This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1995
Differences emerge within India's Atomic Energy Commission on the merits of signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the absence of further Indian nuclear tests. A group of scientists led by the Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Dr. Anil Kakodkar and the Director of the Solid State & Spectroscopy Group and head of the nuclear weapons program, Dr. S. K. Sikka, oppose the CTBT on grounds that it would effectively block further Indian nuclear weaponization efforts. The scientists are supported in their efforts by the defense ministry.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 379.

6 January 1995
Unit 1 of the Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS) is resynchronized to the power grid. It went critical in December 1994 for the first time since the March 1993 fire that damaged its turbine generator.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1994-1995, p. 3.3.

7 January 1995
Indian government officials say India is buying enriched uranium from China to fuel the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS). The first batch of the uranium arrived from the China Nuclear Energy Corporation on January 5, 1995. According to the officials, the sale has been approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is expected to inspect TAPS to make sure it complies with safeguards protocols.
—"India Turns to China to Fuel Nuclear Plant," New York Times, 8 January 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 January 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Krishnan Guruswami, "India Buys Enriched Uranium from China for a Nuclear Power Plant," Associated Press, 7 January 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 January 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 January 1995
The second unit of the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) achieves criticality. According to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) officials, the unit has the latest technology in its coolant system and other safety mechanisms to avoid Narora-type incidents.
— Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1994-1995, p. 2.2; "Kakrapar 2 Starts Up," Nuclear Engineering International, May 1995, p. 13; Neelam Jain, "India Gets One More Nuclear Plant Working," 9 January 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 January 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 1995
Commenting on the first consignment of enriched uranium India received from China on January 5, 1995, Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Director A.N. Prasad says India is buying "only raw material and the rest of the processing including fabrication of fuel is done [at the Nuclear Fuels Complex] in Hyderabad." He remarks that India is buying enriched uranium from China to avoid using its unsafeguarded material at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS), which is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
—"India Buys Nuclear Fuel from China as Domestic Prices Costlier," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 January 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 January 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India Defends Purchase of Enriched Uranium from China," Agence France Presse, 10 January 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 January 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 1995
The chief executive of the Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC) Dr. K.K. Sinha says that the uranium purchased from China will be processed at the NFC. According to press reports, India has received 30 tons of enriched uranium from China in three consignments since the beginning of the year.
—"India Receives 30 tons of Nuclear Fuel from China," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 January 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 January 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China to Supply Uranium for Indian Plant," 23 January 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 January 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 February 1995
The Indian government publicly states that India will not accept any caps on its nuclear program until a satisfactory convention to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes enters into force.
—"India Not to Accept Restrictions on Nuclear Program," Xinhua News Agency, 11 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 February 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 February 1995
Addressing a news conference in New Delhi, India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee reiterates that India will neither unilaterally cap the production of fissile material nor sign any discriminatory nonproliferation agreement that is not linked to a phased elimination of nuclear weapons. India's Foreign Secretary K. Srinivasan says that India may attend the NPT review conference as an observer.
—"India Will Not Sign Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 23 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 February 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 1995
Kakrapar-2 is synchronized to India's Western grid, following mandatory tests and authorization from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). The 220MWe unit will provide further operating information on thorium fuel that India intends to use in its nuclear power program. According to India's Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) officials, Kakrapur is equipped with "two diversified independent shutdown systems, a high level of redundancy in equipment, double containment, and the latest fire safety solutions." The addition of this reactor to the Western grid brings India's total nuclear power capacity to 1940MWe.
—Government of India Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1994-1995, p. 2.2; "Kakrapur 2 Starts Up," Nuclear Engineering International, May 1995, p. 13.

20 March 1995
In a statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, US Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphel says the United States "seeks first to cap, then overtime reduce, and finally eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems in South Asia. We seek also to help reduce tensions and avoid conflicts which could possibly escalate to the use of WMD or ballistic missiles....We seek to inhibit exports to India and Pakistan of goods and technology that can contribute to WMD and missile delivery systems and to discourage third countries from supporting such programs. We have also pursued the idea of convening a multilateral conference to discuss security and nonproliferation in South Asia. This proposal has been stalled, principally due to Indian concerns over the scope and participation envisioned for such a conference. India prefers a global over a regional focus, and objects to Pakistan's insistence on explicit inclusion of Kashmir on the agenda."
— Robin Raphel, "Nonproliferation Policy in South Asia," statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Washington, DC, 9 March 1995 ; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 April 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1995
Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says that the discoveries made in the field of unconventional fissile materials must be taken into consideration during the NPT review process. He says that a new fuel, atomic "issomiyur," capable of releasing enormous amount of energy without fission, has been discovered. He argues that the fission fuel can also be produced in laboratories called accelerator or "smayser" centers. According to Iyengar, it is impossible to prevent the spread of these technologies since they are used in medicine and isotope production.
—"Official Views Unconventional 'Nuclear' Fabrication," Dinamani (Chennai), 22 March 1995, p. 9; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-102, 22 March 1995.

22 March 1995
India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) Chairman A. Gopalakrishnan says India's accession to Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994 will open its nuclear installations to international scrutiny. According to Gopalakrishnan, the Directorate of Regulatory Inspection and Enforcement, set up in January 1994, "has conducted many surprise checks on nuclear power plants [in India] to ensure nuclear safety."
—Neelam Jain, "Expert Warns India of Nuclear Scrutiny," United Press International, 22 March 1995.

27-29 March 1995
Canada sends a fact-finding mission to India "to explore the possibilities of nuclear cooperation within the parameters of current Canadian policy.
—"Canadian Team Explores Safety Aid to India under 1990 Policy Change," Nucleonics Week, 13 April 1995, p. 13.

