Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1991
The Chinese 8610 surface-to-surface missiles that were shipped to Iran in 1990 are put into production. As the 8610 is similar to the HQ-2 surface-to-air missile, it can be produced at the same site in Isfahan that was established to produce the HQ-2.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 64.

1991
Iran will receive and test fire the North Korean intermediate range surface-to-surface Nodong ballistic missile this month. The Nodong, which is being developed in two versions, will have a range of between 1,000 to 1,300kms. An Iranian delegation traveled to Pyongyang in 1991 and purchased 150 Nodong missiles. It is believed that Iran's ultimate aim is to develop its own missile production facilities.
—David Makovsky, "North Korean Missiles 'Due to Arrive in Iran this Month'," Jerusalem Post, 5 December 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1991
Iran, along with North Korea and China, is helping Syria build Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) missile production facilities near the cities of Aleppo and Hamah.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 9.

1991
Reports claim that the Bush administration has paved the way for selling sensitive American technology to the Iran and Syria, even though they still remain on the State Department list of nations that sponsor terrorism. The administration issued a new policy in the fall of 1991 that says that licenses for sales to commercial customers in Syria and Iran would be considered on a case-by-case basis. This new policy could send an array of dual-use technology to the two nations, although a top Bush administration export official contends that restrictions remain tight and basically unchanged. A Commerce Department report sent to Congress says that the previous policy of denying exports licenses to military customers will remain in place. The same report shows that Iran and Syria now may obtain such high-tech commodities as gravity meters and magnetometers, which can be used in missile guidance systems. They also may buy computer-controlled machine tools, which shape metal with microscopic accuracy and can be used for military purposes.
—Douglas Frantz, "U.S. to OK High-Tech Sales to Iran and Syria," Los Angeles Times, 13 February 1992, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1991
The People's Mojahedeen, an Iranian opposition group, claims that in 1991, Iran buys 170 Scud missiles from North Korea and 2,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launching pads from Bulgaria. Iran reportedly has built ballistic missiles with a range of nearly 185 miles with help from China and North Korea. Iran is also said to have tested these missiles.
—John Hughes, "Arms Buildup in Iran Belies the Image of A 'Moderate' Regime," Christian Science Monitor, 6 February 1992, p. 19, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1991
Syria receives Scud-C missiles and missile-production equipment worth an estimated $250 million from North Korea. Iran has agreed to transship about $100 worth of the missiles to Syria.
—Bill Gertz, "Iranian-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3.

1991
A major military deal is concluded during a visit by Iranian Defense Minister Akbar Torkan to Pyongyang. The deal is reportedly worth $2.5 billion and includes 110 Scud-C missiles.
—"Navy On Alert Since Arrival of Korean Freighter," Sawt Al-Kuwayt Al-Duwali (London), 12 March 1992, pp. 1, 11; in Proliferation Issues, 26 March 1992, pp. 32-33; James Kraska, "Iran Flexes Maritime Muscles in Gulf," Defense News, 4 October 1994, pp. 25-26.

1991
Iran makes a $3 million loan to the Trieste International Center for Theoretical Physics. The Trieste Center is a nuclear research institution where scientists from Third World countries like India, Pakistan, and Iran may be conducting research on nuclear weapons, missile systems, and other military technologies.
—Steve Coll, "Loan from Tehran Saved Third World Nuclear Research Center," Washington Post, 24 December 1992, pp. A8, A10.

1991
Reportedly Iran begins negotiating the purchase of approximately $300 million worth of Astros-2 multiple launch rocket systems from Brazil.
—"British Kit for Zulfaqr Tank," Iran Brief, 8 January 1996, pp. 2-3.

1991
Production of the 45km-range Fajr-3 begins.
—"Iran Builds Its Strength," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 February 1992, pp. 158-159.

1991
Iran tests the North Korean Scud-C manufacturing equipment.
—Ivan Safranchuk, Dmitriy Yevstafyev, ed., "Scientific Notes No. 8: The Nuclear and Missile Programs of Iran and Russian Security – The Framework of Russian-Iranian Collaboration," Nauchnyye Zapiski (Moscow), 5 May 1999, Vol. 8, pp. 1-36; in "Russia, Iran Nuclear Program Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19990701001333, 1 July 1999.

