23 January 2004
Dr. David Kay resigns his position as head of the Iraq Survey Group. In public statements he explains that he resigned because he concluded that WMD would not be found in Iraq: "I don't think they existed. What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the last Gulf War and I don't think there was a large-scale production programme in the 90s." David Kay criticized the intelligence that led to the war in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying "we were all wrong and that is most disturbing." Kay does state that even if Iraq did not have weapons stockpiles, this does not mean that it wasn't dangerous.
--"US Steps Back from WMD Claims," BBC News, 24 January 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3426931.stm>; "Admit WMD mistake, survey chief tells Bush" The Guardian (London), 3 March 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1160842,00.html>.

25 January 2004
There are suspicions that Iraq's CBW materials may have been moved to Syria. "We are not talking about a large stockpile of weapons," he said. "But we know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD program. Precisely what went to Syria, and what has happened to it, is a major issue that needs to be resolved." There is no physical evidence to support this contention.
--"Saddam's WMD hidden in Syria, says Iraq survey chief," The Telegraph (U.K.), 25 January 2004, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?
=/news/2004/01/25/wirq25.xml>.

27 February 2004
UNMOVIC releases a summary of Iraqi chemical and biological munitions. Through the 1990s Iraq declared and subsequently destroyed 155-millimeter artillery shells filled with mustard agent, 122-millimeter rocket warheads filled with Sarin nerve agent, and sub-munitions for cluster bombs filled with chemical agent simulant. Iraq considered, but did not implement, development of chemical warheads for the 107-millimeter rocket and 540-millimeter rocket. In addition, UNMOVIC discovered unusual components indicating possible chemical munitions development and implementation for 81-millimeter rocket warheads, cluster warheads for a 200-millimeter rocket, and sub-munitions for the Nasr-28 cluster bomb. UNMOVIC was not able to complete investigations on these components prior to its withdrawal from Iraq.
-- Sixteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) , UN document S/2004/160, 27 February 2004, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/quarterly_reports/
s-2004-160.pdf>.

30 March 2004
The CIA releases the unclassified portion of testimony by the new head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), Charles Duelfer, before the US Congress. Regarding chemical weapons, Duelfer says that the ISG has new information on Iraq's dual-use facilities and research projects and their potential to be quickly converted to weapons programs. He states that Iraq had such facilities and also had plans to build new facilities, including plans to build chemical facilities capable of producing substantial quantities of chemicals every month. Although most of the chemicals in this plan were only commercial use, a few were dual-use, including DCC, which can be used as a stabilizing agent for VX nerve agent.
--Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer, Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs, 30 March 2004, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches
-testimony/2004/tenet_testimony_03302004.html>.

30 March 2004
Senator Carl Levin issues a statement that the publicly released testimony of Charles Duelfer to Congress on 30 March 2004 creates a misleading impression that there is WMD in Iraq, while the classified testimony casts doubts on that conclusion.
--Senator Carl Levin, Press Release, 30 March 2004, "Statement of Senator Carl Levin relating to public release of testimony of Mr. Charles Duelfer DCI's Special Advisor for WMD in Iraq", <http://www.nci.org/04nci/04/carl-levin.htm>.

17 May 2004
Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt confirms that an artillery round filled with sarin was found in Baghdad by a US convoy. The artillery round was rigged as an explosive device and partially detonated before being disarmed, resulting in minor injuries to two members of the explosive ordnance team from sarin exposure. Kimmitt comments that the people who rigged the bomb probably did not realize the shell contained chemical agents.
--Paul Kerr, "Chemical munition found in Iraq," Arms Control Today 34 (June 2004), p. 43.

28 May 2004
UNMOVIC comments on the unclassified portion of Charles Duelfer's testimony to the US Congress on March 30, 2004, saying that Iraq purchased both biological and chemical dual-use equipment between 1999 and 2002, but there is no evidence that it was used in prohibited weapons programs. Most of the materials bought were declared to UN monitors properly.
--Seventeenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2004/435, 28 May 2004, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/document_list.asp>.

Early June 2004
Polish troops find two warheads in an Iraqi bunker that test positive for cyclosarin nerve agent. Further testing is conducted in Baghdad and the US.
--"Polish troops find sarin warheads in Iraq," USA Today, 1 July 2004, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-07-01-poland-iraq-
sarin_x.htm>.

14 June 2004
Some US experts disagree with the assessment that the people making the sarin bomb, which exploded on 17 May, did not realize the shell contained chemical agents. These experts point out that other similar homemade bombs found in the same area as the sarin bomb typically are constructed by drilling out the old artillery shell and placing the detonator inside the shell. However, in the case of the sarin bomb, the shell was not drilled and the detonator was simply placed next to the shell.
--Mark Hosenball, "IED's secret sarin supply?" Newsweek 143 (14 June 2004), p. 8.

23 June 2004
Polish troops find and buy 17 chemical 122-millimeter warheads and two 82 millimeter mortar bombs, all of which believed to contain cyclosarin. In addition, Polish military intelligence had received information that Iraqi terrorists were offering $5,000 per chemical warhead. Initial indications are that the warheads were produced before 1989.
--"Roundup: Poles confirm discovery of chemical warheads in Iraq," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2 July 2004.