April 1995
India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says that Pakistan's construction of a second nuclear reactor vindicates India's fears "that the nonproliferation treaty has failed to check clandestine transfer of nuclear technology." Mukherjee remarks that India is not going to participate in the NPT review conference and has no intention of sending an official observer.
—Ian Stewart, "India Targets Pakistan Nuke Program," United Press International, 10 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 April 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ian Stewart, "Indo-Pakistan Rift to Thwart NPT," United Press International, 11 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 April 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Philippe Sauvanargues, "India to Be Consciously Absent at Nonproliferation Conference," Agence France Presse, 13 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 April 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early April 1995
Managing Director of the CANDU Owners Group (COG) Barry Collingwood says Canada is considering safety-related cooperation with India on Rajasthan-1 and -2 CANDU-type reactors. He emphasizes that it will be strictly safety-related cooperation "under [the] auspices of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]" and "within current Canadian policy." [Note: The assistance is offered under the policy document of 30 May 1990 on Canadian policy towards India and Pakistan, which offered Canadian expertise to Indian and Pakistani engineers to ensure ongoing safety of the Kanup and Rajasthan CANDU reactors if their governments met the requirements of the IAEA and the UN.]
—"Canadian Team Explores Safety Aid to India under 1990 Policy Change," Nucleonics Week, 13 April 1995, p. 13.

3 April 1995
Speaking to the news conference at Panjim, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee warns the Congress government led by Narasimha Rao not to compromise India's national security by giving up its nuclear option and indigenous missile program under pressure from the United States. He urges the government to take the Parliament and people into confidence on its intentions regarding these two "vital" issues. A resolution, adopted at BJP's meeting in Panjim says the government's decision to negotiate the production of fissile material would put plutonium production under international safeguards, thus capping India's nuclear option. The BJP holds that only an absolutely non-discriminatory agreement for halting fissile material production can be satisfactory. As such, "it must not allow the continued possession [of fissile material] by some nuclear weapon states while capping, reducing, and eliminating the capacity of the others."
—Paul Iredale, "Opposition Says India Giving Up on Nuclear Option," Reuters, 3 April, 1995; "India's Main Opposition Party Wants to Build Nuclear Bomb," Associated Press, 3 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 April 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 April 1995
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Director A.N. Prasad says that existing measures for spent nuclear fuel management are insufficient, while their long-term safety can be questioned. He urges the need for a global consensus on this issue. Prasad says that the "disposal of spent fuel without separating the long-lived radioactive products [is] not wise." It only helps to create a "plutonium mine." According to Prasad, the time has come to "perceive plutonium as energy and not evil." Prasad argues that separating plutonium from spent fuel will "considerably augment energy resources" and make the nuclear waste more "easily manageable from the safety point of view." Prasad says India is one of the few countries that developed the technology for reprocessing and "immobilization of fission product waste in non-leacheable glass matrix."
—"Consensus on Spent Nuclear Fuel Stressed," Financial Express (Mumbai), 4 April 1995.

7 April 1995
The Canadian government confirms that Indian and Canadian delegations have met to discuss the safety of India's CANDU-type reactors. A spokesperson for the Canadian Foreign Ministry says that Canada, which severed all nuclear ties with India after the latter's nuclear explosion in 1974, already offered some form of technical assistance to India in 1990. The spokesperson adds that this "limited technical assistance" is fully in compliance with the NPT.
—"Canada and India Renewed Nuclear Contracts, Foreign Ministry Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 April 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 April 1995
The Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) is shut down due to the discovery of a leak in its waste immobilization plant. Examinations of the storm water pipe at TAPS reveal the danger level of 20 to 30 micro R/hr, significantly above the prescribed norm of 8 to 15 micro R/hr. The plant's superintendent Kanwar Raj says "the leak occurred in one of the pipes in early March and, as a result, one and a half liters of radioactive waste leaked out." According to reports, the radioactive water seeped into the subsoil. India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) decides not to publicize the event.
—Rahul Bedi, "Radioactive Water Leak Threatens Indian Town," Washington Times, 8 June 1995, p. A5; R. Abrel, "Tarapur Lapse," India Today, 31 July 1995, p. 42.

21 April 1995
Addressing the combined commanders' conference in New Delhi, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao reiterates India's commitment to complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe. Rao urges the international community to devise a universal, comprehensive, nondiscriminatory, and verifiable nonproliferation regime. Rao regrets that the NPT "has failed to achieve its objectives, as is evident from clandestine efforts by Pakistan to attain nuclear weapon capability."
—"Rao Reiterates Commitment to Nuclear Nonproliferation," Doordarshan Television Network (New Delhi), 21 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950421000043, 21 April 1995.

April 1995
Scientific Advisor to the Indian government, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, sets up a special cell within the Defense Research and Defense Organization (DRDO) to speed up work on India's nuclear command and control system. The cell is tasked with working out problems related to storing nuclear cores at several different strategic locations in the country, apart from the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Trombay; working out mechanisms for mating the nuclear core with the non-nuclear warhead assembly in the shortest time possible; ensuring that command to authorize nuclear detonation remains under civilian authority; and finally, to work out a system so that concurrence of at least three agencies would be required to approve nuclear launch.
—Raj Chengappa, "Tell Your President, I Keep My Word," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2000), p. 391.

April 1995
The Indian Army is ordered to ready shafts at the Pokhran test site in the Rajasthan desert for a possible round of nuclear tests. The Army's 8th Engineer Regiment is tasked with refurbishing the two shafts that were built in 1982; it also starts digging a third, shallower shaft. The Army discovers that one of the deeper shafts is filled with up to three-fourths with water.
—Raj Chengappa, "Tell Your President, I Keep My Word," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2000), p. 394.

May 1995
A report from the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi states that India and Iran have agreed on an accelerated plan to step up cooperation in nuclear research and development. The report also says that India sent nuclear experts to Iran.
—"Israeli Paper Alleges Indo-Iran Nuclear Ties," Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), 21 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950521000175, 21 May 1995.

8 May 1995
During a meeting with the British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd, India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says India will not sign the NPT. He adds that New Delhi supports total elimination of nuclear weapons through a multilateral nondiscriminatory, universally verifiable agreement.
—"Minister Rejects UK Plea for Support to Extend NPT," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 8 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950508000342, 8 May 1995.

11 May 1995
The NPT is extended indefinitely, a decision that makes the treaty permanent.
—Julia Preston, "Nations Make Nuclear Pact Permanent; US Scores Victory at Global Conference," Washington Post, 12 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 12 May 1995.

12 May 1995
A spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs declares that India is not going to sign the NPT in its present form, yet it will continue to work towards complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. The spokesperson remarks that the treaty only perpetuates a discriminatory regime and legitimizes the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states.
—"Spokesman Rules Out Signing NPT in 'Its Present Form'," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 8 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000506, 12 May 1995.

