
This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
1998 Gerald Steinberg writes that China is alleged to have supplied Iran's Razi Serum and Vaccine Production Center with biological weapons technical assistance. —Gerald M. Steinberg "Chinese Policies on Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East," China Report, 1998, number 3-4, pp. 381-400.
1998-1999 Mohammad Mohaddessin of the National Council of Resistance of Iran believes that biological weapons research is being carried out at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production facility northwest of Karaj on the Qazvin-Hessarak highway. —"NBC Capabilities, Iran," Jane's NBC Defence Systems 1998-1999, 1998.
1 January-30 June 1998 The CIA reports that Iran "is seeking to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems...Tehran continued to pursue purchasing dual-use biotechnical equipment from Russia and other countries, ostensibly for civilian uses. Its biological warfare program began during the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran may have some limited capability for BW deployment." —"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions – 1 January Through 30 June 1998," Central Intelligence Agency, <http://www.odci.gov>.
1 March 1998 Seth Carus reports that "there is no information about the extent to which the Iranians have solved all the problems associated with production and dissemination of biological agents. Without such knowledge, it is impossible to assess the true threat posed by Iran's biological weapons." —W. Seth Carus, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications and Responses," Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1 March 1998, p. 40.
19 June 1988 Nachum Manbar, an Israeli businessman, is convicted for selling biological and chemical weapons parts and know-how to Iran for $16 million. —"Iran Denies Buying Chemical Weapons from Israeli Trader," Pakistan Link, 20 June 1998, <http://www.pakistanlink.com/>.
15 October 1998 Iran's Foreign Ministry's Director-General for International and Political Affairs, while addressing the Conference on Disarmament, reiterates Iran's commitment to the nuclear, chemical, and biological arms control treaties that it has signed. —"Iran Urges UN to Confront Israeli Nuclear Threat," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program in Persian (Tehran), 16 October 1996, reported in FBIS Document ID LD1610103598.
6 November 1998 The Federation of American Scientists reports that "Iran's biological warfare program is now believed to generally be in the advanced research and development phase. Iran has qualified, highly trained scientists and considerable expertise with pharmaceuticals. It also possesses the commercial and military infrastructure needed to produce basic biological warfare agents and may have produced pilot quantities of usable agent. Iran is judged to be able to support an independent BW program with little foreign assistance (although some...BW expertise, especially from Russia, is flowing to Iran). It is reported that the country has located a BW lab near its CW production facilities at Damghan....Iran also can make some of the hardware needed to manufacture agents. Iran has most likely investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents, produced some agents and probably weaponized a small quantity of its production. It is possible that Iran has developed a small BW arsenal that could be delivered by a variety of systems." —"Biological Weapons - Iran," Federation of American Scientists, 6 November 1998, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/bw/index.html>.
8 December 1998 According to Russian scientists and American officials, Iran has allegedly succeeded in recruiting at least five scientists from the former Soviet Union "who once worked in laboratories tied to Moscow's vast germ warfare program." —Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "The Germ Warriors: Iranians, Bioweapons in Mind, Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scientists," New York Times, 8 December 1998, p. A1.
10 December 1998 In a statement, the Iranian Embassy denies the 8 December 1998 New York Times report that the Iranian government actively recruited five germ warfare Russian scientists to develop a BW program. An Iranian scientist, Mehdi Rezayat, who was identified as a key figure in an Iranian purchasing network, also denies that he tried to recruit Russian biologists to develop Iran's germ warfare program: "...he said yesterday that his approaches were entirely peaceful, and that he was only trying to acquire the talent and technology to make diagnostic kits for hepatitis and AIDS, and antibiotics and other medicines."
Hamid-Reza Asefi, the spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, states the 8 December accusations by the United States Department of State as well as the New York Times are nothing more than a "provocation against technological progress in our country, particularly in the field of microbiology." Asefi states that "scientific cooperation with Russia is utterly transparent and is aimed at solving peaceful problems." —"Iran Denies use of Russian Scientists to Develop Germ Weapons," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 10 December 1998; William J. Broad, "Iranian Denies Seeking Biological Arms in Russia," New York Times, 11 December 1998; "Iranian Embassy Denies Report That it Recruited Russian Scientists," CNN, 11 December 1998, <http://www.cnn.com>.
