Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1994
Iranian government representatives visit the Ublinsky Metallurgical Works in Kazakhstan. This site reportedly specializes in uranium and has not been properly guarded for up to two years. The United States asked the Kazakhstani government to block any Iranian transactions. The United States prevents Iran from purchasing beryllium from Kazakhstan, which is one of the few places in world with a beryllium processing plant. After the CIA found out that Iranian agents had visited the Kazakhstan plant, US agents began negotiations with the plant and purchased its entire inventory. The beryllium, which was sufficient for 20 nuclear warheads, was transferred to the United States to be modified for non-military use.
—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?," Jane's International Defense Review, September 1997, pp. 29-31; Con Coughlin, "Iran Plays With Nuclear Fire As Israel Watches," Sunday Telegraph (UK), 15 January 1995.

1994
The BND German intelligence service is aware of 124 cases involving the purchase of nuclear materials on the black market in 1994.
—Juergen Marks, "Basar Des Schreckens [Terror Bazaar]," Focus, 22 July 1996, pp. 28-29.

1994
Although the Clinton administration has called for a total embargo of nuclear technology on Iran, China and Russia agree to sell nuclear facilities to Iran in 1994, while other nations such as Japan and Germany continue to sell Iran high-tech dual-use technology. Israel is concerned that Iran may acquire key nuclear components from the former Soviet Union, thus shortening the predicted eight to ten years Iran is expected to need to be able to produce nuclear weapons.
—Leonard Spector, "'Islamic Bomb' West's Long-Term Nightmare," Washington Times, 19 January 1994, p. A19.

January 1994
Italy seizes ultrasound equipment bound for Iran at the port of Bari. The equipment can be used for reactor testing.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

4 January 1994
US Undersecretary for International Security Lynn Davis says that Iranian nuclear procurement is "inconsistent with any rational civil nuclear program." The CIA has concluded that Iran's nuclear program is in its "infancy stage," but that Iran could possess nuclear weapons by the year 2000.
—Security Affairs, April-May 1994, p. 3; Jack Kelley, "Nuclear Program in the works/US firms many have helped supply parts," USA Today January 4, 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>, 13 February 1994.

5 January 1994
Eberhard Posner, head of corporate communications for Germany's Siemens, in a letter to The New York Times, refutes speculation that his company is "somehow involved in Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear technology." Posner says, "Siemens has no joint venture with Skoda Plzen in nuclear technology. We have no activities whatever to enable third parties to advance nuclear technology in Iran." He concludes that Siemens "has no plans to complete Bushehr—with Skoda or anyone else."
—Eberhard Posner, "No Iran Nuclear Role for German Company," The New York Times, 13 January 1994, p. A14.

12 January 1994
Ali Shirzadian, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that claims of an Iranian nuclear weapons program reported in USA Today are "sheer lies" and that such accusations are part of a US plot against the Islamic world. Shirzadian says that Iran is an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has been faithful to its commitments as a signatory to the [Non-Proliferation Treaty]."
—Reuters, 12 January 1994; in Executive News Service, 31 January 1994; "US Repot on Iranian Weapons Production Dismissed as 'Sheer Lies'," IRNA (Tehran); British Broadcasting Corporation, 14 January 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>, 20 February 1994.

13 January 1994
Two Iranian officials visit Bonn, Germany. One of the officials, Javad Larijani, states that the most "negative point" in German-Iranian relations is Germany's refusal to continue construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Today, the officials are expected to visit the Siemens corporation in Munich. [Note: Siemens was building the reactor in Bushehr before the government pulled out of the contract. See February 1991 and 30 June 1991 for other meetings between Iran and Germany.]
—"Pardon for German in Iran?" Taz, die Tageszeitung, 13 January 1994, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. [CNS Translation]

27 January 1994
The Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations releases a press release regarding CIA Chief James Woolsey's 25 January 1994 testimony before the US Congress. The release denies that Iran has a nuclear weapons program and affirms that Iran cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency in regards to inspections, such as the last IAEA visit in November 1993. The release states that Woolsey's remarks about Iran were "self-serving" and were made in the interest of "securing budgetary and otherwise allocations for the current administration" in the United States.
—Islamic Republic of Iran, Permanent Mission to the UN, Press Release No. 103, 27 January 1994; in IRNA (Tehran); in JPRS-JND-94-007, 31 January 1994, p. 12; Reuters, 27 January 1994; in Executive News Service, 31 January 1994.

