Introduction

Iran's interest in nuclear technology dates to the 1950's, when the Shah of Iran began receiving American assistance through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. Although Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, the Shah may have had nuclear weapons ambitions. However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq war limited the nuclear program's expansion. In the 1990's Iran began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by developing a uranium mining infrastructure and experimenting with uranium conversion and enrichment.

In 2002 and 2003, The National Council of Resistance of Iran, an opposition group based in Paris, revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities at Arak and Natanz. Iran then admitted to small-scale enrichment experiments and plans to construct an enrichment facility, a heavy water production plant, a heavy water-moderated research reactor, and a fuel fabrication facility. Iran suspended its enrichment and conversion activities in 2003, but resumed uranium conversion in 2005, and started enrichment in 2006. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governorsfound Iran in non-compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and the UN Security Councilhas passed five resolutions demanding that Iran halt its enrichment and reprocessing activities. Tehran insists that possession of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities is its inalienable right and continues to enrich uranium.

History

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: 1950s to 1988
Iran's nuclear program began in the 1950s but was slow to progress. The United States supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC)with a small 5MWt research reactor (TRR), fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU), in 1967. In 1973, the Shah unveiled ambitious plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power in Iran by the end of the century, charging the newly founded Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) with oversight of this task. [1]

In the five years that followed, Iran concluded several nuclear technology related contracts with foreign suppliers and invested in education and training for its personnel. In 1976, Iran paid one billions dollars for a ten percent stake in Eurodif's Tricastin uranium enrichment plant in France and a fifteen percent stake in the RTZ uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia.[2] Tehran signed a $700 million contract to purchase uranium yellowcake from South Africa, and sent Iranian technicians abroad for nuclear training. [3] By the time of the 1979 revolution, Iran had developed an impressive baseline capability in nuclear technologies.

Much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution. [4] This loss, compounded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's opposition to nuclear technology, resulted in the near disintegration of Iran's nuclear program post-1979. Work on nuclear projects that had been ongoing under the Shah, such as construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactors, was suspended. However, in 1984 Khomeini expressed a renewed Iranian interest in nuclear power, seeking the assistance of international partners to complete construction at Bushehr.[5]

Accelerating Under the Radar of the International Community: 1989 to 2003
Freed from the burden of the costly war with Iraq, Iranian leaders began refocusing on nuclear technology acquisition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Iran signed long-term nuclear cooperation agreements with Pakistan and China, in 1987 and 1990 respectively. [6] Accords with both countries involved the training of Iranian personnel, and China also agreed to provide Iran with a 27KW miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) and two 300MW Qinshan power reactors. [7] In January 1995, Russia announced that it would complete Bushehr's construction and agreed to build three additional reactors. [8]

U.S. intelligence agencies have long suspected Iran of using its civilian nuclear program as a cover for clandestine weapons development, and the U.S. government has actively pressured potential suppliers to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran. As a result, China did not ultimately supply Iran with the research reactor (which would have been suitable for plutonium production), the two Qinshan power reactors, or the uranium conversion plant it had previously offered Iran. The United States also blocked Iran's agreement with Argentina for uranium enrichment and heavy water production facilities.

Russia and Iran signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in August 1992. [9] In a follow-up agreement in 1995, Russia agreed to complete construction of the Bushehr-1 nuclear power plant and also secretly offered to supply Iran with a large research reactor, a fuel fabrication facility, and a gas centrifuge plant. [10] Hearing of these covert negotiations, U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed concerns about the technology transfers to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who eventually agreed to scale back Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation at least until Bushehr's construction had been completed. [11] Despite this top-level ban on nuclear cooperation with Iran, American officials believe that individual Russian scientists and institutes assisted Iranian engineers in sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle and with the construction of a 40MW heavy water research reactor at Arak. [12]

On 14 August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, including Natanz, the address of the Kalaye electric company, a heavy water production plant under construction at Arak, and the names of various individuals and front companies involved with the nuclear program. [13] Between September and October 2003, the agency carried out a number of facilities inspections and met with Iranian officials to determine the history of Iran's nuclear program. In November, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution welcoming Iran's decision to sign the Additional Protocol and suspend enrichment. However, the Board noted with concern Iran's previous concealment efforts and pointed out that Iran's new declarations contradicted the agency's previous information about its nuclear program. Furthermore, the Board outlined the procedures for sanctions if Iran failed to meet the requirements of the Resolution. The Board requested that the Director General take all of the necessary steps to confirm Iran's past and present nuclear activities.[14]

At a Diplomatic Impasse with the International Community: 2003 to 2008
To avoid referral to the UN Security Council, Iran entered into negotiations with the EU-3 (France, Germany, and Great Britain), and agreed in October 2003 to cooperate with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend conversion and enrichment activities. [15] However, Iran exploited ambiguities in the definition of "suspension" to continue to produce centrifuge components and carry out small-scale conversion experiments. [16] Faced with renewed sanctions threats, Iran concluded the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 on 15 November 2004. [17] Tehran agreed to continue the temporary suspension of enrichment and conversion activities, including the manufacture, installation, testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic solution. [18]

