazite processing – a gift from DAE – is in its final stage of completion.
—"Experts Visit Vietnam to Study Uranium Resources," Hindu (Chennai), 16 April 1990, p. 7; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-011, 28 June 1990, p. 19.
April 1990
A spokeswoman for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry Sigrid Romundset says Romanian officials have recently informed the ministry that a 1986 shipment of heavy water from Norway was reshipped from Romania to Mumbai, India. The spokesperson of the Indian embassy in Washington, DC, says India produces enough heavy water domestically and does not import anything.
—Michael R. Gordon, "A Nuclear Deal is Reported Between Romania and India," New York Times, 30 April 1990, p. A7.
April 1990
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) urges the government to adopt a policy of "hot pursuit" to "knock out training camps and transit routes" of the Kashmiri terrorists in Pakistan. Former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi also urges the ruling United Front (UF) government to take "some very strong steps on Kashmir." Indirectly referring to India's nuclear option, Gandhi says, "I know what steps are possible. I also know what is in the pipeline and what the capabilities are. The question is, does the government have the guts to take strong steps?"
—Cited in Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 75.
8 April 1990
The United States decides to sell a Cray supercomputer to India's Institute of Science in Bangalore, provided that India is willing to restrict its use to peaceful purposes only.
—"Administration Eyes Sale of Supercomputer to India, Sources Say," AP, 8 April 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
10 April 1990
India and Cuba sign a document on cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the period of four years.
—"Cuba: Nuclear, Cultural Agreements Signed with India," Havana Radio Reloj Network, 10 April 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-008, 29 April 1990, p. 22.
10 April 1990
In an address to the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), Prime Minister V.P. Singh says the Indian army is "ready for any emergency." He adds that Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability "radically changes the strategic situation on the South Asian subcontinent" and India has "no choice but to accept and worthily rebuff [Pakistan's nuclear challenge]. Indian scientists are able to do it." In a warning to Pakistan, Singh says, "...those who talk about 1,000 years of war should examine whether they will last 1,000 hours of war."
—"Indian Prime Minister Warns Pakistan," Itar-TASS News Agency, 11 April 1990, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cited in, Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 75.
14 April 1990
Prime Minister V.P. Singh tells the press that Indian military deployments are a response to offensive deployments by Pakistan. Singh says, "In my perception, Pakistan's strategy is to avoid conflict, yet continue to fan the insurgency within India. Their strategy is to achieve the territorial goals without the price of war." Singh explains that his strategy is to avoid war. "Many wars," according to Singh, "have been prevented by a timely warning. It is indecision and confused signals that have usually triggered conflict."
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 86.
25 April 1990
Indian foreign minister I.K. Gujral and Pakistani foreign minister Yakub Khan meet in New York and agree to reduce tensions by employing the existing confidence-building measures and keeping channels of communications open.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 95.
Late April 1990
Former Indian Chief of Army Staff, General K. Sundarji, downplays the likelihood of an Indo-Pakistani war. In an interview to India Today, Sundarji says, "...any sensible planner sitting on this side of the border is going to assume that Pakistan does indeed have nuclear weapons capability. And by the same token, I rather suspect the view from the other side is going to look very similar...on the other side, there may be the odd person who has kidded himself into believing that they have the nuclear weapon capability and we do not," which is "stupid. The sooner they wake up to this reality, the better."
—Cited in, Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 86-87.
Late April 1990
India deploys seven military divisions in Kashmir; these divisions are supplemented by an estimated 10,000 paramilitary troops. The four divisions deployed in Punjab are supplemented by a fifth under-strength division. In addition, one infantry division and one armored brigade, besides the tank units exercising in the Mahajan ranges, are located in Rajasthan. However, with the exception of one Indian armored division, the other two armored divisions remain in their peacetime locations. The director generals of military operations in both India and Pakistan remain in touch through a military hotline. India also dispatches its defense secretary Naresh Chandra to Islamabad to reassure the Pakistani government of the defensive nature of the Indian deployments.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Domestic Insurgency to International Concern," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 87-89.
May 1990
Scientists at the Center for Advanced Computing, Indore (Madhya Pradesh state) say that an indigenously developed triggering mechanism for a thermonuclear fusion device will be operational by the end of 1990. According to the scientists, the device "would trigger thermonuclear fusion by directing four laser beams uniformly on spherical glass micro-balloons filled with fusion fuel, a mixture of deuterium and lithium gas. The laser beams would first compress the micro-balloon gas targets to as high as 10,000 times their normal density. The resulting Alpha particles emerging from the fusion reaction would then heat up the target to very high temperatures for sustained fusion to take place."
