Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1999
Iran apparently decides to employ Russian technology for its Shahab-4 ballistic missiles, rather than acquiring North Korea's Taepodong- and - missiles and technology.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 33.

1999
North Korea delivers 10 tons of powdered aluminum to Syria. The shipment originates in China and is delivered to the Centre des Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS, Scientific Studies and Research Center), the institute in charge of Syria's missile and chemical weapons programs.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 19.

1999
North Korea sells 20 Nodong engines to Iran. [Note: This could be the same shipment of 12 missile engines for Iran's new Shahab medium-range missiles that took place in November 1999 according to the Washington Times.]
—Andrew Koch and Steve Rodan, "Iran Begins Serial Production of Shahab 3," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 15, 10 October 2001.

Late 1999
The further development of the Shahab-3 and the Shahab-4 missile programs causes alarm among Iran's neighbors and the United States. The Shahab-4 missile will use a variant of the RD-216 liquid-propellant rocket motor originally developed for the Russian SS-5 Skean missile. There are reports that the Shahab-4 will be test-launched within the early months of 2000 at the Shahroud test center. In late 1999, Minister of Defense and Military Logistics Ali Shamkhani notes that there are unspecified problems with the Shahab-4 propulsion unit and states that one test-firing had been conducted but had not been a success because of a "mechanical problem." [Note: The article by Ed Blanche in Jane's Missiles & Rockets suggests that according to "US sources," the Shahab-4 project has been code-named "Kosar." There appears to be a significant degree of confusion regarding the Shahab-4 missile—in some locations, the Shahab-4 appears as an independent missile endeavor from the Kosar, and in other areas, Kosar appears as the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in development by Iran in addition to the Shahab-5 and Shahab-6. Efforts to clarify this by contacting the journalist in question are being pursued.]
—Ed Blanche, "Iran launches four new missile programmes," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 December 1999, p. 12.

January 1999
The CIA reports that Russian and Chinese firms continue to supply missile components and technology to Iran, and that Tehran hopes to use this assistance to become self-sufficient in producing medium-range ballistic missiles.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000, p. 44.

3 January 1999
Keyvan Khosravi, spokesman of the Iranian Defense Ministry, denies the allegations made by the Japanese NHK channel that Iran has purchased missiles from North Korea. He adds that a country capable of producing missiles such as the Shahab-3 would not need to buy missiles.
—"Iran Denies Having Bought Missiles from North Korea," AFP, 3 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>. [CNS translation]

13 January 1999
The U.S. government announces sanctions against NIKIET (The Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology) and the D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology and the Moscow Aviation Institute. The sanctions focus on "all United States Government procurement from, and assistance to, these entities," states David Leavy, National Security Council Spokesman. Similar sanctions had been announced last July against seven Russian enterprises accused of selling technology to Iran. He adds that the Russian government stopped suspect deals with Iran in recent months after the July sanctions.
—David Stout, "US Imposes Sanctions on Tech Labs in Russia" New York Times, 13 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

13 January 1999
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev strongly denies allegations that Russian scientific centers have passed missile and nuclear secrets to Iran. Sergeyev's comments come in response to U.S. sanctions against the Russian Mendeleyev University of Chemistry and Technology, the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI), and the Research and Design Institute of Energy Technology. "These centers could not have passed any know-how because they do not have it in full," he states. "Generally speaking, Russia monitors the nonproliferation of missile and nuclear technologies, and this monitoring is reliable." Russian Education Minister Vladimir Filippov says that connections between Iran and two of the institutions, the Russian Mendeleyev Chemical Engineering University and the Moscow Aviation University, "are wholly unrelated to Iran's nuclear missile complex." Filippov does acknowledge that a professor from Mendeleyev University once visited Iran on a private trip. Rector Pavel Sarkisov of the Mendeleyev Chemical Technology University also denies the allegations, claiming, "decisions on selling missile know-how refer to the political sphere and have nothing to do with us." He says one Iranian postgraduate student is doing research into polymers and the synthesis of polystyrene, which is used in machine-building, construction and electrical engineering, but not in the defense industries. Rector Aleksandr Matviyenko of the MAI acknowledges that his institute does work on missile and satellite projects, but states, "we simply do not admit any foreigners to such studies." Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi also dismisses the accusations, saying that Iran's missile programs are completely indigenous, and that Iran does not rely on any country. Likewise, Iran's embassy in Moscow denies the claims, saying that the new allegations are the same old accusations previously denied by Iran and Russia.
—"Sergeyev Denies Nuclear Technology Passed to Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 13 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS1999011300225, 13 January 1999; "Minister Says US Claims of Missile Help to Iran Groundless," RIA (Moscow), 13 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990113000843, 13 January 1999; "Russia Denies Selling Missile Information to Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 13 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990113000408, 13 January 1999; "Russian Scientists on Cooperation With Iran," NTV (Moscow), 13 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990114001064, 14 January 1999; "Iran Refutes US Statement on Iranian Military Capability," IRNA (Tehran), 13 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990113000566, 13 January 1999; "Iran Denies Nuclear Cooperation With Russian Institutes," IRNA (Tehran), 13 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990113000467, 13 January 1999.

14 January 1999
Russia reacts negatively to the U.S. sanctions imposed on three Russian institutes suspected of assisting Iran with missile and nuclear technology. Russian Prime Minister Yevegeny Pimakov says that the measures are "counterproductive." The foreign ministry maintains that the allegations "have no ground whatsoever" and the three institutes "are in full compliance" with Russian and international law. The D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology and the Moscow Aviation Institute are suspected of hosting Iranian students seeking nuclear and missile technology. Pavel Sarkisov, Dean of Mendeleyev, says that work on nuclear issues is not possible at the institute, and the only enrolled Iranian student is studying polymers. Alexander Matveyenko states that none of the 28 Iranian students enrolled at his institute studies missile technology.
—David Hoffman, "Russia Denounces US Sanctions, Claims Linking Institutes, Iran Have No Grounds Whatsoever," Washington Post, 14 January 1999.

14 January 1999
Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin rejects as "unfounded" American accusations that Russia is helping Iran's missile programs.
—"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation called Washington's attempts to link US cooperation with Moscow on satellite launches with the Iranian issue "far fetched," Interfax (Moscow), 14 January 1999. [CNS translation]

14 January 1999
According to Aleksandr Zdanovich, spokesman for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), a probe of three research institutes—the Mendeleyev Chemical-Technological Institute, the Moscow Aircraft Institute, and the Research and Development Institute of Energy Engineering—reveal no indications of cooperation with Iran's nuclear or missile programs. Zdanovich says that the FSB effectively prevents the illegal export of dual-use items. He cites Russia's success in halting the illegal transfer of components for a liquid-fueled rocket engine from Russia's Trud company to Iran. However, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Aleksey Yablokov, says the United States may have valid reasons to suspect Russian organizations of providing Iran with sensitive information. Yablokov says that the Moscow Chemical Technology University "is developing a chemical component of missile fuel. This is well-known in the entire scientific world." Furthermore, he cites a case from the summer of 1998 when an Iranian spy was detained in Moscow "for receiving technical information on missile characteristics."
—"Spokesman: FSB Working to Stop Dual-Use Technology Exports," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 14 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990114000310, 14 January 1999; "Russian Ecologist Backs US Claims on Technology to Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 14 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990114000228, 14 January 1999.

18 January 1999
According to Major General Aleksandr Zdanovich, head of the public relations center of the Russian Federal Security Service, Iran receives equipment for its missile programs from Europe, and many of its scientists are trained in the United States, Europe, and Canada. Zdanovich says, "in 1996 the Iranians acquired a three-coordinate coil winder from the Bolenz and Schafer Maschinenfabrik GmbH and Co. KG. 3560 Biedenkopf, which can be used, among other things, in the production of ballistic missiles and rocket motors. In addition, Iran has equipment that makes it possible to produce parts and assemblies for liquid-propellant rocket motors; electroerosion equipment from the Swiss firms Roboform, Robofill, and AGIE. It is equipped with instruments from the Japanese firms Mittutujo and Nikken, and much of the state-of-the-art software is US-produced."
—"FSB Aide: European Firms Sold Iran Missile Technology," Segodnya (Moscow), 18 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS1990118000614, 18 January 1999.

20 January 1999
The Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI) started two projects in 1995 to develop aviation engines for Iran, which could be used in short-range cruise missiles. The paper recognizes that as early as 1996, the MAI obeyed the Russian government's orders to stop the projects, pursuant with Russia's commitments to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Though the project was cancelled, the Iranian scientists were able to do further work based on the information they received. The paper says that the MAI started its relationship with Iran in late 1994 and is currently involved in two projects to train personnel for Iran's aviation industry, including one to establish a training center in the Iranian city of Isfahan. The U.S. State Department became interested in the MAI's relationship with Iran in April 1998, when it asked the Russian export control commission to evaluate its contracts with Iran. The final report has not yet been submitted, but the commission announces that no violations of the export restrictions were discovered.
—"Value of MAI's Iran Ties Balances Cost of Sanctions," Kommersant (Moscow), 20 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990120000719, 20 January 1999.

20 January 1999
According to an Israeli defense official, Iran delays a second test-launch of its Shahab-3 surface-to-surface missile because of operational problems. He says, however, that the Shahab-3 missile program is on-schedule and will probably be operational by 2000. He says that Iran is having trouble trying to apply sophisticated Russian technology to a simplistic missile frame that it purchased from North Korea.
—"Iran delayed missile test due to problem: Israeli," Reuters, 20 January 1999.

20 January 1999
Commenting on the United States' imposition of sanctions on three Russian entities for allegedly assisting the Iranian proliferation efforts, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi says, "Iran has merely scientific and industrial relations with the Russian companies and institutions which have been subjected to U.S. sanctions....Iran has not and will not be interested in acquiring technology for developing nuclear and ballistic missiles from other countries...."
—"Iran blasts US sanctions on Russia," Associated Press, 20 January 1999; in "Iran Announces New, Non-Military Missile," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 34, Acronym Institute, <http://www.acronym.org>.

