
Introduction
Iran's
interest in nuclear technology dates to the 1950's, when the Shah of Iran
began receiving American assistance through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program.
Although Iran signed the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT)as a
non-nuclear weapon state in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, the Shah may have had
nuclear weapons ambitions. However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and subsequent
Iran-Iraq war limited the nuclear program's expansion. In the
1990's Iran began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by
developing a uranium mining infrastructure and experimenting with uranium
conversion and enrichment.
In
2002 and 2003, The National Council of Resistance of Iran, an opposition group
based in Paris, revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities at Arak
and Natanz. Iran then admitted to small-scale enrichment experiments and plans
to construct an enrichment facility, a heavy water production plant, a heavy
water-moderated research reactor, and a fuel fabrication facility. Iran
suspended its enrichment and conversion activities in 2003, but resumed uranium
conversion in 2005, and started enrichment in 2006. The
International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governorsfound
Iran in non-compliance with its Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement, and the UN Security Councilhas
passed five resolutions demanding that Iran halt its enrichment and reprocessing
activities. Tehran insists that possession of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities is
its inalienable right and continues to enrich uranium.
History
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: 1950s to 1988
Iran's
nuclear program began in the 1950s but was slow to progress. The United States
supplied the Tehran Nuclear
Research Center (TNRC)with a small 5MWt
research reactor (TRR), fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU), in 1967. In 1973, the Shah unveiled ambitious
plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power in Iran by the end of the century,
charging the newly founded Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) with
oversight of this task. [1]
In the five years that followed, Iran concluded several nuclear technology related
contracts with foreign suppliers and invested in education and training for its
personnel. In 1976, Iran paid one billions dollars for a ten percent stake
in Eurodif's Tricastin uranium enrichment plant in France and a fifteen
percent stake in the RTZ uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia.[2] Tehran signed a
$700 million contract to purchase uranium yellowcake from South
Africa, and sent Iranian technicians abroad for nuclear training. [3] By the time of the
1979 revolution, Iran had developed an impressive baseline capability in nuclear
technologies.
Much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution.
[4] This loss, compounded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's opposition to
nuclear technology, resulted in the near disintegration of Iran's nuclear
program post-1979. Work on nuclear projects that had been ongoing under
the Shah, such as construction of the Bushehr
nuclear reactors, was suspended. However, in 1984 Khomeini expressed a renewed Iranian interest
in nuclear power, seeking the assistance of international partners to complete
construction at Bushehr.[5]
Accelerating Under the Radar of the International Community: 1989 to 2003
Freed from the burden of the costly war with Iraq, Iranian leaders began refocusing on
nuclear technology acquisition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Iran
signed long-term nuclear cooperation agreements with Pakistan
and China,
in 1987 and 1990 respectively. [6] Accords with both countries involved the
training of Iranian personnel, and China also agreed to provide Iran with a 27KW
miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) and two 300MW Qinshan power reactors.
[7] In January 1995, Russia announced that it would complete Bushehr's
construction and agreed to build three additional reactors. [8]
U.S. intelligence agencies have long suspected Iran of using its civilian nuclear
program as a cover for clandestine weapons development, and the U.S. government
has actively pressured potential suppliers to limit nuclear cooperation with
Iran. As a result, China did not ultimately supply Iran with the research
reactor (which would have been suitable for plutonium production), the two
Qinshan power reactors, or the uranium conversion plant it had previously
offered Iran. The United States also blocked Iran's agreement with
Argentina
for uranium enrichment and heavy water production facilities.
Russia and
Iran signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in August 1992. [9] In a
follow-up agreement in 1995, Russia agreed to complete construction of the
Bushehr-1 nuclear power plant and also secretly offered to supply Iran with a
large research reactor, a fuel fabrication facility, and a gas centrifuge plant.