15 May 1995
According to the Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) performance budget for fiscal year 1995/96, the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-2 (RAPS) will be shut down for a period of three years. DAE's decision to replace the reactor's cooling channels is the reason for the shutdown.
—R. Ramachandran, "Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant to Be Shut Down for Three Years," Economic Times (Mumbai), 22 May 1995.

17 May 1995
Speaking in the Rajya Sabha (India's upper house of parliament), India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says India will not sign the NPT since it does not include a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He adds that India remains committed to "genuine nonproliferation which can be ensured only when the nuclear weapon states agree to give up their nuclear arsenals and eliminate them under international verification." Mukherjee remarks that India rejects "any unilateral restrictions on India's nuclear program which remains geared exclusively to peaceful purposes."
—"India Committed to Nuclear Nonproliferation but Rejects NPT," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 May 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 1995
Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) officials say India is self-reliant in safety-related technologies for its nuclear reactors and will not be affected by the US threats to ban export of such equipment. They claim that these threats are aimed at pressuring India into signing the NPT.
—"Self-Sufficiency Claimed in nuclear Technology," Asian Age (New Delhi), 25 May 1995, p. 5; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-101, 25 May 1995.

24 May 1995
Minister of State Bhuvanesh Chaturvedi tells the Lok Sabha (India's lower house of parliament) that new design, safety factor, variations in foreign exchange rates and the paucity of funds are the factors behind the delay in completion of India's nuclear power projects.
—"'Paucity of Funds' Said Delaying Nuclear Projects," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 24 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950524000326, 24 May 1995.

30 May 1995
Speaking at the Consultative Committee of the Scientific Departments in Parliament, Minister of State for Atomic Energy Bhuvnesh Chaturvedi says nuclear energy will play an important role in ensuring India's national energy security and overall development. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman R. Chidambaram says India has developed comprehensive and self-reliant capability in the field of nuclear power despite the rigid international technology control regimes. According to Chidambaram, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is about to start the construction of the new 500MW pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) at Tarapur, as well as develop prototype fast breeder reactor technology. He says about 500 industries in India have developed expertise in different aspects of manufacture of nuclear components and equipment, thus contributing to the indigenous capability.
—"N-Energy 'Must' for Development," Hindustan Tines (New Delhi), 31 May 1995.

Late May 1995
CANDU Owners Group (COG) formally asks the Canadian government what the scope of permissible cooperation is with India on its two CANDU-types reactors at Rajasthan. India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) officials say they are interested in collaboration with Canada in dealing with Rajasthan reactors, yet, they are determined to address the problem of the reactors' ageing on their own should the Canadian government continue to curtail COG activities.
—"COG Seeks Government Guidance on Cooperation with India," Nucleonics Week, 1 June 1995, p. 3.

June 1995
In an interview to Le Figaro (Paris), India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao says that India is "very concerned" by Pakistan's nuclear program. He remarks that India tried "to draw the world's attention to this danger. In vain." Rao adds that while Pakistan has nuclear weapons, India does not have them. He mentions, however, that India has "the means to produce [nuclear weapons]," but it has never taken this step. Rao points out that India cannot abandon its nuclear option "in the present context."
—"Rao Addresses National Issues, Pakistan, France," Le Figaro (Paris), 12 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950612000494, 12 June 1995.

1 June 1995
B.K. Modi announces that his Delhi-based industrial group is negotiating with Electrecite de France to construct a nuclear power plant in India.
—"B.K. Modi group, French Co Plan N-Power Venture," Financial Express (Mumbai), 4 June 1995, p. 12.

1 June 1995
Speaking in the Rajya Sabha (India's upper house of parliament), Minister of State for Atomic Energy Bhuvanesh Chaturvedi says India is among the few countries that have developed a "comprehensive capability in the entire nuclear fuel technology." He adds that India has also achieved self-reliance in heavy water technology, reactor control system, reactor repair and maintenance technology.
—"Minister Comments on 'Nuclear' Fuel Development," Delhi All India Radio Network, 1 June 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-106, 1 June 1995.

2 June 1995
In an interview, India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says there is no pressure on India to sign the NPT. He adds that India has not "felt any change after the NPT members agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. It is our conviction that genuine nonproliferation can only be achieved within the framework of a time-bound program for the elimination of all nuclear weapons."
—"Minister Interviewed on US, International Issues," Times of India (Mumbai), 7 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950607000542, 7 June 1995.

7 June 1995
Project Director of the Kaiga Atomic Power Plant (KAPP) P. Tiwari says the first unit of KAPP will be commissioned in 1996. According to Tiwari, the construction of the new dome for the reactor, which collapsed in May 1994, is in progress. Tiwari says that one of the changes in the new dome design is "a 100mm increase in the thickness of the central portion of the dome from the present 340mm." Tiwari adds it will be possible to synchronize the first unit with the second one, scheduled for commissioning "after a gap of six months." Tiwari notes that the new design incorporates "two independent fast acting shutdown systems, high pressure, intermediate pressure and low pressure emergency core cooling systems. The cooling water to all heavy water heat exchanges will be maintained in a closed loop so that failures in these do not lead to escape of radioactivity in the atmosphere." He adds that the station will have a waste management plant and a waste burial facility, while an environmental laboratory will be established "to study the impact of the plant operation in the environment." According to Tiwari, the site for the nuclear power plant is selected after the "most careful consideration given to all aspects of safety, environment and several other factors."
—"New Design for Kaiga Project," Financial Express (Mumbai), 8 June 1995, p. 12.

27 June 1995
Addressing the Parliamentary Consultative Committee for External Policy, India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says India will not unilaterally halt the production of fissile materials provided "an all-embracing convention, completely banning their production for military purposes, is signed." He underscores that India's nuclear program is peaceful. Mukherjee says that India will not sign the NPT but it will nevertheless continue to work for achieving genuine nonproliferation through elimination of all nuclear weapons.
—"Minister Rules Out 'Capping' Fissile Material Production," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 27 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950627000006, 27 June 1995; Yuri Kozmin, "India Will Not Stop Producing Fissionable Materials," TASS, 287 June 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 29 June 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

July 1995
The Indian defense secretary allegedly tells the chief Indian negotiator at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Arundhati Ghosh, that the defense ministry will continue with nuclear weaponization efforts regardless of what the Indian foreign affairs ministry negotiates at Geneva.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 379.