20 January 1999
Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai provides secret documents to the United States alleging that at least 10,000 Russian scientists are helping Iran develop missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The report says the Russian scientists are helping Iran develop its Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles, as well as a 3,600km-range SS-400. Israel believes the missiles will be completed in 2002 and capable of carrying nuclear warheads by 2007. Details will be revealed in the next issue of the Foreign Report. Iran first tested the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 on 22 July 1998. An Israeli defense official said that Iran is delaying a second test because of problems applying sophisticated Russian technology to the North Korean-produced missile frame. Iran claims that the Shahab-3 design was based on indigenous technology.
—"Mordekhay Said to Give US Data on Russia-Iran Cooperation," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 20 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990120000938, 20 January 1999; "Israeli Official Says Iran Missile Program 'On Schedule'," Jerusalem Post, 21 January 1999;in FBIS Document FTS19990121000290, 21 January 1999.

21 January 1999
Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai informs U.S. President Bill Clinton that Russian experts are helping Iran develop Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 ballistic missiles as well as a missile named SS-400 with a range of 3,600km. On another level, a defense official states that Iran is delaying the testing of a surface-to-surface missile (Shahab-3) because of operational problems. The official says that Iran is having problems applying Russian technology on a simple missile purchased from North Korea.
—Arieh O'Sullivan and Douglas Davis, and News Agencies, "'Foreign Report': 10,000 Russian Experts in Iran," Jerusalem Post, 21 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 January 1999
Iran has been trying to develop a ballistic missile that would reach Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey. It is assisted by Russia through state-supported institutes or private enterprises. Iran has spent more than $50 million for assistance from Russian entities since the late 1980s. Kenneth Timmerman, editor of the Iran Brief newsletter in Washington, says he was told by some Iranians that 12 Russian institutes sent nearly 200 experts for technical instruction in Iran. Some institutes, such as the Central Aerohydrodymanic Institute (TsAGI ), have stopped their assistance to avoid U.S. sanctions. TsAGI had a contract with Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group to help Iran design its missiles. It built a special wind-testing tunnel for several hundred thousand dollars.
—Steve Goldstein, Knight-Ridder Newspaper, "Russia Helping Iranians With Missiles," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 22 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 January 1999
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Yury Maslyukov tells a Russian television program that nuclear and missile technologies have been leaking out of Russia to Iran and other countries.
—"Maslyukov Says US Right on Iran Leaks," Moscow Times, 22 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

23 January 1999
Leslie Morris, former technician who revealed secret details of the Tornado F3 fighter jet's radar system to Iran and Iraq, is jailed. He gave information relevant to firing guided missiles from aircrafts. From 1973 to 1995, he worked for a company that was contracted to carry out classified projects including the Foxhunter Radar System, which is used in the Tornado combat aircraft to help guide missile systems. He worked on the microwave frequency generation system for the Tornado. In May 1997, he sent a letter to the Iranian Embassy in London and another to the Jordanian Embassy in London describing how the system works.
—"Technician Jailed Over Secrets for Saddam," Herald (Glasgow), 23 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

30 January 1999
The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran announces that the Shahab-3 missile would be put on public display at Tehran's international exhibition site for the "Ten Days of Dawn" exhibition, which highlights achievements of the Islamic Revolution.
—"Iran's Shahab-3 Missile To Be Exhibited in Tehran," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 30 January 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990130000823, 30 January 1999.

February 1999
George Tenet, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, testifies on Russia's technical assistance to Iran. He says, "Especially during the last six months, expertise and materiel from Russia has continued to assist the Iranian missile effort in areas ranging from training to testing to components. This assistance is continuing as we speak, and there is no doubt that it will play a crucial role in Iran's ability to develop more sophisticated and longer-range missiles."
—W. Seth Carus, "Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction," The American Jewish Committee, <http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/Publications.asp?did=148>.

1 February-13 February 1999
An exhibition of the achievements of the Islamic Revolution is held at the Tehran Permanent International Fairs and Exhibitions Agenda. Among the missiles on display are the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, and Shahab-3 ballistic missiles. Also on display is the Chinese C-802 ship-to-ship cruise missile.
—Farzin Nadimi, "Report on Military Exhibition in Tehran," Sanai-yi Havai (Tehran), 1 February 1999, pp. 7-10; in FBIS Document FTS19990619000579, 1 February 1999.

1 February 1999
In a speech commemorating the return of the late Ayatollah Khomeyni to Iran in 1979, former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani discusses Iran's self-sufficiency in missile production. He says, "today your nation can build all its own defense needs, from colt bullets to intercontinental missiles.... Everything which we realized, during the war, is really necessary for war and defense, and which is needed by the country, we are building in these same factories which we have constructed ourselves and are running ourselves." Rafsanjani also says, "When America, using satellites, sees that at our international exhibition, the Shehab-3 missile, with a range of 1,350 kilometers, is on display, it grieves but can do nothing about it."
—"Rafsanjani Speech on Khomeyni Anniversary," IRNA (Tehran), 1 February. 1999; in FBIS Document FTS1999020100310, 1 February 1999.

2 February 1999
Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani says, "The Shehab-3 missile has been manufactured without any foreign model, and innovations in the manufacture of light- and heavy-artillery pieces and heavy naval vessels are among the other achievements of Iranian engineers." Iranian Revolution Guards Corps Major General Seyyed Yahya Safavi announces in Shiraz, "we are equipped with the most advanced missile system that we produce ourselves, and we are not dependent on any foreign country."
—"Minister on Iran's Military Manufacturing Capability," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 2 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990202001250, 2 February 1999; "Guards Commander Insists Corps Not Factional," Nim-Negah (Shiraz), 3 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990329000593, 3 February 1999.

6 February 1999
For nine years, Mr. Jamshid Hashemi, an Iranian-born arms dealer, was used by "MI6 to help set up deals with Iran, including the purchase of silkworm missile from China.
—Guardian Service, "Iranian Arms Dealer Freed in London," Irish Times, 6 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

7 February 1999
In a press conference for foreign and domestic reporters, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani says Iran has begun work on engine design and testing for its Shahab-4 missile. He says the missile will be used for launching satellites, and has no military applications. Furthermore, Shamkhani said all work on the Shahab-4 will be done by Iranian experts. The Iranian defense industries now manufacture the Shahab-3 missile. Shamkhani also says that the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 will not be used against any Muslim state and poses no threat to the region. He says Iran has no plans for producing a missile with a longer range than the Shahab-3. [Note: The two stories, both from IRNA's account of the same press conference, seem to be contradictory, with Shamkhani saying Iran will not produce a missile with a longer range than the Shahab-3. Shamkhani classifies the Shahab-4 as a space launch vehicle, not as a military missile.] Shamkhani also denies reports in the Western media that an Iranian delegation had traveled to Moscow to increase nuclear and missile cooperation.
—"Shamkhani Announces Shahab-4 Space Rocket Production," IRNA (Tehran), 7 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990207000166, 7 February. 1999; "Shamkhani on Shahab-3, King Abdallah, Abadan Missile," IRNA (Tehran), 7 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990207000374, 7 February 1999; "Shamkhani Denies Iran-Russia Discussed Missile Cooperation," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 7 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990207000549, 7 February 1999.

7 February 1999
Iranian Defense Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani says, "Missiles and military equipment made in Iran pose no threat for the countries of this region." Shamkhani says that the Shahab-3 missile is not a threat to other countries in the region, and that due to its successful testing, there would be no reason to retest the missile in the future.
—"The Shehab-3 Missile Will Not Land on Any Islamic Country," IRNA (Tehran), 7 February 1999.

7 February 1999
Iranian Defense Minister General Ali Shamkhani says that Iran will test a civilian missile, the Shahab-4, for satellite-launching purposes. He adds that Iran has completed its deterrence capabilities through the development of the Shahab-3.
—Kianouche Dorraine, "Iran is trying to Enter the Club of Satellite Launching Countries," Agence France Presse, 7 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>. [CNS translation]

7 February 1999
Shamkhani announces that Iran's armed forces are scheduled to test a motor for the Shahab-4 missile on 9 February 1999. He says the Shahab-4 missile has "no military use" and would not be produced on a large scale. He says the Shahab-4's motor had already been tested, but the test was unsuccessful due to a mechanical problem.
—Kianouch Dorranie, "Iran to Test Motor for New Space Rocket," Agence France Presse, 7 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, 7 February 1999, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

7 February 1999
According to Moscow's ITAR-TASS news agency, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani says Iran would test the engines for its Shahab-4 rocket on 9 February 1999. He says production of the Shahab-4 will not be large scale, and that it will have no military applications. In July 1998, Iran successfully tested its 1,300km-range Shahab-3.
—"TASS Reports Iran To Test Shahab-4 Engines 9 Feb," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990207000811, 9 February 1999.

8 February 1999
Iranian Minister of Defense and Military Logistics Ali Shamkhani holds a press conference in Tehran and says that the Shahab-3 ballistic missile "will be the last combat missile to be produced in Iran. We are not planning to develop any new missiles." This is in contradiction to his November 1998 statement that Iran was in the process of developing a new missile. The Shahab-4 missile is now reportedly designed for purely civilian use to place satellites in orbit.
—"Iran not to produce any new combat missiles," ITAR-TASS, 9 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

11 February 1999
In commemoration of the Shah's fall, Iran holds an impressive military exhibition at which the Shahab-3 missile is displayed for the first time.
—Safa Haeri, "The Ayatollah's Dream Fades," Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), Issue No. 415, 4-10 February 1999, <http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly>.

