This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

6 January 2004
A Japanese newspaper reports that Libya and Iran "have exchanged a memorandum on cooperation in developing warheads for missiles that will carry nerve gas and technology to produce nerve gas using phosphorus trichloride." This report suggests cooperation on the production of the G group of nerve agents.
--"North Korea and Iran also support Libya's Development Weapons of Mass Destruction – the United States and the UK Will Analyze Their Technological Level," Tokyo Sankei Shimbun, 6 January 2004, Open Source Center document number JPP20040106000017, <http://www.opensource.gov>.

14 January 2004
In the US Fox News, quoting unnamed Iraqi sources, reports that "as many as twenty-nine warheads, some possibly armed or able to be armed with chemical weapons" have been smuggled into Iraq from Iran and are now in the hands of Iraqi resistance groups. The content of this report is confused and appears to conflate chemical weapons and plastic explosives.
--Fox Special Report with Brit Hume, Fox News, 14 January 2004, available from Lexis-Nexis, transcript number 011403cb.254.

27 January 2004
In Tokyo, officials from Japan and Iran meet for bilateral consultations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A summary posted on the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: "As for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)/Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), both sides stressed the importance of conventions' universalization, which gains a momentum in the wake of Libyan accession to CWC, and of strengthening their national implementation by all member states. The Iranian side explained the current status of its bills to implement CWC/BWC. The Japanese side appreciated Iranian positive and constructive stance in the BWC enhancement process based upon the three-year 'work program', particularly in the Annual Meeting of the States Parties held in November 2003."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 63 (March 2004), p. 45.

1 April 2004
The U.S. State Department announces new sanctions on 13 foreign companies or individuals under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. These companies or individuals were sanctioned because they "had transferred to Iran, since January 1st, 1999, either equipment and technology on the export -- multilateral export control lists or items such as those on the list but falling below control list parameters or other items with the potential of making a material contribution to proscribed programs." The items transferred to Iran had the potential to assist chemical weapons, biological weapons or long-range missile programs.
--Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing by Deputy State Department Spokesman J. Adam Ereli, 2 April 2004, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/31109.htm>.

7 June 2004
The United Kingdom releases its annual report on the application of national strategic export controls in 2003. The report notes the UK government's approval of exports of unspecified "toxic chemical precursors" and civil NBC protection clothing and equipment to Iran by British companies.
--United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls, Annual Report 2003 (June 2004), pp. 198-199, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Full_Report_03.pdf>.

19 June 2004
In Tehran, the Secretary-General of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Hasan Rowhani, is interviewed by Al-Jazeera television. During the interview, Rowhani says: "The decision made by the Islamic Republic of Iran not to possess weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, goes back to many years and not only the near past. Therefore, even during the eight-year war Iraq imposed on us and although Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran, we did not seek the production of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons." [see 18 Nov 98.] He continues: "Our decision not to possess weapons of mass destruction is strategic because we believe that these weapons will not provide security for Iran. On the contrary, they will create big problems. Iran exerted huge efforts during the past few years to build bridges of confidence with the states of the region. We absolutely do not want to blow up these bridges by mobilizing our resources to produce weapons of mass destruction. We are confident that our possession of these weapons will force these countries to seek the support of big powers. Consequently, regional security will worsen. This will not serve our national security. Therefore, our efforts focused and continue to focus on building bridges of confidence with the states of the region before focusing on the possession of weapons of mass destruction."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 36.

24 June 2004
In the US House of Representatives, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee convenes a hearing on Iranian Proliferation: Implications for Terrorists, their State-Sponsors and U.S. Counter-proliferation Policy. US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security appears before the committee and says: "We believe Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons. ... Although Iran has declared a portion of its CW program to the OPCW, it is time for Iran to declare the remainder and make arrangements for its dismantlement and for the destruction of its chemical weapons."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 38.

29 June 2004
In Tehran, Speaker of the Majlis Gholamali Haddad-Adel says that Iran condemns the use of any kind of weapons of mass destruction in general and chemical weapons in particular. He announces that Iran's Public Culture Council has designated 28 June, the day in 1987 on which the northwestern city of Sardasht was attacked by Iraqi aircraft armed with chemical weapons, as the Day of Fight Against Weapons of Mass Destruction and Chemical Weapons.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 40.

