Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

27 January 2004
In Tokyo, officials from Japan and Iran meet for bilateral consultations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A summary posted on the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: "As for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)/Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), both sides stressed the importance of conventions' universalization, which gains a momentum in the wake of Libyan accession to CWC, and of strengthening their national implementation by all member states. The Iranian side explained the current status of its bills to implement CWC/BWC. The Japanese side appreciated Iranian positive and constructive stance in the BWC enhancement process based upon the three-year 'work program', particularly in the Annual Meeting of the States Parties held in November 2003."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 63 (March 2004), p. 45.

19 - 30 July 2004
As part of the preparations for the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the BWC which is to be held in Geneva in December 2004 a Meeting of Experts is convened in Geneva. The Iranian delegation sets out its positions on a number of proposals before the meeting. In regard to the surveillance of infectious disease, the statement say: "although the BWC lacks a verification mechanism, we do believe that assigning security and politically oriented responsibilities, such as investigation of suspicious cases of use of biological weapons, to certain international organizations such as WHO, puts the humanitarian and fundamental objectives and mandate of these organizations in jeopardy." In regard to the issue of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons; "even though according to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the 'Use' is prohibited, but [...] regrettably some States Parties have still kept their reservations to that effect, that is keeping the right of retaliation for any case of use against them."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 14.

2 August 2004
In Tehran, the chairman of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Foreign Policy Committee says that since the war with Iraq it has been the policy of Iran to take defensive measures against chemical, biological and nuclear attacks. In an interview with IRNA news agency, Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian says that the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics is responsible for enforcement of the policy.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 66 (December 2004), p. 35.

22 September 2004
An officer in the Iranian Republic Guards appears on Iranian television to describe an ongoing military exercise, "Ashura-5." The officer claims that the exercise has demonstrated the ability of the Iranian armed forces to oppose invaders even if they are equipped with "the most destructive bacteriological and chemical weapons."
--Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network, 22 September 2004, translated transcript provided by FBIS as "Guards commander says Iran ready for bacteriological, chemical warfare," FBIS document IAP20040922000086, http://www.opensource.gov.

23 November 2004
The US Central Intelligence Agency submits its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 July Through 31 December 2003 in accordance with S.721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. In respect to Iran, the report states that; "Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise that could be used in Tehran's BW program. Iran probably has the capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents." This statement, which repeats the statements issued on this matter by the CIA for a number of years now suggests an absence of new developments.
--Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 July Through 31 December 2003 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2004), p. 3, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/
721report_july_dec2003.pdf.

19 January 2005
Speaking in Paris at the Middle East, Peace, Stability, and the Role of Iran seminar Iranian nuclear spokesman Hossein Musavian says: "Tehran has fully respected its commitments to disarmament treaties but developed countries have not acted responsibly in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and biological cooperation for peaceful purposes as stipulated in international agreements." This statement continues the Iranian tradition of criticizing western export control regimes such as the Australia Group which it sees as being noncompliant with the requirements of the BWC.
--"Iranian Official Says Country Ready For Security Cooperation With Europe," 19 January 2005, FBIS document IAP20050119000107, http://www.opensource.gov.

21 January 2005
The Cuban and Iranian governments sign a memorandum of intent formalizing a number of decisions made on cooperation between the two governments. One of these decisions will result in the construction, in Iran, of a factory for the production of Hepatitis B vaccine. The facility is expected to commence operations by April 2005.
--"Cuba and Iran sign memo of intent to expand cooperation," Havana Granma, 21 January 2005, FBIS document LAP20050121000064,
http://www.opensource.gov.

11 February 2005
The Washington Post reports that the US government is undertaking a wide-ranging review of existing intelligence on Iran in the wake of reviews of intelligence performance on Iraq prior to the US invasion of 2003. One product of this review will be a memo focusing exclusively on Tehran's chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities - [which] will reflect an updated consensus within the intelligence community.
-- Dafna Linzer and Walter Pincus, "U.S. Reviewing its Intelligence on Iran," Washington Post, 12 February 2005, p. A12,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A17526-2005Feb11.html.