—"India to Test Run Thermonuclear Fusion Device," Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly (Alexandria, VA), 14-20 May 1990, p. 1.
May 1990
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says India can export research reactors on a turnkey basis. India intends to export nuclear technologies that are not proliferation sensitive.
—Arjun MBT Production to Start in 1992," Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly (Alexandria, VA), 21-27 May 1990, p. 4-5.
1 May 1990
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) reveals a breakthrough in an electrochemical process for plutonium separation. The process involves electrolytic reduction and stripping of plutonium, oxidation of plutonium and electrolytic dissolution of plutonium oxide. According to BARC officials, the process can lead to simplification of reprocessing operations, improved performance and reduction in nuclear wastes.
—"Breakthrough in Separating Plutonium from Spent Fuel," Hindu (Chennai), 2 May 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-012, 18 July 1990, p. 22.
4 May 1990
The Foreign Ministry of Norway confirms that the Norwegian firm Norsk Data sold six computers of the ND 100 and ND 500 type worth 15 million kroner to the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in 1983 and 1984. BARC is the largest facility for plutonium production in India, housing the CIRUS and DHRUVA research reactors, and is outside the IAEA safeguards. The agreement includes a provision that the computers cannot be used in nuclear plants. According to BARC sources, the ND machines, along with a US system, deliver "all datapower to scientists and engineers at the center." Over the past five to six years, Norsk Data sold about 60 computers to India. The majority of machines were produced in Norway. Some were manufactured by the Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (ECIL) that received the rights to ND technology in the 1980s under a technology sharing agreement worth 120 million kroner. Over the recent years, BARC has attempted to purchase more computers from Norsk Data. However, the Foreign Ministry of Norway has refused to license the sale due to fears that the computers may be used for nuclear weapons-related purposes. Mr. Kanavin, press spokesperson in Norwegian Foreign Ministry, says new computers are more advanced than those sold in the 1980s.
—"Norsk Data Computers Used in Indian Nuclear Program," Dagbladet (Oslo), 4 May 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-011, 28 June 1990, p. 44.
10 May 1990
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Director R. Chidambaram publicly states that India would be producing 10,000MW of nuclear power at the turn of the century if there are "no resource constraints." The current capacity is at 1,700MW. According to Chidambaram, India has enough of uranium deposits to meet the requirements of power stations and the technology for heavy water production has reached an advanced stage. Chidambaram rejects charges that India was smuggling heavy water from other countries [Norway]. Chidambaram also rules out the possibility of a Chernobyl-type disaster in India since only "very mature scientists" who have undergone through a rigorous training process handle reactors in India. Chidambaram says environmental safety concerns are exaggerated.
—"Research Chief on Nuclear Capabilities," Hindu (Chennai), 12 may 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-012, 18 July 1990, p. 22.
16 May 1990
The Bush administration announces that a special envoy, Robert Gates, the Deputy National Security Advisor, will be sent to South Asia to help defuse tensions between India and Pakistan. The administration urges both India and Pakistan to take steps to restore calm and security and reduce tension in the region. The Gates team includes two other members: Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East John Kelly and Senior National Security Council staffer for South Asia Richard Haas.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "America's Deepening Engagement," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 101.
17 May 1990
Minister of State for Defense Raja Ramanna rules out a possibility of a nuclear exchange in South Asia because "the long-term effects will make continued human habitation in the region very difficult."
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (University of Illinois at Urbana Campaign, July 2000), p. 85.
18 May 1990
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) senior leader L.K. Advani calls on the government to weaponize India's nuclear capability and urges it to send the army "to Pakistan to destroy [militant] training camps."
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity, University of Illinois at Urbana Campaign, July 2000, p. 85.
19-21 May 1990
US Special envoy Robert Gates visits Pakistan and India to help ease the tensions in Kashmir. During their trip to New Delhi, Gates and his team meet Prime Minister V.P. Singh, Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral, and the Chief of Army Staff General Sharma. Gates asks his Indian interlocutors to avoid provocations that could spiral out of control, and offers to share information collected by US satellites to keep both India and Pakistan accurately informed. The gist of the US message is that it would not benefit either India or Pakistan to go to war.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "America's Deepening Engagement," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 105-106.
