Other Names: Shehab-1

Immediately following the first War of the Cities in March-June 1985, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hashemi-Rafsanjani led a high-level Iranian delegation to Libya and Syria seeking additional Scud-B missiles and continued military assistance.[1] The following week he visited the People's Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea (DPRK). These trips apparently laid the foundation for future deliveries of missiles and missile related technology to Iran.

The visits to the PRC and DPRK were successful, and although all parties publicly stated that no military assistance agreements were signed, circumstantial evidence suggests that the reality was otherwise. In both countries, Hashemi-Rafsanjani secured increased military assistance and agreements to sell Iran missiles and engage in bilateral missile technology exchanges. Specifically, during the visit to the PRC, Hashemi-Rafsanjani apparently secured PRC agreement in the following missile-related areas:

• The delivery of HY-1 silkworm and HY-2 seersucker coastal defense missiles beginning in 1986 and assistance in establishing an assembly facility for these missiles.
• The continued delivery of HN-5A and HQ-1/2 SAMs.[2]
• Technology transfer and long-term assistance in the development of Iranian ballistic missiles and artillery rockets.

The visit to the DPRK was equally fruitful, with Hashemi-Rafsanjani apparently securing DPRK assistance in the following missile-related areas:

• The delivery of HN-5A surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and assistance in establishing an assembly facility for these and the HQ-1/2 SAMs.
• Long-term assistance in the establishment of a factories to manufacture the HN-5A and HQ-2.
• Technology transfer for new Iranian missiles and artillery rockets.
• Assistance in the establishment of a factory to assemble the DPRK Scud-variant missiles.

Also agreed upon was the continued presence of DPRK military advisors within the Iranian armed forces and military industries. Within the military industries, these advisers would initially exercise important supervisory and technical positions within Iran's SAM production. During early 1986, a DPRK colonel was reported to be assisting an Iranian plant manager supervise production and engineering at a large SAM facility in Sadhzi, near Esfahan. His technical staff included 48 DPRK military personnel, 18 East Germans, two Yugoslavs, and a Pakistani.[3]

Additionally, as a result of DPRK progress with its Hwasong-5 program, the Iranians agreed to continue financing the program. An example of this financial assistance was the 7 December 1986 agreement by the Iranian government to reschedule the entirety of the DPRK's $170 million debt for oil purchases. The debt was now to be paid back in equal quarterly installments over a period of five years and retroactive to January 1985.[4]

As a result of the agreements concluded by Hashemi-Rafsanjani during his June 1985 trip to the DPRK, the indigenous Scud program was reorganized during 1986. Though little is known concerning this program, it appears that its initial goal was the establishment of a DIO facility to assemble the DPRK produced Hwasong-5—known locally as the Shahab-1 ("meteor" or "shooting star"). The probable long-term goal was the indigenous manufacture of this missile.

By early 1987, the DPRK had initiated production of the Hwasong-5 (see North Korea entries). This achievement probably came as a tremendous relief to the Iranians, who were rapidly depleting their inventory of Scud-Bs. There was little hope of obtaining additional Scud-Bs from either Libya or Syria because of Soviet pressure. Even without this pressure, it is unlikely that either Libya or Syria could provide additional missiles in the quantities that Iran desired without severely hampering their own military capabilities. Concurrent with this activity, Iraq was acquiring large quantities of Scud-Bs from the Soviet Union and making significant progress on it indigenous extended-range variant of the Scud-B—the al-Husayn.

Sometime during June 1987, Iran concluded an estimated $500 million arms agreement with the DPRK. The agreement called for the supply of Hwasong-5 missiles, transporter-erector launchers (TELs), and HY-1 silkworm coastal defense missiles. The exact details of the agreement are unknown; however, it is estimated to have consisted of approximately 90-100 missiles and an estimated six TELs.[5] The method of delivery and exactly how these missiles arrived in Iran is unclear. Most sources, however, suggest that they arrived by sea between August 1987 and February 1988.[6] Upon arrival, the missiles were assigned to the "Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force," which appears to have been expanded to brigade size and been responsible for all Scud operations against Iraq. These transactions were widely misreported in the Western press. Contrary to many accounts, the Iranians obtained no Scud-B missiles from either the Soviet Union or the PRC (the PRC did not possess nor manufacture the Scud).[7]