1991
Iran starts producing the North Korean Scud-C, with a range of 550km.
—"Mideast Missile Race Detailed," Al-Wasat (London), 30 August 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990903000290, 30 August 1999.

1991
An article in a widely circulated Israeli newspaper argues that Iran's recent acquisitions of nuclear and missile technology require that Israel take Iran into consideration when making defense and strategy decisions. Iran has launched a military modernization plan that emphasizes three components: tanks, Soviet-supplied MiG-29 and Sukhoi-24 aircrafts, and surface-to-surface missiles with ranges up to 1,000km.
—Alon Pinkas, "Iran looms a growing strategic threat for Israel," Jerusalem Post, 21 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1991
U.S. officials confirm that China is supervising the construction of HY-2 and M-type missile facilities.
—"Iran," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1991
Sources report the orders of 170 North Korean Scud-B and Scud-Cs, and Chinese-made M-11 missiles.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Threats and Non-Threats from Iran (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995), p. 56.

1991
Syria receives Scud-C missiles and missile-production equipment worth an estimated $250 million from North Korea. Iran has agreed to transship about $100 million worth of the missiles to Syria.
—Bill Gertz, "Iranian-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times 10 March 1992, p. A3.

1991
Iran reportedly purchases 2,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launching pads from Bulgaria.
—John Hughes, "Arms Buildup in Iran Belies the Image of A 'Moderate' Regime," Christian Science Monitor, 6 February 1992, p. 19, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

January 1991
Since January 1991, Iran receives Scud-C missile parts from North Korea.
—"The Post-War Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991.

January 1991
Iran acquires Scud-C missile components from North Korea.
—Lee Chae Hak, "Kkorimunŭn Pukhan Scud Such'ul/Shimsangch'anh'ŭn Taechungdong P'anmaesŏl," Joongang Ilbo, 13 July 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://wwwkinds.or.kr>.

January 1991
The CIA, working with a "friendly" Middle Eastern intelligence agency, reports that North Korea appears to be supplying Scud missiles—some modified to carry chemical warheads—to Syria, Libya, and Iran. North Korea has agreed to build new facilities in Iran to assemble three types of Scud missiles. The CIA has reported North Korea's activities to the U.S. State Department.
—Adel Darwish, "N Korea 'selling Scuds'," The Independent (London), 6 April 1991, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

January 1991
Iran receives shipments of an estimated 100 North Korean Scud-Mod. C (Scud-C) missiles together with the necessary equipment for them.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., pp. 57-58.

January 1991
U.S. intelligence agencies begin tracking shipments of Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) missiles en route from North Korea to Iran. Some reports later suggest that Iran acquired 60 of the missiles, but the exact number is unknown. The Hwasong-6 is known as the Shahab-2 in Iran.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 18.

January 1991
The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) announces that, "... from 4 February 1991 Iran's munitions industry will launch the production of its own long-range, powerful 'surface-to-surface' missiles." [Note: This production capability is probably a reference to the facilities at Isfahan that assemble missiles from DPRK components.]
—Ed Blanche, "Iran Says It Will Start Missile Production," Associated Press, 29 January 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Iran To Mass Produce Long-Range Missiles, Launch Second Submarine," Xinhua News Agency, 29 January 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

7 January 1991
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Acting Commander Rahim Yahya Safavi says that the forthcoming large-scale Fajr maneuvers are directly related to the presence of foreign military force in the Persian Gulf. SAM-2 and SAM-6 missile systems will be used for the first time during the maneuvers.
—"Plans to Use SAMs," Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 7 January 1991; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-91-005, 8 January 1991, p. 51.

21 January 1991
The Iranians finalize an agreement with the Chinese for the assembly of the M-9 missile with a range of 560km.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 26.

29 January 1991
Iran announces the production of a longer-range missile. This missile is understood to be an upgraded version of the Scud-B and is referred to as the Scud-C or Scud PIP.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 23.