February 1994
Major General Mohsen Rezaie, the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), dismisses an accusation that Iran is trying to obtain nuclear weapons as "just a baseless rumor." Rezai states that Iran will not allow North Korea or any other country to use Iran as a testing ground for nuclear weapons.
—IRNA (Tehran), 23 February 1994; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-007, 23 March 1994, p. 8; Reuters, 24 February 1994; in Executive News Service 24 February 1994.

February 1994
A US Department of Defense official says that Iran currently is negotiating with China and Russia for the purchase of commercial nuclear reactors that could be used for military purposes.
—Philip Pinnegan and Theresa Hitchens, Defense News, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service, 3 February 1994.

February 1994
Amid concerns that Iran will acquire dual-use technology and use it to develop nuclear weapons, the United States is urging other countries not to sell such technology to Iran. US officials say that they are concerned that Iran may try to obtain items such as centrifuges and high-speed computers that can aid in the development of nuclear weapons. The United States is sharing information with other countries concerning Iran's procurement network.
—Philip Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, Defense News, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service.

February 1994
North Korea and Iran sign a nuclear cooperation agreement, according to South Korean and Arab media sources. Iran has also tested North Korean missiles in the region between Shahrud and Damghan, east of Tehran.
—"Secret Nuclear Sites Detailed," Iran Brief: Policy, Trade, & Strategic Affairs, 6 November 1995.

2 February 1994
A senior Clinton administration official says that Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear technology and materials from the former Soviet Union have been unsuccessful.
—Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service, 3 February 1994.

7 February 1994
US Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis says that the United States will press the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls' [COCOM] successor regime, which will be formed once COCOM is dissolved on 31 March 1994, to halt transfers of dual-use and military technology to Iran.
—Philip Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, Defense News, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service.

10 February 1994
Vaclav Klaus, prime minister of the Czech Republic, while on an official visit to Israel, says Skoda has done nothing wrong. Klaus dismisses the allegations as "rumors and speculations usually created by the competition in the Western European countries, in the United States' companies which want to catch the markets themselves and try in advance to send rumours to undermine the Czech position."
—"Vaclav Klaus Denies Reports of Nuclear Sales to Iran," BBC, 10 February 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-February 1994
A North Korean delegation composed of 29 experts in military technology returns from a "long visit" to Iran, during which they signed an agreement on military and nuclear cooperation, according to the Arab weekly Al-Watan Al-Arabi. The delegation was led by North Korean Air Force commander Cho Myong Nok. Diplomatic sources believe that the North Koreans visited military and nuclear facilities in Iran.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 February 1994; in FBIS Document JPRS-JND-94-007, 23 March 1994, pp. 27-28; The Washington Times, 25 February 1994.

16 February 1994
CIA spokesperson Dave Christian says that according to the latest estimates, Iran could develop a nuclear bomb within six to eight years. Christian states that the Iranian nuclear weapons program is in its early stages and still heavily relies upon foreign technology and expertise.
—Philip Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, Defense News, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service.

18 February 1994
The German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) issues a report stating that the Physics Research Center (PHRC) at Sharif University is involved in the procurement of "nuclear-related materials" and that the Educational Research Institute (ERI) and the Iranian Research and Development Organization are "wholly or in part devoted to military projects...with the aim of supplying know-how, equipment, and materials." As a result of German intelligence reports in 1992 and 1993, the German export control review body, the Bundesamt für Wirtschaft (BAW), was instructed to deny all requests by Sharif University to import equipment from Germany.
—Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 28 March 1994, pp. 10-11.

23 February 1994
In an interview with the English daily Tehran Times, Major General Mohsen Rezai denies Iran is involved in developing nuclear weapons, stating, "Political logic, morality, our own culture and above all the situation in today's world does not allow us to have such deadly weapons."
—"IRGC Head Denies Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons; Reports UK-US-Israeli Gulf 'plot'," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 February 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 1994
A Chinese-supplied 27kWt miniature neutron source reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center goes critical. [Note: This reactor should not be confused with a 27MW reactor also proposed for sale by China for installation at Isfahan. See 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, June 1990, November 1991, and 1 June 1995 for entries on the 27 MW reactor.]
—Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran's Nuclear Facilities: a Profile," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998.