11 February 1999
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens says Iran has exaggerated its missile capabilities and is experiencing problems with its missile technologies. However, Arens says that with more assistance from Russia and other countries, Iran's long-range surface-to-surface missiles could become operational. In January 1999, an Israeli official said Iran was having technical difficulties applying Russian technology to the simpler missile frame purchased from North Korea.
—"Arens Says Iranian Missile Capability 'Exaggerated'," Qol Yisrael (Jerusalem), 11 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990211001060, 11 February 1999.

12 February 1999
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens says that Iran faces problems in its missile program and makes exaggerated statements about the time its missiles would be operational.
—"Arens: Iran nuclear capability overblown," Jerusalem Post, 12 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

15 February 1999
Former General Commander of the Iranian Revolution Guard, Muhsin Ridhai, tells the London-based Al-Hayat paper in Tehran, "if Israel launched one missile against us, we will retaliate by launching ten and we have the capacity to carry out such a retaliation."
—"Iranian Veteran: Iran to Retaliate if Israel Attacks," Al-Hayat (London), 15 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990215001303 15 February 1999.

16 February 1999
According to Western intelligence sources, Iran provides Lebanon with long-range artillery rockets that can reach Haifa in northern Israel. The Iranian defense minister publicly hints at the presence of the long-range rockets in Lebanon, claiming that Iran has strategic weapons—other than its Shahab-3 missile—to deter Israel. Iran has the 45km-range Fajr rocket, which may be a modified version of a North Korean rocket. Iran originally purchased the 43km-range M-1985 multi-barreled rocket launcher from North Korea, which is now being made in Iran.
—"Iran's Nuclear Development Reached 'Point of No Return'," Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 16 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990216001294, 16 February 1999.

17 February 1999
Clifford Beale, a leading defense analyst and editor of Jane's Defense Weekly, says that Iran's new ballistic missile is more likely to be a long-range surface-to-surface missile than a satellite launcher. He adds that according to U.S. intelligence, the Shahab-4 is derived from the obsolete Soviet SS-4 ballistic missile. He says that if the missile is a SS-4, it is too small to launch a satellite. [Note: This would contradict Iran's stated intended purpose for the missile, see 7 February.]
—Times Wire Reports, "Britain Expert Questions Iran's Satellite Claim," Los Angeles Times, 17 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

17 February 1999
Iran's next ballistic missile, the Shahab-4, is largely derived from the Soviet SS-4 Sandel medium-range ballistic missile. The SS-4, designed and built in Ukraine by NPO Yuzhnoye, has a maximum range of 2,000km and a circle of equal probability (CEP) value of 2,400km. Iran's Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, announces that the Shahab-4 is intended as a space launch vehicle, not for military applications. A Russian missile expert tells Jane's that the SS-4 design is so old that technical data could have been obtained openly from a variety of sources, even in the United States.
—Clifford Beal, "Iran's Shehab-4 is a Soviet SS-4, says US intelligence," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

26 February 1999
Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev strongly denies reports in the American media that 10 Russian institutes are assisting Iran with missile technologies. "It cannot be," Sergeyev said. "With the existence of such tough export control in our country, it is impossible to export such technologies. We cannot agree with these accusations addressed to us," he says.
—"Russia's Sergeyev Rejects US Iran Cooperation Reports," RIA (Moscow), 26 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990226000457, 26 February 1999.

27 February 1999
Moscow's Polyus Scientific Research Institute develops laser gyroscopes and other laser equipment. In May 1998, the Iranian Organization of the Electronics Industry requested a contract with Polyus for the assembly of laser gyroscopes in Iran. The directors of Polyus did not agree to the transaction due to the potential for gyroscopes to be used in military equipment and for the Iranian scientists to gain practical knowledge. The director of the Moscow-based MOSO and Yevropalas-2000 Firms, Iranian citizen Ali Mazidi, is under investigation by the Russian Federal Security Service.
—"U.S. Claims on Iran Arms Projects Refuted," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), 27 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990308000140, 27 February 1999.

28 February 1999
Chairman of Iran's Expediency Council and former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani discusses Iran's missile programs. He states that Iran has built all of their missiles domestically and has successively improved the ranges of the missiles. "Naturally we began with a missile with a range capability of just 50km, and we now have several generations of missiles with different range capabilities: 50km, 100km, 200km, 300km, 500km. We have now reached a radius of action of 1,350km." [Note: The 1,350km missile Rafsanjani refers to is likely the Shahab-3.] Rafsanjani emphasizes, "we built all these missiles ourselves, starting from scratch. We did use Soviet-made Iraqi missiles with which we were shelled by Iraq during the war. Some dropped without exploding; we collected them and were able to reproduce some of their components." In answer to allegations of Russian cooperation, Rafsanjani states, "I can give a specific example for people who continue to say that the Russians are providing assistance in making these missiles. Special mixtures of explosives are needed for these missiles. We buy them abroad, and not in the East but in the West, because it is much easier to buy this material on Western markets."
—"Rafsanjani Denies Russian Missile Help," NTV (Moscow), 28 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990228000736, 28 February 1999.

March 1999
An unconfirmed report suggests that North Korea has assisted with an Iranian development program, possibly known as Shahab-5, based on the design of the Taepodong-1 missile.
—"Iran," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

2 March 1999
According to the South Korean Yonhap News Agency, Iran purchases North Korean Scud-B missiles using counterfeit currency. In its 26 February 1999 issue, the German magazine Der Spiegel reported that a Swiss company sold six printing machines to Iran between 1973 and 1984, which were used to make the fake currency.
—"Der Spiegel: Iran Bought DPRK Arms With Counterfeit Money," Chosun Ilbo, (Seoul), 2 March 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990302000702, 2 March 1999.

4 March 1999
Daniel Malloy, president of International Helicopter, Inc. (New Jersey), admits to having shipped 100 Hawk missile batteries and other military aircraft parts to Iran.
—"Aviation Company President Admits to Shipping Jet Parts to Iran," Ottawa Citizen, 4 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

4 March 1999
Daniel Malloy is indicted on charges that he ordered 20 batteries for AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles from a Missouri manufacturer and was planning to ship them to businessman Joseph T. P. Balakrishna Menon, owner of Heli-World Aviation, Ltd., based in Singapore, who would in turn send them to Iran. [Note: The number of batteries varies from entry to entry, see other 4 March entries.]
—"Man Admits Trying to Sell Missile Parts to Iran," New York Times (New York), 4 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

4 March 1999
The United States wants to restrict the unrestricted cross-border trade in arms products with Canada. The United States claims that Canada's lax policies about exports of U.S.-made equipment make such equipment more easily available to countries such as Iran. During the past two years, Canadians have been caught trying to ship U.S.-made missile components and military equipment to Iran. Last May, two Iranian-born Canadian citizens were arrested in Vancouver on allegations that they were tying to buy guidance equipment for Hawk missiles. According to the U.S. Justice Department, the components were to be shipped to Iran via Canada.
—David Pugliese, "Arms Dealers Put Canadian Jobs at Risk: US Calls Canada A Smuggler's Pipeline, threatens Military Trade Restrictions," Ottawa Citizen, 4 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

8 March 1999
According to a U.S. intelligence report, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami orders the production of 15 Shahab-3 missiles, which will be deployed in underground bunkers near Khorramabad.
—"Shahab-4 Motor Test," Iran Brief, 8 March 1999, pp. 4-5.

12 March 1999
According to a joint assessment by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Israeli intelligence reports, Russia continues to provide Iran with sensitive technical information for the development of ballistic missiles and non-conventional weapons. "We are approaching the red line," a senior security source says. "Action must be taken to stop the transfer of security information to Iran and Iraq. We will not be able to prevent the acquisition of non-conventional weapons if we don't stop this activity now."
—"Israeli-US Reports Note Russian Aid to Iran, Iraq, Syria," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 12 March 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990312000642, 12 March 1999.

14 March 1999
Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov asks for proof that 10 Russian companies are assisting Iran with nuclear and missile programs, as alleged by a Newsweek correspondent. Primakov states, "We are cooperating with the United States in that sphere and have permanent channels to exchange confidential information."
—"Primakov Calls for Proof of Nuclear Assistance to Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 14 March 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990314000567, 14 March 1999.

18-24 March 1999
The U.S. and Israeli pressure on China and Russia falls short of stopping the Iranian missile and nuclear programs. This suggests that the Iranian programs are beyond the stage of relying on outside support.
—Abdel-Azim Hammad, "Preemptive Diplomacy," Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 18-24 March 1999, Issue No. 421, <http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly>.

19 March 1999
Iran claims that Israel owes $5 billion for contracts it made that were never completed or filled. The issue is discussed by a panel in Geneva. Haaretz outlines the three major deals that were struck and went wrong: (1) oil given to Israel by Iran for which it wasn't reimbursed; (2) "the Soltam mortar factory project for which Iran paid and received nothing in return; (3) and a large sum that was paid to Israel for the establishment of a factory to manufacture Jericho-2 surface-to-surface missiles, the supply of a few components for the missiles and the joint development of the Jericho-3 at a later stage."
—Ronen Bergman, "5 billion Reasons to Talk to Iran," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 19 March 1999; in "Israel's Outstanding Debt to Iran Viewed," FBIS Document FTS19990319001273, 19 March 1999.

19 March 1999
Missile-tests are planned for this week in the Gulf of Oman at a spot close to the Strait of Hormuz, off the Iranian port of Jask. The Defense Space and Missile Activity Center, known as "Defsmac," said earlier this month that the Iranian Air Force was set to fire two new air-to-surface test missiles of a new anti-ship missile called the Project Fajr.
—Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Missile Watch," Washington Times, 19 March 1999.