20 December 1998 The Razi Vaccine and Serum Research Institute hosts a mock biological weapons inspection for the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the BWC. The mock inspection, referred to as a "national trial visit," is conducted "in order to evaluate the procedures for random visits and to prepare for the effective implementation of the provisions of the Protocol." The four-person inspection team consists of a microbiologist, pharmacologist, legal expert, and general manufacturing practice engineer.
According to a report on the national trial visit, the Razi facility was notified of the visit and the composition of the team 24 hours before the visit. At that time, "...the mandate and notification were submitted to the team for its consideration and review. The mandate was to examine the accuracy of declaration provided by the facility." During the visit, the inspection team inspected equipment and was briefed on the activities of the facility, its organizational chart, complex layout, and production process. The inspection team inspected vaccine production lines, fermentation areas, QC laboratories, BL-3 areas, and other key equipment. "In a limited number of cases, managed access techniques were practiced by the facility. For instance, the visiting team requested access to some parts of the facility where access was denied for the CPI [confidential proprietary information and property] reason, with the arguments that these parts are unrelated to the visit mandate. But as an alternative, the home team (a team with a similar make-up from the Razi Institute) made an effort to find other means of satisfying the visiting team to fulfill its mandate." —"Working Paper Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report of a National Trial Visit to A Vaccine and Serum Production Facility," Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Thirteenth Session, Geneva, 4-22 January 1999.
22 December 1998 Jane's reports that "Iran held a combined arms exercise in the Gulf earlier this month [that] tested its defences against nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare and the use of domestically developed electronic countermeasures." —"Latest Exercises Test Iranian ECM System," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 December 1998.
1999-2000 Jane's reiterates its 1998-1999 report that Mohammad Mohaddessin of the National Council of Resistance of Iran believes that biological weapons research is being carried out at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production facility northwest of Karaj on the Qazvin-Hessarak highway. —"NBC Capabilities, Iran," Jane's NBC Defence Systems 1999-2000, 22 July 1999.
19 January 1999 The Russian biologist Dr. Valery Bakayev denies having worked in any offensive biological warfare program for the Soviet Union or Iran. —Judith Miller, "Russian Biologist Denies Work in Iran on Germ Weapons," New York Times, 19 January 1999.
20 January 1999 It is reported that the Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai allegedly provided secret documents to the United States stating that at least 10,000 Russian scientists are helping Iran develop missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The report claims that the Russian scientists are helping Iran develop its Shehab-3 and Shehab-4 missiles (capable of deploying chemical and biological weapons), as well as a 3,600 km range S.S.-400. Israel believes the missiles will be completed in 2002, and that they will be capable of carrying nuclear warheads by 2007. Iran claims that the Shehab-3 was designed based on indigenous technology. —"Mordekhay Said to Give US Data on Russia-Iran Cooperation," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 20 January 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990120000938, 20 January 1999; "Israeli Official Says Iran Missile Program 'On Schedule'," Jerusalem Post, 21 January 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990121000290, 21 January 1999.
24 January 1999 Dr. Valeriy Bakayev, Doctor of Biological Sciences at the Pasteur Institute in Tehran's Iranian Science Center for Biotechnology and Molecular Biology, responds to accusations made in the New York Times last month. A reporter covering Bakayev's press conference states that Bakayev says the article "juggled the facts in such a way that the article made out that Russian biological scientists are working in Iran on creating biological weapons....This claim does not conform to reality and discredits the honest name of a scientist and citizen of Russia." The reporter says that Bakayev "intends to look into the possibility of bringing an action against the New York Times for libel." Bakayev states, "I correctly understand the term 'freedom of the press,' and I believe that it should bear juridical and financial responsibility for gross distortion of and juggling with the facts....Neither I nor any other Russian biological scientists working in Iran are participating in any military programs of the Islamic Republic, and [the Russian scientists] know nothing about any such efforts by the Iranians in this direction." —"Scientist: Russia Not Helping Iran Build Biological Weapons," Moscow Radio Rossii (Moscow), 24 January 1999, reported in FBIS Document LD2601173699, 24 January 1999.