30 June 2004
In Tehran, there is a national congress on Review of the Consequences of Application of Chemical Weapons. Addressing the congress, Chairman of the Expediency Council and former President Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani says that Iran should "file our legal claims in Saddam's court on the use of chemical weapons against our people." He continues: "The West is sensitive in the process of learning science. The ones who accuse us of seeking WMD [see 24 Jun], are active themselves in this field and try to distract people through their media. ... With all our Islamic and human capacity, we stood against the cunning, lying and ruthless enemies who claim today to be supportive of human rights and despite their efforts in expanding WMD, accuse Iran of seeking such weapons." During the congress, its secretary, Mostafa Qane'i, announces that some 100,000 Iranians have fallen victim to chemical weapons used by Iraq during the 1980-88 war. He expresses his surprise that only 45,000 Iranian chemical weapons victims have been registered by the Martyrs' Foundation, 15 per cent of whom have been medium to severely affected and 85 per cent of whom suffer minor ailments. He adds that 18 billion tomans is spent annually on caring for the chemical weapons survivors.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 41.

4 July 2004
Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says that Iran has prepared a complaint against Saddam Hussein for his invasion of Iran in 1980 and use of chemical weapons against Iran during the 1980-1988 war. Iran intends to lodge this complaint with the tribunal that will be trying Saddam Hussein on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The tribunal had its first session on 1 July 2004. Asefi says that Iran has "asked [its] charge d'affaires in Baghdad to seek explanation from the Iraqis on why the attack on Iran did not feature among the charges against [Saddam Hussein]."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 41.

7 July 2004
An Iranian government advisor says that Iran will refrain from pressing charges against the European states that aided Iraq's production of chemical weapons in the 1980s in the Iraq tribunal that is prosecuting Saddam Hussein. The advisor indicates that this position is conditional on European states not increasing pressure on Iran over its nuclear program.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 43.

19 July 2004
In the Israeli Knesset, Israeli chief of military intelligence research, Brigadier-General Yossi Kuperwasser says – during a Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meeting – that "the possibility certainly exists" that Iran might provide chemical weapons to Hezbollah.
--Gideon Alon "MI official: Iran May Have Provided Hizballah With Chemical Weapons" Ha'aretz (English online version), 19 july 2004, <http://www.haaretz.co.il>, transcribed text available as "IDF Intelligence Officer: Iran May Have Provided Hizballah With Chemical Weapons," FBIS document GMP20040719000175, <http://www.opensource.gov>.

24 to 25 July 2004
The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Mr. Rogelio Pfirter, visits Tehran. He meets with a number of Iranian government officials including the Supreme National Security Council, H.E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani, and the Foreign Minister H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharazi.
--Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 2004), p. 6.

2 August 2004
In Tehran, the chairman of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Foreign Policy Committee says that since the war with Iraq it has been the policy of Iran to take defensive measures against chemical, biological and nuclear attacks. In an interview with IRNA news agency, Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian says that the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics is responsible for enforcement of the policy.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 66 (December 2004), p. 35.

September 2004
A report in Jane's Defence Weekly alleges that a Syrian delegation visits Iran to conclude a deal whereby Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) will supply Syria with unspecified quantities of sodium sulphide. The chemical is reportedly intended for use in the production of mustard agent.
--Robin Hughes, "Iran aids Syria's CW Programme," Janes Defense Weekly, 21 October 2005, <http://www.janes.com>.

6 September 2004
The Iranian Ministry of Defence issues a statement attacking those states which supported Iraq's acquisition and use of chemical weapons during the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war. The statements reads in part: "Shame on those who supplied Saddam Hussein of Iraq with chemical weapons to attack Iranian soldiers (in 1980s). Today, they introduce themselves as advocates of human rights and opponents of the weapons of mass destruction... The Iranian nation, as the great victim of chemical weapons reserve the right to take legal action with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against supporters of the Iraqi dictator in his horrible crimes against Iranian soldiers."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 66 (December 2004), p. 40.

9 September 2004
Azeri Member of Parliament Elman Mammadov says before the parliamentary commission for security and defence that Iran and Armenia are "involved in the production of chemical weapons" and that if the United Nations were to investigate the matter it could "easily prove this".
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 66 (December 2004), p. 41.