July 1995
The Indian Express (Mumbai) reports an accident at the Dhruva research reactor in July 1995 was averted by "fortunate happenstance." According to the report, "the inlet hose of a temporary ion exchange unit of the Dhruva reactor got disconnected. Huge amounts of water drained out of the wet storage block, containing the uranium fuel assemblies submerged in the block....The low-level alarm of the storage block was not working, and the water level was just three meters above the top of the uranium rods."
—Sumit Ghoshal, "Series of Near Accidents Cast Doubts on Safety at BARC," Indian Express (Mumbai), 17 July 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

1 July 1995
The Press Trust of India news agency reports that the geologists from India's Atomic Minerals Division have discovered new deposits of uranium in northeastern state of Meghalaya.
—"New Uranium Deposit Discovered in India," United Press International, 1 July 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 29 June 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 July 1995
The Indian Express (Mumbai) reveals that the leak at the nuclear power plant at Tarapur contaminated drinking water in the area. India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) Chairman A. Gopalakrishnan says that the leak at the waste immobilization unit of TAPS, which occurred in March this year, is due to "faulty pipe joints in the power station's water decontamination plant....Defective heater coil in the evaporator of the second unit in the liquid decontamination plant had allowed some waste to seep in the drain." According to Gopalakrishnan, the accident occurred due to a "faulty design of the American-built plant," commissioned last year. Gopalakrishnan maintains that only "permissible quantities" of radioactive material could have escaped through the leak. A. Gopalakrishnan adds there is "absolutely no danger to anyone within or outside the area of [TAPS]." According to Gopalakrishnan, the radioactive leak has been "successfully contained." He notes that about 3.5 tons of contaminated soil has been "removed and kept for further processing before disposal." The AERB has given the accident provisional rating of level one on the International Nuclear Event Scale.
—Rahul Bedi, "Radioactive Water Leak Threatens Indian Town," Washington Times, 8 July 1995, p. A5; Shiraz Sidhva, "India Seeks to Calm N-Fears," Financial Times, 5 July 1995; "Radioactive Leak from Tarapur Atomic Power Plant Contained," Delhi All India Radio Network, 6 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-130, 6 July 1995; "Small Leak at Tarapur Creates Media Outcry," Nuclear News, August 1995, p. 76; "3,000 People Hit by Nuclear Plant Leak Near Bombay, Report Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 July 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 July 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ashok Sharma, "Radioactive Water Leaks from Power Plant," Associated Press, 3 July 1995.

6 July 1995
At a news conference dedicated to the visit of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Yarov, India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says India and Russia are in the process of finalizing the protocol to an agreement on the construction of two VVER-1,000 reactors in Koodankulam.
—"Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arrives in New Delhi: Joint Venture Projects Announced," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 6 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950706000384, 6 July 1995.

17 July 1995
Speaking to the press, India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee, citing the arrest of a Pakistani national in Germany for smuggling nuclear materials, says that during his visit to Germany, he urged German government to "make all-out efforts" to prevent clandestine transfer of nuclear material through its territory. Mukherjee asserts that there is no pressure on India to sign the NPT "or any conditions imposed for transfer of dual use technology to India." He says that nuclear tests by China and France after the indefinite extension of the NPT only strengthened India's position about inadequacy of current nonproliferation regime.
-—"Minister Comments on Countering Pakistani Weapons," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 6 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950717000323, 17 July 1995.

20 July 1995
An Indian government press release states that India is one of the few countries in the world that have managed to achieve a comprehensive capability in the entire nuclear fuel cycle. According to the release, Indian engineers and scientists have successfully mastered the design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel reprocessing, and waste management. India has also reached self-reliance in heavy water technology, reactor control systems, and radiation monitoring and radiation safety equipment.
—"Delhi States 'Nuclear Fuel Cycle' Capability," Delhi All India Radio Network, 20 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-139, 20 July 1995.

July 1995
The Indian Army's 8th Engineer Regiment finishes draining one of the test shafts that had become three-quarters filled with water after three months of work.
—Raj Chengappa, "Tell Your President, I Keep My Word," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2000), p. 394.

August 1995
In an interview to Jane's Defense Weekly, Indian Vice Admiral Premvir S. Das says that the Indian Navy needs nuclear submarines because India has to cope not only with the threats from Pakistan, which is rapidly modernizing its Navy, but also with "other burgeoning naval powers in the Indian Ocean."
—"Jane's: Indian Navy to Build Its First Aircraft Carrier," Associated Press, 23 August 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 August 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 August 1995
Financial Express (Mumbai) reports that the Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC) plans to commission three plants—uranium oxide fuel, uranium fuel assembly, and zircaloy fuel fabrication plants—at Moulali in December this year. According to the report, the plants have been completed and "the erection of new machinery is nearing completion." Indigenous equipment includes a "slurry extraction for uranium purification, pellet sintering furnaces, vacuum annealing furnaces and cold reducing mills." The NFC plans to double the production of nuclear fuel to reach 600 tons per year.
—"Three N-Centers to Be Commissioned near AP," Financial Express (Mumbai), 7 August 1995, p. 5; "More Fuel Plants Planned," Nuclear Engineering International, October 1995, p. 5.

28 August 1995
A spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs denies that India is ready to participate in the proposed five-nation talks on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia. He says these allegations are "a part of disinformation campaign [since] India has consistently opposed a regional approach for a solution to the nuclear proliferation issue and is in favor of global solution on a nondiscriminatory basis."
—"Official Denies Readiness to Join Nuclear Talks," AFP (Hong Kong), 28 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950828000379, 28 August 1995.

August 1995
K. Santhanam, Chief Technical Advisor at Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), is appointed Mission Director for a possible round of nuclear tests in the Rajasthan desert.
—Raj Chengappa, "Tell Your President, I Keep My Word," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2000), p. 391.

September 1995
A Russian delegation visits India to discuss the Koodankulam nuclear power reactor deal. It is agreed that Russia will supply "most of the reactors' main components while the Indian side will carry out most of the construction work." It is not decided yet whether India will supply instrumentation for the reactors.
—"Russians Reconsider Koodankulam," Nuclear Engineering International, October 1995, p. 5.