22 March 1999
Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agree to establish a joint committee to oversee the transfer of non-conventional weapons technology from Russia to Iran. The committee is to be headed by the Israeli and Russian foreign ministries. However, Israeli sources indicate that despite the committee, Russian military assistance to Iran would continue. In Jerusalem's Qol Yisrael, Netanyahu refutes media reports that Iran has a missile capable of reaching Israel. However, during an interview with a Moscow television reporter, Netanyahu indicates the opposite. In response to a statement that Russia's technological cooperation with Iran is a barrier to stronger Russian-Israeli relations, Netanyahu says, "I think that this is a problem which should worry all of us, both Russia and Israel, since Iran has ballistic missiles, which are capable of reaching Moscow moreover with nuclear warheads, as you understand, this is not only Israel's problem. It is a problem of all those who are located in the radius of these missiles." Netanyahu goes on to say, "they [Iran] have made progress in the production of missiles. However, they still have to cover a certain distance so that these missiles can become operational...I am convinced that only through cooperation and on the basis of understanding will we be able to find common ways to resolve this problem with the Russian government."
—"Committee to Oversee Russian Technology Transfer to Iran," Qol Yisrael (Jerusalem), 22 March 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990322001172, 22 March 1999; "Netanyahu—Iran Has No Missile Reaching Israel," Qol Yisrael (Jerusalem), 22 March 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990322000560, 22 March 1999; "Israeli Premier on Russia-Iran Cooperation," Russian Public Television First Channel Network (Moscow), 22 March 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990322001695, 22 March 1999.

23 March 1999
Israel and Russia agree on a mechanism to control the transfer of weapon of mass destruction technologies to Iran. Benjamin Natanyahu says that "the issue of non-conventional weapons technological transfer is of cardinal importance to us and...Primakov is now committed to taking care of it."
—Danna Harman, "Israel, Russia Agree to 'mechanism' on Technology Transfer to Iran," Jerusalem Post, 23 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

2 April 1999
Senior U.S. officials say that North Korea has shipped "missiles, missile technology, and parts produced by its advanced ballistic program" to "countries such as Iran and Pakistan" and that North Korea earns about $100 million annually from missile sales.
—"Missile Exports Earn Pyongyang $770 Million a Year, Report Says," South China Morning Post, 3 April 1999, <http://www.scmp.com>.

3 April 1999
A French company, Microturbo, SA is thought to be providing Iran with missile components that were used in the construction of C-802 missiles. The United States believes that Iran has 150 anti-ship cruise C-802s, most of them bought from China, but some made locally as copies of the French-provided TRI-60 engines. France is supposed to have delivered 50 Microturbo engines in 1987, 50 in 1995 and 50 in 1996 to China, who reverse-engineered the engine to put them on the C-802. Iranians used the Hong Kong-based firm Jetpower Industrial Ltd. as a front to purchase the engine from both Chinese and Microturbo. The French company had deals with Iran whereby it provided power generators. Its Chairman, Cocheteaux, says that the generators are "very different from engines used to propel missiles" and are not useful in building missile engines. He adds that "Microturbo SA never assisted Iran in any way or on any missile."
—John Mintz, "Tracking Arms: A Study in Smoke, Ambiguity Clouds French Role in China-Iran Deal," Washington Post, 3 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

5 April 1999
Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon is in favor of having direct contact with Russia regarding the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Iran. Sharon and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed the matter in Moscow during a March 1999 visit. Sharon feels the United States is not taking a strong enough role in preventing the cooperation between Russia and Iran, and therefore maintains that Israel should speak directly with Russia.
—"Sharon Favors Direct Contact With Russia on Missiles," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 5 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990405000553, 5 April 1999.

7 April 1999
China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp. is believed to have computer equipment that might have helped it develop anti-ship missiles that it subsequently sold to Iran. Iranian radar system and nuclear reactors seem to benefit from China connections to U.S. exports, as many products used in nuclear and missile work have been licensed to academies, aircraft industries, and institutes.
—Michael S. Leyveld, "US Sold $15 billion of Tech Goods to China," Journal of Commerce, 7 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

7 April 1999
Russia's export control commission discusses U.S. allegations against ten Russian organizations of illegal cooperation with Iran. The commission notes that an investigation into these organizations reveals violations of customs legislations by the Moso and Yevropalas-2000 firms. Moso, founded by an Iranian and two Tajikistanis, acquired a consignment of stainless steel in Spain, which was seized by suspicious authorities in Azerbaijan in May 1998 after discovering falsified customs documents. According to the United States, this steel was destined for Iran's missile programs. The investigation also reveals that Yevropalas-2000 helped process the order. Both companies are considered "fictitious" according to the Kommersant report. The commission has additional questions for one or two more of the listed organizations, but the others are not suspected of having broken the export control restrictions. [Note: Refer to the entry for 27 February 1999 for more details on these organizations.]
—"Export Commission Views Technology 'Leak' to Iran," Kommersant (Moscow), 8 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990412000845, 8 April 1999.

12 April 1999
During a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers to increase military and technological cooperation with Russia in exchange for tightened control of technology transfer to Iran's missile and nuclear programs. Meanwhile, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens tells the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, "We know today that Russian technological information regarding nuclear capability and ballistic missiles has for months been passed from Russia to Iran. I believe that we must do what we can, in addition to the efforts by the U.S., to prevent this transfer of technology to Iran." According to a senior defense official, Iran is set on developing long-range surface-to-surface missiles, as well as acquiring biological and chemical weapons and achieving nuclear capability. He said that Iran would be unable to achieve these goals without Russian assistance, and that there are no indications this aid is stopping.
—"Further on Sharon's Russia Talks, Iranian Procurement," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 13 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990413001053, 13 April 1999.

13 April 1999
Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers more military technology cooperation to Russia on the condition that it tries to stop its weapons technology exports to Iran. A senior intelligence officer states that Iran is developing a long-range surface-to-surface missile equipped with biological and chemical warheads, and it is also set on developing nuclear weapons. He adds that Russian assistance is imperative to these endeavors.
—Danna Harman and Liat Collins, "Sharon Offers Russia Increased Technological Cooperation," Jerusalem Post, 13 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

14 April 1999
Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics spokesman, Keyvan Khosravi, states that the Iranian-made advanced anti-aircraft missile Sayyad-1 has been successfully test-fired.
—"Iran Radio Commentary Defends Test of Sayyad-1 Missile," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 15 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990415000920, 15 February 1999.

14 April 1999
According to a spokesman for the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, Iran successfully tests its Sayyad-1 surface-to-air missile. The missile, named for assassinated commander Lt-Gen. Ali Sayyad-Shirazi, successfully destroys a mock target in the air. The spokesman says that the missile was fully designed and manufactured by the Aerospace Industries Organization, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. He says that the Sayyad-1 will be a major component of Iran's medium- and long-range air defense missiles. [Note: Lt-Gen. Sayyad-Shirazi was deputy commander in chief of the Iranian armed forces, and was allegedly assassinated by the Iranian opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) based in Iraq.]
—"Iran 'Successfully' Test Fires Surface-to-Air Missile," IRIB Television First Program (Tehran), 14 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990414000484, 14 April 1999.

14 April 1999
Khosravi says the missile was produced entirely by the airspace industries organization, affiliated to the defense and armed forces logistics ministry. Khosravi states that manufacture of the missile would meet a part of Iran's air defense needs for the medium-and long-range surface-to-air missiles.
—"Iran Successfully Tests Sayyad-1 Missile," IRNA (Tehran), 14 April 1999, <http://www.irna.com>.

14 April 1999
Diplomatic sources quoted by the Internet Conservative News Service (ICNS) say that Iranian defense ministry officials acknowledge the Sayyad-1 missile is of Chinese design, but was manufactured at least partially in Iran. ICNS also reports that Chinese Aviation Industry Minister Zha Yuli is on an official visit to the "strategic Iranian town of Qeshm in Bushehr province" at the time the missile is test-fired and that the Chinese ambassador to Iran, Wang Shijie, accompanies him on the trip. A number of factories used for military as well as civilian purposes are located on Qeshm Island.
—"Iran tests new AD missile," Iran Brief, 3 May 1999, p. 8.

14 April 1999
The Iranian armed forces carry out a successful test of a surface-to-air missile. A spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of Defense reports, "the missile was able to hit its target at an appropriate altitude." This missile is dubbed Sayad-1.
—"Teheran announced a successful test of a surface-to-air missile," Agence France Presse, 14 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>. [CNS translation]

15 April 1999
Tehran's Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran broadcasts, "...With the manufacture of this modern surface-to-air missile by the Iranian designers and specialists at the Aerospace Industries Organization affiliated to the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, another step has been taken to reinforce Iran's defense might....Iran's defense might is in fact a speed bump on the way of the aggressive and expansionist policies of the Zionist regime, and the test-firing of the Sayyad-1 surface-to-air missile is a display of the will and might of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran to stand firm against the true enemies of Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran."
—"Iran Radio Commentary Defends Test of Sayyad-1 Missile," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 15 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990415000920, 15 April 1999.

28 April 1999
Iran's Hesa firm is developing an improved version of its Ababil-2 (Swallow) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Hesa hopes to increase the three-hour endurance of the UAV. The Ababil-2 can carry a small camera and cruise at 370km/hour at an altitude of 3.3km.
—"Iran Tests Unmanned Air Vehicle," Flight International, 28 April-4 May 1999, p. 16.

29 April 1999
Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani says that Iran has "a considerable number" of deployed Shahab-3 missiles that can be launched at any time. He says that Iran will "continue to produce them as the situation demands." Shamkhani denies reports that the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 is based on the 1,000km-range North Korean Nodong-1, and says that Iran's defense industries developed and manufactured the Shahab-3 indigenously. He also dismisses reports that Iran is planning to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, saying, "We do not need missiles that can fly longer distance than Shehab-3." Iran claims its Shahab-4 is to be used only as a space launch vehicle with no military function.
—"Iranian Defense Minister Admits Deployment of Shahab-3," Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 29 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990430000054, 29 April 1999.