26 January 1999 The National Council of Resistance (NCR) of Iran, an Iranian opposition group, charges today that the Iranian "regime's BW and chemical weapons program has been intensified since Mohammad Khatami took office as president....Khatami created a group of advisors, called the Science and Technology Group, which oversees the regime's plans and projects in the area of biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons. The Science and Technology Group is affiliated with the Office of the President. The group's head is Taqi Ebtekar; Dr. Bahari-Pour is its secretary. The group's office is located in Tehran. In the Ministry of Defense, Dr. Dowlatshahi is the expert responsible for the development of biological weapons."
The opposition group alleges that there are four primary institutions responsible for producing biological weapons in Iran. The Special Industries Organization (SIO) of the Defense Ministry, headed by Dr. Abbas-Pour, is under the supervision of the Science and Technology Group. The organization, headquartered in Tehran, is made up of five branches and employs about 4,000 people. The Biological Research Center is located in the Shaheed Maysami Complex and is where the SIO conducts its BW research. The leaders and key personnel in this center are from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp, and the National Council of Resistance claims that 25 Iranian experts are currently working on "germ weapons." The NCR claims that the SIO has a fermenter project headed by Dr. Gholamhossein Riazi. In conjunction with the Razi Institute, he has managed to produce a fermenter with the help of a man by the name of Shalashi with a capacity over 100 liters.
The second organization alleged to be helping in the BW production effort is the Research and Engineering Center of the Construction Crusade. This center, headed by an engineer named Fazlollah Vakili-Fard, manufactures an advanced fermenter.
A third group that the NCR alleges is working on BW in Iran is the Revolutionary Guards Corps. This research is conducted at Imam Hossein University in Tehran and has developed a 40-50 liter fermenter.
The fourth organization named by the NCR is the Bio-Technlogy Research Center, which works under the supervision of the Organization for Scientific Industrial Research. Five biotechnology groups work in this center, one of which is developing biotech equipment such as fermenters.
The group also claims that six different organizations concentrate on "germ warfare research and production." The Vira Laboratory, located in Tehran with 250 employees, is headed by Dr. Riazzi and works under the supervision of the Defense Ministry. The NCR claims Vira is currently working on "agents that contaminate soil...Vira is now in the protection and containment stage for these agents."
A second organization, the Construction Crusade's War Engineering Research Center, is alleged to focus on research and production of VX (which the NCR apparently believes is a biological agent).
The third organization named by the NCR is the Pasteur Institute of Tehran, where the NCR claims the Defense Ministry maintains "a secret experimental lab...where the toxicity of mold and biological poisons is studied. This center is supervised by a man named Massoumi from the Defense Ministry. In this institute, research is conducted on extremely poisonous chemicals, especially the class of mold which produce aflatoxin."
The fourth organization named is the Razi Serum Institute, located in Hessarak, Karaj, 25 miles west of Tehran. "This center is capable of producing at least three microbes, useful for germ and biological warfare."
The fifth and sixth organizations working on germ warfare are the previously mentioned Revolutionary Guards Corps Imam Hossein University and the Special Industry Organization's Biological Research Center.
The group claims that Brigadier General Mohammad Fa'ezi of the Special Industry Training Center is in charge of "handling the affairs of foreign researchers." Dr. Moboudi, under the Office of the President, coordinates the project. The NCR claims that 14 Russian, Chinese, and Korean experts currently work for the SIO. The NCR claims Iran uses Beheshti, Amir Kabir, and Tarbiat Universities as covers for purchasing dual-use biotech equipment from Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Denmark. —Soona Samsami, "Clerical Regime's Quest for Biological Weapons & Germ Arsenal," National Council of Resistance of Iran, 26 January 1999.
28 January 1999 Another scientist denies the US allegations that Russian scientists are assisting Iran in developing biological weapons: "Mortez Azartush, head of the Pasteur Institute, denied reports of the US press about cooperation with Russian scientists to start the production of chemical and biological weapons in Iran." —"Russia-Iran Cooperation in Biological Weapons Denied," ITAR-TASS; FBIS, Document FTS19990128001732, 28 January 1999.