The first public reports concerning the Shahab-1 program began to appear in early 1987.[8] These reports indicated that Iran was establishing production lines for a reverse-engineered Scud-B. Although discounted by Western observers, these reports were essentially correct. During November 1987, while discussing the status of missile production in Iran, IRGC Minister Mohsen Rafiqdust stated,

"At present we are copying Scud-B missiles. A factory for its production is being completed. We have no problems as far as the manufacture of this missile is concerned." [9]

While this statement was somewhat premature, it clearly indicates that Iran was not only serious about its Scud program, but that it was devoting significant resources towards that end. On 12 December 1987, Head of War Information Headquarters Kamal Kharrazi, indicated,

"... that Iran will soon reach self-sufficiency in manufacture of advanced missiles and other equipment, has made the foes of the revolution scared stiff. ...[T]he Islamic Republic is capable of mass-producing chemical weapons, but Iran does not deploy them out of respect for Islamic and humanitarian considerations."[10]

Progress within the Shahab-1 program was relatively steady and during early 1988, Iranian officials claimed that the missile had entered production. On 11 April 1988, Brigadier General Mohammad Jalali stated, "... two missiles with ranges of 130km and above are manufactured by Defense Industries Organization."[11] The first of these two systems is believed to have been the Shahin-II.[12] A statement made three days later by Colonel Rahimi, First Deputy Minister of Defense, suggests that the second was the Shahab-1, "...We have also succeeded in manufacturing missiles with a range of 320km."[13] This 320km range is the range of the Shahab-1 (i.e., Hwasong-5) and is slightly greater than the 280km of the standard Scud-B. It is unlikely that the Iranians manufactured these missiles, but rather they were assembled from components provided by the DPRK. It appears that it wasn't until the mid-1990s that Iran would advance from assembly to production of the Shahab-1.

During the early morning hours of 29 February 1988, Iran—in its largest missile attack of the war so far—launched three Shahab-1s against Baghdad. This attack was in response to a major air attack on an oil refinery in Tehran two days earlier. Iraq quickly responded that afternoon, launching five of its new long-range al-Husayn missiles against Tehran.[14] Thus began the second "War of the Cities," which would last for 52 days and witness the launching of approximately 532 rockets and missiles by both sides.

Iran's ability to conduct these attacks was primarily the result of two factors. First, was the experience gained in missile operations during the previous three years, especially by the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force. Second, it had enlarged its Scud-B/Shahab-1 and Oghab (a 40km artillery rocket) inventory during 1987. During the first week, Iran launched ten Oghabs and 26 Scud-B/Shahab-1s, including five Scud-B/Shahab-1s on 6 February alone—their highest daily total for the entire war.[15] At first the Iranians believed they not only were matching the Iraqi missile efforts, but were also inflicting greater damage than they were receiving. On 9 March, the commander of the IRGC Air Force (which controlled the Shahab-1s) stated,

"Due to the destructive power and accuracy of our missiles, and according to reports we have received from inside Iraq, Baghdad has sustained the great damage in the course of the war as a result of our surface-to-surface missiles, as have other cities that have been targeted by our missiles. One can say that in this round of the War of the Cities, the Iraqi cities have suffered greater damage."[16]

This, however, was quickly proven wrong as Iraq soon outpaced Iran in the intensity of missile attacks, the amount of physical damage caused and, most importantly, the psychological damage inflicted. This last factor would quickly become of paramount importance. Throughout the eight-year war, Tehran and its civilian population were only occasionally attacked by Iraq, and only by small, relatively ineffective strikes. Under such conditions, the civilian population and the leadership quickly adapted. This resulted in the development of a general feeling of security. The new al-Husayn attacks upon Tehran quickly dispelled this feeling of security. They were continuous, caused large numbers of casualties, and were combined with an increasing fear that Iraq might resort to using chemical weapons as they recently had at Halabjah. Iranian morale soon plummeted and, reportedly, by early March, nearly one million Iranians had fled Tehran.[17] By the end of March, it became apparent that the Iranians were aware of the limitations of their missile forces compared with Iraq's. On 29 March Hashemi-Rafsanjani stressed "...if we pay more attention to our missile industry, we can get the better of Iraqi missiles."[18]