3 May 1999
China says it would not sell missiles with nuclear warheads to Iran.
—Batsheva Tsur, "China Vows Not To Sell Nukes To Iran," Jerusalem Post, 3 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

5 May 1999
President Clinton's decision to impose sanctions on nine Russian entities because of their role in Iran's missile program "was a planned rather than a spontaneous decision," according to a report on Russian military cooperation with Iran. At the time the nine entities were chosen,Vice President Al Gore was traveling to Russia prior to Iran's testing of its Shahab-3 missile. The list was agreed upon after the examination of a report from Russia's export controls committee. On the same day, Nikolay Kovalev, the director of Russia's Federal Security Service, was in Israel defending the companies on the U.S. sanctions list. Immediately following Iran's test of the Shahab-3, President Clinton toned down his accusations against Russia. This may have been due to the recognition by most analysts that the origin of the Shahab-3 was apparently North Korean rather than Russian. The report says that Russia has nothing to do with Iran's missile program at the governmental level.
—Ivan Safranchuk, ed. by Dmitriy Yevstafyev, "Scientific Notes No. 8: The Nuclear and Missile Programs of Iran and Russian Security—The Framework of Russian-Iranian Collaboration," Nauchnyye Zapiski (Moscow), 5 May 1999, vol. 8, pp. 1-36; in "Russia, Iran Nuclear Program Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19990701001333, 1 July 1999.

7 May 1999
Bob Galluci, a special envoy appointed by President Clinton to work for the containment of missile and nuclear technology transfer, discusses Russian cooperation with Iran's missile and nuclear programs. He says that Iran will likely have an operational launch of the Shahab-3 missile either this year or next. He notes that although the July 1998 test was technically not an operational launch, it was close. Regardless of Iran's progress on the Shahab-3, he says that efforts must continue to halt Russian assistance for this and other missile projects, including the longer-range Shahab-4. "The bigger the missile range, the greater would be the deployment of launching pads in Iranian territory. This is why it is important for us to keep our disruption efforts. I believe that countries that wish to attain missiles and nuclear capability will, eventually, attain their goal. Our only hope is that slowing down the process is worth the effort, while at the same time efforts are made to encourage changes in Iranian and regional leadership," he says. According to Tel Aviv's Maariv, the Shahab-3 has a range of 1,300km. Galluci also discusses the role of Russian officials, saying that some are willing to work with the United States on halting the technology transfer to Iran. He says that Yuriy Koptiv, director of the Russian space agency, "is very interested in cooperation with us. He would like to see the problem go away." Galluci said that other officials, however, do not acknowledge the problem, "Are there Russians who know the policy and violate it? Yes. I heard this all over Russia and most publicly: Doing business with Iran in a way that promotes the Iranian missile program is not the official Russian policy. Some people do the contrary to official policy. This is why we are taking steps against companies in the commercial sector." Galucci says that the United States is working with Russia to help them better control exports and develop stronger rules and regulations. Upon Galluci's recommendation, President Clinton imposed sanctions on ten Russian companies for missile cooperation with Iran, and on two other companies for assisting Iran's nuclear program. Galluci says that theoretically, Iran could deploy the Shahab-3 with a nuclear warhead within a year, but that this is unlikely due to Iran's lack of a sufficient amount of fissile material.
—"Former US Envoy on Missile Threat," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 7 May 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990519000774, 7 May 1999.

26 May 1999
China is said to have transferred missile technology to Iran.
—"Findings of Cox Reports" Irish Times, 26 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

3 June 1999
According to classified U.S. government documents, President Jiang Zemin promised President Clinton in late 1996 that China would halt shipments of missiles to Iran, yet sales of parts for the weapon known as the C-802 missile continued through late 1997. Subsequently, Iran has developed the capability to produce the missiles in a plant near Tehran. Both China and Iran had signed contracts for approximately 400 of the missiles, about 150 of which were delivered. The last "confirmed" delivery of a complete missile, the documents reveal, came in February of 1997. The middleman between Iran and China for the missile deal was arms dealer named Sarkis Soghanlian, formerly convicted in the United States of selling technology to Iraq. But when China conceded to U.S. demands to stop selling the weapons, Iranian officials went in search of engines and other parts to build the missiles itself. According to NSA communication intercepts, Iran turned to Jetpower Industrial Ltd. (Hong Kong) in July 1997 to buy the engines from France and then ship them to Iran. The French engines being used were from a corporation called Microturbo. In early 1998, French officials told U.S. diplomats that its export inspectors opened Microturbo crates bound for Iran and confirmed that they contained generators. Microturbo chairman Cocheteux said the generators are "very different from engines used to propel missiles." In late August 1997, Iranian military officials discussed efforts by Monzer al-Kassar, a Syrian arms dealer, to obtain missile parts for Iran, according to NSA intercepts. Iran can use patrol boats and frigates to launch missiles from the Gulf. According to the documents, Iran can fire the C-802s from mobile launchers, which use support vans for power, radar, and missile-direction, and has also modified several jet fighters to launch the missiles.
—Stephen Green, "Iranian missiles put US Navy in harm's way in Persian Gulf," 3 June 1999, Copley News Service, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; John Mintz, "Ambiguity Clouds French Role in China-Iran Deal," Washington Post, 3 April 1999, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.

3-9 June 1999
Iran and North Korea assist Syria in its efforts to develop missile and warhead production capabilities.
—Galal Nassar, "Bolstering Syrian-Russian Ties," Al-Ahram Weekly, (Cairo), Issue No. 432, 3-9 June 1999, <http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly>.

4 June 1999
Using the Chinese-supplied C-802, Iran is now able to attack ships in the Persian Gulf. The range of these missiles is 25km and can reach an altitude of 65km if Iran obtains an over-the-horizon-radar system. China can use patrol boats and frigates for a sea-launched base and mobile launchers for a surface-based launch.
—Steven Green, "Missile Bought From China Gives Iran Capability to Hit Navy Ships in the Gulf," San Diego Union Tribune, 4 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

9 June 1999
Martin Indyk, head of the Middle East Bureau at the State Department, says that Iran is developing missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
—"Arms Race In Mideast Predicted," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 26 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

10 June 1999
Iran launches Scud-B missiles on the National Liberation Army's camp in Ashraf, Iraq. An official spokesman for Iraq says that Iran fires three missiles at the camp, and also cites the United Nations Security Council for "stripping Iraq of its defense capabilities, which enable it to protect its security and sovereignty against the aggression threatening it." Sanabarq Zahedi, chairman of the Judges Council at the National Resistance of Iran, says that the missiles do not cause any injuries to the Iranian Liberation Army, but some Iraqi civilians are injured near the Ashraf camp. In response to Iran denying responsibility for the attack, Zahedi says, "I think that this denial is ridiculous because Iran is the only party that owns Scud-e missiles." [Note: "Scud-e" is likely a mistranslation, and should read "Scud-B."] Zahedi says that three missiles fall on the Ashraf camp, and the attack violates all international resolutions, including Resolution 598 that calls for the end of the war between Iran and Iraq. According to "reliable sources," Iran "will probably launch more attacks on MKO [Mojahideen-e Khalq], avenging its assassination of Brigadier General Ali Sayad Shirazi, deputy commander in chief of the Iranian Armed Forces." MKO Spokesman Farid Suleiman says that Iran launches a fourth missile from Kermanshahan in western Iran, but it explodes in the air. In statements to the Iraqi News Agency, a speaker for Iraq's National Assembly warns Iran against launching more attacks. Citing unnamed media reports, the Tehran Times acknowledges the MKO claims that several Scuds hit their base, and quotes "an informed source" as saying, "the Iraqi government had been informed of the attack in advance." Several days after the attacks, the MKO calls on the international community to condemn the attacks, saying that Iran's development of missiles and weapons of mass destruction "will pose a threat to the region as a whole." The MKO says that the decision to launch Scuds on the Ashraf base "was made in a session of the Iranian National Security Council that was run by President Mohammad Khatami and attended by Hasan Moqaddam, commander of the missiles unit in the Revolutionary Guard." Mohammad Muhdithin, chairman of external relations for the "National Resistance Council in Iran," says that Iran is seeking missiles with a 3,000km range, and has spent over $1.5 billion on its missile programs over the past ten years.
—"Iran-e Azad Reports Missile Attack Against MKO Base," Iran–e Azad (Internet), 10 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990610001993, 10 June 1999; "Iraqi Spokesman Warns Iran Over 'Stupid' Acts," Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad), 11 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990611000485, 11 June 1999; "Opposition: Iran Denial of MKO Base Strike 'Ridiculous'," Al-Jazirah Space Channel Television (Doha, Qatar), 11 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990612000191, 11 June 1999; "More Iranian Attacks on MKO Expected 'Avenging' Shirazi," Al-Hayat (London 12 June, 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990612000117, 12 June 1999; "National Assembly Warns Iran of Launching 'More' Attacks," Republic of Iraq Radio Network (Baghdad), 13 June 1999;in FBIS Document FTS19990613000197, 13 June 1999; "Iran: Iraq Warned of Missile Attack on MKO," Tehran Times (Tehran), 15 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990615000681, 15 June 1999; "MKO Warns of Iranian Missile 'Threat'," Al-Hayat (London), 17 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990617000590, 17 June 1999.

11 June 1999
Iraq says that Iran fires three long-range ground-to-ground missiles at an Iranian exiled opposition group, Mujahideen Khalq, based in Iraq.
—"Iranian Missiles Fired, Iraq Says," Buffalo News, 11 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

11 June 1999
Iraq accuses Iran of firing three long-range missiles into a military base of the People's Mujahideen [Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO)] in Iraq. A spokesman for the opposition group says that several Scud-B missiles hit the group's Ashraf base, 110km northeast of Baghdad, near the border with Iran.
—"Baghdad accuses Iran of firing missiles into Iraq," Agence France-Presse (Baghdad), 11 June 1999.