29 January 1991
Hojat al-Islam Alawi, spokesman for the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Says that Iran is scheduled to begin mass production of long-range surface-to-surface missiles on 4 February 1991. [Note: Mass production of long-range surface-to-surface missiles may have actually begun in March 1991.]
—"Mass Production of Long Range Missiles Planned," Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 29 January 1991; in Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1991, p. 32.

29 January 1991
There is speculation that the long-range missile system about to enter mass production is an upgraded Scud-B with extra fuel tanks and a reduced payload.
—"Iran Builds Its Strength," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 February 1992, pp. 158-159.

30 January 1991
U.S. intelligence officials say that Iraq wants to buy 100 mobile Scud launchers from Iran. The request, along with the flight of 90 Iraqi planes to Iran, reportedly has U.S. military officials perplexed. U.S. officials are unsure whether Iran is willing to sell the launchers, which were purchased from North Korea in the 1980s. Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, Kamal Kharrazi, claims that speculation about Scud launcher sales to Iraq is "baseless." Iran bought the launchers and SS-1 (Scud-B) missiles in response to Iraqi missile attacks on Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War.
—"Iraq reported dealing for Iran Scud launchers," Los Angeles Times, 30 January 1991, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1 February 1991
Iran contacts North Korea to purchase Scud missiles. Experts conclude that Iran would either transfer the missiles to Iraq or would sell Iraq mobile missile launchers.
—"Republic Allegedly to Buy North Korean Scuds," Iran's Flag of Freedom Radio, 1 February 1991; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-91-022, 1 February 1991, p. 51.

2 February 1991
The Iraq-based Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) alleges that the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) is using test equipment bought from the German MBB Corporation to extend the Silkworm range.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 23.

16 February 1991
Japan's Jiji News Agency reports that two Iranian aircraft arrived in Pyongyang the previous week and that each aircraft was loaded with 50 Scud missiles. The source reportedly says that the missiles were transferred to Iraq. [Note: This report is not credible. It is not plausible that Iran would transfer missiles to Iraq at this time. Furthermore, 50 Scud missiles could not fit into one transport aircraft.]
—"Pukhan, Iran T'onghae Iraq E Scud 1 Baekki Panmae—Ilchijit'ongshin Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 16 February 1991, <http://www.joins.com>.

22 February 1991
Brazilian Reserve Brigadier Hugo de Oliveira proposes to the Iranian Ministry of Military Industrialization on 16 February that he advise the ministry's missile group in the development of 600km and 1,000km range missiles. Oliveira gives the names of two engineers who would assist with the project: Celso Leal Mariuzzo and Carlos Eduardo Santana.
—"Retired Officer Proposes Missile Deal with Iran," Folha De Sao Paulo, 22 February 1991, p. 4; in Nuclear Developments, 19 March 1991, p. 17.

March 1991
North Korea signs a five-year contract with Iran for the supply of 20,000 barrels of oil per day.
—"A Lonely State of Defiance," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 August 1992, pp. 26-27.

March 1991
Iran is thought to have deployed Silkworm anti-ship missiles at seven sites on the north side of the Straits of Hormuz.
—"HY-2 'Silkworm' Anti-Ship Missile Detailed," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, March 1991, p. 120.

March 1991
Iran's Ministry of Defense and Logistics reports that Iran begins production of its own long-range surface-to-surface missiles, which have a range of 800km. [Note: This event may be the same one that was predicted to occur on 4 February 1991.]
—"Iranian SSMs in Production," Defence, March 1991, p. 6; in Aerospace/Defense Markets & Technology, April 1991, p. 156.

March 1991
Iran receives 24 Scud-C missiles in March 1991.
—Bill Gertz, "Ship with Scud Cargo for Syria Alters Course," Washington Times, 9 November 1991, p. A6; Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Missiles Likely on 2nd Ship," Washington Times, 10 December 1991, p. A6; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3.