September 1995
India's Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) plans to raise one billion rupees through bonds in the capital markets for the second time in 1995. Earlier, the NPC raised two billion rupees through the same process. Overall, it needs seven billion rupees in 1995 to proceed with Kaiga (Karnataka) and Rawatbhata (Rajasthan) projects currently under construction.
—"India NPC Plans 1.0 bln Rupee Bonds at 16.25 Pct," Reuters, 18 September 1995; in Executive News Service, 18 September 1995.

1 September 1995
The Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) goes fully operational when its 220MWe Unit 2 reactor begins commercial power generation.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1995-1996, p. 11.

5 September 1995
Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Srinivasan says India might end up producing only about 3,000-4,000MW of nuclear power by the turn of the century, which is about one-third of its initial target of 10,000MW. According to Srinivasan, the scarcity of resources allocated by the government and the delay in the clearance of 500MW reactors are the reasons for the program's slowdown. He mentions the case of Kaiga Atomic Power Project, where the dome collapsed in May 1994, and neither the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) nor the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) provided clear reasons for the accident or said what needs to be done to get the project back on schedule. Speaking about the deal with Russia for two VVER-1,000 reactors for Koodankulam, Srinivasan says that while India should not scrap the agreement, it should explore other options for the supply of light water reactors from France or Germany. He adds that the deal with Russia is beneficial because it does not require India to join the NPT or accept the full-scope safeguards, while France began insisting on full-scope safeguards after it joined the NPT. Srinivasan says, however, that France might relent if "there is a good business proposition." Srinivasan believes that India should develop a fast breeder reactor program at some point. He maintains, however, that at present the efforts and resources should be concentrated on the consolidation of the heavy water reactor program and exploration of light water reactor projects.
—"AEC Chairman: India 'Must Push' Nuclear Program," Business Line (Chennai), 5 September 1995, p. 24; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-005, 5 September 1995.

14 September 1995
In a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near-Eastern and South Asian Affairs, US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel says any resumption of Russian exports of nuclear power reactors or missile-related equipment to India will be of concern to the Clinton administration.
—"Article Claims US Alarmed by Sale of Russian Reactors," Hindu (Chennai), 18 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950918000021, 18 September 1995.

15 September 1995
India's Ministry of External Affairs regrets the nuclear tests carried out by France and China recently, calling the development "a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty." The ministry's spokesperson says that the development highlights the "inherent defects" of the NPT. He expresses the hope that "all countries will negotiate in good faith for a universal and nondiscriminatory treaty and refrain from actions contrary to this objective."
—"Spokesman Expresses 'Dismay' over Nuclear Tests," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 15 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950915000299, 15 September 1995.

Mid-September 1995
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman R. Chidambaram tells Nuclear Fuel that "in coming weeks, Tarapur-2 will be reloaded with a core including more assemblies of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel than the two MOX assemblies that were loaded last year at Tarapur-1." According to Chidambaram, the Tarapur reactors will be loaded with far less than maximum allowable 30 percent of MOX fuel. Under the trilateral agreement with the United States and the IAEA, India has notified both about its intentions. He adds that a "semi-commercial-scale reprocessing plant" under construction at Kalpakkam is "nearly completed" and all hot-cell equipment, produced by the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), has been installed. The plant will commence trial operations "in less than one year's time," he says. According to Chidambaram, the plant's capacity will allow India to separate enough plutonium within "several years" for a 500MW prototype fast breeder reactor (FBR), which the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) intends to construct. The FBR itself can be produced within several years, Chidambaram says, even though it is still "at the proposal stage, and there has been no funding commitment thus far."
—Mark Hibbs, "Tarapur-2 to Join Twin BWR in Burning PHWR Plutonium," Nuclear Fuel, 25 September 1995, pp. 18-19.

29 September 1995
At the 12th Plenary Meeting of the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says that "the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to peace and security" and global nuclear disarmament is the only way to eliminate that threat." According to Mukherjee, the NPT is a "pernicious document" because it legitimizes the "illogic" of nuclear "haves" and "have nots." He adds that the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) must become "an integral step in the process of nuclear disarmament." The development of advanced warhead designs after the CTBT is signed will be "as contrary to the spirit of the CTBT as the NPT is to the spirit of nonproliferation," he says. Furthermore, Mukherjee notes that the CTBT "must contain a binding commitment on the international community, especially the nuclear weapon states, to take further measures within an agreed timeframe towards the creation of a nuclear weapon free world."
—Speech by Pranab Mukherjee, UNGA 50th Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 29 September 1995; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://www.meadev.nic.in>.

September 1995
During the 50th Session of the UNGA in New York, John Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, requests a meeting with Indian Ambassador Arundhati Ghose. In the meeting, Holum allegedly describes India's nuclear weapon-related efforts a "pipe dream" and urges Ghose to join the United States in successfully negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Ghose informs Holum that India should not be expected to support another discriminatory treaty, similar to the NPT.
— Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 382-383.

October 1995
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao attempts to coordinate and harmonize the conflicting positions within Indian government on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations. Rao orders that Indian negotiators should explicitly link the CTBT to the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 381.

7 October 1995
A spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs issues a denial that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao agreed to participate in the proposed five-nation conference on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia during his meeting with US Senators Hank Brown and Arlen Specter.
—"Report on Rao Statement to US Officials Denied," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 7 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951007000159, 7 October 1995.

13 October 1995
Addressing the XI Nonaligned Summit at Cartagena, Colombo, India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says that India does not support the US position that resumption of military supplies to Pakistan will not enhance the latter's striking capacity. He asserts that the threat perception following the arms transfer is real and not over-exaggerated. Mukherjee says that India has to step up its defense expenditure to meet the threat. Mukherjee adds that even if the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is signed in 1996, nuclear proliferation can nevertheless continue.
—"Mukherjee Comments on US Arms, Nuclear, UN Issues," All India Radio Network, 13 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951013000026, 13 October 1995.