February 1999 Iran's opposition in exile accuses Tehran of researching and developing VX, toxic molds, and soil-contaminating agents: "The Iranian regime....is now capable of producing at least three types of biological munitions, usable for germ warfare. Teheran is concentrating on increasing production to mass production levels, and safeguarding these biological weapons," says Mitra Bagheri, the Italian representative of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. According to the Iranian opposition group, four different organizations/facilities are now engaged in producing biological weapons: Special Industries Organization of Iran's Ministry of Defense; Research Center of the Construction Crusade; Revolutionary Guards Corps research concentrated in the Imam Hossein University; and the Biotechnology Research Center. These sources have also supposedly identified an additional six unnamed BW research and production centers. —"Iran Opposition Says Teheran in Deadly Weapons Drive," CNN, 4 February 1999, <http://www.cnn.com>; "Group Accuses Iran of Germ War Program," Washington Times, 27 January 1999, p. A12; Arnold Beichman, "Arsenal of Germs in Iran?," Washington Times, 26 January 1999, p. A17.
10 February 1999 The CIA claims Chinese business groups have exported chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Syria, and India in the past six months, despite a ban on such exports from the Chinese government. —"Further on Spokeswoman on Arms Sales Principles," Tokyo Kyodo, 11 February 1999, reported in FBIS Document OW1102104299, 11 February 1999.
13 February 1999 The MKO reports that Iran has accelerated its chemical and biological weapons production program since President Khatami came to office: "Under the supervision of around 25 of their Russian counterparts, Iranian scientists have hastened their efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons...." According to MKO sources, Iran is awaiting sophisticated computers to accelerate its chemical and biological weapons production and has already managed to produce the nerve agent VX, as well as B. anthracis and aflatoxin. In addition to Russian scientists who are assisting Iran's program, the MKO claimed that Chinese and North Korean scientists are also "helping to further Iran's WMD capabilities...." —Greg Seigle, "Iran is Accelerating WMD, Claims Opposition," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 10, 1999, p. 63; "Iran Daily: 'What's Up' Column," Iran News, 13 February 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990220000113, 13 February 1999.
17 February 1999 British Foreign Office Minister Tony Lloyd claims that Britain has not been able to verify Israeli claims that there are thousands of Russians working on developing Iran's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs. —"IRNA: UK Has no Evidence on Russia-Iran Arms Ties," Islamic Republic News Agency, 17 February 1999, FBIS Document LD1702231899, 17 February 1999.
12 April 1999 During a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers to increase military technology cooperation with Russia in exchange for tightened control of technology transfer to Iran. At the same time, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens states to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, "We know today that Russian technological information regarding nuclear capability and ballistic missiles has for months been passed from Russia to Iran. I believe that we must do what we can, in addition to the efforts by the US, to prevent this transfer of technology to Iran." According to a senior defense official, Iran is set on developing long-range surface-to-surface missiles, as well as acquiring biological and chemical weapons and achieving a nuclear capability. He said that Iran would be unable to achieve these goals without Russian assistance, and that there are no indications that this aid is stopping. —"Further on Sharon's Russia Talks, Iranian Procurement," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 13 April 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990413001053, 13 April 1999.
13 April 1999 Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers additional military technology cooperation to Russia on the condition that it ceases its weapons technology exports to Iran. A senior intelligence officer states that Iran is developing a long-range surface-to-surface missile equipped with biological and chemical warheads, and that Iran is set on developing nuclear weapons. He adds that Russian assistance is imperative to these endeavors. —Danna Harman and Liat Collins, "Sharon Offers Russia Increased Technological Cooperation," Jerusalem Post, 13 April 1999.
28 April 1999 In an interview with Jane's Defence Weekly, Dr. Ken Alibek states that "between five and ten" of the best biological warfare scientists have been hired by Iran for long-term, top secret projects. Iran is allegedly paying them between $3,000 and $5,000 per month. —Al J. Venter, "Analysis, Spectre of Biowar Remains," Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 April, 1999, p. 63.
29 April 1999 During congressional testimony, John A. Lauder, Director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, states, "Teheran also continues to seek dual-use biotechnological equipment from Russia and other countries—ostensibly for civilian uses." —Unclassified Statement for the Record by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder on the Worldwide WMD Threat to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 29 April 1999, <http://www.cia.gov>.