22 September 2004
An officer in the Iranian Republic Guards appears on Iranian television to describe an ongoing military exercise, "Ashura-5." The officer claims that the exercise has demonstrated the ability of the Iranian armed forces to oppose invaders even if they are equipped with "the most destructive bacteriological and chemical weapons."
--Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network, 22 September 2004, translated transcript provided by FBIS as "Guards commander says Iran ready for bacteriological, chemical warfare", FBIS document IAP20040922000086, <http://www.opensource.gov>.

27 September to 1 October 2004
In Slovenska Lupca, Slovakia, a training course on providing assistance and protection against chemical weapons takes place at the Institute of Civil Protection. The training course is an annual event offered by the Slovak government under Article 10 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), offering participants a basic understanding of chemical weapons protection and national capacity building so as to assist them in training civilians in protection against chemical weapons in their respective countries. Fifteen specialists and experts from ten CWC member states, including Iran, participate in the course.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 66 (December 2004), p. 46.

9 to 13 October 2004
The Annual Course on Medical Aspects of Defense against Chemical Weapons is conducted in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. This course makes available to OPCW member states the experience of Iranian physicians and facilities associated with the treatment of victims of chemical warfare, and provides medical personnel from member states with a unique opportunity to examine and learn from actual victims of chemical weapons.
--Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 2 No. 3 (September 2004), p. 36.

25 October 2004
In Tehran, the Iranian Cabinet approves implementing legislation for the CWC, Government spokesman Abdollah Ramezanzadeh says: "According to the draft, Iran's Customs Administration is required to declare the statistics on all the exported and imported chemicals listed in the triple tables of the related treaty to the relevant national secretariat. Based on one of the articles of the draft, except the materials listed in the treaty, production, proliferation, stockpiling, use, threat to use, direct or indirect transportation of chemical weapons, as well as assistance in setting up the related production units by anyone is banned." The bill must now be sent to the parliament for finalization.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 66 (December 2004), p. 58.

28 October 2004
The United Kingdom releases its second quarterly report on Strategic Export Controls, covering the period 1 April to 30 June 2004. The report notes the issuing of four licenses for the export of "corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment."
--Strategic Export Controls: Quarterly Report - April to June 2004, (October 2004), p. 88, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/strategicexportcontrols
2004aprjunreport.pdf>.

23 November 2004
The US Central Intelligence Agency submits its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 July Through 31 December 2003 in accordance with S.721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. In respect to Syria, the report states that; "Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents--and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them--which it previously had manufactured. "This statement, which repeats the statements issued on this matter by the CIA for a number of years now suggests an absence of new developments."
--Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 July Through 31 December 2003 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2004), p. 3, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/
pdfs/721report_july_dec2003.pdf>.

29 November 2004
At the Ninth Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague, Dr. Ali Khoshrou, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and Interational Affairs notes that Iran is in the process of adopting "implementation legislation [that] covers all key areas of the Convention, in particular verification of any prohibited activity."
--Statement by H.E. Dr. Ali Khoshrou, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and Interational Affairs before the Ninth Session of the Conference of the CWC States Parties, 29 November 2004, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/csp9/iran.pdf>.

2 December 2004
The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) holds a press conference to describe developments in Irans national missile programs. Spokesman Ali Safavi claimed that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is engaged in the prduction of long range missile and chemical warheads at the Hemmat Missile Induistries Complex in northeast Tehran.
--Ed Johnson, "Iranian opposition group claims to have evidence of Iranian missile program," Associated Press, 2 December 2004,
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 December 2004
As part of the Peyrovan-e Velayat (followers of the supreme religious leader) military exercise Iranian troops conduct simulated defensive chemical warfare operations.
--Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network, 6 December 2004, translated transcript provided by FBIS as "Iranian military conducts stage four of major exercise," FBIS document IAP20041206000095, <http://www.opensource.gov>.

19 January 2005
Speaking in Paris at the Middle East, Peace, Stability, and the Role of Iran seminar Iranian nuclear spokesman Hossein Musavian says: "Tehran has fully respected its commitments to disarmament treaties but developed countries have not acted responsibly in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and biological cooperation for peaceful purposes as stipulated in international agreements." This statement continues the Iranian tradition of criticizing western export control regimes such as the Australia Group which it sees as being noncompliant with the requirements of the CWC.
--"Iranian Official Says Country Ready For Security Cooperation With Europe," 19 January 2005, FBIS document IAP20050119000107, <http://www.opensource.gov>.

