This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

January-June 2000
According to a report by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), during the first half of 2000, "...Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in Russia and China." Regarding Chinese assistance to Iran's CW program, the reports states, "...Evidence [during this period] ...shows Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to what extent these efforts have succeeded."
—Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2000, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2001.htm>.

4 February 2000
Boris Labusov, chief of the Press Center of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, denies allegations made by the CIA that Russia is continuing exports of chemical, biological, and ballistic missile production technologies to Iran. According to Labusov, the United States does not support these statements with verifiable evidence. Labusov does not comment on reports that hackers from Russian special services could have broken into the personal computer of former CIA chief John Deutch.
—"SVR Denies CIA Director's Allegations of Continuing Exports of Rocket Technologies from Russia to Iran" Interfax, 4 February 2000.

7 February 2000
According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, most estimates indicate that Iran has between six and 12 Scud-B launchers, and as many as 200 Scud-B ballistic missiles, with a range of 230-310km. Other sources, including the Israel government, indicate that the number could be as high as 300 Scud-Bs with 15 launchers. US analysts reportedly say that Iran can domestically produce nearly all components of the Scud-B, except for the most sophisticated components of the guidance system and motors. Iran may also have between five and 10 Scud-C launchers, each with several missiles. This number probably includes four transporter-erector launchers (TELs) that Iran received from North Korea in 1995. The North Korean Scud-C has a range of 500km and can carry a 700kg warhead. Iran has reportedly tested the new missiles from mobile launchers near Qom, to a target area about 500km south of Shahroud. Iran may be working with Syria on developing chemical or biological warheads for the Scud-C. In addition, North Korea may have sold such technology to Iran as part of the Scud-C sale.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), pp. 35-36.

10 February 2000
In an article written by US Defense Secretary William Cohen and translated for and published in the German paper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Cohen states that Iran (as well as Iraq and North Korea) are trying to manufacture nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In addition, Cohen claims that Iran is building missiles capable of carrying these weapons.
—William Cohen, "Schirm oder Schrecken - der Streit um den ABM-Vertrag," [To Defend or to Scare – the Debate over the ABM Treaty], Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 10 February 2000.

18 February 2000
China rejects accusations that it cooperates with Iran in developing WMD, including chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as missiles.
—"The Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister in Teheran to Launch Cooperation," Agence France Presse, 18 February 2000. [CNS translation]

25 March 2000
According to "knowledgeable sources," Iran will not give up its efforts to develop long-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads, despite the victory of reformists in the recent Iranian parliamentary elections.
—"Iran Will Not Abandon Developing Its Long-Range Missiles," Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), 25 March 2000, <http://www.alquds.com>.

11 April 2000
US President Bill Clinton signs the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which allows the United States to impose immediate sanctions on any country that supplies Iran with equipment or technology that can be used to develop or deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

12 April 2000
An FAS report on Damghan states that it is "said to be Iran's primary chemical weapons production facility, along with facilities located at Esfahan, Parchin, and Qazvin." (The report claims that an Indian company is helping build a major plant to produce phosphorus pentasulfide, a nerve gas precursor.) However, other sources conclude that claims that Iran had chemical weapons plants at Damghan and Parchin that began operations as early as March 1988 are of uncertain reliability.
—"Iran Special Weapons Facilities: Damghan," Federation of American Scientists, 12 April 2000.

19 July 2000
A report by Turkish intelligence units claims that Iran possesses 500 tons of chemical weapons, most of which consist of nerve agents. The rest consist of blood agents.
—"Iranian Missile Program, Threat against Turkey Viewed," Istanbul Milliyet, 19 July 2000, reported in FBIS Document GMP20000719000225, 19 July 2000.

August 2000
According to a study by Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, "Iran has been hampered in its nuclear weapons programs but appears ready to use its growing arsenal of chemical bombs." The study quotes expert Michael Eisenstadt as saying that Iran has the most active chemical warfare program in the developing world, and it raises concerns that Iran may be working to develop the Russian Novichok agent.
—Middle East Newsline 2 (333), 29 August 2000; W. Seth Carus, "Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction," MERIA 4 (3) (September 2000).

9 August 2000
The CIA finds evidence that Iran continued to seek Chinese assistance in its chemical warfare program. However, "it is unclear to what extent these efforts have succeeded."
—Robert Burns, "CIA: China Expanded Missile Role," Washington Post, 9 August 2000.