17 June 1999 The Mojahedin-e Khalq claims that Iran has spent "huge sums...in recent years on developing chemical, germ warfare, and nuclear weapons in Iran." —"MKO Warns of Iranian Missile 'Threat'," Al-Hayah (London), 17 June 1999, FBIS Document MS1706112299, 17 June 1999.
July-December 1999 In its bi-annual report to congress, the CIA states that, "Teheran expanded its efforts to seek biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses." —Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 1999.
10 August 1999 A Washington DC news report claims that Iran is suspected of trying to produce the smallpox virus; that it is "among the nations that have hidden quantities of Variola for possible weapons production." —August Gribbin, "Scientists Test New Defense for Old Enemy - Smallpox; Rogue Nations Feared to Have the Virus," Washington Times, 19 August 1999, p. A1; "Iran Radio on Western 'Allegations' Against Iran," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran; FBIS, Document FTS19990822000726, 22 August 1999.
21 August 1999 Iran's Armed Forces reject US reports that Iran is producing weapons of mass destruction. It responds that it was a victim of such weapons and has consistently supported all international efforts to ban such weapons. —"Iran Rejects US Reports of Mass Destruction Weapons," Deutsche Presse- Agentur, 21 August 1999.
22 September 1999 A report by the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center claims that Iran is building a missile that is expected to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. According to the report, most of the new medium- and intermediate-range missiles built by Iran, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan "will be armed with non-conventional warheads." —Bil Gertz, "Tehran Increases Range on Missiles – Likely to Carry Nukes, Chemicals," Washington Times, 22 September 1999.
23 September 1999 It is reported that the Organization for Defense Industries has begun operation of the production line for uniforms resistant to biological agents (protective suits). —"Iran Commissions NBC Suit Production Plant," IRIB Television; FBIS Document, 23 September 1999.
10 November 1999 Iran's new Zulfiqar main battle tank features a nuclear, biological, and chemical defense system. —Christopher F. Foss, "Iran's Zulfiqar MBT Enters Full Production," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 November, 1999, p. 26.
2000-2001 Jane's reiterates its 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 report that Mohammad Mohaddessin of the National Council of Resistance of Iran believes that biological weapons research is being carried out at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production facility northwest of Karaj on the Qazvin-Hessarak highway. —"NBC Capabilities, Iran," Jane's NBC Defence Systems 2000-2001, 1 March 2000.
January-June 2000 According to a report by the Director of Central Intelligence, during the first half of 2000, "...Tehran expanded its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses. We judge that this equipment and know-how could be applied to Iran's biological warfare (BW) program." —Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2000, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2000.htm>.
4 February 2000 Boris Labusov, chief of the Press Center for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, denies allegations made by the CIA that Russia is continuing exports of chemical, biological, and ballistic missile production technologies to Iran. According to Labusov, the United States does not support these statements with verifiable evidence. —"SVR Denies CIA Director's Allegations of Continuing Exports of Rocket Technologies from Russia to Iran" Interfax, 4 February 2000.
7 February 2000 According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, most estimates indicate that Iran has between 6 and 12 Scud-B launchers, and as many as 200 Scud-B ballistic missiles, with a range of 230-310km. Other sources, including the Israel government, indicate that the number could be as high as 300 Scud-Bs with 15 launchers. US analysts reportedly say that Iran can domestically produce nearly all components of the Scud-B, except for the most sophisticated components of the guidance system and motors. Iran may also have between 5 and 10 Scud-C launchers, each with several missiles. This number probably includes four Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) that Iran received from North Korea in 1995. The North Korean Scud-C has a range of 500km and can carry a 700kg warhead. Iran has reportedly tested the new missiles from mobile launchers near Qom, to a target area about 500km south of Shahroud. Iran may be working with Syria on developing chemical or biological warheads for the Scud-C. In addition, North Korea may have sold such technology to Iran as part of the Scud-C sale. —Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), pp. 35-36.