21 March 1994
Russian experts start work on the first unit of Iran's 1000MW plant, according to a source at the plant. Iran signed an agreement with the Russian experts several months ago. The Bushehr nuclear power plant is scheduled to be finished in four years. According to the report, 85% of the construction and 65% of mechanical and electrical work at Bushehr is complete.
—Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran) 13 April 1994, p. 4; in FBIS-NES-94-079, 25 April 1994, p. 82; Mena (Cairo), 13 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 49.

April 1994
During a visit to Pakistan, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Nateq Nuri denies Western media reports that he held talks with Pakistani officials concerning cooperation between Iran and Pakistan in the field of nuclear technology. Some US officials have claimed that Iran is trying to purchase weapons technology from Pakistan.
—Nucleonics Week, 21 April 1994, pp. 14-15.

April 1994
The Independent reports that the United Kingdom vice-chancellors rejected a secret government proposal to exclude students and researchers from countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, China, and Libya from working at British universities in fields of study that could be useful in the development of nuclear weapons.
—Ngaio Crequer, Independent, 25 April 1994.

6 April 1994
Ilja Mazanek, the director of Czech Republic's Foreign Ministry's Middle East and North Africa department, says that the Czech Republic is not exporting any weapons or components for nuclear power plants to Iran.
—CTK, 6 April 1994; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

13 April 1994
A source at the uncompleted Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant reports that 30,000 tons of the plant's main parts are being stored in Iran after export from Germany, although another 7,000 tons that were reportedly paid for by Iran are being held up because Germany has not issued an export permit.
—Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran) 13 April 1994, p. 4; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-94-079, 25 April 1994, p. 82; Mena (Cairo), 13 April 1994; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 49.

18 April 1994
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix visits Iran to discuss a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East. Blix also discusses verification and safeguards arrangements in a nuclear-weapon free zone. Blix meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, Atomic Energy Organization Commission Chairman Reza Amrollahi, the first Deputy to the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Habibi, and the Deputy to the Speaker of the Majlis, Hassan Ruhani, as well as various members of parliament. Additionally, Blix discusses the possibility of cooperation in technical matters, such as the use of radioisotopes to study rising water levels in the Caspian Sea. Amrollahi states that Blix has supported Iran's proposal to establish a nuclear-free Middle East, which would require that all countries in the region cooperate on the issue.
—Director General Of IAEA Visits Iran IAEA Press Release (PR 1904), 20 April 1994; "Amrollahi On Blix Meeting." IRNA (Tehran), 19 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 15; "Commentary Views Blix Visit." Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 20 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94- 010, 5 May 1994, pp. 15-16; "Blix Meets Amrollahi." IRNA (Tehran), 18 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 14.

17 May 1994
A US General Accounting Office (GAO) report ["Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to be strengthened" (GAO-NSIAD-94-119)] says that since 1988, the United States has approved 24% of Iranian requests for shipments of nuclear-related material. The report states that the US government has approved 1,508 export licenses for nuclear-related equipment destined for "companies or sites known or suspected to be involved in developing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials."
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "GAO Details Lax Control Of Nuclear-Tech Exports," The Washington Post, 18 May 1994, p. A17; Vincent Kiernan, "Is US carelessness arming foreign powers?," New Scientist, 28 May 1994, p. 8.

June 1994
A Chinese research reactor begins operation at Isfahan.
—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

7 June 1994
A Chinese nuclear engineer working with a group of Chinese experts for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran on the construction of uranium enrichment plants at Rudan in Shiraz, in southeastern Iran is kidnapped. Two Iranian technicians are kidnapped at the same time, and it is likely that the three experts had critical classified information on Iran's nuclear program. Iran's Interior Ministry acknowledges the disappearances in mid-June. Iran says seven people working on mining and uranium conversion in Fasa, southern Iran, have disappeared. They also include three North Korean technicians, an Australian, and two Iranian technicians.
—"Mysterious Disappearances," Intelligence News Letter, 23 June 1994, p. 5.