15 October 1995
The Press Trust of India reports that India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) are planning to reach 20,000MW of nuclear energy production within two decades by means of using new plutonium-rich carbide fuel – "plutonium-uranium moncarbide."
—"India to Increase its Nuclear Capacity," United Press of India (New Delhi), 15 October 1995; in Executive News Service, 16 October 1995.

19 October 1995
Addressing the XI Nonaligned Summit at Cartagena, Colombo, India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao urges the nonaligned countries to support India's position on disarmament. He asks, "If such a commitment [on universal nuclear disarmament] is not forthcoming, what are we to make of a status in which a few hold on to their awesome arsenals, kept trim by sophisticated computer simulation techniques, while they want all others to watch on with empty hands?"
—Raj Chengappa, "Testing Times," India Today, 31 December 1995, pp. 46-51.

24 October 1995
Speaking at the Special Commemorative Meeting of the 50th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao says the world, bristling with nuclear weapons, cannot be secure. Rao maintains that "deterrence is a false belief" since the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries prompts other countries to acquire them as well, thus leading to nuclear proliferation "which is impossible to police for all time." According to Rao, the idea of a permanent number of nuclear weapon states is "unrealistic and self-defeating." Rao appeals to the UN General Assembly to "take credible steps for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a stipulated time frame" and notes that the Action Plan suggested by India in 1988 can be an "appropriate starting point."
—Speech by Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, Special Commemorative Meeting, UNGA 50th session, 24 October 1995; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://www.meadev.nic.in>.

27 October 1995
Addressing a UN committee, a senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee urges nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals in a time-bound and phased manner. He adds that the recent nuclear tests by some nuclear weapon states have further compounded the problem of nuclear nonproliferation.
—"UN Envoy Urges Phased Elimination of Nuclear Arms," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 27 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951027000249, 27 October 1995.

30 October 1995
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) issues a four-page "Agenda for the Future," in which it outlines its foreign policy perspective. The document states that the image of "managed and maneuvered" India should be changed. The party reiterates that India must exercise its nuclear option and take the necessary steps for testing a nuclear device.
—"India Must Test Nuclear," Asian Age, 31 October 1995; in Strategic Digest, February 1996, p. 265.

11 November 1995
Embarking on a new election campaign, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) senior leader Murli Manohar Joshi asserts that his party will build a nuclear deterrent against Pakistan and China if voted to power in 1996.
—Madhu Nainan, "India's Main Opposition Party Vows to Build Nuclear Arsenal if Elected," Agence France Presse, 11 November 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 November 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 November 1995
Senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee says India should declare itself a nuclear weapon state in response to recent US efforts to have India sign the NPT. Vajpayee remarks that there can hardly be "a general agreement on nuclear disarmament since the US administration wants some countries to strengthen their nuclear arsenals."
—"Right-Wing Leader for a Nuclear India," United Press International, 18 November 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 November 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 November 1995
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) director A.N. Prasad says the government has decided to set up an experimental Kamini nuclear reactor at the Kalpakkam Atomic Power Station. The planned reactor could generate 30KW of electricity. Prasad adds that U-233, extracted from thorium, will be used to fuel this reactor.
—"Thorium-Based Nuclear Unit Planned for Madras," Dinamalar (Chennai), 28 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951128000077, 28 November 1995.

November-December 1995
The compressed enriched uranium water reactor for India's Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) or nuclear submarine project fails a series of tests carried out at Kalpakkam.
—Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Technical Snags Frustrate Indian Nuclear Sub Program," Defense News (Springfield, VA), 24-30 June 1996, p. 40.

August-December 1995
Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao begins an internal debate within the government over whether India should conduct additional nuclear tests. The Indian cabinet is divided on the issue; some cabinet ministers support a program of tests; others such as finance minister Manmohan Singh oppose the tests on grounds that US sanctions will disrupt India's economic recovery. Some of Rao's advisors believe that tests should be preceded by preparations to ride out US sanctions for a period of at least two years. However, the Chief Scientific Advisor, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr. R. Chidambaram, argue in favor of tests. Rao orders Kalam and Chidambaram to make preparations so that tests can be conducted within 10 days of political authorization. Ultimately, however, Rao decides to defer the tests until later.
—Raj Chengappa, "Tell Your President, I Keep My Word," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2000), pp. 392-395.

December 1995
Senior Russian officials say the construction of the two VVER-1,000 reactors will not begin until India proves it has sufficient resources for project completion. According to Russian officials, India does not want a turnkey plant construction anymore and wants to have an agreement, similar to the one Russia had with China (when Russia supplied engineering and hardware for the two VVER reactors, which were built largely by Chinese contractors). Russian officials say that Minatom has not initiated the change of an agreement with India so far. According to an official from Zarubezhatomenergostroy (a branch of Minatom, responsible for foreign nuclear plant contracts), the financing issue is critical and the interest rate India is seeking is not acceptable to Russia. He also says that India wants to finance a part of the project in barter trade. Project officials say that some modifications would have to be done to the reactors given the tropical climate and the changes will affect the layout of the safety-related systems and equipment, in particular the design of the coolant system.
—Mark Hibbs, "India Seeks China-Style Deal for Two VVERs, Minatom Says," Nucleonics Week, 11 January 1996.

3 December 1995
Mulayam Singh Yadav, a leader of Samajwadi (socialist) Party says India should not manufacture nuclear weapons to avoid an arms race. He says that resources should rather be allocated for the improvement of the wellbeing of the Indian people.
—"Party Head Urges Government not to Make N-Bomb," Varanasi Aj (Varanasi), 3 December 1995, p. 5; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-247, 3 December 1995.

5-7 December 1995
Marketing and Research Group (MARG) carries out an opinion poll, testing the attitudes of India's urban elites towards various issues pertaining to India's nuclear weapons program. The survey is carried out in nine cities: Mumbai, New Delhi, Calcutta, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Ahmedabad, and Patna and encompasses 2,000 respondents. Thirty-eight percent of them rate the nuclear issue as "very important" among a range of other concerns. Sixty-two percent say they would approve if India was to explode "an atom bomb" to develop its nuclear weapon capabilities. Fifty-four percent say they would approve such move even if it entailed economic sanctions from the United States and Japan, affecting India's economic growth. Sixty-eight percent answer "yes" to the question whether India should "give up the option of making atom bombs only if other nuclear powers agree to do the same." Forty-three percent of respondents say they would be "more inclined to support the party" that would say it will "certainly ensure India will have nuclear weapons," while for 31 percent, it makes no difference and 26 percent say they would be less inclined to support such political party.
—"Yes to the Bomb," India Today, 31 December 1995, p. 48; "Majority Favor Country Going Nuclear: Poll," Hindu (Chennai), 17 December 1995.