21 September 2000
Deputy Director A. Norman Schindler of the DCI Nonproliferation Center states in testimony to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, "We believe the [chemical weapons] program [of Iran] remains active despite Teheran's decision to ratify the CWC."
—Statement by Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center, A. Norman Schindler, statement on Iran's WMD programs to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 21 September 2000, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2000/ schindler_WMD_092200.htm>.

5 October 2000
John A. Lauder, director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, testifies to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iran's pursuit of CW: "We believe the program remains active despite Tehran's decision to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Iran has a large and growing CW production capacity and already has produced a number of CW agents, including nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. We believe it possesses a stockpile of at least several thousand metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent." Lauder states further, "Tehran's goals for its CW program for the past decade have been to expand its production capability and stockpiles, reach self-sufficiency by acquiring the means to manufacture chemical production equipment and precursors, and diversify its CW arsenal by producing more sophisticated and [lethal] agents and munitions."
—John A. Lauder, Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center, Statement to the Near East and South Asian and European Affairs Subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 October 2000, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/ 000/lauder_WMD_100500.html >.

17 October 2000
Anthony Cordesman reports that "India is assisting in the construction of a major new plant at Qazvim, near Tehran, to manufacture phosphorous pentasulfide, a major precursor for nerve gas. The plant is fronted by Meli Agrochemicals, and the program was negotiated by Dr. Mejid Tehrani Abbaspour, a chief security advisor to Rafsanjani. A recent report by German intelligence indicates that Iran has made major efforts to acquire the equipment necessary to produce Sarin and Tabun, using the same cover of purchasing equipment for pesticide plants that Iraq used for its Sa'ad 16 plant in the 1980s. German sources note that three Indian companies—Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India—have approached German pharmaceutical and engineering concerns for such equipment and technology under conditions where German intelligence was able to trace the end user to Iran."
—Anthony Cordesman, "Iranian Arms Transfers: The Facts," 17 October 2000.

22 October 2000
An Iranian Army newsletter states, "a one-day seminar was held to study the contents of the [Chemical Weapons Convention]...[one of the presenters at the conference said that] Iran played a sensitive role in prevention of the manufacture and use of chemical weapons on an international level. He added that Iran was in fact a strong pillar of international campaign against such weapons. 'Despite the fact that there are stockpiles of chemical weapons in the arsenal of many countries in the world, Iran does not regard possession of such weapons us a measure of military strength....Iran to day is recognized as the best campaigner against chemical weapons among nations of the world. The words of the president and members of the National Committee on Prevention of Chemical Weapons prove that statement.' At the seminar Army Brigadier Javadian...added 'The close and all-embracing cooperation between the Army and the Convention on Prevention of Chemical Weapons is the best expression of the commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the contents of the said convention'."
—"Iran: Saff Army Monthly Carries 'News in Brief,'" Tehran Saff, 21 November 2000, reported in FBIS Document IAP2001011170000063.

November 2000
A one-day seminar is held in Iran to study the contents of the CWC. Participants include the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the National Committee on Prevention of Chemical Weapons, and top Army personnel. Speaking at the seminar, Secretary Abol-Hasani says, "...Iran does not regard possession of such [chemical] weapons as a measure of military strength."
—"One Day Seminar on Chemical Weapons and Surveying of the Contents of International Convention on Prevention of Chemical Weapons," Saff, 21 November 2000; FBIS, Document IAP20010117000063, 21 November 2000.

November 2000
For the November 2000 edition of Synthesis, a publication of the OPCW, an Israeli academic discusses Iran's possible CW program as rationale for Israel not joining the CWC. He states, "...Iran's actions regarding CW are watched closely. After Iran deposited the instruments of ratification for the Chemical Weapons Convention in November 1997, its declaration was late, and its contents were not officially revealed. In November 1998, Iranian Ambassador Mohammed Alborzi made a major presentation at the 3rd Conference of States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague. He admitted that Iran had sought to develop the deadly weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, but claimed that "Following the establishment of the cease fire, the decision to develop chemical weapons capabilities was reversed and the process was terminated..." He also repeated complaints that the United States and other state parties have imposed limitations on access to technologies and materials that might be used in producing chemical weapons, even to CWC signatories, which in turn, was seen as an effort to maintain or even enhance a CW capability. Given its past and current policies with respect to Israel, Iranian membership on the OPCW Executive Council and the OPCW's courses in Iran did not help to increase the credibility of the regime, in Israeli eyes."
—Gerald M. Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC," Synthesis, November 2000, pp. 29-31.