24 January 2005
Journalist Seymour Hersh publishes an article claiming that the US government "has been conducting secret reconnaissance missions inside Iran at least since last summer. Much of the focus is on the accumulation of intelligence and targeting information on Iranian nuclear, chemical, and missile sites, both declared and suspected." The information is allegedly being gathered in anticipation of military action planned for later in 2005.
--Seymour Hersh, "The Coming Wars: What the Pentagon can now do in secret," The New Yorker, Vol. 80 (44), 24 January 2005, p. 40.

28 January 2005
The United Kingdom releases its third quarterly report on Strategic Export Controls, covering the period 1 July to 30 September 2004. The report notes the issuing of a license for the export to Iran of "corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment."
--Strategic Export Controls: Quarterly Report - July to September 2004, (January 2005), p. 66, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/strategicexportcontrolsjulsep2004.pdf>.

11 February 2005
The Washington Post reports that the US government is undertaking a wide-ranging review of existing intelligence on Iran in the wake of reviews of intelligence performance on Iraq prior to the US invasion of 2003. One product of this review will be a "memo focusing exclusively on Tehran's chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities – [which] will reflect an updated consensus within the intelligence community.
--Dafna Linzer and Walter Pincus, "U.S. Reviewing its Intelligence on Iran," Washington Post, 12 February 2005, p. A12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17526-2005Feb11.html>.

20 February 2005
The German Customs Office of Criminal Investigations (ZKA) believes that Iran possesses chemical weapons including "S-Lost [sulfur mustard] tabun, and prussic acid [hydrogen cyanide], perhaps also sarin and VX." Chemical weapons research and development efforts are reportedly being conducted "in small laboratories of universities, strictly guarded from the outside world." A member of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) notes that due to this secret activity "there were no worldwide speculations about Tehran's real intentions regarding chemical weapons."
--"German intelligence services see Iran possessing biological, chemical weapons," 20 February 2005, FBIS document EUP2005022000035, <http//:www.fbis.gov>.

31 March 2005
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction presents its final report to the President. The report notes that the Commission "reviewed the state of the Intelligence Community's knowledge about the unconventional weapons programs of several countries that pose current proliferation threats, including Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. We cannot discuss many of our findings from these studies in our unclassified report, but we can say here that we found that we have only limited access to critical information about several of these high-priority intelligence targets."
--Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 11, <http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html>.

24 June 2005
An Iranian parliamentary delegation, led by H.E. Mr Alaeddin Borojerdi, Chairman of the National Security and Foreign Relations Commission of the Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran, visits the headquarters of the OPCW in The Hague.
--Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 3 No. 3 (September 2005), p. 6.

6 September 2005
In his opening address to the Third Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties [to the Chemical Weapons Convention] in Asia, H.E. Dr. Pirouz Husseini, Director General for Political International Affairs at the Iranian foreign ministry says: "100,000 Iranians are suffering from injuries with chemical weapons they sustained during the war with Iraq."....] "50,000 of the afflicted are in dangerous conditions and are exposed to slow death." Dr. Husseini goes on to say: "[Iran's] interest in the Convention stems from our strong belief that maintaining the international peace and security can only be achieved through the collective endeavours by the international community towards multilateral, non-discriminatory implementation of disarmament treaties in the field of weapons of mass destruction".
--Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 3 No. 3 (September 2005), p. 17; "100,000 chemical arms victims in Iran," 6 September 2005, UPI, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 to 8 September 2005
In cooperation with the OPCW, Iran hosts the Third Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties [to the Chemical Weapons Convention] in Asia. The meeting is attended by sixty-three participants from twenty-three regional States Parties and six participants from three States Parties from outside the region. In addition representatives from Egypt and Myanmar, both of which are not parties to the CWC attend the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to to facilitate the exchange of information among representatives in particular in areas where collective action might be required, such as the development of effective national implementing legislation, implementation of the import and export provisions of the CWC, and improvements in the quality of declarations.
--Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 3 No. 3 (September 2005), p. 17.

9 to 12 October 2005
An Iranian team participates in the major CW defense preparedness field exercise "Joint Assistance 2005." The exercise, jointly organized by Ukraine, the OPCW and NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) was held at the Yavoriv training site near Lviv, Ukraine.
--Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 3 No. 4 (December 2005), p. 40.