10 February 2000 In an article written by US Defense Secretary William Cohen and translated for and published in the German paper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Cohen states that Iran (as well as Iraq and North Korea) are trying to manufacture nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In addition, Cohen claims that Iran is building missiles capable of carrying these weapons. —William Cohen, "Schirm oder Schrecken - der Streit um den ABM-Vertrag," [To Defend or to Scare – the Debate over the ABM Treaty], Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 10 February 2000.
22 March 2000 CIA Director George Tenet says that Iranian technological advances have made it difficult for the CIA to monitor Iran's BW program. Tenet says that "Iran, for example, driven in part by stringent international export controls, is acquiring the ability to domestically produce raw materials and the equipment to support indigenous biological agent production." —"Iran Becoming Self-Sufficient in Bioweaponry," Middle East Newsline, 22 March 2000.
22 March 2000 US President Bill Clinton signs the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which allows the United States to impose immediate sanctions on any country that supplies Iran with equipment or technology that can be used to develop or deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. —Ivan Safronov, "Iranian Stumbling Block," Kommersant, 16 March 2000, p. 2, reported in "Western Hemisphere; United States," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 12 April 2000, p. 23.
June 2000 Iran "made the most active attempts to hire biologists from the FSU (Former Soviet Union) states. The Iranian representatives proposed cooperation to the leadership of some Russian organizations. The Council of Resistance demonstrates that some Russian scientists have signed the contracts and work now for the Iranian defense industry or in the Pasteur Institute." [Note: this appears to be completely drawn from the NCR allegations made on 26 January 1999.] —"Brain Drain from Russia: A Nonproliferation Threat?" Security Issues – Executive Intelligence Newsletter, June 2000.
1 July-31 December 2000 The CIA reiterates past reports that Iran continues to seek dual-use biological equipment, expertise, and materials from abroad. "Iran probably began its offensive BW program during the Iran-Iraq War, and it may have some limited capability for BW deployment." —Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 2000, 21 September 2001, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2000.htm>.
19 July 2000 Turkish intelligence suggests that production of biological weapons is carried out at front companies and other institutions in nine locations in Iran's north and western regions. The work is allegedly being done with the help of Chinese, Indian, and North Korean assistance. —"Iranian Missile Program, Threat against Turkey Viewed," Milliyet (Istanbul), 19 July 2000, reported in FBIS Document GMP20000719000225, 19 July 2000.
20 July 2000 The Iranian Embassy in Ankara denies allegations that Iran has the necessary equipment to produce biological weapons. —"Turkey: Iranian Embassy Says Missiles Not Targeted at Foreign Countries," British Broadcasting Corporation, 21 July 2000.
29 August 2000 Iran is seeking to build cooperation in the biotechnology field with foreign institutions in order to offset the challenges posed by insufficient budgets, lack of skilled workers, and unclear Iranian government policies. "Our country's scientific and university centers can compensate for the domestic scientific weaknesses and educational vacuums with the aid of foreign researchers and experts." —"Call for International Cooperation in Biotechnology," Info-Prod Research (Middle East), 29 August 2000.
21 September 2000 In Senate testimony, the CIA reiterates most of the information it related on 10 May 1996. Instead of the statement, "Currently, the program is mostly in the research and development stages," the CIA now says "the program is in the late stages of research and development." —"Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," Statement by A. Norman Schindler, Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center to the International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 21 September 2000, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2000/ schindler_WMD_092200.htm>.
5 October 2000 John A. Lauder, Director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Iran is pursuing both civilian biotech activities and a biological warfare (BW) program...The program is in the late stages of research and development, but we believe Iran already holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons." —"Russian Proliferation to Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs," Statement by John A. Lauder, Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 October 2000, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2000/ lauder_WMD_100500.html>.
5 October 2000 Robert J. Einhorn, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, reiterates what is said by John A. Lauder. —"Statement by Robert J. Einhorn, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 October 2000, <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/001005_einhorn_sfrc.html>.
6 October 2000 Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage tours an Iranian-Cuban vaccine and biotechnological medicine factory in Iran. The facility is expected to be ready in late 2001 for the production of hepatitis B vaccine, streptokinase, interferon, and erythropoietin. —"Cuban Vice President Lage Begins Official Visit to Iran," Prensa Latina (Havana), 6 October 2000, reported in FBIS Document LAP20001006000055, 6 October 2000.