11 June 1999
The Mujahideen-e Khalq (MKO) claims that Iran fires four Scud-B missiles on their base in Iraq.
—"Iran-Iraq Opposition," Agence France Presse, 11 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>. [CNS translation]

12 June 1999
Iran launches surface-to-surface missiles on an Iranian opposition base in Iraq. Farid Soleimani, a guerilla spokesman, says that two missiles, Scud-Bs, hit the camp and a third one hits the village of Sheik Shuneif, while a fourth missile explodes in the air.
—"Iran is Accused of Missile Strikes on Opposition Base in Iraq," St Louis Post Dispatch, 12 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

14 June 1999
The Iraqi parliament condemns the Iranian missile launch against an exiled Iranian opposition group inside Iraq. Iran also fires three long-range missiles on the camp of Ashraf used by Mujahedin-e Khalq.
—Patrick Cockburn, "Iranian Jews Demanded Fair Trail for 13 Accused of Spying," Independent (London), 14 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

20 June 1999
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami asks British officials to approach Israeli officials with confidence-building measures to improve Iranian-Israeli relations. The British sources say that Khatami's suggestions include a regional agreement that would ban a pre-emptive surface-to-surface missile attack against other Middle Eastern countries that sign the agreement. Khatami also suggests a bilateral agreement with Israel to disarm long-range ballistic missiles with non-conventional warheads, to be followed by an agreement that development of long-range missiles would be strictly for launching satellites, and would have no military applications. According to Haaretz, British sources feel the Iranians are "acting in good faith," and maintain that the Iranian military build-up is not targeted against Israel, but against other regional threats including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Israeli sources, however, are wary of the proposal, saying, "Khatami is less than totally informed when it comes to security affairs. The country's defense and security establishments are controlled by bodies not totally under his command, and his ability to have the final word on these matters is questionable at best."
—"UK Sources—Iran Seeking 'Secret Dialogue' With Israel," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 20 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990620000317, 20 June 1999.

21 June 1999
President Mohammed Khatami of Iran is seeking arms control agreements in the Middle East, whereby countries possessing surface-to-surface missiles would not launch pre-emptive missile attack on the signatory member-states. Iran is also seeking a bilateral agreement with Israel concerning the disarmament of long-range ballistic missiles carrying non-conventional warheads.
—Mark Huband, "Iran Moves to Open Dialogue With Israel," Financial Times (London), 21 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

25 June 1999
Senior academic associate of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Radzhab Sattarovich Safarov, analyzes Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile. In an article from Moscow's Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, he says that Iran is intent on developing its missile capabilities, and that its leaders "have learned to prepare for the worst." Regarding alleged Russian cooperation with Iran, he says that the United States is concerned about aid involving personnel training, control systems, software, computer hardware, special steels, graphite, and other materials. He says the Shahab-3 can carry a one-ton warhead, and is capable of reaching as far as Egypt, Israel, some NATO countries, all of Central Asia and the Persian Gulf countries, southern Russia, and parts of China and India.
—"Iran's Ballistic Missile test Eyed," Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, (Moscow), 25 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990707001674, 25 June 1999.

30 June 1999
The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force recently unveiled two new laser-guided air-to-surface missiles, which were built under Project ASSR-67, at Tactical Air Base 1 in Mehrabad, Iran. The Sattar-1 reportedly has a 20km range, and the Sattar-2, a 30km range. The two missiles are apparently for use by Iranian F-4E and F-5E fighter aircraft.
—Homa Farmehr, "Iran's Air-Power Projects Revealed," Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 June 1999, p. 18.

July 1999
On 2 September 1998 a joint statement by the presidents of Russia and the United States arranged for further collaboration in the fields of export control and nonproliferation. As a result of this statement, joint expert groups meet to discuss legal and practical export control issues. The author observes that the joint project is enabling practical cooperation between Russian and U.S. agencies. Zvedre believes that continuing cooperation in establishing international nonproliferation and export control regulations is in the long-term interest of Russia and the United States.
—Yevgeniy Zvedre, "Russian-American Dialogue on Nonproliferation: the Iran Factor and Cooperation on Export Controls," Yadernyy Kontrol, No.3, May-June 2000, pp. 4-7.

July 1999
Two new laser guided air-to-surface missiles built under Project ASSR-67 are unveiled at a recent Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force display at Tactical Air Base 1 at Mehrabad. The Sattar-1, which outwardly resembles a combination of HAWK/Phoenix missiles, is claimed to have a range of 20km. The Sattar-2, which is said to have a completely indigenous design, is equipped with a Paveway-type search sensor and has a range of 30km. These two missiles are intended for use by Iran's F-4E Phantoms and F-5E Tiger Is.
—Homa Farmehr, "Iranian Sea Cobras Rebuilt: Helos and Missiles Developed," Jane's Defence Upgrades, 30 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

13 July 1999
Iran opens a consulate in Hong Kong. This raises suspicions of arms smuggling, due to Iran's record of using Hong Kong as a conduit for smuggling weapons and weapon components. Missile guidance components were smuggled through Hong Kong in 1992 to the Iranian Air Force and companies run by the military.
—Glenn Schloss, "Consulate for Iran Raises Arms Concern," South China Morning Post, 13 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

14 July 1999
Kenneth R. Timmerman, president of the Middle East Data Project Inc., recently testifies before the U.S. House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics that Russian aerospace entities, including the Russian Space Agency, were directly assisting Iran in the design of a ballistic missile called "Kawsar" (Kosar), which he reports as having a range of 4,250km.
—Audrey Hudson, "Analyst Fears US Helps Iran Develop Missile Via Moscow," Washington Times, 14 July 1999, <http://www.washtimes.com>.

14 July 1999
According to Kenneth R. Timmerman, president of the Middle East Data Project Inc., Iran's new ballistic missile appears to be developed around the Russian RD-216 liquid-fueled rocket engine, which the Soviet Union first used in the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile. The new missile comes as a follow-up to the Iranian Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 ballistic missiles. House Science Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., says, "If the information on the Kosar [sic] missile is true, Iran's progress in developing a missile capable of reaching the United States represents a sea change in the threat facing the US mainland."
—F. James Sensenbrenner, "Hearing Reveals first detailed findings of Iranian Missile," Federal Document Clearing House, 16 July 1999; in SIPA Gulf 2000.

18 July 1999
According to Representative James Sensenbrenner, Jr., it is imperative that the U.S. Congress pass a law to penalize Russia for its assistance to Iranian missile program. In a Congress testimony, Kenneth Timmerman says the Iranian missile "Kosar," which is a multi-staged ballistic missile, seems to be based on the old Soviet SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile. This missile follows the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4, and is capable of reaching the Middle East and Europe.
—Frank A. Aukofer and Craig Gilbert, "Iranian missile a threat to U.S., Sensenbrenner warns," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 18 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

18 July 1999
The Houston Chronicle reports that with Russia's help, Iran is preparing to test a medium-range multi-stage missile with a range of perhaps 4240km.
—"Nuclear Threat is Reason to watch upheaval half World Away," Houston Chronicle, 18 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 July 1999
Qods Air Industries, a company affiliated with the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, is scheduled to demonstrate its newest unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and drones on 20 July 1999. The Saeqeh-1 (Thunder) and Saeqeh-2 are to be used as targets for air defense training. The Muhajer-2 (Traveler), Muhajer-3, and Muhajer-4 are UAVs designed for patrol and reconnaissance missions.
—"Iran Exhibits Advanced Aircraft and Drones," IRIB (Tehran), 19 July 1999.

19 July 1999
According to Hassan Tallayee, managing director of Iran's aviation industries, Iran successfully tests dozens of locally produced unmanned planes, with a flying radius of 1500km at an altitude of 11,000 feet. The planes are equipped for surveillance missions and electronic warfare. He says the Saeqeh-1 (Thunder-1) and Saeqeh-2 are ready for mass production.
—"Aviation Official Lauds Merits of Unmanned Planes," IRNA (Tehran), 19 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990719001791, 19 July 1999.

22 July 1999
The Iranian Project Ya-Zahra succeeds in producing a reverse-engineered version of the French Crotale surface-to-air missile (SAM). Iran also has reverse-engineered British Aerospace (Bae) Rapier SAMs. Iranian missile engineers successfully tested eight of these after a complete re-build and upgrade.
—Homa Farmehr, "Anti-aircraft capability is Iran's highest priority," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 July 1999.

23 July 1999
U.S. State Department Spokesman James Rubin expresses concern over the transfer of missiles and missile technology from North Korea to Iran, Pakistan, and other countries. "We will be vigilant in ensuring that we do what we can to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles," he states. Iranian television notes the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report that describes Iran's attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction as posing "a serious threat to America." The report indicates that Iran is seeking self-sufficiency in its Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles, as well as trying to acquire nuclear weapons.
—"US Expresses Concern Over Possible DPRK Missile Transfers," Yonhap (Seoul), 23 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990722001932, 23 July 1999; "Iran TV: CIA Believes Iran 'Serious Threat' to US," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 24 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990724000705, 24 July 1999.

26 July 1999
Officials from Russia and Iran's foreign ministries discuss nonproliferation issues in Moscow. The Russian foreign ministry issued a press statement saying, "The firm resolve to promote the aims of nuclear and missile nonproliferation was confirmed at the meeting. Both sides again stated their support for the initiative to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Near East." The Russian-Iranian working group for export control meets to discuss the further development of cooperation on export regulations. The press statement says, "the results of the consultations confirmed the sides' mutual interest in expanding cooperation in the spheres of disarmament, nonproliferation, and export control."
—"Russia, Iran Hold Nuclear Nonproliferation Talks," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 27 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990727000371, 27 July 1999.