11 October 2005
In Tehran, the Majlis Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy approves draft Chemical Weapons Convention implementation legislation [that] covers all key areas of the Convention, in particular verification of prohibited activities. The draft legislation must next be approved by the full Majlis. [see 29 September 2004]
--"Iranian Majlis commission approves convention against chemical weapons," BBC Monitoring Service, 11 October 2005, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 2005
Jane's Defense Weekly quotes an unidentified "diplomatic source" alleging that Iran and Syria have concluded an agreement whereby Iran will construct a number of facilities intended to give Syria an independent capability for the production of CW agent precursors, eliminating its current dependence on imports. The report notes that a contract has not yet been officially signed. Iran will reportedly "supply Syria with reactors, pipes, condensors, heat exchangers and storage and feed tanks, as well as NDCAM equipment (to detect CW agents in the air)." The agreement to construct these facilities is allegedly the product of a series of discussions and agreements that began in February 2004.
--Robin Hughes, "Iran aids Syria's CW Programme," Janes Defense Weekly, 21 October 2005, <http://www.janes.com>.

14 November 2005
Syrian and Iranian officials are described as signing a "confidential strategic accord...which includes a sensitive chapter dealing with co-operation and mutual aid during times of international sanctions, or scenarios of military confrontation with the West." Amongst other provisions the accord allegedly requires the Iranian government to provide "co –operation and continuous transfer of technology and equipment in the areas of weapons of mass destruction [particularly the upgrade of Syrian missile and chemical warfare capabilities]." In return Syria will reportedly "allow Iran to safely store weapons, sensitive equipment or even hazardous materials on Syrian soil should Iran need such help in a time of crisis."
--Robin Hughes, "Iran and Syria sign mutual assistance accord," Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 December 2005.

23 December 2005
The U.S. State Department announces the imposition of sanctions on two Indian chemicals companies for exports to Iran. The State Department states that the exported chemicals may be of assistance to alleged Iranian CW activities. The companies are Sabero Organic Chemicals Gujarat Ltd. and Sandhya Organic Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. The State Department does not specify the chemicals or the quantities transferred.
--Susan Krause, U.S. Sanctions Nine Companies Under Iran Nonproliferation Act, Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 28 December 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2005&m=December&x=20051228125201ASesuarK0.4326593; Sharon Squassoni, India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities, CRS Report CRS-2006-FDT-1575, 8 November 2006, p. 5.

31 January 2006
The German Customs Office of Criminal Investigations (ZKA) and Federal Office of Criminal Investigations publishes a report on illegal arms transfers by German companies to Iran. The report claims that Iran is working to increase its stockpiles of chemical weapons.
--"German Investigators See Signs of "Secret Military Nuclear Programme" In Iran," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 31 January 2006,
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 2006
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of chemical weapons General Maples says: "we believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development."
--Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 February 2006, p. 10, <http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement24.pdf>.

May 2006
The US Central Intelligence Agency releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004. In the section addressing Iranian programs the report states: "Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents."
[In contrast to previous reports this one does not include assertions that Iran possesses CW agent stockpiles: see 23 November 2004 and 10 April 2003.]
--Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006), p. 3, <http://www.dni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf>.

4 August 2006
The US State Department announces the imposition of sanctions on seven companies, from four countries, for violating the Iran Nonproliferation Act 2000, the purpose of which is to prevent Iran acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Two Indian chemical manufacturers, Balaji Amines Limited and Prachi Poly Products Limited, are sanctioned for the sale of precursor chemicals to Iran that could have been used in the production of chemical weapons.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 74 (December 2006), p. 46; Sharon Squassoni, India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities, CRS Report CRS-2006-FDT-1575, 8 November 2006, p. 5.

22 September 2006
The United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry issues an updated list of Iranian entities that are considered to be of potential WMD concern. These entities are end-users of goods for which an export licence has been refused on end-use grounds related to suspected WMD programs. The updated list adds three entities: Amir Kabir University of Technology; M/S Iran Electromotor; and Oil Industries Engineering and Construction aka LG/OIEC/IOEC. There are now forty-nine entities on the DTI's list. The list is intended to help exporters judge which exports might potentially be of concern on end use grounds, based on previous licensing decisions. The presence of an entity on the list does not totally preclude the issuing of export licenses; fifteen entities on the list have had export licenses granted as well as refused.
--WMD End-Use Control: Licence Applications for Iran, Amended May 2006, <http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-exportcontrol/
licensing-policy/end-use-control/page29307.html>.