15 October 2000 The head of the Razi Research Institute, Ali-Akbar Mohammadi, claims the Institute produces more than $100 million worth of vaccines every year. He claims the Institute meets 100 percent of Iran's livestock vaccine needs every year, 80 percent of its poultry vaccine needs, and 85 percent of its human vaccine needs. The annual production is 2.7 billion vaccine doses per year. Mohammadi claims the Institute exports to 21 countries, and that some 30 percent of the Institute's vaccines were given away last year free of charge to Afghanistan, Kenya, Albania, Azerbaijan, and Tanzania. He adds that although the Institute is allocated $5 million every year, the institute spends considerably less than that. —"Iranian Economic Roundup 15-22 Oct," Islamic Republic News Agency, 15 October 2000, reported in FBIS Document IAP20001102000034, 2 November 2000.
2001-2002 Jane's reiterates the claim in its 1998-1999, 1999-2000, and 2000-2001 reports from Mohammad Mohaddessin of the National Council of Resistance of Iran that biological weapons research is being carried out at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production facility northwest of Karaj on the Qazvin-Hessarak highway. —"NBC Capabilities, Iran," Jane's NBC Defence Systems 2000-2001, 20 June 2001.
January 2001 The US DOD reports that "Iran is believed to be pursuing offensive biological warfare capabilities and its effort may have evolved beyond agent research and development to the capability to produce small quantities of agent." —US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 36.
1 January-30 June 2001 In its unclassified, semi-annual report to the US Congress, the CIA charges that Iran is attempting to develop biological weapons and their delivery systems. The CIA says that Iran continues to seek dual-use biotech equipment from Russia and Western Europe and that the equipment could be used to enhance Iran's BW program. The CIA believes Iran began its BW program during the Iran-Iraq War, and that it "may have some limited capability for BW deployment." In addition, the report states, "Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD...technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons—chemical, biological, and nuclear—and their delivery systems." The report alleges that Iran received additional assistance in its efforts from entities in North Korea and Western Europe. —Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 1 January through 30 June 2001, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2001.htm>.
7 March 2001 Unconfirmed reports claim that Iran is working to make its 1,300km-range Shehab-3 missile capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons. —Salameh Ne'matt, "Keeping the Options Open," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 2001, <http://www.janes.com>.
29 March 2001 Former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, in a speech before the National Press Club, says that Iranian intelligence officers have been "making recruiting trips to Russia, offering biological weapons scientists many times their pay to move to Iran." —Martin Schram, "Nunn's Somber Warning," Washington Times, 6 April 2001.
31 March 2001 Cuban Vice President and Head of Biotechnology Affairs, Dr. Mose Myar, says Cuba is ready to increase its cooperation with Iran in the field of biotechnology. Strengthening cooperation with Iran is viewed by Fidel Castro as being important. Cooperation in the field of manufacturing medicines, technology transfer, and vaccine production began six years ago. —"Cuba, Iran to Expand Cooperation in Biotechnology," Islamic Republic News Agency, 31 March 2001, reported in FBIS Document IAP20010331000035, 31 March 2001.
1 April 2001 According to Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute in Washington, DC, Iran has a BW program that possibly includes B. anthracis and botulinum toxin. —A. Venter, "Iran's Increasingly Unconventional Arsenal, Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 April 2001.
5 April 2001 India and Iran are about to sign a new trade deal that aims to increase Indian exports to Iran, and one of the areas India will reportedly concentrate on is biotechnology. Biotechnology is a "major interest" according to Dr. Amit Mitra, Secretary-General of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. —"India, Iran to Sign New Trade Accord during PM's visit," Business Line, 6 April 2001.