27 July 1999
A senior Israeli military intelligence officer tells the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran is developing a 3000km-range missile, in addition to its 1300km-range Shahab-3. Israeli Defense Forces Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz also tells the committee that these missiles and Iran's non-conventional capabilities pose a definite threat to Israel, and that Israel must build a response of its own.
—"Mufaz Sees Need for Response to New Iranian Missile," Jerusalem Post, 28 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990728001225, 28 July 1999.

30 July 1999
According to a report in Seoul's Sisa Journal on the history of North Korea's missile programs, in late 1985, Iran and North Korean agreed to mutually assist each other with ballistic missile technology. In exchange for priority purchasing rights for North Korea's modified Scud-B missiles, Iran would help fund North Korea's missile programs. North Korea modified the Russian-made Scud-B, extending its range by 20-40km. Starting in 1986, North Korea produced between 4 and 12 modified Scud-B missiles each month, and delivered approximately 100 of the missiles to Iran between 1987 and February 1988. Iran used these missiles against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. In the autumn of 1990, Iran signed a deal with North Korea to purchase modified Scud-C missiles, which have a range of 600km, capable of carrying a 700kg warhead.
—"History of DPRK Missile Development Eyed," Sisa Journal (Seoul), 30 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990805001385, 30 July 1999.

3 August 1999
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak presses the Russian leaders to exert more control over the transfer of technology to Iran and Iraq.
—Micheal Wines, "Russians Pressed by Barak on Technology to Iran and Iraq," New York Times, 3 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

17 August 1999
According to Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, Iran is not receiving missile technology nor equipment from North Korea. "We don't have any relationship with North Korea, so there is no need to worry," Kharazi tells Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura.
—"Kyodo: Iran Denies Using DPRK Missile Technology," Kyodo (Tokyo), 18 August 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990817001664, 18 August 1999.

17 August 1999
According to Japanese officials, during a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi denies reports that Iran is using North Korean missile technology.
—"Iran Denies Using North Korean Missile Technology," Kyodo (Tokyo), 18 August 1999, <http://home.kyodo.co.jp>.

19 August 1999
According to the commander of the Iranian Air Force, Brig-Gen. Habib Baqai, surface-to-air missiles will be deployed during the Haydar-e Karrar military exercises around the province of East Azarbayjan.
—"Paper Reports Start of Iranian Air Force Exercises," Keyhan (Tehran), 19 August 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990819001131, 19 August 1999.

19 August 1999
China is reported to have signed a contract worth $11 million to upgrade Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles. The contract will focus on Chinese-supplied short-range, anti-ship cruise missiles known as FL-10s. The Chinese will modify the missiles so that they can be launched from Iran attack helicopters and fast patrol boats.
—"China Reportedly to Upgrade Iran's Anti-ship Cruise Missiles," Seattle Times, 19 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 August 1999
China signs an $11 million deal to improve Iran's anti-ship missiles. According to U.S. intelligence reports, the deal involves transfers of technology to upgrade Iran's FL-10 anti-ship cruise missile. The missiles will be modified in order to be fired from Iranian attack helicopters and fast patrol boats.
—Bill Gertz, "China Agrees to Deal with Iran on Missiles," Washington Times, 19 August 1999, p. 1.

20 August 1999
China denies a Washington Times report that it signed an $11 million deal to upgrade Iran's anti-ship cruise missile technology. China's Foreign Ministry issues a statement calling the report "groundless." The report alleges that the deal would allow Iran's short-range FL-10 cruise missiles to be fired from attack helicopters and patrol boats. Chinese ambassador to the United States Li Zhaoxing says, "I can tell you with all certainty that China has never done anything contrary to its international commitments [or] in violation of international norms." U.S. officials disagree on whether the deal violates verbal assurances from Beijing to Washington not to sell cruise missiles or technology to Iran.
—"AFP: PRC Dismisses Reports of Iran Missile Deal," AFP (Hong Kong), 20 August. 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990820000296, 20 August 1999.

30 August 1999
London's Al-Wasat paper details Iran's missile program in a report on missile proliferation in the Middle East. According to the report, Iran first acquired Scud-B missiles from Libya during the war with Iraq in the mid-1980s. In 1987, Iran began producing these missiles domestically, with technical assistance from North Korea. In 1991, Iran started producing the North Korean-modified Scud-C, with a range of 550km. The Scud-B and Scud-C missiles are known in Iran as the Shahab-1 and Shahab-2, respectively. Iran also received assistance from China in manufacturing the 400km M-11 and the 800km M-9 missiles, known in Iran as the Zelzal-1 and Zelzal-2, respectively. With North Korean assistance, Iran is able to start production of the Shahab-3 missile, which is believed to be a version of North Korea's Nodong-1. According to the report, the Shahab-3 has a range between 1,300 and 1,500km, carrying a 750kg warhead. Iran is also working on developing the Shahab-4, believed to have a range of 3,600km with a 1,000kg warhead, or 2,400km with a 2,000kg warhead. The report says that the Shahab-4 is "probably" a version of the old Soviet SS-4 Sundial missile, obtained with Russian assistance. The report also suspects Iran of developing the Shahab-5, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of up to 6,000km, "probably" based on North Korea's Nodong-1. Iran is suspected of manufacturing a space launch version of the Shahab-5 to launch its Zahra-1 satellite within the next three years. The report provides specific details of Iran's missile capacity, saying that Iran has 1,500 missiles, including 30 Shahab-3 missiles (1,300km-range); 170 Shahab-2 (Scud-C) missiles (550km-range), some armed with chemical and possibly biological weapons; 250 Shahab-1 (Scud-B) missiles (300km-range), some armed with chemical and possibly biological weapons; 260 Zelzal (M-7) missiles (150km-range) armed with conventional warheads; 250 Nazeat missiles armed with conventional warheads; 200 Shahin missiles (120km-range) armed with conventional warheads; 200 Iqab missiles (100km-range) armed with conventional warheads; and 150 Frog-7 (Luna) missiles (70km-range) armed with conventional warheads.
—"Mideast Missile Race Detailed," Al-Wasat (London), 30 August 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990903000290, 30 August 1999.

30 August 1999
Iran Air Industry Organization tests the first mini-jet produced in Iran. The Tulu-4 (Rising or Dawn) engine is suitable for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and will lead to the production of the largest jet engines in Iran.
—"First Mini-Jet Engine made in Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 30 August 1999, <http://www.irna.com>.

September 1999
Iran's Islamic Revolution Guard Command exhibits the Zelzal missile, which it claims is "now in mass production." The Zelzal allegedly took four-and-a-half years to develop, and is said to be capable of carrying a 500kg warhead up to 900km. The missile exhibited, however, is a rocket on a truck-mounted launch rail, which likely has a range of 150-200km.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), p. 40.

4 September 1999
Iran will soon be self-sufficient in manufacturing missiles. German customs intelligence states that Iran is making Scud-D missiles with a 300km range. It also notes Iran's desire to make a long-range, solid-fueled missile. Iran turned down an offer of Scud-Ds from North Korea in order to produce its own. According to the magazine Flight International, with the help of North Korea and China, Iran has the capability of making parts of the Scud DB [sic]. Speculations that Iran may purchase Nodong-1 missiles from North Korea are also stated in the magazine. The Nodong-1 missile has a 1,000km range and has been tested by North Korea. Iran is also researching the possibilities of making a cruise missile utilizing Chinese technology from the Silkworm missile.
—Staff Colonel Yaqub Aslan, "World Strategic Rockets and Missiles: Iran's Surface to Surface Missiles," Saff (Tehran), No. 229, 22 May- 21 June 1999; in "Saff on Iran's Surface-to-Surface Missiles," FBIS Document FTS19990904000330, 4 September 1999.

5 September 1999
A short video airs on North Korean Central Television showing details of the first stage of the Taepodong missile engine. The video reveals a single engine that looks very much like the engines for Iran's Shahab-3 and Pakistan's Ghauri missiles. The video lends credence to analysis by the United States that the missile programs of these three countries have common ties.
—"Video Shows TaepoDong Engine Resembles Ghauri, Shahab-3," Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo), 11 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990912000879, 11 September 1999.

10 September 1999
A United States intelligence report estimates that Iran could test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by 2010. The report is similar to one projected by the intelligence community in 1998. Keyvan Khosravi, a spokesman for the Iranian military, refutes the assessment, saying the report is based on "unfounded assumptions and conjecture." He says that Iran's defense policy is based on deterrence and that Iran poses no threat to non-hostile nations.
—"US Warns of Missile Threat by DPRK, Iran, Iraq," Korea Times (Seoul), 10 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990910000654; "Iran: Defense Ministry Refutes CIA Report on Missiles," IRNA (Tehran), 11 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990911000303, 11 September 1999.

10 September 1999
Iran will be able to test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering a non-nuclear payload to the U.S. in the next 10 years. However, in just more than 5 years, Iran will be able to launch an ICBM with a nuclear warhead to most of the U.S. mainland.
—Walter Pincus, "Iran, Iraq Could Join Missile Threat to US, Report May Bolster Calls for Defense System," Washington Post, 10 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

13 September 1999
U.S. Department of State Spokesman James Rubin says that bilateral talks held in Berlin between the United States and North Korea had resulted in a pledge by North Korea to refrain from testing a long-range ballistic missile. Rubin notes that the agreement stipulates "North Korea will refrain from testing any long-range missiles for the duration of negotiations that are aimed at improving relations between the United States and North Korea." Rubin says that the agreement is not a formal treaty, but that it is a positive step towards a permanent solution to problems on the Korean peninsula.
—James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov>, 13 September 1999; Donga Ilbo (Seoul), 3 May 2001, in "ROK Daily Sees DPRK Decision To Freeze Missile launch as Gesture to US," FBIS Document ID KPP20010503000123; "North Korea, Iran and Iraq Could Develop ICBMs" Jane's Missiles and Rockets, October 1999, Vol. 3, No. 10, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>

15 September 1999
According to Professor Kim Chol-Hwan of the Korea National Defense University, North Korea has exported 160 modified Scud-B and 42 modified Scud-C missiles to Iran in recent years. Professor Kim, speaking at a symposium on international security in Seoul, states that North Korea has exported a total of 490 modified Scud missiles to the Middle East. The modified Scud-B has a range of 320-340km, while the modified Scud-C has a range of 550km.
—"ROK Military Professor on NK Scud Exports," Yonhap (Seoul), 15 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990915001765, 15 September 1999.