March 1991
The Tondar-68 missile with a range of more than 1,000km is test-fired at the Salt Desert test range near Shahroud. The Iranians developed the Tondar-68 with the help of the Chinese.
—"Improved Silkworm Test-Fired," Iran Brief, 5 December 1996, pp. 7-8.

March 1991
Iran test-fires two missiles at its testing facility in Semnan. One of the missiles has a range of over 700km and the other one over 1,000km. The two missiles are assumed to be the offspring of the Scud-C due to the fact that it has a range of 600-650km. The two missiles have been temporarily classified as the Tondar-68 for the 1,000km-range missile and Iran-700 for the 700km-range missile. Iran has yet to publicize its names for the missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 59.

April 1991
North Korea begins deliveries of an estimated 60 Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C) missiles and 12 transporter-erector launchers (TELs) to Syria via Iran. North Korea and Syria conclude an agreement for long-term deliveries that continue until at least 1995. There is also a report that North Korea has agreed to build new facilities in Iran to produce three types of Scuds.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 18; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 277; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; Adel Darwish, "N Korea 'Selling Scuds'," The Independent, 6 April 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

May 1991
U.S. satellites detect an Iranian test launch of a Shahab-2/Hwasong-6 missile using a North Korean transporter-erector launcher (TEL) near the city of Qom. The missile flew 500km and landed south of Shahroud in the Dasht-e Kavir (Salt Desert). North Korea likely provided advisors or observers for the test. North Korea also helped build the missile test facility at Shahroud and a tracking station near the town of Tabas.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 18.

May 1991
China is providing Iran with help in establishing production sites around the city of Isfahan for the HY-2 Silkworm missiles and M-class missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 59.

Mid-May 1991
U.S. intelligence sources report that a new ballistic missile is test-fired from a mobile launcher near the city of Qom. The test results in the missile flying for 500km and landing in the Salt Desert.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 24.

24 May 1991
U.S. satellites observe the launch of a Scud-C missile from a mobile launcher near Qom in Iran. The missile flies 500km before impacting south of Shahroud (Emamshahr) in the Salt Desert (Dasht-e Kavir). The missile was assembled in Iran from components provided by North Korea in a series of shipments tracked by Western intelligence agencies since January 1991. Iran has thus far purchased 170 Scud-C missiles, assembling them from "knock-down kits" at the Isfahan facility. (Note: This test may have been an Iranian test of the missile, a joint Iranian-North Korean test, or an early example of North Korea making use of the larger test areas in Iran, as was later planned for Nodong in October or November of 1993. As to the 170 Scud-C missiles, it is unlikely that all 170 could have been delivered. According to production estimates, North Korea would not have been able to produce that many Scud-Cs by this time.)
—Bill Gertz, "U.S.: Iran Fired Ballistic Missile," Washington Times, 24 May 1991, p. A5; Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12. Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Mednews, 21 December 1992, p. 4-5; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 203.

30 May 1991
The United States reportedly is concerned that China may have supplied a production line in the northeastern part of Iran at Isfahan for Chinese-designed short-range ballistic missiles. [Note: Isfahan is not in the northeastern part of Iran. The article probably refers to Shahroud.]
—"Iran Now Top Threat in Region," Washington Times, 30 May 1991, pp. A1, A11.

June 1991
Iran is focusing on greater missile accuracy rather than increased missile range.
—"Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control" (Stanford: Center for International Security & Arms Control, June 1991), pp. 39-72.

Summer 1991
The North Korean ship Mupo departs Namp'o bound for Syria, allegedly carrying eight launchers and an additional missile shipment as part of the Syrian order for 150 Scud-C missiles.
—Bill Gertz, "Ship with Scud Cargo for Syria Alters Course," Washington Times, 9 November 1991, p. A6; Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Missiles Likely on 2nd Ship," Washington Times, 10 December 1991, p. A6; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3.