4 to 8 November 2006
The Eighth Annual Course on Medical Aspects of Defense against Chemical Weapons is conducted in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The course took place at the International Medical Centre for Training and Treatment against Chemical Weapons (IMCTTCW). It makes available to OPCW member states, the experience of Iranian physicians and facilities associated with the treatment of victims of chemical warfare, and provides medical personnel from member states with a unique opportunity to examine and learn from actual victims of chemical weapons.
--"Course on the Medical Aspects of Defence against Chemical Weapons," Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 4 No. 4 (December 2006), p. 42.

11 January 2007
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of chemical weapons General Maples says: "Iran has a large and growing commercial chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability."
--Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 11 January 2007, <http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?
hearingid=2467&witnessId=5974>.

20 to 23 January 2007
Eight doctors from the 'Organization of Doctors Against Nuclear Weapons,' a Swedish NGO, visit Iran to study the long-term health effects of chemical weapons exposure by examining Iranian soldiers and civilians who were injured during Iran's war with Iraq in the 1980s.
--"Swedish NGO in Tehran to conduct research on victims of chemical weapons," IRNA, 20 January 2007, <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/
line-17/0701206666184739.htm>.

11 February 2007
Addressing 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in Munich, Germany, Mr. Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, states: "Repeatedly and frankly we have announced that in Iran's national security doctrine there is no room for atomic and chemical weapons as we consider them against Islamic laws."
--"No room for WMDs in Iran's national security doctrine, says Larijani," IRNA, 11 February 2007, <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/
line-20/0702111128162815.htm>.

12 May 2007
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahdi Mostafavi says that Iran has commenced the process of filing lawsuits against all legal entities involved in facilitating the production of chemical weapons, or of helping Iraq to use CW against Iran during the 1980s.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 76+77 (October 2007), p. 37.

16 May 2007
Speaking at a press conference during the Tenth Chemical Demilitarization Conference (CWD 2007) in Brussels, Belgium the OPCW Director-General. Amb. Rogelio Pfirter says: "Iran is a full member of CWC. We have carried out several inspections in Iran and so far it has proven to comply with the CWC."
--"Chemical weapons watchdog says Iran complying with CWC," IRNA, 16 May 2007, <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-20/0705164594140044.htm>.

21 July 2007
The London Asharq al-Awsat Arabic language newspaper alleges that Syria and Iran have reached an agreement whereby in return for Syria's undertaking not to enter into peace-talks with Israel, Iran will provide Syria with assistance in the development of chemical weapons, amongst other benefits.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 76+77 (October 2007), p. 48.

22 July 2007
An Iranian government spokesperson rejects allegations that have appeared in a London-based Arabic language newspaper claiming that Iran has agreed to assist Syria in the development of chemical weapons.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 76+77 (October 2007), p. 48.

26 July 2007
Jane's Defence Weekly alleges that an unspecified number of Iranian missile weaponization engineers are killed in an accidental explosion during an attempt "to weaponise a 500 km [range] 'Scud C' with a mustard gas warhead" at a Syrian military facility in the vicinity of Aleppo.
--Robin Hughes, "Explosion aborts CW project run by Iran and Syria," Jane's Defense Weekly, 26 September 2007, (first posted on Jane's website on 17 September 2007).

27 September 2007
Speaking at the High-Level Meeting to Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention at the United Nations headquarters in New York, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki states that "[c]ertain countries are threatening world peace by maintaining stockpiles of chemical weapons" and that the "threat to world peace and international security will continue unless states that still possess chemical weapons arsenals destroy their stockpiles on schedule." The Minister went on to insist "that those countries and companies that sold chemical precursors to Saddam Hussein or otherwise facilitated the former Iraqi regimes chemical weapons program must be tried and forced to pay reparations to the victims and their families."
--"Chemical Weapons Arsenals Threaten World Peace: FM," Tehran Mehr News Agency Open Source Center Document IAP20070928950118 28 September 2007.

10 October 2007
The OPCW reports that Iran was one of 18 countries that met the deadline for submission of annual declarations regarding projected activities and anticipated production in 2008 at schedule 1 facilities. The report does not specify the nature of the Iranian facility which may be a Single Small Scale Facility, a facility for protective purposes or a facility for medical, pharmaceutical, or research purposes.
--Status of Annual Declarations Regarding Projected Activities and Anticipated Production in 2008 at Schedule 1 Facilities, S-657-2007, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 10 October 2007, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/snotes/2007/s-657-2007(e).pdf>.

