Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1987
Iran says it plans to build a yellowcake plant in Yazd Province. [Note: Construction begins in 1989.]
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

1987
At a conference on nuclear science in Tehran, attendees say Iran is researching laser isotope separation.
—"Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1995, Special Report No. 6; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

1987
Fifteen Iranian engineers from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran are training in China in the fields of nuclear reactor design and research pursuant to a secret bilateral agreement signed after 1995.
—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1992," Middle East Defense News, 8 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1987
Iran receives a small calutron for experimental uranium isotope separation from the Chinese for the Isfahan nuclear research center. The Isfahan facility is now believed by some to contain processing capabilities for the entire uranium fuel cycle. According to US officials, the calutron is "desk-top sized," and is capable of a current of one milliamp, too small to enrich uranium. US officials, however, fear Iran could reverse engineer it to make larger calutrons. According to a report by the China Institute of Atomic Energy, the calutron can enrich uranium to 36.5%.
—"Nuclear Facilities," Middle East Defense News, 8 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995; Li Gongpan, Lin Zhizhou, Xiang Xuyang and Deng Jingtang, "Electromagnetic Isotope Separation At the China Institute of Atomic Energy," Nuclear Instruments and Methods In Physics Research, Section B, 1992, Vol. B70, p. 17-20; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

1987
Iranian President Rafsanjani commissions a study on the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
—Alon Pinkas, "Thinking the Unthinkable About Iran," The Jerusalem Post, 23 April 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1987
The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran begins to transfer test equipment, computers, and scientific instruments bought from the West from Tehran to Isfahan. [Note: Prior to the move to Isfahan, laser isotope separation research was conducted at Amir Kabir Technical College.]
—"Nuclear Facilities," Middle East Defense News, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1987
Construction begins on a nuclear research and production center for weapons-grade fissile material at Moallem Kalayeh. The facility is said to contain uranium labs and laser enrichment equipment. The facility is run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. A 10MW reactor from India is planned for the site, but apparently the plan is never realized. Iranian investment at the site totals $300 million by 1995.
—"Nuclear Facilities," Middle East Defense News, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

1987
Under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Moshen Rezai, a special unit of the IRGC begins working on a project at Bandar-e Abbas to extend the range of Silkworm missiles procured from China with the intention of arming them the with nuclear warheads
—"Nuclear Facilities," Middle East Defense News, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1987
Argentina concludes a deal to sell 20% enriched uranium to the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.
—"The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud," Middle East Defense News, 22 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1987
Siemens tries to convince the West German government to allow its subsidiary, Kraftwerk Union, to rebuild the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—"Iran Pledges To Complete Nuclear Plant," Middle East Defense News, 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1987
Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran begins, according to a 1999 article written by Viktor Mikhaylov, then chairman of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy's Scientific Council.
—Viktor Mikhaylov, "Minatom and International Cooperation," Yadernyy Kontrol (Moscow), Volume 44, Number 2, March-April 1999, pp. 62-66.

1987
Iran purchases "a large quantity of materials needed for the production of atomic weapons" from Japan, according to a Kuwaiti newspaper.
—Nuclear Developments, 5 May 1989, p. 20; in MENA (Cairo), 21 April 1989.

1987
Pakistan and Iran sign an agreement to send Iranian engineers to Pakistan for training. The agreement is signed between Reza Amrollahi, director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Munir Ahmad Khan of Pakistan. The deal calls for at least six Iranian scientists to get training at the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology and the Nuclear Studies Institute at Nowlore. Two of the scientists to be trained have been identified as Saeed Reza or Sayyid Reza and Hadi Ranbshahr or Hadi Rambashahr.
—Nuclear Developments, 13 July 1988, p. 19; in Al-Watan (Kuwait), 13 June 1988, p. 1; Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance To Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs: Emphasis On Russia Assistance; Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

1987
Iran demands that West Germany finish the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Iran has already paid for the reactors, according to some sources. The United States pressures West Germany not to complete the reactors. Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, but US officials say there are "solid nonproliferation grounds" for not completing the reactors. The West German Foreign Office has refused to export the components, citing restrictions on exports to regions of conflict, but since those do not apply to civil nuclear technology, Iran may file compensation claims. Equipos Nucleares of Spain, a Siemens' Licensee, would like to receive a subcontract from Siemens to complete Iran's reactors.
—Mark Hibbs, "German Officials Say Government May Not Let Bushehr Be Finished," Nucleonics Week, 7 February 1991, pp. 15-16.

1987
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is unable to account for fissile material that Iran said it moved to Bushehr from another site in Iran. The IAEA's investigation is hampered by the fact that Iran never declared the material. West Germany requests and is given permission to send engineers from TUeV [German reactor inspectorate Technischer Ueberwachungsverein] to the reactor site to search for the material with a Geiger counter, but nothing is found.
—Mark Hibbs, "Bonn Will Decline Teheran Bid To Resuscitate Bushehr Project," Nucleonics Week, 2 May 1991, pp. 17-18.