12 June 1994
Inferences made by President Clinton that Iran may misuse the nuclear technology it is given by Russia to produce nuclear weapons rather than to generate electricity provokes a response by Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister. Kozyrev says, "Iran clearly stated it is prepared to open its nuclear facilities for inspection."
—Al-Wasat (London), 12-18 June 1994, p. 24; in "Kozyrev Terms Relations With Iran, Iraq 'Good'," in FBIS Document FTS19970603002465, 3 June 1997.

16 June 1994
ITAR-TASS reports that Russia will assist Iran in completing construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The plant is expected to produce one-seventh of Iran's electricity demand and is scheduled for completion by 1995. Russian specialists are doing technical research for the project.
—Oleg Kuzmin, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 16 June 1994; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-94-117, 17 June 1994, p. 12.

29 June 1994
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says in an interview that Israel is asking the United States for help in stopping Iran and Iraq from developing long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. According to an Israeli intelligence official, China, North Korea, and some European countries are supplying manufacturing tools and components Iran is using in its nuclear weapons program. The official notes that Israel regularly provides the names of nuclear suppliers suspected of dealing with Iran to other countries' intelligence services, and adds that a first step in confronting Iran's nuclear weapons development should "focus on sanctions or a boycott."
—Richard C. Barnard, Defense News, 4 July 1994, pp. 4, 29.

Late June 1994
The secretary general of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Mostafa Hijri, says that Iran intends to develop its own nuclear arms.
—Mouna Naim, "Un Dirigeant Kurde Demande Que Le Regime De Teheran Soit Mis En Quarantaine," [Kurdish Leader Asks That The Tehran Regime Be Quarantined] Le Monde, 29 June 1994.

4 July 1994
Iran and China announce a deal for a 300MW reactor near Tehran.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

13 July 1994
Literaturnaya Gazeta (Moscow), reports that Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev, deputy chief of the Main Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense, says that reports of a Kazakhstani sale of nuclear warheads to Iran are unfounded.
—"General Examines Nuclear Safety Concerns;" in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-014, 13 July 1994, p. 46.

17 July 1994
The Sunday Times reports that two North Koreans in possession of diplomatic passports were detained in Macau carrying $180,000 in counterfeit US bills. According to sources in the US Secret Service, North Korea may have agreed to accept high payments made in fake dollars for the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. In 1989 Iran and North Korea reached an agreement on "economic, scientific and technological cooperation" and on "exchanges of military and science information," which opened channels for trade in nuclear technology.
—Nick Rufford, "Iran Linked To Flood Of Fake Dollars," Sunday Times (London), 17 July 1994, p. 18.

27 July 1994
In an effort to "remain committed" to the regulations promulgated by the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear nonproliferation, Iran says it will accept the Agency's supervision of the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—"Iran Agrees to Bring Nuclear Plant Under IAEA Supervision," Agence France Presse, 27 July 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

August 1994
During a news conference, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani says that even if North Korea has developed nuclear weapons, Iran does not want them. Rafsanjani was responding to the question of whether Iran is attempting to buy nuclear weapons from North Korea. Rafsanjani adds that Iran is not trying to obtain nuclear weapons.
—"Rafsanjani Denies Seeking Nuclear Weapons From DPRK," Asian Defence Journal, August 1994, p. 91.

10 August 1994
German police arrest a Spanish or Columbian national who arrived in Munich on a Lufthansa flight from Moscow carrying 300 grams of plutonium concealed in a metal box and "lead foil." After being told by the arrested man that two people, a Frenchman and a Spaniard, were waiting for him at the airport, German police were able to arrest them as well. According to another source, the man smuggling "between 100 and 300 grams" of plutonium is a Spanish businessman named Javier Bengoechea Arratibel. The source also said that Bavarian police had arrested a "Columbian and two Spaniards," and that those arrested were not part of "an international terrorist group". According to an article in Der Spiegel, confirmed by police spokesman Fritz Dillinger, approximately 2.2lbs of lithium 6 were seized as well. Officials with Bavaria's special police services believe that the illegal shipment "could wind up in an Arab country's embassy." Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran have been named as possibilities. Russian Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Sidorenko was also on the Lufthansa flight.
—Yaderny Chemodanchik, '"Zasvetilsya" V Bonne" [A Nuclear Briefcase Shows Up In Bonn], Komsomalskaya Pravda (Moscow), 17 August 1994, pp. 1, 3; Michael Binyon, "West Dismisses Russian Denials On Smuggled Plutonium," The Times, 16 August 1994, Terrence Petty, "H-bomb Material Included In Seizure," Washington Times, 21 August 1994, p. A9.