4 July 1991
Top executives of Japan Aviation Electronics (JAE) publicly apologize for illegally exporting missile parts to Iran. Koichi Kondo, senior managing director, claims that JAE had established an in-company committee in July 1987 to monitor exports, but the committee had "inadvertently overlooked" the exports of missile parts. Kondo does not explain the connection of a Hong Kong agency that placed an order for the repair of missile parts, nor a Singapore company that served as the intermediary for the exports to Iran.
—"Executive Offers Apology," Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 6 July 1991, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

4 July 1991 
Kondo apologized on 4 July for the company's "mistakes," but said "only a few people" were aware that the components were for missiles because "flywheels are new to our company."
—Robert Thomson, "NEC unit admits military Iran deal," Financial Times (London), 6 July 1991, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

5 July 1991
The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department searches the offices of Japan Aviation Electronics (JAE) on the suspicion that the firm illegally exported missile parts to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. JAE reportedly imported broken and faulty parts for the U.S.-designed Sidewinder air-to-air missile from Iran, repaired them, and re-exported them to Iran through Singapore. Iran used the missiles for its U.S.-made F-4 fighters. JAE shipped a total of more than 1,000 parts in and out of Japan in at least 10 different shipments, police report, though they do not disclose the dates of the shipments. Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sadaaki Numata confirms that an investigation is in progress and adds, "We have reason to suspect the people concerned may have gone around the law to export." There have been many cases of weapons exports to the Middle East in which Japanese companies were mentioned.
—"Japanese Firm Exported Missile Parts to Iran," Report from Japan, 5 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; "NEC, Unit Probe Reports of Arms Export to Iran," Wall Street Journal, 5 July 1991, p. A4; Colin Nickerson, "Japan probing sales to Iran of arms parts," Boston Globe, 6 July 1991, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

6 July 1991
Mr. Koichi Kondo, senior managing director of Japan Aviation Electronics (JAE), claims that JAE was paid about ¥35 million for approximately 1,500 flywheels used to enhance the guidance of Iran's Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.
—Robert Thomson, "NEC unit admits military Iran deal," Financial Times (London), 6 July 1991, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

6 July 1991
Japan Aviation Electronics (JAE) imported parts for U.S.-made Sidewinder missiles from Iran via Hong Kong during a one-year period from May 1983 and then shipped them back via Singapore. The company allegedly filed a false report with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry that it was exporting machinery, not missiles.
—"Missile Parts Allegedly; Exported to Iran Illegally," Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 6 July 1991, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

6 July 1991
Reports suggest that Japan Aviation Electronics' (JAE) dealings with Tehran went beyond the repair of flywheels for Sidewinder missiles. Tokyo police, acting on information provided by U.S. authorities, are seeking to establish whether JAE also sold Iran $5 million worth of advanced aviation gyroscopes and accelerometers between 1983 and 1984. The equipment was reportedly for use in F-4 Phantom fighters. Allegations also surface to suggest that JAE was part of the Iran-Contra arms ring established secretly by the U.S. government to exchange hostages for arms to Iran.
—Colin Nickerson, "Japan arms sales linked to Iran-Contra," Boston Globe, 7 July 1991, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

8 July 1991
The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Japanese police intensify the investigation of Japan Aviation Electronics (JAE). The investigation began after U.S. investigators tipped off MITI in February 1991 about illegal technology exports to Iran since 1984. Following a raid of its offices on 5 July 1991, JAE admits to exporting 1,500 flywheels for Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.
—"Japan Steps Up Iran Deals Probe," Financial Times, 8 July 1991, p. 3; "Weapons Scandal Hits Japan, Clouds Tokyo's Hope for Role in Arms Control," Wall Street Journal, 8 July 1991, p. A6.

9 July 1991
The gyroscopes that Japan Aviation Electronics (JAE) shipped to Iran are produced under license from a Californian firm on the condition that they be sold only to Japan's Defense Agency.
—"Gyros sent to Iran licensed only for sale to Defense Agency," Report from Japan, 10 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

10 July 1991
Iranian exile sources say that an Iranian scientific and technical delegation travels to China and North Korea to negotiate an increase in the transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Unmask Saddam's Nuclear Lies," Wall Street Journal, 24 July 1991, p. A10.