6 December 1995
Addressing the Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament), Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says the recent nuclear tests by France and China present a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—"Nuclear Tests by France, PRC Cause 'Dismay'," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 6 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951206000111, 6 December 1995.

15-16 December 1995
The New York Times reveals that over recent weeks, US spy satellites have "recorded a flurry of scientific and technical activity at the Pokhran test site in the Rajasthan desert in India." The report notes, however, that the US intelligence experts have not been able to determine whether the activity recorded related to the test preparations or "some other experiment to increase India's expertise in making nuclear weapons." Citing a US official, the Washington Post notes that "the efforts to clean out a deep underground shaft for lowering a nuclear weapon into the earth" and "possible preparations for instrumentation" of the nuclear test were detected. The reports state that the United States "is working to discourage" India from testing in order to prevent a "snowball effect." White House spokesperson Michael McCurry says India's testing would jeopardize the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations. The government of India denies the allegation, stating that the activity involved was a "routine" military exercise. An Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson says that while India has "the capability," it has not utilized it since it believes "in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and not for weapons purposes." He adds that the satellites detected military exercises conducted in the area on a regular basis.
—Tim Weiner, "US Suspects India Prepares for Nuclear Test," New York Times, 15 December 1995, p. A6; Sridhar Krishnaswami, "US Warns India on N-Test 'Plan'," Hindu (Chennai), 23 December 1995, p. 3; "India and Nuclear Testing," Trust and Verify, No. 63, January 1996, p. 1; "India Suspected of Preparing for Nuclear Test," Arms Control Today, December 1995-January 1996, p. 28; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Possible Nuclear Arms Test by India Concerns US," Washington Post, 16 December 1995, p. A17; John F. Burns, "India Denies Atom-Test Plan but Then Turns Ambiguous," New York Times, 16 December 1996, p. 4; "India Calls Nuclear Test Report 'Speculative'," Reuters, 15 December 1995; in Executive News Service, 15 December 1995; "Nuclear Test Report Called Speculative," Washington Times, 16 December 1995, p. A9; "Spokesman Denies Plans for Nuclear Test," ISI Diplomatic Information Service (New Delhi), 15 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951215000385, 15 December 1995.

17 December 1995
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) says the US warning against India's attempt to carry out nuclear tests is a "ploy to coerce India into accepting the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]." The Janata Dal party says India should not sign the CTBT since it is "a question of national security on which there must be no pressure." The leader of India's Communist Party (Marxist) Prakash Karat adds that the government must resist pressure to sign the CTBT.
—"Opposition Flays US for Comments on Reports of Indian Nuke Test Plan," Agence France Presse, 17 December 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 December 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 December 1995
Citing the studies from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India's Minister of State for External Affairs R.L. Bhatia says that Pakistan has enough nuclear material to produce 20 nuclear devices and that India will have to take necessary steps to cope with this security threat.
—"India: Pakistan Has Nuclear Material," United Press International, 18 December 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 December 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 December 1995
In a press release, senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee says the recent New York Times report that accuses India of an attempt to conduct a nuclear test "is deliberately planted by the US government." Vajpayee urges the Indian government not to succumb to external pressure in matters of national security.
—"Nuclear Test Report 'Deliberately' Planted by US," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 18 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951218000449, 18 December 1995.

18 December 1995
Addressing reporters in New Delhi, the ruling Congress spokesperson V.N. Gadgil says the government will not succumb to external pressure on the issue of India's nuclear policy.
—"Congress-I rejects 'External Pressure' on Nuclear Program," Doordarshan Television Network (New Delhi), 18 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951218000448, 18 December 1995.

19 December 1995
India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee denies that India had plans to carry out a nuclear explosion. He dismisses the New York Times report as "speculative and baseless." According to Mukherjee, India "deliberately opted not to manufacture nuclear weapons" since its nuclear program is "for peaceful purposes." Mukherjee denies that the United States has pressured India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). He adds that India will continue to participate in the treaty negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.
—"Mukherjee Calls Nuclear Program 'Peaceful'," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 19 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951219000682, 19 December 1995; "Foreign Minister Denies Nuclear Test Plans," AFP (Hong Kong), 19 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-243, 19 December 1995; "India Says No Plans to Conduct New Nuclear Test," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 December 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 December 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 December 1995
In a written reply to the Lok Sabha (India's lower house of parliament), India's Minister of State for External Affairs R.L. Bhatia says India's stance on the NPT issue "enjoys national consensus." He states that New Delhi is opposed to the NPT because of its discriminatory character. He adds that India remains committed to the goal of nonproliferation through elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework. He says the government monitors the security situation and will take all necessary steps to meet any security threat.
—"Official Reiterates 'Peaceful' Nature of Nuclear Program," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 19 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951219000609, 19 December 1995.

20 December 1995
In a written reply to India's upper house of parliament (Rajya Sabha), India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee says that the government is constantly reviewing India's security situation in view of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons program. Mukherjee asserts that the government will take adequate steps to meet any threat to India's security.
—"Mukherjee Calls Nuclear Program 'Peaceful' Pakistan Called 'Weapons-Oriented'," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 20 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951220000586, 20 December 1995.

22 December 1995
India's Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy demands a review of the country's nuclear policy given the reduction in financial and political support for the program over the last decade. Initially, the nuclear program aimed to produce 10,000MW of nuclear energy by the turn of the century, and then the target was changed to 5,700MW and later to 3,200MW of nuclear energy to be attained by 2004. The committee's report states that the uranium mining, fuel fabrication, reprocessing, waste management and heavy water production facilities will be "grossly underused" as a result. The financial support from the government for the nuclear power projects has reduced significantly: instead of planned 144 billion rupees proposed for the eighth plan, the government allotted only 6 billion rupees. The revenues of the government-owned Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) are insufficient to fund new projects and it has no access to overseas funds.
—"'Dismay' Over Indian Program," Nuclear Engineering International, February 1996, p. 9.