13 August 1994
John D. Holum, the director of the US Arms Control Agency, says Iran is still attempting to build a nuclear weapons program despite information provided by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors that they are aware of no wrongdoing. Concerned that Iran's signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, which included a stipulation that it could obtain nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, Holum says Iran's objectives are obvious "in terms of their procurement activities, the kinds of reactors they're interested in acquiring."
—"Tehran Pursuing Nuclear Programs," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 13 August 1994, p. A4; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 August 1994
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, referring to Israel's warning to Germany that smuggled Russian plutonium is being received by Iran, tells visiting German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel that "the time has come to settle accounts with Iran." Peres says that there is information indicating that Europeans have been selling "nuclear merchandise" to Iranians or Iranian groups. Peres wants Germany, which has hosted the head of the Iranian security services, to pursue a harder line against Iran in its foreign policy.
—Roger Boyes, "Peres Tells Germans Stolen Plutonium Is Reaching Tehran," The Times (London), 23 August 1994; John Rettle, "Pakistan 'Has The Bomb'," Atom (UK), 24 August 1994; "Potential Buyer Of Russian Uranium," Asian Recorder, 25 June 1994, p. 24055.

September 1994
A senior Iranian official states that Iran is considering withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because Western nations continue to deny it nuclear technology, even though it has complied with the NPT's requirements. The official statement confirms "rumors" circulating in the Western intelligence community that Iran might decide to leave the NPT. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in Geneva, the Iranian delegation claims that Iran is not being granted access to technology designed for peaceful use of nuclear energy as stipulated by Article IV of the NPT. Iranian delegates to the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in Vienna say that Iran would postpone its decision on withdrawal from the NPT until closure of the final Preparatory Committee meeting for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. A US official notes that Iran had nothing to gain from leaving the NPT and would be "better off" gauging the extent of Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) support at the January 1995 PrepCom meeting. A Japanese official remarks that North Korea had succeeded in withdrawing from the NPT and was "rewarded with power reactors." The Japanese official says Iran might attempt a similar maneuver. Officials observe that although the Iranian delegation to the General Conference seemed sympathetic to the NPT and uneasy with the hardline stance ordered by Tehran, "quitting the NPT is a card" Iran could play at any time. Pakistani sources confirm Iranian claims that the United States pressured Pakistan into denying Iranian nuclear specialists access to a Chinese-supplied pressurized water reactor (PWR) at Chashma, northeast of the Pakistani town, Faisalabad.
—Mark Hibbs, "Iran May Withdraw From NPT Over Western Trade Barriers," Nucleonics Week, 22 September 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Mark Hibbs, "Western Group Battles Iran At Third NPT Prepcom Session" Nucleonics Week, 22 September 1994, pp. 9-10; Mark Hibbs, "It's 'Too Early' For Tehran To Leave NPT, Delegates Say," NuclearFuel, 26 September 1994, pp. 9-10.

September 1994
The US Central Intelligence Agency reports that Iran is using Russian expertise and technology to expedite its nuclear weapons program. Some US and Israeli officials believe that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon within five years. Iran's mission to the United Nation flatly denies these allegations in a statement which read that "Iran does not, and will not, in light of its own national interest, engage in a nuclear weapon program."
—"Iran's Nuke Plant Deal With Russia Raises Fears" Washington Times, 10 January 1995, p. A13; "Russia Signs Deal For Iranian Nuclear Plant," Reuters, 8 January 1995, in Executive News Service, 8 January 1994; "Iran, Russia Agree On $800 Million Nuclear Plant Deal," Washington Post, 9 January 1995, p. A18; "Russia Has Agreed On The Terms . . .," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 11, 16 January 1995; "Russian Visits Iran To Sign Nuclear Deal," Washington Post, 7 January 1995, p. A17.

1 September 1994
In a speech at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Iranian Foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati proposes that the Persian Gulf States create a forum for the discussion of security issues, including a commitment to forswear nuclear weapons acquisition and establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Gulf region.
—Robert Evens, Reuters, 1 September 1994.