In early November 2004, the CIA received thousands of pages of information from a "walk-in" source indicating that Iran was modifying the nose cone of its Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead. Iranian officials continue to dismiss these documents as forgeries. [19] Furthermore, in early 2004, the IAEA discovered that Iran had hidden blueprints for a more advanced P-2 centrifuge and a document detailing uranium hemisphere casting from its inspectors. [20] The IAEA called on Iran to be more cooperative and to answer all of the agency's questions about the origins of its centrifuge technology. [21] Iran amended its previous declaration and admitted that it had clandestinely imported P-1 centrifuges through a foreign intermediary in 1987. Iran also acknowledged for the first time that it had imported P-2 centrifuge drawings in 1994. [21] The agency determined that the traces of HEU and LEU on Iranian centrifuge equipment most likely originated from the foreign intermediary, as they did not match any samples from Iran's declared inventory. [22]

Diplomatic progress truly broke down on 1 August 2005, when Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume uranium conversion activities at Esfahan. [23] On 5 August, Iran rejected the EU-3's Long Term Agreement, because Tehran felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement. [24] The Board of Governors responded by adopting a resolution that found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement.

The year 2006 witnessed a series of diplomatic advance and retreat maneuvers from both sides. In February, Tehran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz. The IAEA Board of Governors subsequently voted to report Iran's case to the UN Security Council. On 15 March, the United Nations Security Council released a Presidential Statement, calling on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. [25] Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded by delivering a speech in April in which he discussed Iran's possession of a second uranium enrichment facility with P-2 centrifuges. [26] In June, the EU-3 together with the United States, China and Russia (P5+1) offered to provide Tehran with advanced civilian nuclear technology if Iran suspended enrichment activities and resumed implementation of the Additional Protocol. [27] Iran responded to this proposal in a letter addressed to President Bush, in which it blamed U.S. foreign policy for the chaos in the world. The letter made only brief reference to the nuclear issue and did not address the demands of the international community. [28] In response to Iranian defiance, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1696 in July, which demanded that Iran suspend enrichment activities, banned international transfer of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran and froze the foreign assets of twelve individuals and ten organizations involved with the Iranian nuclear program. [29] President Ahmadinejad vowed to ignore the UNSC resolution and continue enrichment. [30] That same month, Iran inaugurated a heavy water production plant at Arak, prompting yet another UNSC resolution. [31] As it had with Resolution 1696, Iran also ignored Resolution 1737 and continued to operate its enrichment facility and to install 18 cascades at the FEP's 3000-machine hall. [32]

In November 2007, Iran admitted that the foreign intermediary from its previous declarations was the A.Q. Khan network. Iran also admitted to purchasing a complete set of P-2 centrifuge blueprints from the Khan network in 1996, which it used when it began constructing and testing P-2 centrifuges in 2002. However, Iran refused to answer the agency's outstanding questions about its UF4 conversion activities ("The Green Salt Project"), high explosives testing, and re-entry vehicle design. [33]

On 14 June 2008, Javier Solana met in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, and Iran's top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili to deliver a new P5+1 incentives package. The proposal offered economic incentives, access to LWR technology, and a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply in exchange for the freezing of Iran's enrichment efforts. [34] Speaking just days before the deadline set by world powers for Iran's reply, Ayatollah Khamenei said Iran would "continue with its path" of nuclear development. [35] The UN Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1835 on 27 September 2008. [36]

Recent Developments and Current Status

In spite of five UN Security Council Resolutions condemning its actions, Iran continues to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility. According to the IAEA, as of February 2009 Iran had accumulated 839 kilograms of low enriched uranium. David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) argues that Iran has enough material for nuclear weapons breakout—should Iran further enrich the LEU to weapons-grade levels. ISIS believes that it would take between 2.5 and 4.8 months for Iran to produce 20 to 25 kg of weapons grade uranium metal. [37] However, Alexander Glaser and R. Scott Kemp of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University claim that these estimates are excessively optimistic. Glaser and Kemp believe that if Iran were to batch recycle its LEU feedstock through its existing cascades it would first need to produce an additional 2,200 kg of LEU feedstock. They estimate that this process would take Iran 31 months, and that Iran would then need an additional 8 to 36 months to produce 20 to 25 kg of weapons grade uranium metal. However, if Iran chose to re-pipe its LEU facility, production of additional LEU feedstock would not be required. In this case, Iran would need only 6 to 9 months to produce a weapons significant quantity of HEU. [38]