23 December 1995
Dismissing Pakistan's statement on reports that India was preparing for a nuclear test, a spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs says this is a familiar example of Pakistan's anti-India propaganda. He says Pakistan's statement aims to divert the attention of the international community from Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. According to the spokesperson, Pakistan's nuclear program poses a real threat to peace and stability in South Asia and the world.
—"Pakistani Nuclear Program Said Posing Threat," All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 23 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951223000155, 23 December 1995.

Late December 1995
A few members of parliament move a private bill proposing that both houses pass a "unanimous resolution stating that India should not sign the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] unless the nuclear powers agreed to work towards the total elimination of their nuclear weapons." Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) parliamentarian Jaswant Singh, who is one of the bill's proponents, says that India must realize that the CTBT "hurts India's national interests more than it does that of the others. The challenge is to balance vital national interests with valid international concerns about proliferation." The director of the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam says that while India should support the CTBT, it should "negotiate from a position of strength."
—Raj Chengappa, "Testing Times," India Today, 31 December 1995, pp. 46-51.

28 December 1995
The Indian Express reports that pressure is mounting on India's Prime Minister to declare India a nuclear weapon state at the forthcoming session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva without nuclear testing. The newspaper states that during the meetings over the past several months, the prime minister's office, defense and nuclear establishments, and ministries of external affairs and defense agreed on the "middle line" for India: "abjuring a test, yet claiming nuclear weapon status." They also agreed that after the indefinite extension of the NPT, the policy of "keeping the nuclear option open" is redundant unless it can be turned into effective deterrence to protect India's interests in both diplomatic and military terms; that both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Materials Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) "have been made untenable," thus requiring a review of India's nuclear policy. Citing a government official, a report states that "if an underground shaft used for lowering a nuclear weapon is being cleaned out or new wiring is being done at the site, it does not mean that a bomb is about to be tested." According to the report, India's strategic and defense community agrees that it is important that India possesses delivery systems and other relevant infrastructure if it wants the nuclear weapon states to take its posture of keeping the option open seriously.
—K.P. Nayar, "Rao Under 'Pressure' to Declare Nation Nuclear Power," Indian Express (Mumbai), 28 December 1995, p. 1; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-250, 28 December 1995.

December 1995
A Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) official says the nuclear power plant for India's Advance Technology Vessel (ATV) was developed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and is currently being assembled at Kalpakkam. He says the land testing will begin within two-three months. The official adds that the submarine program is still five years and 25 billion rupees away from completion. According to DRDO scientists, the ATV will be eventually equipped with 1,000km-range missiles. A DRDO official adds that the main problem with India's ATV project "relates to the sub-surface technology of the missile system." The sound navigation and radiation (Sonar) equipment is under development at Cochin and Hyderabad, respectively. [Note: India's ATV project was conceived in 1970s but was cleared by the government only in the mid-1980s. In 1995 the DRDO produced titanium-steel Pre-Test Capsule (PTC) that is currently located about 60 km south of Chennai.]
—"Submarine N-Power Plant Getting Ready," Times of India (Mumbai), 29 December 1995; in Strategic Digest, March 1996, pp. 440-441.

1995
Nuclear scientists and engineers at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) continue working on designs of deliverable fission, boosted-fission, and thermonuclear weapons. The scientists make the case for nuclear tests on three grounds: tests are needed to validate the weapon designs; tests are required to recruit and retain talented scientists and engineers who otherwise might be lured by career alternatives; and finally, tests will raise the morale of the nation and help recruit future scientists to replace the team that designed and tested the nuclear device in 1974.
—George Perkovich, "India Verges On Tests," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 364-365.

1995
The Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Dr. R. Chidambaram allegedly advises the Indian Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiating team in Geneva that India has the technological expertise and capability to conduct "sub-criticals" such as "hydrodynamic" and "hydronuclear" tests.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 382.

December 1995-January 1996
Ambassador Arundhati Ghose and a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) team comprising Rakesh Sood and Kamlesh Sharma travel to the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam to seek technical clarifications on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The clarifications sought by the MEA team are mainly related to issues concerning verification, and "sub-critical" testing. Based on the advice rendered by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) led by Dr. R. Chidambaram, the Indian negotiating team proposes amendments to the CTBT draft. However, differences emerge between the DAE and MEA on negotiating tactics at Geneva. The MEA believes that India should adopt a principled stand on the CTBT, whereas the amendments suggested by the DAE are essentially "spoilers" aimed at delaying negotiations on the treaty.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 384-387.

1995-1996
The Tuticorin Heavy Water Plant is shut down for more than four months due to a faulty super heater coil.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1995-1996, p. 16.

Mid-1990s
The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) or nuclear submarine suffers delays as Russian technical assistance to India falters. Russian officials decline to transfer blueprints of the actual reactor design out of fear of alienating the United States. However, Indian designers and engineers are allowed to visit Russian design bureaus in Leningrad, and are shown the equipment they wish to see, and allowed to take notes.
—Bharat Karnad, "The Perils of Deterrence by Half Measures," Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), p. 656.

Mid-1990s
Scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) encounter design problems with the reactor built for the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV); the reactor has problems functioning at variable planes. The slow progress on the reactor design leads to tensions between BARC and the Indian Navy (IN). In order to meet its internal deadline of acquiring a nuclear submarine by the year 2000, the IN proposes that BARC build a reactor to Russian specifications with Russian assistance. As part of the resulting trade-off, the IN expresses willingness to treat the entire reactor unit as a "black box" that would periodically be sent to Russia for servicing and fuel loading. However, BARC opposes the IN's proposal on grounds that it would compromise India's independence and make the country dependent on a foreign supplier. Senior scientists from the nuclear establishment also doubt the IN's commitment to the ATV project citing the lack of continuity in the officers' team assigned to the project and their impatience. BARC scientists allege that Russia is playing an insidious role by sowing seeds of doubt about the Indian reactor design in the minds of senior IN officials; with the latter insisting that Russian scientists and engineers certify each of the ATV's indigenously designed sub-systems and assemblies.
—Bharat Karnad, "The Perils of Deterrence by Half Measures," Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), pp. 656-657.