23 May 1990
Chief of the Navy Staff Admiral J. Nadkarni publicly denies reports that India is planning to acquire a second nuclear submarine. He says India neither plans to acquire another submarine nor to build it indigenously. However, Nadkarni states that in case Pakistan adds a nuclear submarine to its fleet, India will have to "give a fitting answer."
—"Plans for Second Nuclear Submarine Denied," Telegraph (Calcutta), 23 May 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-013, 8 August 1990, p. 30.
28 May 1990
Western newspapers allege that in 1983 and 1986, the Ministry of Trade of Norway gave export licenses to Norsk Hydro to sell 27.5 tons of heavy water that ended up in India. In 1983, fifteen tons of heavy water were sold to German businessman Alfred Hempel to be used in West Germany. Journalists and researchers claim that the heavy water was later resold to India without reaching German soil. It was shipped to Switzerland, where it was combined with a shipment of 4.7 tons of Soviet heavy water and flown to Mumbai, India. In 1986, Romania purchased 12.5 tons of heavy water from Norway. Romanian officials say it was later resold to India. The Indian government denies the allegations.
—Harald Stanghelle "Norway Called Naïve, Tricked," Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), 28 May 1990, p. 5; in Document JPRS-TND-90-011, 28 June 1990, p. 42; Michael R. Gordon "A Nuclear Deal is Reported Between Romania and India," New York Times, 30 April 1990, p. A7.
28 May 1990
A spokesperson of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs says the government has "taken due note" of the report by Sunday Times (London) that the superpowers are concerned that current tensions in Kashmir could lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. According to the newspaper, "heavily armed convoys" were dispatched from Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear facility and satellite photographs caught F-16 aircraft "fitted with racks made especially for fitting nuclear bombs."
—"India Won't Comment on Nuclear Weapons Report," United Press International, 28 May 1990, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
29 May 1990
The Minister of State for Science and Technology Professor M.G.K. Menon states in parliament that Indian heavy water reactors are among the safest in the world and India is not building Chernobyl-type reactors.
—"Minister Menon Comments on Safety of Reactors," Delhi Overseas Service, 29 May 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-011, 28 June 1990, p. 19-20.
Early June 1990
India announces that the armored units sent for training to the Mahajan ranges in February 1990 will return to their peacetime locations.
—Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Amercia's Deepening Engagement," The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics, and Insecurity (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 109.
June 1990
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar attends the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors in Vienna. There he formally offers to export nuclear technology and products for industrial and medical uses. The list offered by Iyengar consists of nine categories, "including the production of composites by radiation, polymerization, gamma irradiators for research and industrial applications, radio-immunoassay counters, radio chemicals, medical preparations, special tracers and tracer complexes for the use in industry and hydrology, labeled nutrients, pesticides, and inorganic compounds." The services offered by India include isotope processing labs, tracer service for industrial troubleshooting, design and engineering of research reactors, remote handling tools for hot cells and technologies relating to waste management, instrumentation and monitoring systems. At the meeting, Iyengar also suggests setting up training centers for personnel from developing countries and stresses the need to carry out the research and development tailored to the specific needs of the developing countries.
—"India: Nuclear Exports Offered," Nucleonics Week, 16 August 1990, p. 13; "India Offers to Export technology," Nuclear Engineering International, October 1990, p. 18.
23 June 1990
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is reconstituted. Mr. S.D. Soman is appointed as AERB chairman. Other members include R.D. Lele, medical director of Jaslok hospital; S.S. Ramaswamy, former director-general of the factory advice services and Labor Institute; and A. Gopalakrishnan, director of the Central Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (Jamshedpur). M.S.R. Sarma, the chairman of the safety review committee for operating plants, is an ex officio member of the board.
—"Reconstitution of Atomic Energy Board Reported," Times of India (Mumbai), 24 June 1990, p. 5; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-016, 20 September 1990, p. 32.
30 June 1990
India's outgoing Chief of Army Staff General V.N. Sharma says that India will have "no option" but to possess "nuclear capability [if a] potential hostile neighboring nation" acquires a capacity to deploy nuclear weapons.
—"India to Keep Nuclear Option Open: Sharma," Xinhua General Overseas News Service; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 February 1992, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1990
India signs an agreement expanding cooperation in the field of nuclear energy with Vietnam.
—"Agreements for India," Nuclear Engineering International, July 1990, p. 7.
1 July 1990
The Press Counselor at the Indian embassy in Washington, DC, Dayakar Ratakonda, rejects allegations that India was clandestinely importing heavy water from West Germany. Ratakonda says India is "one of the few countries" that produces heavy water in substantial quantities since it has six operating heavy water plants and two more are under construction.