11 September 1994
Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, breaks ground at the site for the nuclear research center at Bonab. He says the research there will be for "agricultural purposes." It is scheduled to open in July 1995. The Iranian press has called it a "cyclotron center" for research in nuclear medicine and agriculture. [Note: See January 1995.]
—"Blix Visits Iranian Nuclear Sites," The Iran Brief, 1 August 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 September 1994
Israeli Army intelligence head Uri Saguy says that within about eight years, Iran is likely to have developed a nuclear weapon. Saguy adds that Israel and other countries are undertaking measures to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions.
—Reuters, 19 September 1994; in Executive News Service, 19 September 1994.

19 September 1994
Reza Amrollahi, Iranian Vice President and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), says at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference that Iran intends to continue construction of the Esteqlal nuclear plant in Bushehr as part of a two-year-old bilateral cooperation agreement with China. According to an Iranian official, Iran would prefer to receive technical assistance from the United States and Europe, but because of the West's reluctance to supply Iran with the necessary nuclear technology and equipment, Iran has been forced to turn to China and Russia for assistance at Bushehr. [Note: The Federation of American Scientists reports that the Esteqlal nuclear plant is at Darkhovin, not Bushehr. See 1993 entry on Esteqlal. Note: See July 1991, October 1991, 31 October 1991, and 29 September 1994 for additional information on China's role in the construction of Bushehr.]
—Mark Hibbs, "Iran May Withdraw From NPT Over Western Trade Barriers," Nucleonics Week, 22 September 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Mark Hibbs, "Western Group Battles Iran At Third NPT Prepcom Session," Nucleonics Week, 22 September 1994, pp. 9-10.

22 September 1994
Reza Amrollahi, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, says that the first nuclear power plant in Bushehr will be completed, with Russian assistance, in 1999. Amrollahi also confirms that Iran intends to build two more power plants with production capacities of 300MW each with China's help.
—ITAR-TASS, 22 September 1994; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu/>.

23 September 1994
Michael Ryzhov, director of international relations for the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), says that Minatom and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) have agreed on a draft contract for the completion of Bushehr-1 but are still negotiating the financing for the project. The contract will involve the installation of VVER-1000 equipment in the reactor building that was partially constructed by Siemens in the late 1970s. Minatom and AEOI still need to determine how to modify the building, which was designed for four Siemens vertical steam generators, so that it can house six horizontal VVER steam generator units. Ryzhov adds that Minatom expects to finish the project within five years.
—Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 29 September 1994, pp. 3-4.

23 September 1994
CIA Director James Woolsey says "Iran is also looking to purchase fully fabricated nuclear weapons in order to accelerate sharply its timetable."
—James Woolsey, "Challenges to Peace," speech before the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 23 September 1994 (mimeo); in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

29 September 1994
Nucleonics Week reports that, according to Iranian officials, China will construct a minimum of two pressurized water reactors at Bushehr. Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, names the Chinese reactor project Esteqlal. An Iranian official says his country has already made a "down payment" on the reactors and wants "to see some results."
—Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 29 September 1994, pp. 3-4.

October 1994
US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin reach an agreement in which Russia will ban nearly $1 billion worth of arms exports to Iran in exchange for access to export markets and US financial assistance. Yeltsin indicates that Russia will fulfill its previous commitments to Iran, but it is not clear whether the 1992 Russian agreement to provide two nuclear reactors and 170 technicians to Iran will be terminated.
—James Bruce, "Russian Agrees 'Arms Sales To Iran' Ban," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 October 1994, p. 2.

4 October 1994
The Washington Times reports that the US Congressional Research Service published a report by Kenneth Katzman and Rinn-sup Shinn that notes that "there is concern that North Korea may transfer nuclear technology to Iran" in order to obtain Iranian financing for its nuclear efforts. The report noted US fears that North Korea may sell "a completed nuclear weapon or key nuclear technology" to its clients in the Middle East who have been purchasing North Korean ballistic missile technology, including Iran.
—Andrew Borowiec, "N. Korea Sells Arms To Iran, Syria," Washington Times, 4 October 1994, p. A13.

5 October 1994
The Washington Times reports that US officials believe China has been a major contributor to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and is also providing Iran and Algeria with nuclear weapons technology.
—Bill Gertz, "China Will Stop Missile Sales; U.S. Will Lift Sanctions," Washington Times, 5 October 1994, p. A3.