7 May 2001 An editorial in the Iran News notes that, "Havana (Cuba) is currently participating in the construction of a vaccine factory near Tehran." This report coincides with the official state visit to Iran of Cuban President Fidel Castro, from 8-11 May 2001. During the visit, the two countries solidify the joint Iranian-Cuban project on biotechnology. Further information reports that Cuba is assisting Iran in the production of hepatitis B vaccine in the town of Karaj. The factory is slated to go online at the end of 2001. —"Iran: Daily Praises Iran-Cuba for Debunking Myth of US Supremacy," IRNA, 7 May 2001; FBIS, Document IAP20010508000073, 7 May 2001; "Urab: Castro Views Joint Iranian-Cuban Biotechnology Project," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1, 8 May 2001; FBIS, Document IAP20010509000070, 8 May 2001; "Castro Hails Iran's Fight against Imperialism since Revolution," IRNA, 8 May 2001; FBIS, Document IAP20010508000032, 8 May 2001.
8 May 2001 Iran joins China and seven other countries in calling for the international community to scrap an agreement that seeks tighter control on exports of BW-related technology. The Australia Group (AG), the 32-member state organization created to control the export of technology that could be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons, seeks to enforce stringent verification measures. Iran, a target of past technology transfer restrictions, claims that the AG's policies are discriminatory and politically motivated. —"Kyodo: China, Others Call for Disbanding Biological Weapons Group," Tokyo Kyodo, 8 May 2001; FBIS, Document JPP20010509000005, 5/16/01; "Iran Calls for Terminating Efforts for BW Treaty," Middle East Newsline, 10 May 2001, Vol. 3, No. 184.
31 July 2001 Iran Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi disputes claims by White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer that Iran is trying to produce or gain access to biological weapons. Mr. Asefi states that the claims are "desperate and unfounded," and that the United States is making the allegations to justify its refusal to sign the protocol to the BWC. Furthermore, Asefi says that his country has supported the 1972 BWC in both word and deed. —"Asefi Denies US Claims on Iran's Access to Biological Weapons," IRNA, 31 July 2001.
31 July 2001 Two Iranian MPs deny US allegations that Iran is producing biological weapons, calling the allegations "baseless": "Iran is opposed to such moves, and all its nuclear research and activities are in line with upgrading its technological information, not for developing biological or nuclear weapons to use against any country." Iran stands by its signature to the BWC, the MPs say. —"US Greatest Producer of Biological Weapons: MPs," Tehran Times (Tehran), 31 July 2001; FBIS, document IAP20010731000014, 31 July 2001.
5 September 2001 An unnamed US administration official states that Russian companies continue to help Iran develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. He asks not to be named and does not elaborate. —Jonathan Wright, "US Official: Russians Help Iran with Arms Programs," Reuters, 5 September 2001.
October 2001 José de la Fuente, former Director of Research and Development at the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) in Cuba, states that CIGB sold Iran the "production technology for three of the CIGB's most significant accomplishments: a recombinant hepatitis B vaccine, IFN-αIIb, and streptokinase." De la Fuente called this technology sale "profoundly disturbing to many of us who gave so much time and effort to the development of an economically viable but essentially altruistic biotechnology for our country. The strengthening of Cuban-Iranian cooperation began with Cuban aid shortly after the Iranian earthquake of 1990...It has culminated in Iran buying outright the prized fruits of the CIGB, namely recombinant protein production technologies in yeast and Esherichia coli, as well as the large-scale production protocols for both soluble and insoluble proteins synthesized in or excreted by them. There is no one who truly believes that Iran is interested in these technologies for the purpose of protecting all the children in the Middle East from hepatitis, or treating their people with cheap streptokinase when they suffer sudden cardiac arrest." —José de la Fuente, "Wine into Vinegar – the Fall of Cuba's Biotechnology," Nature Biotechnology 19 (October 2001), p. 906.
19 November 2001 John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, accuses Iran of having an offensive BW program in violation of the BWC in his address to the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. In his words: "We are also quite concerned about Iran, which the United States believes probably has produced and weaponized BW agents in violation of the convention." —"Bolton Says Iraq, North Korea, Violate Biological Weapons Pact," US-Iraq Policy, 19 November 2001; distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, US Department of State, <http://usinfo.state.gov>; "US Names Rogue States as BW Producers," Middle East Newsline, 20 November 2001.
December 2001 A report states that Iran "is seeking" nuclear weapons, "likely" has biological weapons, and "has had" chemical weapons. —Tamar A. Mehuron, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," Air Force Magazine, December 2001, p. 11.
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Updated January 2004 |
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