20 February 2005
The German Customs Office of Criminal Investigations (ZKA) believes that Iran is engaged in efforts to develop biological weapons. Biological weapons research and development efforts are reportedly being conducted "in small laboratories of universities, strictly guarded from the outside world." The ZKA also observes that "Iran has long-standing experience in the field of bio-technology so that is has the necessary know-how for operating biological combat agent programs."
--"German intelligence services see Iran possessing biological, chemical weapons," 20 February 2005, FBIS document EUP2005022000035, http://www.opensource.gov.

28 February 2006
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of biological weapons General Maples says: "we believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development."
--Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 February 2006, p. 10, http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement24.pdf.

9 March 2005
A nine member panel, made up of former senior government officials, completes a 14 month review of the United States foreign intelligence gathering capacity and found the intelligence on Iran deficient. The panel, created by President Bush, has expressed particular concern over the unreliable quality of intelligence on Iran's weapons of mass destruction which was unsatisfactory.
--Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, "Intelligence about Iran for Bush is called weak," International Herald Tribune, 9 March 2005, http://www.lexisnexis.com.

31 March 2005
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction presents its final report to the President. The report notes that the Commission "reviewed the state of the Intelligence Community's knowledge about the unconventional weapons programs of several countries that pose current proliferation threats, including Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. We cannot discuss many of our findings from these studies in our unclassified report, but we can say here that we found that we have only limited access to critical information about several of these high-priority intelligence targets."
--Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 11, http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html.

May 2006
The US Central Intelligence Agency releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004. In the section addressing Iranian biological programs the report states: "As of 2004, the status of Iran's biotechnology infrastructure indicated that at a minimum, Iran probably had the capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents for offensive purposes. Iran continued to seek dual- use biotechnology materials, equipment, and expertise that is consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but could benefit Tehran's BW program."
--Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006), p. 3, http://www.dni.gov/reports/
2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf.

22 September 2006
The United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry issues an updated list of Iranian entities that are considered to be of potential WMD concern. These entities are end-users of goods for which an export licence has been refused on end-use grounds related to suspected WMD programs. The updated list adds three entitites: Amir Kabir University of Technology; M/S Iran Electromotor; and Oil Industries Engineering and Construction aka LG/OIEC/IOEC. There are now forty-nine entities on the DTI's list. The list is intended to help exporters judge which exports might potentially be of concern on end use grounds, based on previous licensing decisions. The presence of an entity on the list does not totally preclude the issuing of export licenses; fifteen entities on the list have had export licenses granted as well as refused.
--WMD End-Use Control: Licence Applications for Iran, Amended May 2006, http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-exportcontrol/
licensing-policy/end-use-control/page29307.html.

28 - 30 September 2006
The United States Congress passes the Iran Freedom Support Act which is signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 30th. The law is an amended version of the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. In addition to authorizing assistance to support democracy in Iran the act attempts to prevent Iran from acquiring biological weapons and other WMD. It requires that "mandatory sanctions" be applied to any person who provides any "goods, services, technology, or other items" which could be used for biological weapons or weapon of mass destruction.
--Jim Abrams, "House Approves Iran Freedom Support Act," The Associated Press, 28 September 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/28/ AR2006092800941.html; "President Bush Signs H.R. 6138 and H.R. 6198," 30 September 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060930-3.html; U.S. Public Law H.R. 6198. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 28 September 2006. Iran Freedom of Support Act, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&
docid=f:h6198eh.txt.pdf.