26 October 1994
Al-Hayat reports that, according to Russian Counterespionage Agency statistics, about 12% of applied physicists and 40% of highly qualified theoretical physicists have emigrated from the former Soviet republics, in particular from Russia. A recent Labor Institute poll indicated that 40% of former Soviet scientists might be willing to emigrate, and 13% are prepared to do so immediately. The report says such emigration could aid Middle Eastern or Asian countries in the acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
According to the report, General Viatchilev Ogordonikov, deputy director general of the Russian Interior Ministry and member of the Control Council of Rosvooruzheniye, the state company for the export and import of military weapons and equipment, accused the West of using espionage and open financial appeals to lure "the cream of Russian scientific thinking." Furthermore, Ogordonikov stated that Kalmykya has emerged as a key transfer point in the emigration of Russian specialists to Iran. According to Ogordonikov, a shipment of radioactive material was recently seized while in route from Kalmykya to Central Asia. Counterespionage experts indicated that in most cases the final destination for such shipments is often Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. An ensuing investigation revealed that the radioactive substance was originally sent from Chilyabinsk [Chelyabinsk] in western Siberia, site of a Russian nuclear complex. The shipper of the radioactive material left the country and cannot be traced.
—"Paper Reports On Arms Shipment To Iraq, Iran;" in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-94-210, 26 October 1994.

November 1994
Interfax reports that a high-ranking Russian diplomat denied rumors that Kazakhstan would have sold 600kg of uranium to Iran had the United States not purchased it first. According to the official, the Kazakhstani fuel is incompatible with Iran's nuclear research reactor, and Iran has no other operational nuclear power stations. Also, the official said, "Over the recent years, Iran has not shown any nuclear ambitions." The official contends that the motive behind such rumors is to give momentum to a plan to place Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and in particular Russian, nuclear programs under either US or international control. The official suggested that these rumors are linked to recent reports about Russian and CIS nuclear materials smuggling.
—"Uranium Said Unsuitable For Iran's Reactor," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-94-228, 25 November 1994.

16 November 1994
Boris Rosev, a Los Alamos National Laboratory technical staffer who recently spent more than one year in Russia studying its nuclear safeguards, says that President Yeltsin is using Russia's perceived technical expertise in the sphere of nuclear weapons to lure foreign investment. Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and other nations have set up trade offices in Moscow and are soliciting Russian research laboratories to work on their nuclear programs. Foreign nuclear projects are submitted to the government for approval but, according to Rosev, "it is easy to bribe anyone in the hierarchy to grant approval, or to change the name of the project." Rosev says that Russian scientists who work on foreign nuclear programs can see a ten-fold increase in wages, making it extremely difficult for them to turn down these projects. According to Rosev, the Russian government provides few subsidies to national research laboratories, and scientists are sometimes told that "the money is not there" for wages. According to Rosev, provisions for the direct payment of Russian scientists should be included in US programs for the safeguarding of nuclear materials at Russian research facilities and weapons sites.
—Kathleen Hart, "Russian Weapons Scientists Said To Be Working On Foreign Nuclear Projects," NuclearFuel, 21 November 1994, pp. 2-3.

20 November 1994
Iran says Russia agrees to finish the first reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant for $800 million. Reuters reports that Russian experts have already started work on the project. An official of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, identified as Mehralizadeh, says work at the plant has continued with a $850 million. [Note: The contract for the plant is signed on 8 January 1995.]
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995; Reuters, 20 November 1994; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu/>.

22 November 1994
Reuters reports that the United States has secretly negotiated to bring one-half ton of highly enriched uranium to the United States from a poorly protected site from Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. The US clandestine operation named "Operation Sapphire" retrieved enough uranium to build 20 to 50 nuclear weapons. [Note: The Sunday Times of London says 20 bombs, Reuters says 50.] The 600kg of uranium was secured by 31 nuclear specialists from the Ulba metallurgy plant in Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic. The Russian government, which still considers Kazakhstan under its "sphere of influence," agreed to sell the uranium to the United States for what is rumored to be in the "low tens of millions of dollars." The US operation was initiated after rumors arose that Iranian scientists had recently obtained beryllium and low-enriched uranium for Iran's nuclear weapons program from the Kazakh plant, a conclusion the Kazakh government denies.
—James Adams, "America's Secret Deal Stopped Iranian Nuclear Bomb," Sunday Times, 27 November 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; Reuters, 22 November 1994; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu/>.