13 November 2000
Abbas Khani, head of the Iranian Legal Office for the War Veterans, claims that since 1988, over 15,000 veterans have died from an undefined "CW syndrome" as a result of Iraq's use of CW against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.
—"Iran: Over 15,000 War Veterans Have Died of Chemical Weapons Syndrome Since 1988," IRNA, 23 November 2000; FBIS, Document IAP20001123000054, 27 November 2000.

December 2000
The National Intelligence Council, a 15-member CIA-sponsored panel, releases a non-classified intelligence assessment entitled, "Global Trends 2015." According to the document, "Iran sees its short- and medium-range missiles as deterrents, as force-multiplying weapons of war, primarily with conventional warheads, and as options for delivering biological, chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons."
—National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency, "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernmental Experts," December 2000, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html>.

8 December 2000
Mr. Jose Mauricio Bustani, director-general of the OPCW, calls the November 2000 report by Gerald M. Steinberg that appeared in Synthesis to contain "unsubstantiated allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its commitment to the CWC....On the substance of the matter the Secretariat wishes to reiterate that it has no reason whatsoever to question Iran's full compliance with the CWC, and that the application of verification measures in Iran is strictly in accordance with the Convention. There are no grounds for any concern in an atmosphere of openness and transparency, and with the full cooperation of the Iranian Government. Equally, none of the 140 other States Parties has raised any such concerns within the OPCW, which is the sole competent and legitimate authority to verify compliance with the Convention...I would like to conclude with offering, once again, our sincere apologies to the Islamic Republic of Iran."
— Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Office of the Director-General, "Statement by Director-General of the OPCW. Mr. Jose Mauricio Bustani," 8 December 2000.

10 December 2000
Jose Bustani, director-general of the OPCW, allegedly states, "Iran fully abided by its commitments to the chemical weapons treaty and that there is no room for fear or uncertainty on the issue."
—"Iran: OPCW Rejects Israeli Chemical Weapons Claims against Iran," IRNA, 10 December 2000; FBIS, Document IAP20001210000072, 10 December 2000.

January 2001
The US DOD claims that "...Iran has continued its efforts to seek production technology, expertise, and precursor chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient chemical warfare infrastructure."
—US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 36.

January-June 2001
In its unclassified, semi-annual report to Congress, the CIA charges, "During the first half of 2001, Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal of having an indigenous nerve agent production capability." In addition, the report states, "Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD ...technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons—chemical, biological, and nuclear—and their delivery systems." The report alleges that Iran received additional assistance in its efforts from entities in North Korea and Western Europe.
—Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 1 January through 30 June 2001, <http://www.cia.gov>.

9 January 2001
The Israeli Supreme Court releases a copy of its ruling against Nahum Manbar for his alleged assistance to Iran's CW program. Manbar supposedly signed a contract in 1990 with Majid Abasfor, then head of Iran's CW project, to provide know-how and equipment for the construction of a CW factory. The factory was reportedly intended for the production of highly concentrated (96 percent) thionyl chloride, used to produce nerve and mustard gas. In addition to this factory, there were reportedly others to be constructed to produce mustard gas, tabun, sarin, and soman. In 1993, Manbar purportedly signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran to provide the know-how and a list of equipment necessary to build a factory to produce binary shells filled with VX. [Note: Manbar has maintained, however, that he was involved in a highly secretive joint British/Israeli covert intelligence operation to penetrate Iran's CW program; see entries in other chronologies from early 1990s, 1993, 1994, and May 1997.]
—Dan Izenberg, "Court Releases Ruling on "Murky" Manbar Dealings," Jerusalem Post, 10 January 2001.

Early March 2001
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fath-9, in the northern Persian Gulf. During this exercise, "the chemical defense units acted quickly and neutralized the hypothetical enemy's chemical bombardment."
—"Iran: Final Phase of Fath-9 Military Exercises 'Totally Successful'," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 March 2001; FBIS, Document IAP20010306000016, 6 March 2001.

