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Updated December 2009
Introduction
Iran has been a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1970, and has possessed a nuclear program for more than fifty years, ostensibly for peaceful purposes. The nuclear program has advanced significantly in the past decade with Iran's decision to enrich its own uranium. Tehran's refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its insistence on developing all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle has invited intensified international pressure and led many states to worry that Iran's true intention is to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and is actively working to acquire, develop, and deploy a broad range of ballistic missiles and space launch capabilities. The scope and status of Iran's chemical and biological weapons programs are unknown. While Iran joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1973 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, Western intelligence agencies believe that Iran developed chemical and biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and has likely retained these capabilities.
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Nuclear
With assistance from the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program, the Shah initiated Iran's nuclear program during the 1950's. Establishing the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974, the Shah had ambitious plans to construct 20 nuclear power reactors, a uranium enrichment facility, and a re-processing plant for spent fuel. [3] However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah; Ayatollah Khomeini deemed the nuclear program "un-Islamic" and ordered it terminated. In 1984, Khomeini reversed course on the issue of nuclear power and sought international partners to continue building the Bushehr reactors. [4]
Currently, Iran has a robust nuclear infrastructure, including uranium mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment capabilities. [5] As of 27 November 2008, Iran had fed 9,956 kg UF6 into its cascades and produced a total of 839 kg LEU at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Fuel Enrichment Plant. [6] The UN Security Council has passed four resolutions demanding Iran halt its uranium enrichment program. In 2006, the P5+1 offered Iran an incentives package that included light water reactor construction assistance, a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply, and economic assistance, in exchange for Iran suspending enrichment and signing the Additional Protocol. The EU-3 renewed the offer in June 2008, but Tehran was unwilling to freeze its uranium enrichment program. [7] Tehran maintains that it has no interest in nuclear weapons, but that as a member of the NPT it has an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy. Critical parts of Iran's nuclear infrastructure include a VVER-1000 MWe light water reactor at Bushehr, a uranium conversion facility at Esfahan, an enrichment facility at Natanz, a heavy water production plant, and a heavy water reactor at Arak.
Biological
There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is pursuing a biological weapons program. Although Iran acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1929 and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1973, the U.S. government believes Iran began biological weapon efforts in the early to mid-1980s, and that it continues to pursue an offensive biological weapons program linked to its civilian biotechnology activities. The United States alleges that Iran may have started to develop small quantities of agent, possibly including mycotoxins, ricin, and the smallpox virus. Iran strongly denies acquiring or producing biological weapons.
Chemical
Iran suffered severe losses from the use of Iraqi chemical weapons over the period from 1982 to 1988. As a consequence, Iran has a great deal of experience in the effects of chemical warfare (CW). Iran has continued to maintain a significant defensive CW capability since the end of the Gulf War in 1988. The most important incentive for this effort was probably the concern that Iraq continued to possess chemical weapons. Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and has been an active participant in the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Iran has publicly acknowledged the existence of a chemical weapons program developed during the latter stages of the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. On ratifying the CWC, Iran opened its facilities to international inspection and claimed that all offensive CW activities had been terminated and the facilities destroyed prior to the treaty's entering into force.
Nevertheless, through the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the United States continued to claim that Iran maintained an active program for the development and production of chemical weapons. This program was alleged to include the production of significant quantities of sarin, mustard, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide. In 2000, the U.S. government was sufficiently confident of its intelligence to publicly claim that Iran could produce as much as 1,000 metric tons of agent per year and had a stockpile of at least several thousand metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent. Open-sources did not provide unambiguous support to these accusations and since 2003 the U.S. intelligence community has substantially downgraded its public assessments of Iranian chemical warfare capabilities. As of 2008, the U.S. government only accuses Iran of having "a large and growing commercial chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability." Iran has always strongly denied producing or possessing chemical weapons in violation of treaty obligations.
Iran is committed to the development of its civilian and military industries and this has involved an ongoing process of modernization and expansion in the chemical industry aimed at reducing dependence on foreign suppliers of materials and technology. An additional goal is expansion of Iran's range of exports by adding value to basic commodities such as crude oil and natural gas. Due to U.S. claims of ongoing chemical weapons production, Iran has encountered regular difficulties with chemical industry related imports that are restricted by members of the Australia Group. Despite these constraints, the Iranian chemical industry has significantly expanded its capabilities by drawing on the capabilities of new trading partners such as India.
Missile
Iran fields a range of missiles designed to help it to control the sea, land, and air space adjacent to its borders. Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iran acquired Scud-B and Scud-C missiles and production lines from North Korea (renamed Shahab-1 and Shahab-2). [8] Tehran commenced producing considerable quantities of the missiles shortly thereafter. [9] On 22 July 1998, Iran tested a single-stage liquid-fueled Shahab-3 with a range of 1,300 km. [10] Tehran began serial producing the Shahab-3 in early 2001, based upon the model used during the second Shahab-3 test in 2000. [11] The Shahab-3, including its guidance system and engine design, is a derivative of North Korea's Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. [12] On 2 February 2009, Iran launched the small cube-shaped satellite "Omid" into orbit using a modified Shahab-3. [13] Some analysts fear that Iran's space launch vehicle, Safir, has established the technical basis for Tehran to develop long-range ballistic missiles. [14]
Sources:
[1] Judith Perera, "Iran's Nuclear Industry," Middle East and North Africa, January 2006.
[2] M. Ghannadi-Margheh, "Atomic Energy Organization of Iran," World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, 4-6 September 2002.
[3] Judith Perera, "Iran's Nuclear Industry," Middle East and North Africa, January 2006.
[4] "Iran's Nuclear Program: 1950s and 60s: Atoms for Peace," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
[5] "Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
[6] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," The International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 February 2009.
[7] "World Powers Urge Iran to Suspend Nuclear Enrichment During Talks," Reuters, 6 November 2008.
[8] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 295.
[9] Uzi Rubin, "The Global Reach of Iran's Ballistic Missiles," The Institute for National Security Studies, November 2006.
[10] Steve Rodan and Arieh O'Sullivan, "Iran Test Fires Shahab-3 Missile," The Jerusalem Post, 24 July 1998.
[11] Andrew Koch and Steve Rodan, "Iran Begins Serial Production of Shahab 3," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 October 2001.
[12] Doug Richardson, "Iran Satellite Launch Suggests Advances in Indigenous Missile Technology," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 March 2009.
[13] Doug Richardson, "Iran Satellite Launch Suggests Advances in Indigenous Missile Technology," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 March 2009.
[14] Nazila Fathi and William J. Broad, "Iran Launches Satellite in a Challenge for Obama," The New York Times, 3 February 2009.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