[10] Hearing of these covert negotiations, U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed
concerns about the technology transfers to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who
eventually agreed to scale back Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation at least
until Bushehr's construction had been completed. [11] Despite this
top-level ban on nuclear cooperation with Iran, American officials believe that
individual Russian scientists and institutes assisted Iranian engineers in
sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle and with the construction of a 40MW
heavy water research reactor at Arak. [12]
On 14 August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed the
existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, including Natanz, the
address of the Kalaye electric company, a heavy water
production plant under construction at Arak, and the names of various individuals
and front companies involved with the nuclear program. [13] Between September and October 2003, the
agency carried out a number of facilities inspections and met with Iranian
officials to determine the history of Iran's nuclear program. In November,
the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution welcoming Iran's decision
to sign the Additional Protocol and suspend enrichment. However, the Board
noted with concern Iran's previous concealment efforts and pointed out
that Iran's new declarations contradicted the agency's previous
information about its nuclear program. Furthermore, the Board outlined the
procedures for sanctions if Iran failed to meet the requirements of the
Resolution. The Board requested that the Director General take all of the
necessary steps to confirm Iran's past and present nuclear activities.[14]
At a Diplomatic Impasse with the International Community: 2003 to 2008
To avoid referral to the UN Security Council, Iran entered into negotiations with
the EU-3 (France, Germany, and Great Britain), and agreed in October 2003 to
cooperate with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend
conversion and enrichment activities. [15] However, Iran exploited ambiguities
in the definition of "suspension" to continue to produce centrifuge
components and carry out small-scale conversion experiments. [16] Faced with
renewed sanctions threats, Iran concluded the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 on
15 November 2004. [17] Tehran agreed to continue the temporary suspension of
enrichment and conversion activities, including the manufacture, installation,
testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to
find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic solution. [18]
In early November 2004, the CIA received thousands of pages of information from a
"walk-in" source indicating that Iran was modifying the nose cone of
its Shahab-3
missile to carry a nuclear warhead. Iranian officials continue to dismiss
these documents as forgeries. [19] Furthermore, in early 2004, the IAEA
discovered that Iran had hidden blueprints for a more advanced P-2 centrifuge
and a document detailing uranium hemisphere casting from its inspectors. [20]
The IAEA called on Iran to be more cooperative and to answer all of the
agency's questions about the origins of its centrifuge technology. [21]
Iran amended its previous declaration and admitted that it had clandestinely
imported P-1 centrifuges through a foreign intermediary in 1987. Iran also
acknowledged for the first time that it had imported P-2 centrifuge drawings in
1994. [21] The agency determined that the traces of HEU and LEU on Iranian
centrifuge equipment most likely originated from the foreign intermediary, as
they did not match any samples from Iran's declared inventory. [22]
Diplomatic progress truly broke down on 1 August 2005, when Iran notified the IAEA that it
would resume uranium conversion activities at Esfahan. [23] On 5 August,
Iran rejected the EU-3's Long Term Agreement, because Tehran felt that the
proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate
Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement. [24] The Board of
Governors responded by adopting a resolution that found Iran in non-compliance
with its Safeguards Agreement.
The year 2006 witnessed a series of diplomatic advance and retreat maneuvers from
both sides. In February, Tehran ended its voluntary implementation of the
Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz. The IAEA Board of
Governors subsequently voted to report Iran's case to the UN Security
Council. On 15 March, the United Nations Security Council released a
Presidential Statement, calling on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. [25] Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded by delivering a speech in April in which
he discussed Iran's possession of a second uranium enrichment facility
with P-2 centrifuges. [26] In June, the EU-3 together with the United States,
China and Russia (P5+1) offered to provide Tehran with advanced civilian nuclear
technology if Iran suspended enrichment activities and resumed implementation of
the Additional Protocol. [27] Iran responded to this proposal in a letter
addressed to President Bush, in which it blamed U.S. foreign policy for the
chaos in the world. The letter made only brief reference to the nuclear
issue and did not address the demands of the international community. [28] In
response to Iranian defiance, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1696 in
July, which demanded that Iran suspend enrichment activities, banned
international transfer of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran and froze the
foreign assets of twelve individuals and ten organizations involved with the
Iranian nuclear program. [29] President Ahmadinejad vowed to ignore the UNSC
resolution and continue enrichment. [30] That same month, Iran inaugurated a
heavy water production plant at Arak, prompting yet another UNSC resolution.