By 1 April, the Iranian missile total had reached 258; however, only 61 were Scud-B/Shahab-1s, in comparison to 129 Iraqi al-Husayn missiles. From this point on, the number of Scud-B/Shahab-1 and Oghab launches quickly declined as Iran depleted its inventory. This was accompanied by further morale problems and the expanding civilian evacuation of Tehran. For a variety of reasons, Iraq feeling victorious, declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 April 1988. The Iranians tacitly agreed and the War of the Cities was over.

During the 52 days of the War of the Cities, a total of approximately 532 rockets and missiles were launched by both sides. Iran launched approximately 339 (80 Scud-Bs/Shahab-1s, 253 Oghabs, and 6 Shahin-IIs) and Iraq launched about 193 (189 al-Husayns and 4 Scud-Bs). Of the 80 Scud-B/Shahab-1s launched by Iran, 64 were targeted against Baghdad. The remaining were aimed at Mosul (9), Kirkuk (5), Tikrit (1), and Kuwait (1). These attacks brought the total number of Scud-B class missiles fired by the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force during the war to approximately 120.[19] This campaign witnessed the complete depletion of Iran's inventory of R-17 Scud-Bs acquired from Iran and Syria.

Ultimately, the Iranian ability to respond to Iraqi missile attacks appears to have been limited by the small size of its inventory. As indicated by the declining rate at which Shahab-1 missiles were launched during the War of the Cities, the Iranians were running out of missiles. It is unlikely that they totally depleted their inventories before they stopped launching missiles. They, however, probably ended with a very small inventory of Shahab-1s. If reports concerning Iran's development of chemical warheads for its Shahab-1s are correct, it is conceivable that these remaining missiles were so equipped—held in reserve as weapons of last resort or to be used in retaliation for a chemical attack on Tehran by Iraqi al-Husayns.[20] It is likely that Iran had the capability to produce chemical weapons by this time. On 22 August 1988 Hashemi-Rafsanjani publicly declared that Iran had the "... capacity for mass production..." of chemical weapons.[21]

At least one report suggests that the Iranians had considerable problems with their Shahab-1 missiles during the War of the Cities. According to this account, eight of the missiles exploded on launch, inflicting numerous casualties among the launch crews.[22] These eight failures would suggest a total of 69 Shahab-1s launched during the War of the Cities, with a failure rate of approximately 12 percent.

Within four months of the end of the second War of the Cities, and following a continuing string of Iraqi victories (most notably on the Fao Peninsula), Iran sued for peace. On 8 August 1988, after eight years of bitter fighting and tens of thousands of casualties, the Iran-Iraq war came to a formal end. Iran had not only been defeated on the battlefield, it had, more significantly, been defeated at home. Its economy was depleted, its civilian industry near collapse, and its population was simply exhausted from the war.

During late 1988 and early 1989, Iran and the DPRK established two joint committees. The first was to promote economic, scientific, and technological cooperation, and the second was a secret commission to facilitate military collaboration. One of the primary responsibilities of the latter commission was centered on continued cooperation in the development of ballistic missiles. During the May 1989 visit to the DPRK by Minister of Construction Foruzesh and President Khamene'i, an agreement was apparently reached for the supply of additional Shahab-1s and continued Iranian funding of the DPRK's ballistic missile program. Sometime during early 1990, Iran reportedly received an additional 20 Shahab-1 missiles from the DPRK.[23]

During the last week of November 1990, Minister of the People's Armed Forces Oh Jin-u led a delegation to Tehran.[24] It is believed that this trip resulted in a second series of military agreements. These agreements provided for the Iranian purchase of DPRK produced Shahab-1s and assistance in the development of a ballistic missile production infrastructure. This infrastructure would center around four-five primary factories and approximately 400 DPRK engineers and technicians. The majority of these facilities was located in the Esfahan area, where DPRK personnel would assist with the conversion of an Iranian missile maintenance facility, which would house first the assembly and then manufacturing of the Hwasong-6, which would be known locally as the Shahab-2 (see separate entry). By early 1991, DPRK military technical advisers arrived in Iran and commenced the work. Concurrently Iranian military personnel traveled to the DPRK to receive training in the manufacture and operation of the new missiles.[25] Beginning in January 1991, shipments of Shahab-2s and related equipment were tracked being flown from the DPRK capital of Pyongyang to Iran by Iranian Boeing 747 aircraft.[26] Shortly after the introduction of the Shahab-2, Iran is believed to have stopped development of the Shahab-1, although considerable effort has gone into its maintenance.