11 July 1991
During Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng's visit to Iran, he travels to Isfahan where he visits, "...the military complexes to the north and the west of the city where PRC and North Korean workers and experts are working side-by-side with the Iranians on projects to produce ballistic missiles and advanced surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles."
—"PRC to Supply Nuclear Technology," Sawt Al-Kuwayt Al-Duwali (London), 11 July 1991, pp. 1, 4; in Proliferation Issues, 8 August 1991, pp. 19-20; "DPRK and PRC Co-operation in the Iranian Missile Programmes," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

14 July 1991
Reacting to growing evidence that Japan Aviation Electronics (JAE) illegally conducted "more than a dozen separate transactions" in which missile parts and weapons' electronics were shipped to Iran, an official of Japan's Defense Agency notes, "The timing with the Iran-Contra diversions is remarkable, and we are wondering if it can be a coincidence." JAE shipments went through an Aero Systems front, Heirax in Hong Kong, to another firm in Singapore, and then on to Iran. Most of JAE's gyroscopes and inertial navigation systems equipment production is licensed through Honeywell.
—"Inquiry Has Japan Edgy: Was in An Arms Conduit," New York Times, 14 July 1991, p. 10.

15 July 1991
Iran receives MiG-29 fighter planes, as well as tanks, anti-aircraft missiles, and other equipment from the Soviet Union, as part of a deal brokered in 1990.
—"Iran Rebuilds Its Air Force in Cooperation with the USSR and Incorporates Iraqi Aircraft Which Sought Refuge in Its Territories During Gulf War," Al-Hayat (London), 15 July 1991, p. 7; in "Government Reportedly Turns to USSR for Arms," FBIS Document FBIS-NES-91-145, 29 July 1991, p. 64.

28 August 1991
Japanese authorities arrest four former Japan Aviation Electronics (JAE) executives for importing Sidewinder guidance fin flywheels from Iran via Singapore and re-exporting them to Iran for a profit of ¥35 million. Yukio Kaito, former JAE president; Keiichi Fukuizumi, a senior managing director; Yoshiharu Fukunaga, a director; and Hironobu Takahashi, head of the aircraft division, are arrested.
—"Four Arrested for Selling Missile Parts to Iran," Kyodo (Tokyo), 28 August 1991; in Proliferation Issues, 27 September 1991, p. 5.

28 August 1991
Two Iranians, Raza Amiri and Don Danesh of Ray Amiri Computer Consultants, are arrested in Newport Beach, CA, by U.S. government agents and charged with violation of export control laws. The two men allegedly diverted equipment to Iran, including portable oscilloscopes, with potential nuclear and missile applications. The Office of Export Enforcement agent Brooks D. Ohlson reports that this is one of the first cases involving the export of dual-use technologies to Iran.
—"Federal Agents Accuse Two of Export Violations," Los Angeles Times, 29 August 1991, p. D5; "Some Gear Legally Shipped by Firm Went to Agency Linked to Iranian Military," Orange County Register, 30 August 1991.

September 1991
A dissident Iranian military force, the National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA), reportedly has the capability to field some mobile missile launchers.
—"Iranian Dissidents Form Conventional Army," International Defense Review, September 1991, pp. 970-908.

September 1991
The U.S. State Department imposes a "determination" that the South African arms manufacturer Armscor has been "engaged in missile proliferation activities." As a result, the United States will ban dealings with Armscor for two years. Though the U.S. government has declined to disclose what particular missile sales by South Africa resulted in the ban, there is speculation that they could have involved Iraq, Israel, Chile, Iran, or Taiwan. [Note: Israel and Iran were involved in the Jericho ballistic missile project; later, serious speculation surfaced that Taiwan, South Africa, and Israel were participating on joint missile and nuclear research involving the Jericho missile.]
—David Beresford, "US ban deals big blow to South African arms maker: Unspecified sales of missiles cited in punitive embargo by Washington," Guardian (London), 17 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

September 1991
Reports surface that Iran and Syria negotiated to produce the North Korean Scud-Mod. C (Scud-C) together. Iran will supposedly pay North Korea to build the missile factory in Syria.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 58.