25 November 1994
Kazakh and Russian officials deny that Kazakhstan was going to sell Iran the 600kg of enriched uranium transferred to the United States if the United States had turned down the deal. Kazakh Deputy Minister Bulat Nurgaliyev denies that his country had held any talks on the matter with Iran. He adds that if the United States or the other signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had not been willing to purchase the material, it would have been transferred under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and kept in the same storage facilities at the Ulba metallurgical plant. The report also states that experts express skepticism about the alleged plans to transfer the uranium to Iran because the uranium in question was in alloy with beryllium. According to a high ranking Russian Atomic Energy Ministry official, the technology for extracting uranium from beryllium is difficult and expensive, and Iran does not have it.
—Interfax, 26 November 1994; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu/>.

27 November 1994
Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's Foreign Minister, says inspections conducted recently by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) prove the "peaceful nature" of Iran's nuclear program. Kozyrev says Moscow will expand its nuclear relationship with Iran, citing the IAEA report as proof of Iran's good conduct in the nuclear field.
—"Russian Foreign Minister Cited on Readiness to Expand Atomic Cooperation with Iran," BBC, 29 November 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

December 1994
CIA Director James Woolsey claims Iran would need eight to ten years to build a bomb.
—Senthil Ranasabapathy, "No Evidence Of Iranian Nuclear Bomb Plan Says IAEA," IPS Daily Journal, 11 January 1995.

5 December 1994
The Iran Brief reports that, according to US sources, Iran recently procured uranium hexafluoride, commonly known as UF6, from China. UF6 is a gaseous form of uranium used in the enrichment process to produce weapons-grade uranium.
—"Chinese Uranium Sale," The Iran Brief, 5 December 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 December 1994
US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis says Iran "continues to purchase" nuclear reactors from Russia and China. Davis says that the United States has been pushing for an agreement with Russia to ban arms sales to Iran. According to Davis, Russia is committed to fulfilling its current contracts with Iran, but has agreed to ban future arms sales. As an incentive for this agreement, the United States has offered support for Russian membership in a new policy coordinating organization that seeks to control sensitive exports. The European countries are willing to admit Russia into this new regime in spite of Russian arms sales to Iran. "Maintaining their political relationship with Russia and their reluctance to single out Iran have been given priority over their non-proliferation goals," Davis said.
—"US, Europe Differ On Iran Policy, Official Says," Executive News Service, 8 December 1994.

14 December 1994
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin states during a visit to Japan that he believes North Korea is exporting nuclear weapons technology to Iran. Rabin says he is concerned about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and wants to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, monitored by all Middle Eastern nations, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency have been "ineffective" in their attempts to monitor the region.
—"Israel Accuses N. Korea Of Supplying Missiles To Iran Executive News Service," 14 December 1994; "Rabin Says N.Korea Exports Scud Missiles To Iran," Reuters, 15 December 1994; in Executive News Service, 15 December 1994; Miho Yoshikawa, "North Korea-Iran," Reuters, 13 December 1994; in Executive News Service, 13 December 1994; "Crainte D'Une Cooperation Militaire Entre L'Iran Et La Coree Du Nord" [Fear of Military Cooperation Between Iran and North Korea], Le Monde, 15 December 1994.

20 December 1994
Frantisek Svitak, Vice President of Skoda Plzen Engineering Consortium in the Czech Republic, says the company is still considering trading with Iran in nuclear power technology, but will only do so through Russia.
—"Skoda Plzen Seeks Nuclear Deal with Iran," CTK National News Wire, 20 December 1994, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

Late 1994
PPNN Newsbrief reports that Iran is facing difficulties in locating funding for the Russian completion of its Bushehr reactors and is seeking to import less costly VVER equipment from unfinished reactors in Eastern Europe. The US government reportedly has pressured Poland not to respond to an Iranian request for components from the uncompleted Zarnowiec plant where the Soviet Union had been building two VVER-440 type reactors. The United States also is said to have urged Germany not to allow the transfer of parts from the Greifswald plant in the former East Germany to Iran.
—PPNN Newsbrief, Fourth Quarter 1994, p. 16.