—"Embassy in US Denies India Imports Heavy Water," Times of India (Mumbai), 2 July 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-016, 20 September 1990, p. 31.
10 July 1990
CIRUS, the 40MW research reactor built with Canadian assistance in 1950s, completes 30 years of operation.
—"Reporter Tells Usage of Dhruva, Cirus Research Reactors," Times of India (Mumbai), 15 August 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-016, 20 September 1990, p. 35.
13 July 1990
A spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs of India says there is no proposal under consideration either to buy or to lease another nuclear submarine from the Soviet Union.
—"Soviet Report on Nuclear Submarine Denied," Delhi Domestic Service, 13 July 1990; in Document JPRS-TND-90-014, 23 August 1990, p. 28; "Rumor of Nuclear Sub Purchase from USSR Denied," Times of India (Mumbai), 14 July 1990, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-016, 20 September 1990, p. 32.
8 August 1990
The 100MW Dhruva research reactor completes five years of operation. Times of India reports the reactor is "expected to provide increased impetus to basic and applied research and to the production and application of radioisotopes in medicine, agriculture and industry."
—"Reporter Tells Usage of Dhruva, Cirus Research Reactors," Times of India (Mumbai), 15 August 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-016, 20 September 1990, p. 35.
August 1990
An Indian intelligence report produced by the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), citing unnamed sources, states that Pakistan has produced several nuclear weapons and would attempt to use such weapons against one or two targets in India early during any armed conflict.
—"Nuclear Backdrop," From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, December 15, 1999), p. 193.
September 1990
At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference in Geneva Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar distributes a list of technologies available at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) among the fellow delegates.
—"India Aims at Third World in Marketing Its Nuclear Expertise," Nucleonics Week, 7 February 1991, p. 17.
September 1990
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) submits detailed project reports on a 500MW prototype fast breeder reactor to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).
—"India's FBR Program Faces New Delays..." Nuclear Engineering International, February 1991, p. 4.
4 September 1990
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says land acquisition for two Soviet-supplied 1,000MW nuclear reactors to be built in Koodankulam, Tamil Nadu, has been complete. According to Iyengar, the prices have been finalized with the Soviet Union and he expects the first reactor to go critical by 1998. Iyengar says a detailed project report for the Koodankulam plant will be ready by October 1990. According to Iyengar, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu M. Karunanidhi supports the project since Tamil Nadu is short of electricity. Iyengar says the dialogue with France regarding two 1,000MW reactors is still in progress. He says there is a range of places where these reactors could be built, including sites in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, but no agreement has been finalized yet. According to Iyengar, the first 235MW unit of the Kakrapar Atomic Power Project in Gujarat will go critical by August 1990 and the second 235MW unit of Narora Atomic Power Station in Uttar Pradesh will be operational by February 1991. The first unit of Narora station, operating since March 1989, is working at 75 percent of its capacity. Iyengar says India is self-sufficient in heavy water production and refutes reports that India was importing heavy water from several countries, including Norway and the Soviet Union.
—"AEC Chief Iyengar on Setting Up of Soviet Reactors," Hindu (Chennai), 5 September 1990, in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-019, 25 October 1990, p. 35.
4 September 1990
India's Minister of Energy A.M. Khan tells parliament that India will need an additional 38,000MW of nuclear energy during the Eighth Five Year plan in order to meet the energy needs.
—"India's Additional Electricity Needs in 1990-95," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 5 September 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 February 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
8 September 1990
Speaking in Mumbai, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says India will install 3,000MW of nuclear generating capacity during the eighth plan and an additional 1,000MW during the ninth plan. According to Iyengar, India now has the capability to indigenously "design, engineer, build and operate" nuclear power plants.
—"India Plans to Set up Additional Nuclear Capacity" Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 8 September; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 September 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>
30 October 1990
Speaking on Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Founder's Day, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says that "a cultural change in [India's] approach will be needed" if India wants to succeed in exporting nuclear-related technologies since India will have to meet reliability and quality control standards, lead-times and cost targets. India will have to interact with the international community more intensively to familiarize itself with the requirements. In Iyengar's view, this will impose greater responsibilities on the scientists and technicians to meet the standards promptly. Iyengar emphasizes the importance of increased interaction between production and research units.
—"AEC Chairman Discusses Nuclear Technology Export," Times of India (Mumbai), 31 October 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-91-001, 4 January 1991, p. 21.