4 September 1991
Japan Aviation Electronics Ltd. (JAE) is indicted in Washington, DC, for conspiring with a Miami company to ship $7 million in outlawed military equipment to Iran during its war with Iraq. The 22-count indictment also names three JAE executives, Aero Systems Inc., and two former Aero Systems executives. U.S. Attorney Jay Stephens says that JAE repaired U.S.-designed aviation gyroscopes and navigation equipment used in F-4 fighters and their missiles received from Hong Kong subsidiaries of Aero Systems, and shipped them to Singapore subsidiaries of Aero Systems for reshipment back to Iran. The indictment says that JAE knew the components were bound for Iran when it agreed to repair and export them from Japan. JAE faces up to $22 million in fines and could be barred from U.S. contracting on charges of violating the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
—"Japan Aviation Electronics Indicted in US Over Missile Parts," Report from Japan, 6 September 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

12 September 1991
Raza Amiri and Don Danesh are indicted in Los Angeles federal court for illegally exporting $60,000 worth of electronic equipment, which included oscilloscopes, logic analyzers, and pulse generators, to the Iran Telecommunications Research Center and the Iran Telecommunications Manufacturing Company. Federal prosecutors allege that from April 1989 to October 1990, the two unnamed accomplices exported sensitive high-tech electronic equipment to destinations in Iran, including the Ministry of Defense, the Iran Telecommunications Research Center, and the Iran Telecommunications Manufacturing Co.
—Christina Lee, "Owner of Newport Beach firm, manager indicted; Exports: They are accused of shipping to Iran electronics that can be used in missile guidance and nuclear weapons," Los Angeles Times, 13 September 1991, p. D5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

21 September 1991
North Korea has sold 300 Scud missiles to Iran, 20 Scud missiles to Syria, and Libya has signed a contract for the purchase of an unspecified number of missiles. (Note: There is also a report claiming that the 20 Scud missiles were actually delivered to Iran, but this is probably the same delivery).
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 21 September 1991, in JPRS-TND-91-016, 29 October 1991, p. 19; "Pukhan, Iran E Scud Missile 1 Baekki Konggŭp—Egypt Shinmun," Joongang Ilbo, 23 September 1991, <http://www.joins.com>.

Late September 1991
Israeli intelligence say that Syria and Iran finalize an agreement for increased military cooperation, which may be part of Syria's ongoing efforts to acquire North Korean missile technology during a visit by Syrian Chief of Staff General Hikmat Shihabi to Tehran. The agreement may result in the Iranian financing of the construction of a surface-to-surface missile joint development and production center in Syria.
—"Syria and Iran Pool SRBM Resources," Flight International, 16-22 October 1991, p. 15.

October 1991
Iran agrees to buy 20 Scud-Cs from North Korea.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 24.

October 1991
Iranian businessman Hussein Ali Kazemi, known to have acted as an agent of the Iranian air force, is a major shareholder in a Tehran-based firm, Dorin. In 1987, Dorin discussed supplying Silkworm missiles to Iran with the London firm, Alcon Services UK. A spokesman for Kazemi's London firms insists that they have never engaged in armaments deals with Iran.
—"Iran Has Maintained London Arms Office," Flight International, October 1991, p. 5.

October 1991
Western intelligence officials report that Syria and Iran are negotiating to buy factories to manufacture a new generation of ballistic missiles from China. At the same time, intelligence officials say that Syria and Iran have purchased new ballistic missiles from North Korea, including the Scud-B and Scud-C, which has a range of 500km. Iran has ordered about 20 Scuds from North Korea; some of the missiles may have already been delivered, with more on the way.
—James Adams, "Syria and Iran shop around for missile factories," Sunday Times (London), 13 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

October-November 1991
North Korea reportedly supplies Iran with 170 Scud missiles.
—"Government, Pakistan Set for Nuclear Cooperation," Al-Diyar (Beirut), 12 January 1992, p. 5; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-92-015, p. 54.