Late 1987-September 1990
The US government approves sales of "more than $306 million in high-technology items," including computers and oscilloscopes, which may have nuclear weapons applications, to Iran and Syria. The United States grants export licenses for $138 million worth of computers to Iran. Shipments of other nuclear-related technology, including a $130,000 oscilloscope, are also approved. These items may have nuclear weapons applications. The approvals were granted despite a US ban on the sale of sensitive technology to these countries by taking advantage of loopholes in US law; such as the "sanctity of previous contracts" (those approved before legislation is passed); the practice of allowing US-made equipment to be repaired in other countries, including those designated as supporters of terrorism; and the practice of permitting US-made parts to be sold in countries on the terrorist list if they are built into foreign equipment and comprise less than 20% of that equipment. US arms control expert Gary Milhollin identifies the dual-use items on the list. A Commerce Department spokesperson declined to comment on the approvals.
—Mary Gordon, "U.S. Exported Software, Parts To Iran, Syria, Records Show," San Francisco Chronicle, 28 August 1991, p. A2.

1987-1988
Iran and Iraq both say Iraq might attack the Bushehr complex.
—Gamini Seneviratne, Nucleonics Week, 26 February 1987, p. 13; Worldwide Report, 23 April 1987, p. 46; in AFP (Paris), 24 March 1987; Nuclear Engineering International, June 1987, p. 32; PPNN Newsbrief, March 1988, p. 4; in IAEA Newsbriefs, November 1987; Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 26 November 1987; Gamini Seneviratne, Nucleonics Week, 3 March 1988, p. 7; Aziz Utkan, Nuclear Developments, 5 May 1989, p. 20; in MENA (Cairo), 21 April 1989; Nuclear News, August 1989, p. 101.

January 1987
Abdul Qadir Khan, Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, revisits Bushehr. [Note: Khan first visited Bushehr in February 1986.]
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992; p. 42.

January 1987
At a secret meeting, Iranian officials decide to allocate additional funds toward developing nuclear weapons.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992; p. 42.

January 1987
Fereydun Fesharaki, who headed the Shah's secret nuclear weapons program, returns to Iran after a seven-year exile; all of his expenses are paid by the government.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992; p. 42.

February 1987
A team of 18 French engineers from Framatome inspects the Bushehr nuclear power plant to assess the damage from Iraqi bombing raids and to determine what it will take to rebuild. The team finds the plant "far from complete."
—"Iran To Complete Busheir Site," Middle East Defense News, 8 January 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Iran Pledges To Complete Nuclear Plant," Middle East Defense News, 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Mednews), August 1992; p. 42.

17 February 1987
The Muslim (Islamabad daily) reports that Pakistan's president offered nuclear cooperation to all member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference, which includes Iran.
—"Measures Taken To Protect Nuclear Plants," Worldwide Report, 17 February 1987, p. 38.

March-April 1987
A French analyst reports that Pakistan "might be tempted to sell nuclear fire" to Iran for several billion dollars.
—Worldwide Report, 23 April 1987, pp. 56-57; in Nawa-e Waqt (Karachi), 10 March 1987. p. 10; Worldwide Report, 18 August 1987, pp. 92-98; in Michel Balthasart, Le Vif/L'Express (Brussels), 24 April 1987, pp. 10-19.

19 March 1987
Nucleonics Week reports that Argentina will enforce strict guidelines for nuclear trade with Iran on a case-by-case basis but it has left the door open for export of medium-enriched uranium for Iran's research reactor and the transfer of certain uranium enrichment technology.
—Richard Kessler, "Argentina To Enforce Curb On Nuclear Trade With Iran," Nucleonics Week, 19 March 1987, p. 12.

April 1987
Iran, Libya, and Pakistan state that they wish to acquire a nuclear weapon to counter the Israeli nuclear threat. A Belgian newspaper claims that Belgium has provided nuclear-related training to Iranians.
—Worldwide Report, 18 August 1987, pp. 92-98; in Michel Balthasart, Le Vif/L'Express (Brussels), 24 April 1987, pp. 10-19.

April 1987
Nuclear News reports that a West German-Argentine-Spanish Consortium may complete work on Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. The report says representatives of Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West Germany have visited the site over the past two years to assess the situation. KWU is also concerned about legal difficulties over its cancelled contract (cancelled in 1979) and payments for equipment. The West German-Argentine joint venture, ENACE, and Spain's Empresarios Agrupados are also involved in the consortium. Both Spain and Argentina established relations with KWU when KWU built some of their nuclear plants.
—"Consortium Proposed For Bushehr Completion," Nuclear News, April 1987, p. 63.