5 November 1990
Talking to the reporters after inaugurating the second Indo-USSR symposium on the research in the field of rare earths materials in Chennai, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says negotiations with the USSR on two VVER-1000 plants to be built in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) are in progress "on various details." Iyengar also mentions the plans to construct a 500MW PHWR-type nuclear plant in Kerala. He says a team led by Mr. S. Krishnan from the Nuclear Power Corporation is currently inspecting various possible sites in northern Kerala. According to Iyengar, PHWRs used by India not only meet all international safety standards but they are intrinsically safer that Chernobyl-type reactors because they have a much smaller nuclear core. Iyengar adds that the Indian atomic energy establishment will be able to finance new projects from its own profits within five to ten years. He argues that nuclear power is cheaper than thermal power "when the coal mine is away from the thermal plants."
—"AEC Chairman on Plans for Nuclear Power Plants," Hindu (Chennai), 6 November 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-91-001, 4 January 1991, p. 22; "AEC Chairman Opens Nuclear Power Seminar," Hindu (Chennai), 6 November 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-91-001, 4 January 1991, p. 22.
9 November 1990
Purnima-III, a zero-energy research reactor, using U-233 as fuel, goes critical. The reactor is located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC). U-233 fuel for the reactor is obtained by irradiation of thorium rods in the CIRUS research reactor. According to a BARC press release, the reactor has a fissile fuel inventory of 590g of U-233 in the form of uranium aluminum alloy plates, moderated by light water and reflected by beryllium oxide. Its nuclear core volume is less than 10 liters. According to BARC director R. Chidambaram, Purnima-III is the only reactor in the world to be fully fuelled by U-233.
—"Bhabha Center Research Reactor Goes Critical, U-233 Fuel Used," Hindu (Chennai), 14 November 1990, p. 6; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-91-001, 4 January 1991, p. 24; "Further Details," Times of India (Mumbai), 15 November 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-91-001, 4 January 1991, p. 24.
13 November 1990
The first committee of the 45th UN General Assembly approves the draft resolution calling for disarmament at regional and sub-regional levels. The draft was proposed by Pakistan and 10 other nations. In an explanatory note, India's representative to the UN says that the Indian government does not support the draft since it undermines the positive points contained in two drafts sponsored by India.
—"Draft on Regional Disarmament Approved at UN Committee," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 13 November 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 November 1990, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
December 1990
Foreign Secretaries Muchkund Dubey of India and Shahryar Khan of Pakistan conduct a third round of talks on the "Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Facilities" signed by the two countries in December 1988. They agree to embark on the agreement's implementation and exchange the instruments of ratification in January 1991.
—"Pakistan and India to Implement Accord on Nuclear Plant Attacks," Nucleonics Week, 3 January 1990, p. 3.
December 1990
India and Egypt sign an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in several fields, including radiation technology for medicine and industry. The agreement is to come into effect in January 1991 and will be valid for five years, after which it can be renewed. According to the Egyptian nuclear expert, Dr. Raja'I Zaghlul, India will cooperate with Egyptian experts to increase the capacity of the Egyptian research reactor from two to five megawatts.
—"Pact Signed with India on Nuclear Cooperation," Cairo MENA, 10 December 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-91-001, 4 January 1991, p. 21.
11 December 1990
Officials in India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) say that India's fast breeder reactor program may be delayed for three to five years due to the problems with India's fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) at Kalpakkam. The Kalpakkam FBTR, commissioned in 1985, was designed to generate 40 million watts of thermal power and 13 million watts of electricity. To date, the reactor has not produced electricity and has been idle most of the time.
—"India's Fast Breeder Reactor Program in Jeopardy," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 11 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 December 1990, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; N. Vasuki Rao "More Problems Beset India's Nuclear Program," Journal of Commerce, 19 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 December 1990, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
13 December 1990
US President George Bush approves the sale of Cray supercomputers to Brazil, India, and China. He orders new controls on export licenses for the sensitive, advanced technology equipment. In a written statement, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater says, "The president approved several of the license applications, but because of the potential strategic applications of such computers, he also required the imposition of stringent safeguards to ensure that the computers will be used exclusively for peaceful civilian purposes."
—"President Approves Supercomputer Exports," Associated Press, 13 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
17 December 1990
Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey arrives in Islamabad to discuss Pakistan's proposal for a bilateral or regional agreement on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia.
—"Indian and Pakistani Officials Renew Nonproliferation Talks," Nucleonics Week, 20 December 1990, p. 13.
