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Nuclear Facilities

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

Location: Natanz Enrichment Plant
Subordinate to: AEOI
Size: Pilot scale
Primary Function: Uranium enrichment

Description:

The Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) is a test facility located at Natanz before industrial scale enrichment takes place at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), Iran's main uranium enrichment facility. The PFEP, when completed, will hold 1,000 centrifuges. The Director General of the IAEA visited the facility in February 2003 and observed over 100 (as many as 160) centrifuges already installed. The PFEP was originally scheduled to be completed and begin operation in June 2003. On 25 June 2003, Iran introduced UF6 (Uranium hexafluoride) into a centrifuge for single machine testing and subsequently on 19 August 2003, began testing a small ten-machine cascade with UF6. At the time, both tests were conducted with safeguards measures in place.

More recently, following a suspension of all uranium related enrichment and conversion activities in place since November 2004; the IAEA received a letter on 3 January 2006 from Iran stating its intention to resume peaceful uranium related activities. Subsequently, on 7 January 2006, another letter was received from Iran, asking the IAEA to remove the seals in place at the Natanz facility for monitoring the suspension of enrichment related activities. Since the removal of the seals at the Natanz facility, Iran has conducted substantial renovation of the gas handling system at the PFEP. Following the release of an updated design information for the PFEP to the IAEA on 8 February 2006, on 11 February 2006, Iran started enrichment tests by feeding a single P-1 centrifuge machine with UF6 gas. Subsequently, by 15 February and 22 February, the feeding of a 10-machine cascade and 20-machine cascade were carried out at the PFEP respectively.

In April 2006, Iran successfully completed a UF6 feeding campaign using a 164-machine cascade at the PFEP. The level of the enriched product from the aforementioned process was estimated to be between 3.5 percent to 4.8 percent uranium-235. In May 2006, the IAEA took samples to confirm the enrichment levels of the product. Since the April campaign, Iran has fed UF6 into a single machine, and one machine of the 10-machine cascade. Beginning June 6, Iran has started feeding UF6 into the 164-machine cascade and is working on the installation of another 164-machine cascade at the PFEP. While the enrichment process and products at the PFEP, including the feed and withdrawal station are under IAEA containment and surveillance measures, Iran has thus far declined to discuss implementation of remote monitoring for verification of its enrichment facilities.

Key Sources:
[1] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 6 June 2003, p. 6.
[2] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Iran, Player or Rogue," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2003, p. 57.
[3]"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 26 August 2003, p. 7.
[4] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2 September 2005. p. 12, 13.
[5] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 27 February 2006. p. 8, 9.
[6] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 8 June 2006. p. 2, 3.



 

Updated November 2006



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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