Available information suggests that Iran has a current inventory of 200-300 Shahab-1 missiles. The numbers of Shahab-1 systems decrease if Iran undertakes to upgrade them to Shahab-2 configuration. These systems are capable of being armed with conventional high explosive, submunition, chemical, biological and radiological dispersion warheads.

Key Sources:
[1] Foreign Report, 18 July 1985.
[2] "Reagan Defends Military Shipments to Iran, Restates Desirability of Worldwide Embargo," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 November 1986. These are PRC manufactured versions of the SA-7 and SA-2 SAMs, respectively.
[3] Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "North Korea Aids Iran's War of Terror", Washington Post, 3 February 1986, p. B12.
[4] "Majlis Reschedules 'Entirety' of DPRK Debt," IRNA, 7 December 1986, as cited in FBIS.
[5] Pejman Peyman, "International News: Iran," UPI, 18 September 1987; "Pyongyang Missile Sale to Tehran Reported," Washington Times, 1 June 1988, p. A2; John M. Broder, "Five Key Nations Sold Arms to Iran," Los Angeles Times, 20 January 1988, p. 5; "al-Musawwar Interviews Ramadan on War," al-Musawwar, 20 May 1988, pp. 20-21, as cited in FBIS. Pejman provides two separate accounts in his report. In the first, according to an arms dealer, during June the DPRK sold the Iranians 100 Scud-B missiles. In the second, another source, allegedly drawing on information from the Iranian purchasing office in London, the Iranians purchased 90 Scud missiles from the DPRK for $500 million.
[6] Ibid. According to an arms dealer interviewed by Pejman, "the missiles left North Korea about six weeks ago" (e.g., about 15 July). The al-Ittihad, a paper in the United Arab Emirates, reported that 40 "Soviet-made" Scud missiles were delivered to Bandar Abbas in February 1988 by an Iranian cargo ship, the Iran Teyfuri. See AFP, 1 April 1988, as cited in FBIS. According to Lloyd's shipping data, the Iran Teyfouri is an Iranian registered partial container ship built in 1979 and owned and operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (ISIL). It operates on a regular run between the Far East and Iran, and arrived in Bandar Shahid Regaie on 9 February 1988 after making stops in the previous few months in Japan, ROK, and the PRC. There is no record of a stop in a DPRK port, but between 27 September and 25 December 1987, it traveled back and forth between the ROK and Japanese ports, giving it many opportunities to stop surreptitiously in the DPRK. It is interesting to note that the Lloyd's shipping data indicates that the Iran Teyfouri departed from Busan (Pusan) on 6 August and arrived off Bandar Abbas on 24 August 1987. It docked at Bandar Shahid Regaie on 28 August 1987.
[7] Typical is the report in Flight International, 25 April 1987, p. 13, that Iran bought 200 SS-1 Scud B missiles from the Soviet Union; or an AFP, 23 October 1985 story that Iran was negotiating with the PRC to acquire Scud A or Scud B missiles. Peyman Pejman, UPI, 18 September 1987 stated that the Bulgarians had sold Scuds as well. It is not possible to confirm these reports.
[8] Vahe Petrossian, "Iran Stocks Up Its Arsenal," Middle East Economic Digest, 2 May 1987, p. 11; "Scud B Remains Iran's Main Missile Capability," Jane's Defense Weekly, 20 June 1987, p. 1289; James Bruce, "Iran Building Up Its Own Arms Industry," Jane's Defense Weekly, 20 June 1987, p. 1302.
[9] "Minister on Missile Manufacture, New Submarine," IRNA, 8 November 1987, as cited in FBIS; "IRGC Minister on Military Self-Sufficiency," IRNA, 8 November 1987, as cited in FBIS; and "IRGC Commander, Minister Outline Arms Production," Keyhan, 8 November 1987, as cited in FBIS.
[10] "Kharrazi Discusses Weapons, CW Production," IRNA, 12 December 1987, as cited in FBIS.
[11] "Defense Minister on Manufacturing of Missiles," IRNA, 11 April 1988, as cited in FBIS.
[12] It is also possible that some of these were prototypes of the Nazeat family of short range missiles.