19 December 1990
US President George Bush offers assistance in "normalizing relations between Pakistan and India."
—"Pakistan and India to Implement Accord on Nuclear Plant Attacks," Nucleonics Week, 3 January 1990, p. 3.
20 December 1990
India and Pakistan agree to ratify the "Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Facilities" signed by the two countries in December 1988. A joint statement indicates that the two sides will ratify the agreement in January 1991.
—"Pakistan, India to Ratify Confidence-Building Accord," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 December 1990, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India: Talks with Pakistan Yield Mixed Results," Inter Press Service, 21 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 December 1990, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Steve Coll "Ban is Imposed on Attacks Nuclear Installation," Washington Post, 21 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
24 December 1990
Former defense minister and a senior Congress party leader, K.C. Pant, publicly emphasizes that India has no option but to possess nuclear weapons to counter the nuclear threat from Pakistan. He says it is important to raise awareness "of the dangers of nuclear asymmetry – when one side has a capability well ahead of the other." Pant argues that an Indian nuclear capability will eliminate the potential for miscalculation or misadventure on Pakistan's part.
Pant says the problem of a potential nuclear threat from Pakistan must be addressed in detail at different levels of the government (both military and civil), as well as the international community. He warns against downplaying the threat from Pakistan.
—"Pant Says Nuclear Weapon Needed," Patriot (New Delhi), 25 December 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-91-003, 25 February 1991, p. 29.
31 December 1990
India's former Chief of the Army Staff General K. Sundarji discusses the importance of India and Pakistan adopting "a declared nuclear weapon status" to reduce the chances of miscalculation and send clear signals of deterrence to each other. Sundarji says, "the differences between India and Pakistan, in geography, may cause proportionately more damage to Pakistan. But the damage to India will be in absolute terms. The nuclear reality demands that on neither side can a planner recommend nor any decisionmaker accept any step that would have a high probability of leading to a nuclear exchange." He says both sides should have a clear understanding of what constitutes their "vital interests" a threat to which could lead to nuclear exchange. He says a debate within each country and between both countries can facilitate these issues. Sundarji adds it is essential that India embarks on confidence building measures with her smaller neighbors allaying their "Kuwait syndrome" by providing them with "a few short to medium range weapon systems" without conditions.
—General K. Sundarji "Declare Nuclear Status," India Today, 31 December 1990, p. 73.
1990
India accelerates efforts to build an air-deliverable nuclear device that can be delivered on board Indian Air Force (IAF) Mirage 2000 multi-role combat aircraft. Coordination between the IAF and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is increased. Weaponization work is undertaken at three DRDO labs: Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL), and the Electronics Research and Development Establishment (LRDE). ARDE accelerates work on the container for the bomb, mating mechanisms with aircraft, and fail-safe release mechanisms. TBRL works on efforts to reduce the weight of the bomb by optimizing the size of the conventional explosive lens needed to implode the fissile core. A plant is set up to manufacture lighter HMX-TNT explosives as well as more reliable detonators. LRDE designs high-voltage capacitors for the bomb's triggering mechanisms. The weaponization design team begins examining the following aspects of the weapon design: the optimum shape and weight of the bomb; designing and building a bomb container that can withstand the stress and strains of an aircraft in flight; fail-safe electronic trigger mechanisms with safety locks; special communication systems that will enable aircraft pilots to remain in constant touch with ground controllers so that they can be recalled; trade-offs involved in deploying a single man or alternatively two man crew; psychological training for pilots involved in nuclear operations; and possible storage sites for the weapons to ensure speedy access, deployment, and use.
—Raj Chengappa, "End the Wink and Nudge Approach," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 359-360.
1990
The managing director of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) says that India's nuclear program is expected to produce 10,000MW of energy by the year 2000; a target, which if accomplished, would meet 10 percent of India's electricity requirements. The Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) announces that it will submit a report to the government for building a 500MW prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam. The proposed reactor will use a mixed plutonium-uranium carbide fuel and liquid sodium as a coolant. The estimated cost of the project is $580 million. However, the commissioning of the heavy water plant at Manuguru (Andhra Pradesh) is delayed until mid-1990.
—"India," Nuclear Engineering International, June 1990, p. 24.
1990
Environmentalists and economists protest against the construction of two Russia-supplied VVER-1000 reactors in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu state). They cite "horrible safety records" of this type of reactors.
—A.S. Paneersilvan, "Opposition Stalls Nuclear Power Program," Inter Press Service, 30 July 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 August 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
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