7 March 2001
There are unconfirmed reports that Iran seeks to make its 1,300km-range Shahab-3 capable of delivering CBW.
—Salameh Ne'matt, "Keeping the Options Open," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 2001, p. 51.

7 March 2001
In an address to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, DC, Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute states, "According to current Iranian statements regarding its current status of production programs, Iran destroyed its CW production plants and its munitions after the War. Iran submitted declarations on its past programs to the OPCW and declared the production of 500 tons of agents. Its declarations were certified by the OPCW in November 1999.
—Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders, "Allegations of Iranian CW Use in the 1980-88 Gulf War; A Critical Analysis from Open Sources," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 7 March 2001.

April 2001
In its publication Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, the US State Department names Iran as "the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000." The State Department accuses the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) of continued involvement in planning, supporting, and executing terrorist attacks.
—US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, April 2001, p. 32.

April 2001
M. Javad Zarif, deputy foreign minister for International and Legal Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, complains in a letter to the OPCW that certain member states of the CWC are hindered in their quest to import Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals, while certain states not party to the treaty are receiving those chemicals. He complains that external control groups impair the mission of the CWC.
—M. Javad Zarif, "Article XI: Hope and Challenges," Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Spring/April 2001.

1 April 2001
According to Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute in Washington, DC, Iran has a "significant chemical warfare capability," which is thought to amount to several hundred tons of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents.
—A. Venter, "Iran's Increasingly Unconventional Arsenal, Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 April 2001, <http://www.janes.com>.

8 May 2001
Iran joins China and seven other countries in calling for the disbanding of the Australia Group, the 32-member state organization created to control the export of technology that could be used in CBW production. Iran, the target of past technology transfer restrictions, claims that Australia Group policies are discriminatory and politically motivated.
—"Kyodo: China, Others Call for Disbanding Biological Weapons Group," Tokyo Kyodo, 8 May 2001; FBIS, Document JPP20010509000005, 16 May 2001.

18 May 2001
Iran is re-elected to the executive council of the OPCW for another two-year term. An Iranian newspaper claims that Iran has been "at the forefront of an international campaign to ban chemical weapons."
—"Iran Reelected Member of Chemical Weapons Ban Organization," IRNA, 18 May 2001; FBIS, Document IAP20010518000036, 29 May 2001.

4 June 2001
It is reported that the Iranian Fateh-110 missile, which could be armed with conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads, has been developed with help from North Korea, using Russian and Chinese technology. The Fateh-110 is believed to have a range of at least 1500km, while efforts are supposedly being made to improve its range and accuracy.
—"Iran Nears Nuclear Status - Iraq Could Become a Western Asset Again?" Armed Forces Intelligence, 4 June 2001, <http://www.milnet.com/milnet/afi/2001/AFI-Research-0601.htm>.

27 June 2001
The United States imposes sanctions on the Chinese company Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation, for its alleged transfer to Iran of technology controlled under the CWC. The sanctions bar the company, located in Nanjing, from doing business with any US government agency for two years. Jiangsu Yongli was penalized for a similar matter in May 1997. China denied the allegations in reasserting its compliance with the CWC and accused the United States of placing its domestic law above international law.
—"China Denies Chemical Weapons Allegations," United Press International, 28 June 2001; "US Says Chinese, N. Korean Firms Aid Iran in Weapons Technology," Channel News Asia, 28 June 2001; "US Says Chinese and North Korean Firms Aid Iran Weapons Bid," SCMP.com, 28 June 2001, <http.//breakingnews.scmp.com>.

31 July 2001
Two Iranian MPs deny US allegations that Iran is producing CW: "The US is accusing Iran and Syria of producing chemical weapons, while it is ignoring the greatest producer of nuclear weapons in the region, i.e. Israel. Iran definitely has not developed such weapons, but if a country is threatened by any country's nuclear weapons, it is logical for them to develop such weapons in self-defense."
—"US Greatest Producer of Biological Weapons: MPs," Tehran Times (Tehran), 31 July 2001; FBIS, Document IAP20010731000014, 31 July 2001.

December 2001
A report states that Iran "is seeking" nuclear weapons, "likely" has biological weapons, and "has had" chemical weapons.
—Tamar A. Mehuron, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," Air Force Magazine, December 2001, p. 11.

	Updated October 2003