[13] "Radio Phone-In Program With Defense Officials," Tehran Domestic Service, 14 April 1988, as cited in FBIS.
[14] Actually this attack consisted of seven al-Husayn missiles. The first five were fired during the afternoon and evening of the 29th and two more were launched very early on the 30th.
[15] Three of these were launched during a 30-minute period, suggesting at least three TELs and some reasonably good command and control efforts.
[16] "Commander on Damage to Iraq," Tehran Domestic Service, 9 March 1988, as cited in FBIS.
[17] Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War: Vol. II The Iran-Iraq War, Westview Press, Boulder, 1990, pp. 496-506.
[18] "‘Most' Iraqi Cities Now Within Missile Range," IRNA, 29 March 1988, as cited in FBIS.
[19] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Iraqi Missile Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Volume 2, Number 7, July 1990, p. 329; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and W. Seth Carus, "Iraq's al-Husayn Missile Programme, Part II," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Volume 2, Number 6, June 1990, pp. 242-248; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and W. Seth Carus, "Iraq's al-Husayn Missile Programme, Part I," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Volume 2, Number 5, May 1990, pp. 204-209; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and W. Seth Carus, "Iran's Growing Missile Forces," Jane's Defence Weekly, Volume 10, Number 3, 23 July 1988, pp. 126-131.
[20] Farzad Bazoft and Allan George, "Missiles Armed With Chemical Warheads 'In Sight'," The Observer, 13 March 1988, p. 23.
[21] "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Addresses Defense Conference," Tehran Domestic Service, 11 August 1988, as cited in FBIS; Allan George, "Missiles Armed With Chemical Warheads 'in Sight'," Observer, 13 March 1988, p. 23. In contrast to these reports, Robert Gates, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said in early 1992 that Iran could develop the chemical warheads for Scud missiles "in a few years" even though its chemical weapons program remains crude, and appears to be trying to develop nuclear weapons. "Iran Near Having Chemical Weapons," Reuters, 29 March 1992.
[22] Since there has been no confirmation of these eight misfires, they are not included in the figures cited above.
[23] "DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile," Kyodo, 20 September 1991, as cited in FBIS; Elmo Zumwalt Jr. and James G. Zumwalt, "Israel's Missile Plight," Washington Times, 18 July 1991, p. G1; Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12.
[24] "Events in December, 1990", Vantage Point, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January 1991, p. 26.
[25] "Scuds-Mideast," Associated Press, 3 March 1992; "The Postwar Scud Boom," p. A12.
[26] Possibly one of the more emotionally satisfying events to occur within Iran's Shahab program occurred during the U.S.-led Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, when Iraq approached Iran seeking to purchase, among other items, approximately 100 Shahab-1 missiles plus TELs. Iran, however, had declared itself neutral during the conflict and did not provide Iraq with any military assistance. Interestingly, one report suggests that the IRGC obtained three or more Iraqi al-Husayn missiles during the operation. These were utilized to improve production, training, and research at the IRGC Land Force Missile & Artillery Training Center in Esfahan. Iranian intelligence is also reported to have obtained missile-related documents from corrupt Iraqi Army officers. Wyn Bowen, Tim McCarthy, and Holly Porteous, "Ballistic Missile Shadow Lengthens," International Defense Review, 1 February 1997, p. 1; Ruth Sinai, "Gulf-Iraqi Scuds," Associated Press, 30 January 1991; Ed Blanche, "Gulf-Iran Missiles," Associated Press, 29 January 1991; "The Gulf War Briefing: Iran's Arsenal Worries Analyst," Newsday, p. 16.

	Updated February 2006