23 April 1987
Worldwide Report reports that Iran recently gave the International Atomic Energy Agency warning before "nuclear matter" was stockpiled at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—"Nuclear Matter Stockpiled," Worldwide Report, 23 April 1987, p. 46.

May 1987
Nuclear Engineering International reports that Argentina might supply Iran with 20% enriched uranium for Iran's research reactor if current negotiations succeed. Iran and Argentina signed nuclear cooperation agreements in December 1985. An Argentina-Spain-West Germany consortium, including ENACE (Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricos, a West Germany-Argentina joint venture), Empresarios Agrupados and Kraftwerk Union, has proposed to complete one unit of Iran's twin 1200MWe Bushehr plant. [Note: The 1200MWe reactors are sometimes referred to as 1293MW. See 3 December 1986 and 6 March 1990.]
—"Argentina Steps Out With The Argos Phwr," Nuclear Engineering International, May 1987, p. 2.

5 May 1987
After 18 months of negotiations, Argentina's Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP) and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran sign a $5.5 million contract for INVAP to supply Iran with a new core for its US-supplied research reactor at Tehran University. INVAP will modify the core to operate with 20% enriched uranium; the core was originally designed by the United States to take 93% enriched uranium. The 5 May agreement, reportedly acknowledged by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on 18 May, is apparently for broader nuclear cooperation. In addition to the reactor core, Argentina may supply uranium enrichment technology, although Iran says this would be used to produce low-enriched uranium only. Argentina will train Iranian experts at its Jose Balseiro Nuclear Institute as an element of its fuel cycle technology transfer to Iran. CNEA [Commission Nuclear Energy Argentina], will provide the 115.8kg of uranium from its Pilcanyeu enrichment plant. [Note: The International Atomic Energy Agency approves the supply of uranium in September 1988, but later delays it in June 1989 (see entries).]
—Richard Kessler, Nucleonics Week, 14 May 1987, pp. 6-7; Nuclear News, July 1987, pp. 4-5; Nuclear Engineering International, July 1987, pp. 4-5; Richard Kessler and Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 12 November 1987, pp. 6-7.

7 May 1987
Nucleonics Week reports that Argentine officials deny US claims that part of an unsafeguarded 1986 shipment of uranium dioxide to Algeria was retransferred to Iran.
—Richard Kessler, "Panel To Guide Nuclear Technology Sales From Argentina To Algeria," Nucleonics Week, 7 May 1987, p. 6.

12 May 1987
Noticias Argentinas (Buenos Aires) reports Argentina is planning to participate in the final stages of construction of Iran's Bushehr power plant. The Iranian plant uses enriched uranium so that, earlier in its construction, Argentina could only provide its experience with engineering details, as Argentina works exclusively with natural uranium. The West German Kraftwerk Union (KWU) will join the Argentina-West Germany joint venture Argentine Nuclear Enterprise for Electrical Power Plants (ENACE), Spain's Empresarios Agrupados (EMAG), and Iranian companies to build the plant. KWU built Argentina's Atucha I plant and is presently in charge of its Atucha II project. EMAG is also building a KWU designed reactor in Spain.
—"Nuclear Plant," Worldwide Report, 12 May 1987, pp. 16-17.

18 May 1987
An Argentine official confirms that Argentina has signed a wide-ranging nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran on 5 May 1987. [Note: See also 5 May and 4 June 1987.]
—"Argentina Confirms Deal For Work On Bushehr," Nuclear News, July 1987, p. 54.

June-September 1987
Argentina rejects reports that it has transferred uranium enrichment techniques to Iran. It also denies that it is interested in engaging in such transfers.
—Daniel Santoro, Somos (Buenos Aires), 16 September 1987, pp. 40-42; in Nuclear Developments, 24 February 1988, pp. 20-21; Richard Kessler, Nucleonics Week, 4 June 1987, p. 6.

June 1987
Nuclear Engineering International reports that West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (KWU) declines to resume construction of Iran's Bushehr-1 power plant. KWU had previously confirmed that it was negotiating with companies from Argentina and Spain at Iran's request, to complete Bushehr-1 with an international consortium.
—"Iran: Bushehr Still In Limbo," Nuclear Engineering International, June 1987, p. 32.