20 November 2006
Speaking at the Sixth Review Conference of the Convention on Biological Weapons (BWC) the United States Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, Mr. John C. Rood says: "We [the United States] believe that the regime in Iran probably has an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the BWC." Rood did not provide evidence for his accusations. Speaking in reply, Iranian ambassador Alireza Moaiyeri, "categorically rejected" the accusation.
--Richard Waddington, "Iran probably has germ weapons, possibly N.Korea-US," Reuters, 20 November 2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/
newsdesk/L20649826.htm; Remarks to the Sixth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference John C. Rood, Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, 20 November 2006, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/76446.htm; Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and other International Organizations Geneva, press release, 20 November 2006 "Statement by H. E. Alireza Moaiyeri Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC)" http://missions.itu.int/~missiran/
sts2006/06112801BWC.htm.

11 January 2007
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran"s pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of biological weapons General Maples says: "Iran has a growing biotechnology industry, significant pharmaceutical experience and the overall infrastructure that could be used to support a biological warfare program. DIA believes Iran is pursuing development of biological weapons."
--Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 11 January 2007, http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?
hearingid=2467&witnessId=5974.

20 August 2007
Addressing the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland the Iranian representative notes the importance of a legally binding compliance mechanism. He states that "the Fifth and Sixth Review Conferences decided by consensus on the follow-up mechanism aiming at promotion of common understanding among the States Parties with the hope that real multilateralism would be revived and the negotiations on the Protocol on strengthening the Convention would be resumed in a foreseeable future. We strongly believe that the present follow-up mechanism which is of limited scope and nature, cannot be considered as a substitute to afore-mentioned negotiations."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 76+77 (October 2007), p. 7.

14 November 2007
Testifying before a hearing of the National Security and Foreign Affairs subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform committee on the Regional And Global Consequences of U.S. Military Action in Iran Dr. Paul Pillar, former Deputy Director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center addresses the proposition that in the event of a US attack against Iranian nuclear facilities the Iranian government may choose to transfer chemical or biological weapons to terrorist groups for use against the US or its allies. In his testimony Dr. Pillar notes that in the past "Iran [has] not passed any of these unconventional weapons to clients or terrorist groups." "The reason is when you ask what would be the interest of such a regime to pass such weapons to another group where they would lose control, the interest simply isn't there. It's all disadvantage rather than advantage. They lose control and if they were ever used, a group that's known to be a client of Iran's -- say Lebanese Hezbollah -- would automatically be assumed by Washington and everyone else that they would be acting on Iran's behalf. So there's simply no advantage to it."
--Hearing of the on National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee; Subject: Iran: Realities, Options and Consequences, Part 3: Regional and Global Consequences of U.S. Military Action in Iran, 14 November 2007, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 February 2008
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of National Intelligence addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of biological weapons Mr. McConnell says: "We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for biological warfare."
--J. Michael McConnell, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 5 February 2008, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/
20080205_transcript.pdf.

27 February 2008
Testifying before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. General Michael D. Maples states: “Tehran continues to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment and expertise which have legitimate uses, but also could enable ongoing biological warfare efforts.”
--Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services, 27 February 2008, p. 12. <http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement_30.pdf>.

3 March 2008
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2005. In the section addressing Iranian biological weapons programs the report states: “As of 2005, the status of its [Iran’s] biotechnology infrastructure indicated that at a minimum, Iran probably had the capability to produce at least small quantities of biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnology materials, equipment, and expertise that are consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but could benefit Tehran’s assessed probable BW program.”
[This language essentially repeats that of the 2004 report.]
--Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2005, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), p. 2,
<http://www.dni.gov/reports/CDA%2011-14-2006.pdf>.

3 March 2008
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006. In the section addressing Iranian biological warfare programs the report states: “Our assessment of Iran's biotechnology infrastructure indicates that Iran probably has the capability to produce large-quantities of some Biological Warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. Iran continues to seek dual-use biotechnology materials, equipment, and expertise consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but these components could also advance Tehran's BW capability.”
[This language differs from that of the 2005 report by introducing the asertion that Iran is capable of producing “large quantities” of BW agents as opposed to the “at least small quantities” of the previous report.]
--Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), p. 4, <http://www.dni.gov/reports/Acquisition_Technology_Report_030308.pdf>.

Updated April, 2008