22 October 2007
Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki calls on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to bring to justice those who supplied chemical weapons to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. He says: "Tehran requests the ICJ to take legal action against 400 companies which were involved in supplying Saddam's regime with chemical weapons in the 1980s... Legal action against companies supplying Saddam with chemical weapons will prevent expansion of such weapons."
--"Iran calls for justice against suppliers of chemical weapons to Saddam," IRNA, 22 October 2007, <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/
line-17/0710220007124237.htm>.

22 to 23 October 2007
The Iranian government's "national authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention" and the "Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS)" jointly host the International Seminar on the Consequences of Chemical Weapons Attacks Against the Islamic Republic of Iran in Tehran. The event's program aims to address a number of CW related issues includingMedical Aspects, Legal and political dimensions, Psycho-social aspects, Impact on the Environment, Defense against Chemical Weapons and Implementation of the CWC.
-- <http://www.cwconference.ir/en_index.html>.

14 November 2007
Testifying before a hearing of the National Security and Foreign Affairs subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform committee on the Regional And Global Consequences of U.S. Military Action in Iran Dr. Paul Pillar, former Deputy Director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center addresses the proposition that in the event of a US attack against Iranian nuclear facilities the Iranian government may choose to transfer chemical or biological weapons to terrorist groups for use against the US or its allies. In his testimony Dr. Pillar notes that in the past "Iran [has] not passed any of these unconventional weapons to clients or terrorist groups." "The reason is when you ask what would be the interest of such a regime to pass such weapons to another group where they would lose control, the interest simply isn't there. It's all disadvantage rather than advantage. They lose control and if they were ever used, a group that's known to be a client of Iran's -- say Lebanese Hezbollah -- would automatically be assumed by Washington and everyone else that they would be acting on Iran's behalf. So there's simply no advantage to it."
--Hearing of the on National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee; Subject: Iran: Realities, Options and Consequences, Part 3: Regional And Global Consequences of U.S. Military Action in Iran:, 14 November 2007, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

December 2007
Israeli analyst Dany Shoham publishes an article providing a detailed assessment of Iran's alleged CW arsenal and other WMD capabilities. The article also speculates on plans for the arsenal's use in the event of a US or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.
--Dany Shoham, "How Will Iran Retaliate to a Strike on its Nuclear Facilities," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28 No.3 (December 2007), p. 542-558.

23 January 2008
Speaking in Brussels Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalil states: "I assure you that the (chemical) weapons have no place in our defense doctrine." The context is made in the context of a discussion about Iranian actions during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and is intended to support the proposition that Iran made no use of chemical weapons during that conflict. [This assertion may contradict a statement made at the OPCW in 1998 that Iran possessed CW in the latter stages of the war. See 18 November 1998.]
--"Jalili: Chemical weapons have no place in Iran's defense doctrine," IRNA, 23 January 2008, <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/
0801239430180425.htm>.

5 February 2008
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of National Intelligence addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of chemical weapons Mr. McConnell says: "We know that Tehran had a chemical warfare program prior to 1997, when it declared elements of its program. We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce CW agent in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. We assess Iran maintains a capability to weaponize CW agents in a variety of delivery systems."
--J. Michael McConnell, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 5 February 2008, <http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/
20080205_transcript.pdf>.

27 February 2008
Testifying before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. General Michael D. Maples states: "We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce chemical warfare agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications.
--Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services, 27 February 2008, <http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement_30.pdf>.

3 March 2008
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2005. In the section addressing Iranian chemical programs the report states: "Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance its assessed chemical warfare program."
[This language differs slightly from that of the 2004 report. It does not refer to "efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents."]
--Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2005, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), p. 3, <http://www.dni.gov/reports/CDA%2011-14-2006.pdf>.

3 March 2008
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006. In the section addressing Iranian chemical programs the report states: "We judge that Iran maintains a Chemical Warfare (CW) research and development program which began in response to Iraqi use of CW during the Iran-Iraq Qar during the 1980s. ... [Iran] continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance a CW program. We judge that Iran maintains a small, covert CW stockpile."
[This language differs significantly from that of the 2005 report by reintroducing the idea of an Iranian CW stockpile in violation of the CWC.]
--Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), p. 3, <http://www.dni.gov/reports/
Acquisition_Technology_Report_030308.pdf>.

	Updated April 2008