15 September 1999
According to an unnamed Israeli source, Iran is assisting Syria in the development of a 500km-range surface-to-surface missile derived from the Scud-C. It is also reported that Iran's Shahab-3 missile is in a "very advanced" developmental stage and that the "Kawsar" intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is being developed with Russian assistance.
—Arieh O'Sullivan, "Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon: Source," Jerusalem Post, 15 September 1999, <http://www.jpost.co.il>.

22 September 1999
Iran displays its domestically produced Zelzal (Earthquake) surface-to-surface missile during a ceremony to mark the start of the Holy Defense Week in Tehran. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps built the missile over four-and-a-half years, without any foreign assistance. The Shahab-1, -2, and -3 missiles are also on display at the ceremony.
—"Iran: Missile Named 'Earthquake' Displayed at Parade," IRNA (Tehran), 22 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990922000168, 22 September 1999; "Reopener--Zelzal, Shahab Missiles at Tehran Parade," IRNA (Tehran), 22 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990922000750, 22 September 1999.

22 September 1999
Iranian Navy Commander Admiral Abbas Mohtaj says that Iran would test its Fajr-Darya surface-to-sea missile during the Ettehad (Unity) military maneuvers in the Sea of Oman, between the Hormuz Strait and the southern part of Gwatar Gulf, between 25 September and 2 October 1999.
—"Iran: Navy to Test Anti-Ship Missile in Gulf Exercise," IRNA (Tehran), 22 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990922000275, 22 September 1999.

22 September 1999
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) displays its Zelzal (Earthquake) missile for the first time during a parade commemorating the anniversary of the beginning of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Though there appears to be some confusion as to the Zelzal's capabilities, according to Iranian defense officials, this program was initiated in early 1995 and there have been at least three variants produced: the 1, 2, and 3.
—"IRGC to Put on Display Zelzal Surface-to-Surface Missile," IRNA (Tehran), 19 September 1999, <http://www.irna.com>; Ed Blanche, "Iran Launches Four New Missile Programmes," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 December 1999, p. 12.

22 September 1999
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) announces that the Zelzal missile is now in mass production.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), pp. 39-40, <http://www.csis.org>.

22 September 1999
Iranian Navy Commander Admiral Abbas Mohtaj says that the force will launch Ettehad (Unity) maneuvers in the Sea of Oman between the Hormuz Strait and the Southern Part of the Persian Gulf between 25 September and 2 October. The "Fajr-Darya" (Sea Aurora) surface-to-sea missile is to be tested during the military exercises. Though it is not clear whether the Fajr-Darya will be tested after the parade in Tehran, it is the first time that the missile is to be put on public display. It is also unclear whether the Fajr-Darya is a new version of the Fajr-4 missile.
—"Naval Exercises Planned in Sea of Oman Starting 25 September," IRNA (Tehran), 22 September 1999, in Lexis Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; Ed Blanche, "Iran Launches Four New Missile Programmes," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 December 1999, p. 12.

22 September 1999
Iran shows its surface-to-surface Zelzal system during a military parade in Tehran. Parade organizer Brig. General Gholam Husayn Gheibparvar says the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) developed the rocket over a four-and-one-half-year period and that the Zelzal SSM is now in mass production. Though no technical details are disclosed, the Zelzal SSM is believed to be a variant of the Zelzal-2 system, which was offered for export in 1996. Some analysts believe the Zelzal SSM can carry a 500kg warhead, including nuclear or biological weapons, for a range of 900km. Some reports in early 1997, however, said an Iranian project called Zelzal involved a two-stage missile with a range of 1,000km-1,500km. The truck-mounted missile on display appears to be a rocket on a launch rail about one-third longer than its own length and with a likely range of 150km-200km.
—Ed Blanche, "Iran shows off new hardware," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

28 September 1999
A ceremony held in Iran marks the start of 25 projects overseen by the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, including plans to produce laser-guided Tondar-1, Towsan-1, and Super Dragon anti-tank missiles, and the Misaq-1 SSM.
—"Iran: President Khatami Hails Defense Capabilities," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 28 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990928000781, 28 September 1999.

28 September 1999
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami inaugurates 25 defense, industrial, and development projects of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, including several missile projects. Khatami says that the most important projects are the laser-guided Tondar-1 and Towsan-1 anti-heavy armor missiles, the Super Dragon anti-semi-heavy armor missile and the Misaq-1 anti-air missile. These missiles are all being designed and mass-produced by the Aerospace Industries Organization. According to the head of Iran's Armed Forces Research and Center for Self-Sufficiency, Brigadier General Olfati, the Iranian Army has successfully completed its research project on radar-guided missiles and will soon upgrade the F-14 fighter plane with air-to-surface missile capabilities. Olfati also describes other projects underway, including the manufacture of long-range air-to-surface missiles, and the construction of missile boats and destroyers.
—"Iran: President Khatami Hails Defense Capabilities," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 28 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990928000781, 28 September 1999; "Iran: Army to Manufacture Helicopters," IRNA (Tehran), 29 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990929001095, 29 September 1999; "Iran: Exhibition of Army's Innovations Opens in Tehran," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 1 October 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19991001000334, 1 October 1999.

30 September 1999
Britain plays an increasingly active role in forging new ideas in arms control and nonproliferation between Iran and Israel, especially since the resumption of diplomatic ties with Iran. The British foreign office denies reports by the Israeli Haaretz newspaper that during a meeting between British and Israeli officials, the British officials presented a package of confidence-building measures that had come from Iranian sources. According to the newspaper, these measures include a pledge not to use long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.
—Michael Evans, "London Acts as a Broker for Middle East," Times (London), 30 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

30 September 1999
In a dinner organized by the Washington Institute, Mr. Kamal Kharazzi, Iranian Foreign Minister, states that Iran would not be the first nation to use ballistic missiles in the Middle East.
—Barbara Slavin, "Iranian Confirms US Request for Assistance in Probe," USA Today, 30 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

October 1999
According to the Washington Times, North Korea sells 12 missile engines to Iran. The engines are believed to be for "Iran's new Shehab medium-range missiles."
—Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Hit With Sanctions," Washington Times, 28 June 2001, p. 1; Bill Gertz, "'Critical' N. Korean Missile Parts Seen Aiding Iran's Program," Washington Times, 10 February 2000, p. A3.

5 October 1999
The Zelzal-1, Tondar, SAM-6 system, and the Shahab-3 are displayed in Freedom Square, Tehran. A parade also takes place in which Zelzal, Nazeat (Struggle), Sattar (Shield), and Yasir missiles are displayed.
—"Big Parade of the Armed Forces with Advanced Weapons Constructed in Iran," Kayhan (Iran), 23 September 1999, <http://neda.net/kayhan>.

6 October 1999
In his testimony, Kenneth Timmerman, a professional staff member working on nonproliferation issues in Congress, says that the name of Strobe Talbott should be written on the Iranian Shahab-3 missile because of the consistent refusal of Mr. Talbott to confront the Russians. He also adds that the Kosar missile project would not have existed had Mr. Talbott taken a firm position towards the Russians.
—Kenneth R Timmerman, "The Russian Missiles We could Have Stopped," Testimony by Kenneth R. Timmerman before the House of International Relations Committee Hearing on US Policy Towards Russia: Warning and Dissent, Washington, DC, 6 October 1999; in <http://www.iran.org>.

14 October 1999
According to an Armenian businessman, Iran is trading weapons with Chechen rebels in return for equipment to develop its missile programs. The unnamed source says that intermediaries from Armenia and Belarus facilitate the transfer of equipment for Iran's Shahab-3 missile from companies in Russia and Armenia. The equipment, which is banned under U.S. export restrictions to Iran, is said to include machines for bending and coiling metals, electronic machines for lathing metals, and substances for manufacturing liquid fuels. The source says that the Iranian Defense Ministry and the intermediaries began this relationship in late 1998. The official believed to be in charge of procurements for Iran's missile project introduces himself as a representative of the Iranian industrial group "Shigh" (as transliterated).
—"Armenian Says Iran Traded Arms for Missile Equipment," Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 15 October 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19991015000335, 15 October 1999.

25 October 1999
According to intelligence sources in the West and Middle East, Russian companies are smuggling supplies for Iran's missiles and non-conventional weapons via the Caspian Sea. The sources believe that an agreement between the Russian Transport Ministry and Mahmud Hojati-Najafabadi, Iran's Minister of Roads and Transport, was signed in August 1999. The intelligence sources say that a Russian shipping company with branches in Europe transports the banned equipment from European ports to Russian ports on the Caspian Sea. Russian and Iranian shipping companies then transport the equipment to Iran. The main smuggling routes are believed to be between the Russian ports of Astrakhan and Olya to the Iranian ports of Bandar-e Anzali and Bandar Nowshahr. Other ports in use include Lagan in Russia and Banda Naka and Amirabad in Iran. Iran is also believed to be cooperating with India on missile programs, and is suspected of supplying navigation and guidance systems for India's long-range missiles as part of a deal to improve each country's missile capabilities. The Russian