Compounding international concerns about Iran's rapidly growing nuclear capabilities, Tehran announced that the Bushehr reactor would go critical in March 2009. [39] Russian and Iranian engineers began testing the Bushehr reactor without any fuel rods in February 2009, and Iranian officials indicated that the plant will start producing 500 MWt of electricity (thus operating at half capacity) once tests are completed. [40] As of April 2009, however, the reactor has not been started. Iran is also still working to complete the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. [41]

According to the IAEA, Iran has not been forthcoming about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, and Iran's nonparticipation in the Additional Protocol has prevented the agency from determining whether it is currently operating any undeclared nuclear facilities. [42] Despite Iran's continued defiance of the international community's calls for it to halt its fuel cycle work, there are signs that diplomatic progress could be on the horizon. The new U.S. administration, led by President Barack Obama, has softened U.S. rhetoric towards Iran and indicated a willingness to consider direct negotiations. [43] However, the U.S. position on Iran is only one facet of the diplomatic crisis over its nuclear program, and progress will require the good faith participation of Iran and other relevant world players in any negotiations. As recent history illustrates, accomplishing such a feat will be far from easy.

Key Sources:
[1] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 298.
[2] Oliver Meier, "Iran and Foreign Enrichment: A Troubled Model," The Arms Control Association, January/February 2006.
[3] David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, "Is Iran Running out of Yellowcake?," The Institute for Science and International Security, 11 February 2009.
[4] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 9.
[5] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 12.
[6] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 303.
[7] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 303
[8] Nathan E. Busch, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 265.
[9] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
[10] R. Jeffrey Smith and Michael Dobbs, "Russia Promised to Sell Centrifuge Plant to Iran; Bomb Grade Uranium Could be Made There," The Washington Post, 29 April 1995; Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
[11] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
[12] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
[13] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 16.
[14] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Board of Governors Resolution, The International Atomic Energy Agency, 10 November 2003; "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Board of Governors Resolution, The International Atomic Energy Agency, 26 November 2003.
[15] "Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU foreign Ministers," The International Atomic Energy Agency, 21 October 2003, www.iaea.org.
[16] Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 23.
[17] "Iran's Nuclear Program: Expanding the Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Illicit Procurement," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
[18] "Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004," The International Atomic Energy Agency, 26 November 2004, www.iaea.org.
[19] Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007), p. 514.
[20] Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and The Middle East (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 172.
[21] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 15 November 2004.
[22] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 15 November 2004.
[23] Anne Penketh, "Iran in Showdown with EU Over its Nuclear Ambitions," The Independent, 1 August 2005.
[24] "Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement Proposed by the EU3/EU," The Islamic Republic of Iran, downloaded from the British American Security Information Council, www.basicint.org/ pubs/ Notes/ BN050811- IranEU.htm; "Communication dated 1 August 2005 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency," The International Atomic Energy Agency, 1 August 2005.
[25] Warren Hoge, "Text on Iran's Nuclear Work is Under Study by the UN Council," The New York Times, 15 March 2006.
[26] Nasser Karimi, "President: Secret Centrifuge is Operational — Iran's New Nuke Tests," The Daily Telegraph, 19 April 2006.
[27] "'Carrot-stick' deal agreed on Iran," CNN, 2 June 2006; "EU's Solana to present Iran with nuclear proposal," CNN, 5 June 2006; "Iran 'positive' on nuclear offer," BBC, 6 June 2006.
[28] "Chronology of Key Events Related to the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in Iran," The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 16 June 2006, cns.miis.edu.
[29] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696, adopted 31 July 2006.
[30] Nazila Fathi, "Iran's Leader Stands by Nuclear Plans; Military to Hold Exercises," The New York Times, 22 January 2007.
[31] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, adopted 27 December 2006.
[32] "Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006)," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 9 February 2007.
[33] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 15 November 2007.
[34] Julian Borger, "International Diplomats to Visit Tehran to Deliver Nuclear Ultimatum," The Guardian, 14 June 2008.
[35] Graham Bowley, "Despite Call to Halt, Iran says it will Continue its Nuclear Program," The New York Times, 31 July 2008.
[36] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835, adopted 27 September 2008.
[37] David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, "IAEA Report on Iran," Institute for Science and International Security, 19 February 2009.
[38] Alexander Glaser and R. Scott Kemp, "Statement on Iran's Ability to Make a Nuclear Weapon," 2 March 2009, www.princeton.edu.
[39] Borzou Daraghi, "Iran, with Russia, tests its First Nuclear Reactor," The Los Angeles Times, 26 February 2009.
[40] Borzou Daraghi, "Iran, Russia Test Joint Nuclear Reactor in Bushehr," The Los Angeles Times, 26 February 2009.
[41] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1805 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 February 2009.
[42] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1805 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 February 2009.
[43] Ian Black, "Barack Obama Offers Iran 'New Beginning' with Video Message," The Guardian, 20 March 2009.

	Updated May 2009