[31] As it had with Resolution 1696, Iran also ignored Resolution 1737 and
continued to operate its enrichment facility and to install 18 cascades at the
FEP's 3000-machine hall. [32]
In November 2007, Iran admitted that the foreign intermediary from its previous
declarations was the A.Q. Khan network. Iran also admitted to purchasing a
complete set of P-2 centrifuge blueprints from the Khan network in 1996, which
it used when it began constructing and testing P-2 centrifuges in 2002. However,
Iran refused to answer the agency's outstanding questions about its UF4
conversion activities ("The Green Salt Project"), high explosives
testing, and re-entry vehicle design. [33]
On 14 June 2008, Javier Solana met in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki, and Iran's top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili to
deliver a new P5+1 incentives package. The proposal offered economic
incentives, access to LWR technology, and a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply in
exchange for the freezing of Iran's enrichment efforts. [34] Speaking just
days before the deadline set by world powers for Iran's reply, Ayatollah
Khamenei said Iran would "continue with its path" of nuclear
development. [35] The UN Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1835
on 27 September 2008. [36]
Recent Developments and Current Status
In spite of five UN Security Council Resolutions condemning its actions, Iran
continues to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility. According to the IAEA,
as of February 2009 Iran had accumulated 839 kilograms of low enriched uranium.
David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
argues that Iran has enough material for nuclear weapons breakout—should
Iran further enrich the LEU to weapons-grade levels. ISIS believes that it would
take between 2.5 and 4.8 months for Iran to produce 20 to 25 kg of weapons grade
uranium metal. [37] However, Alexander Glaser and R. Scott Kemp of the Program
on Science and Global Security at Princeton University claim that these
estimates are excessively optimistic. Glaser and Kemp believe that if Iran were
to batch recycle its LEU feedstock through its existing cascades it would first
need to produce an additional 2,200 kg of LEU feedstock. They estimate
that this process would take Iran 31 months, and that Iran would then need an
additional 8 to 36 months to produce 20 to 25 kg of weapons grade uranium metal.
However, if Iran chose to re-pipe its LEU facility, production of additional LEU
feedstock would not be required. In this case, Iran would need only 6 to 9
months to produce a weapons significant quantity of HEU. [38]
Compounding international concerns about Iran's rapidly growing nuclear capabilities,
Tehran announced that the Bushehr reactor would go critical in March 2009. [39]
Russian and Iranian engineers began testing the Bushehr reactor without any fuel
rods in February 2009, and Iranian officials indicated that the plant will start
producing 500 MWt of electricity (thus operating at half capacity) once tests
are completed. [40] As of April 2009, however, the reactor has not been started.
Iran is also still working to complete the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, in
violation of UN Security Council resolutions. [41]
According to the IAEA, Iran has not been forthcoming about the possible military
dimensions of its nuclear program, and Iran's nonparticipation in the
Additional Protocol has prevented the agency from determining whether it is
currently operating any undeclared nuclear facilities. [42] Despite Iran's
continued defiance of the international community's calls for it to halt
its fuel cycle work, there are signs that diplomatic progress could be on the
horizon. The new U.S. administration, led by President Barack Obama, has
softened U.S. rhetoric towards Iran and indicated a willingness to consider
direct negotiations. [43] However, the U.S. position on Iran is only one facet
of the diplomatic crisis over its nuclear program, and progress will require the
good faith participation of Iran and other relevant world players in any
negotiations. As recent history illustrates, accomplishing such a feat
will be far from easy.
Key Sources:
[1] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in
Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington,
D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 298.
[2] Oliver Meier, "Iran and Foreign Enrichment: A
Troubled Model," The Arms Control
Association, January/February 2006.
[3] David Albright, Jacqueline
Shire, and Paul Brannan, "Is Iran Running out of Yellowcake?," The
Institute for Science and International Security, 11 February 2009.