4 June 1987
Nucleonics Week reports that an Argentine official denies reports that Argentine companies, together with West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (KWU) and Spain's Empresarios Argupados, recently signed a contract to finish Iran's Bushehr-1 PWR plant. [Note: See 5 and 18 May 1997. It is not clear if the official made the denial before or after another official confirmed the agreement on 18 May 1997.] The official says there is "nothing new" in long-running negotiations between Iran and the West German-Argentine-Spanish consortium on completing the plant. The Argentine companies involved are Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas (a joint venture of Argentina and West Germany), Techint SA, Argatom, and Nuclar. Argentina will insist on International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to cover any nuclear transfers to Iran. Argentina has not ruled out certain nuclear sales to Iran, but it has banned export of technology, materials, or equipment that could be used to enrich uranium, reprocess fuel or produce heavy water. Argentina denies any interest in transferring uranium-enrichment information to Iran and denies that the subject had been discussed in the past 18 months.
—Richard Kessler, "Argentina Denies Deal With KWU And Iran To Finish Bushehr-1," Nucleonics Week, 4 June 1987, p. 6.

July 1987
Nuclear News reports that Argentina wants to earn extra money for its atomic energy agency by exporting nuclear supplies and services, subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, to such countries as Iran and Albania.
—"Still Committed To Nuclear, Alfonsin Says," Nuclear News, July 1987, p. 54.

13 July 1987
The Star of Johannesburg reports Iran is secretly buying uranium from a British-run mine in South African-occupied Namibia. Iran has been buying uranium from the mine at Rossig for the past eight years. [Note: See also 1979-1987 and 1988 reports.]
—"Paper Reports Uranium Sales," 13 July 1987, Worldwide Report, 13 July 1987, p. 40.

29 July 1987
South African media reports that Iran is developing nuclear weapons with help from South Africa and Argentina.
—Edward J Perkins, "Nuclear News from South Africa," Secret Cable [US Embassy in South Africa], 29 July 1987, in Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.co>.

20 August 1987
Nucleonics Week reports that Argentina could win $100 million in nuclear business under proposed contracts to finish Iran's stalled Bushehr-1 PWR. The plan to complete Bushehr-1 under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards teams five Argentine firms, which would be responsible for the auxiliary systems and most safety work, with West Germany's Kraftwerk Union, which would act as project manager and oversee all nuclear steam supply system-related work and fuel supply, and Spain's Empresarios Agrupados, which would handle the conventional side. Iran's leaders have reportedly shown great interest in the plan. The consortium has bid for the at least $400 million project, but business has been stalled by West Germany's refusal to renew an export license for shipment of nuclear steam supply system components until the Iran-Iraq War ends. Argentine technicians have visited the Bushehr site in the "recent past."
—Richard Kessler, "Cnea Estimates Bushehr-1 Work Worth $100 Million To Argentina," Nucleonics Week, 20 August 1987, p. 13.

September 1987
Iran holds a conference on laser isotope separation.
—Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, May 1995, p. 14; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

November 1987
After Iraq bombs the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran requests that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sends a safety mission to the plant. The IAEA declines to send a mission. [Note: The IAEA continues to refuse to send inspectors until March 1988, when it says that it will inspect Bushehr in a few months. See also March 1988, Mid-1989, and 22 June 1989.] Further, Argentina halts talks on completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. An agreement on restarting construction of the plant is cancelled after Iraq bombs the plant on 17 and 19 November 1987.
—Gamini Seneviratne, Nucleonics Week, 26 February 1987, p. 13; Worldwide Report, 23 April 1987, p. 46; in AFP (Paris), 24 March 1987; Nuclear Engineering International, June 1987, p. 32; PPNN Newsbrief, March 1988, p. 4; in IAEA Newsbriefs, November 1987; Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 26 November 1987; Gamini Seneviratne, Nucleonics Week, 3 March 1988, p. 7; Aziz Utkan, Nuclear Developments, 5 May 1989, p. 20; in MENA (Cairo), 21 April 1989; Nuclear News, August 1989, p. 101. Nuclear Engineering International, April 1988, p. 8.

12 November 1987
Nucleonics Week reports that the president of Argentina has approved negotiations between Argentine companies and Iran on nuclear supply contracts. There are also reports that Argentine and other foreign companies--including West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (KWU), Spain's Empresarios Agrupados, Argentina's Techint and Nuclar and the West Germany-Argentina joint venture Empresa Nuclear Argentina—have formed a management structure or unincorporated holding company to bid for that business. KWU says that it is talking to other firms about work for Iran, but KWU says no holding company has yet been formed. Argentina also says that talks with Iran go beyond completing the long-stalled Bushehr-1 PWR and include Bushehr-2, which is reportedly 45% complete. Estimates for the total for both units are $2.35 billion, with Argentine companies getting up to $400 million. KWU's talks about forming a consortium are limited to Bushehr-1, but it is interested in Bushehr-2 as well. Argentina emphasizes that all nuclear exports, including any business with Iran, be covered by International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
—Richard Kessler and Mark Hibbs, "Alfonsin Oks Iran Nuclear Deals For Argentine Firms," Nucleonics Week, 12 November 1987, pp. 6-7

17 November 1987
Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

19 November 1987
Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.