1 October 1991
Ha'aretz, citing "unidentified but reliable" American sources, reports that North Korea is going to "set up" a Scud-C production facility in Syria for joint production. Iran is to finance the facility's construction.
—"Iran, Syria Reportedly Will Build Missiles Together," Associated Press, 1 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Syrian Commander, in Iran, Denounces U.S.-Kuwait Pact," Associated Press, 1 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

13 October 1991
Western intelligence sources indicate that North Korea has exported 20 Scud missiles to Iran, some of which have already arrived and are fully assembled. It reports that missiles bound for Syria will arrive in the near future. Analysts say that North Korea is exporting the missiles to help alleviate its foreign exchange shortage.
—KBS-1 Television Network, 13 October 1991, in "DPRK Scuds Said To Arrive in Iran," FBIS-EAS-91-199, 15 October 1991, pp. 26-27.

15 October 1991
China denies a Sunday Times (London) report that it is negotiating to build missile factories for Iran.
—"Spokesman Denies Missile Deal with Iran, Syria," Agence France Presse, 15 October 1991; in Proliferation Issues, 29 October 1991, p. 4.

21 October 1991
The Chinese Foreign Ministry denies a 16 October Washington Times report that Iran was seeking to acquire M-11 missiles from China.
—"Iranian Nuclear Collaboration Denied," Renmin Ribao Overseas (Beijing), 21 October 1991, p. 1; in Proliferation Issues, 29 October 1991, pp. 3-4.

21 October 1991
The Egyptian government-controlled newspaper Al-Ahram reports that North Korea has provided 300 Scud missiles to Iran.
—"North Allegedly Sold Scuds to Iran, Syria," KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 21 September 1991; in Proliferation Issues, 29 October 1991, p. 19.

30 October 1991
Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, says that the Chinese are supplying M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles under a 10-year military technology transfer agreement between Iran and China signed in 1990. His comments come as Chinese President Yang Shangkun arrives in Tehran on an official visit.
—Simon Tisdall, "China 'helps Iran to make N-bombs'," Guardian (London), 31 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

November 1991
Iran orders 120 Scud-Cs from North Korea.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 24.

November 1991
U.S. Congressional sources report that Iran is financing a longer range north Korean missile, dubbed Nodong-1, with a range of 1000km.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 24.

November 1991
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker reports that China has agreed not to sell the M-11 missiles to Iran as was previously planned.
—Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran," MERIA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1998, in <http://www.biu.ac.il>.

9 November 1991
A North Korean freighter, registered as Mupo, is scheduled to deliver 12 Scud-C missiles and six mobile launchers to Iran's port of Bandar-e Abbas this weekend. The missiles and launchers reportedly belong to Syria. Pressure from the United States and Egypt's refusal to allow the freighter to use the Suez Canal have forced the Mupo to alter its course. The Israelis have complained about a joint Iranian-Syrian cruise missile program. Israeli officials have told the United States that Iran financed a North Korean-designed missile site in Syria for Scud-Cs with a range of 900km.
—Adel Darwish, "Missiles head for Iran," The Independent (London), 9 November 1991, p. 15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

26 November 1991
The United States-China Act of 1991 conference bill passes in the U.S. House of Representatives by a vote of 409-21. The legislation directs that the president may not extend China's most favored nation status (MFN) for another year if, among other criteria, China transfers to Syria or Iran "ballistic missile or missile launchers" for the M-9 or M-11 systems.
—"Conditioning China's MFN Status on Non-Proliferation," Arms Sales Monitor, November/December 1991, pp. 4, 5.

Late 1991-Fall 1992
A U.S. Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare says that Iran purchases nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan toward the end of 1991. Two of the warheads are compatible with Scud missiles, and become functional in late January 1992, as does a nuclear bomb specified for a MiG-27. The status of a nuclear artillery shell is uncertain. In late 1992, Iran agrees to purchase four more nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan. North Korea helped modify these warheads for use on the Nodong 1. [Note: This report is highly dubious. The authors do not reference any sources, and note the document "is intended to provoke discussion and debate." Most analysts agree that Iran has not yet acquired nuclear weapons, although strong evidence indicates they are seeking such a capability.]
—Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 7 February 1994, p. 13.