[4] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 9.
[5] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 12.
[6] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in
Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington,
D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 303.
[7] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly
Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2005), p. 303
[8] Nathan E. Busch, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear
Proliferation (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 265.
[9] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment
(London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
[10] R. Jeffrey Smith and Michael Dobbs, "Russia Promised to Sell Centrifuge Plant
to Iran; Bomb Grade Uranium Could be Made There," The Washington Post, 29
April 1995; Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment
(London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
[11] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment
(London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
[12] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment
(London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
[13] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 16.
[14] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Board of Governors Resolution, The
International Atomic Energy Agency, 10 November 2003; "Implementation of
the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Board of
Governors Resolution, The International Atomic Energy Agency, 26 November 2003.
[15] "Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU foreign
Ministers," The International Atomic Energy Agency, 21 October 2003,
www.iaea.org.
[16] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment
(London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 23.
[17] "Iran's Nuclear Program: Expanding the Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Illicit
Procurement," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS),
www.isisnucleariran.org.
[18] "Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent
Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the United
Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004," The
International Atomic Energy Agency, 26 November 2004, www.iaea.org.
[19] Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North
Korea (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007), p. 514.
[20] Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and The Middle
East (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 172.
[21] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency,
15 November 2004.
[22] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency,
15 November 2004.
[23] Anne Penketh, "Iran in Showdown with EU Over its Nuclear Ambitions,"
The Independent, 1 August 2005.
[24] "Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement
Proposed by the EU3/EU," The Islamic Republic of Iran, downloaded from the
British American Security Information Council, www.basicint.org/ pubs/ Notes/
BN050811- IranEU.htm; "Communication dated 1 August 2005 received from the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency," The
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1 August 2005.
[25] Warren Hoge, "Text on Iran's Nuclear Work is Under Study by the UN
Council," The New York Times, 15 March 2006.
[26] Nasser Karimi, "President: Secret Centrifuge is Operational —
Iran's New Nuke Tests," The Daily Telegraph, 19 April 2006.
[27] "'Carrot-stick' deal agreed on Iran," CNN, 2 June 2006;
"EU's Solana to present Iran with nuclear proposal," CNN, 5
June 2006; "Iran 'positive' on nuclear offer," BBC, 6 June 2006.
[28] "Chronology of Key Events Related to the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards
in Iran," The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 16 June
2006, cns.miis.edu.
[29] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696, adopted 31 July 2006.
[30] Nazila Fathi, "Iran's Leader Stands by Nuclear Plans; Military to
Hold Exercises," The New York Times, 22 January 2007.
[31] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, adopted 27 December 2006.
[32] "Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in the
light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006)," Report
by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 9 February 2007.
[33] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of
Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic
of Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy
Agency, 15 November 2007.
[34] Julian Borger, "International Diplomats to Visit Tehran to Deliver Nuclear
Ultimatum," The Guardian, 14 June 2008.
[35] Graham Bowley, "Despite Call to Halt, Iran says it will Continue its
Nuclear Program," The New York Times, 31 July 2008.
[36] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835, adopted 27 September 2008.
[37] David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, "IAEA Report on Iran,"
Institute for Science and International Security, 19 February 2009.
[38] Alexander Glaser and R. Scott Kemp, "Statement on Iran's Ability to
Make a Nuclear Weapon," 2 March 2009, www.princeton.edu.
[39] Borzou Daraghi, "Iran, with Russia, tests its First Nuclear Reactor,"
The Los Angeles Times, 26 February 2009.
[40] Borzou Daraghi, "Iran, Russia Test Joint Nuclear Reactor in
Bushehr," The Los Angeles Times, 26 February 2009.
[41] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of
Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1805
(2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General,
International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 February 2009.
[42] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of
Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1805
(2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General,
International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 February 2009.
[43] Ian Black, "Barack Obama Offers Iran 'New Beginning' with
Video Message," The Guardian, 20 March 2009.
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Updated May 2009 |
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