3 July 2004
The Coalition Press Information Center in Baghdad reports that the 16 122-millimeter rocket rounds found by Polish troops on 23 June have tested negative for chemical weapons agents. They went on to say that two other 122-millimeter rounds found by Polish troops on 16 June tested positive for sarin, but were in a very degraded state and not militarily useful.
--Walter Pincus, "Chemicals not found in Iraq warheads,"Washington Post, 3 July 2004, p. A21.

14 July 2004
The Butler Report is issued in Britain. This report mostly reviews the reliability and quality of intelligence provided to the UK government prior to the 2003 war with Iraq. The report says that the September 2002 dossier of the Joint Intelligence Committee in Britain omitted several caveats qualifying British intelligence on Iraq. For example, the dossier claimed that Iraq could deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes, but did not mention that this claim only referred to short range munitions and came from only one source. The report also says that Iraq did not have significant stocks of chemical and biological weapons or developed plans to use such weapons.
--Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, House of Commons document number HC 898, 14 July 2004, <http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf>.

12 August 2004
The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs writes to the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a letter of reply in which he affirms "Iraq's commitment to the conventions and treaties on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its intention to accede to the [Chemical Weapons] Convention as soon as an elected Iraqi Government [is] established."
--Letter dated 13 April 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, UN Document S/AC.44/2004/(02)/116, 18 April 2005, p. 7, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/315/16/PDF/N0531516.pdf>.

17 August 2004
The US CIA is reported to have discovered that in the weeks before the war, Saddam Hussein replaced Iraqi border guards with trusted intelligence agents who supervised moving truckloads of contraband materials into Syria. Although officials caution that the new information is "not considered concrete evidence Saddam shipped chemical and biological agents to Syria before the US invasion," there is a clear intention to raise the possibility that this transfer did occur.
--Niles Lathem, "Saddam's WMD may be in Syria," New York Post, 17 August 2004, p. 10, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 August 2004
UNMOVIC reports that significant amounts of Iraqi WMD related items have been exported from Iraq as scrap metal and are showing up in scrapyards in many countries, most notably Jordan and the Netherlands. These items include SA-2 missile engines and chemical dual-use items that still had UN tags attached to them. UNMOVIC estimates that the export of these items began in June 2003 and continued until June 2004. Through the use of satellite imagery, UNMOVIC has determined that several sites previously monitored by them before Operation Iraqi Freedom have been looted and razed. With the exception of the items that have turned up in scrapyards, the status of the dual-use equipment and materials contained at these sites is unknown.

UNMOVIC comments on the likelihood of chemical munitions being found in Iraq by coalition forces. It states that it is not surprised that some chemical munitions have been found since large amounts of munitions had been produced and deployed in Iraq since the early 1980s and not all of them had been accounted for. UNMOVIC further states that the condition of newly discovered chemical munitions could range from highly degraded to very pure.

UNMOVIC also assesses Iraq's remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicle (RPV/UAV) programs based on inspections conducted in the 1990s and 2003. They state that although they had concerns about the ability of some the RPV/UAVs to fly beyond the allowed range, the vehicles were unable to effectively deliver chemical or biological agents. While Iraq's RPV/UAVs technically could have been modified to carry small amounts of chemical or biological agents, the quantities would not have been large enough to make an effective military weapon. In addition, no technical evidence was ever found by UNMOVIC indicating that the Iraqis had tried to develop such modifications.
--Eighteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2004/693, 27 August 2004, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/document_list.asp>.

20 to 22 September 2004
An Iraqi representative attends the “Second Asian National Authorities Meeting” in Beijing, China.
--“Second Asian National Authorities Meeting,” Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 2004), p. 32.

23 September 2004
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his followers threaten to behead a British contractor, Ken Bigley, unless Iraqi female prisoners are released. This demand focuses attention on two imprisoned women scientists: Dr. Rihab Taha, also known as "Dr. Germ", who was in charge of an Iraqi facility that weaponized anthrax, botulinium toxin, and aflatoxin and believed to have designed the Iraqi biological weapons program; and Huda Salih Mahd Ammash, also known as "Mrs. Anthrax" and "Chemical Sally", who was the only woman to serve on Saddam Hussein's Revolutionary Command Council. Although the Iraqi Ministry of Justice is not opposed to releasing these women, the US authorities are still refusing to release them.
--"Hostage crisis: US detaining Iraq scientists despite failure to find WMD," Independent (London), 23 September 2004, p. 4; "Scientists had key roles in Saddam's laboratories," Irish Times, 23 September 2004.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group releases its final report on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The report finds that Saddam Hussein intended to resume WMD programs after UN sanctions were lifted. The ISG determined that Iraq probably destroyed its chemical stockpiles in 1991 and there were no indications that Iraq had resumed chemical weapons production. However, Iraq's chemical industry was re-organized in the mid-1990s to preserve the Iraqi chemical weapons knowledge base.
--Comprehensive report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, Central Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/>.

8 October 2004
Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group is quoted responding to a question about the possibility that Iraqi WMD were transferred out of Iraq prior to March 2003. He says: "We cannot yet definitively say whether or not WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the war. Neither can we definitely answer some questions about possible retained stocks though, as I say, it is my judgment that retained stocks did not exist." [By excluding the possibility of retained stocks of WMD, or new production prior to March 2003 Duelfer also excludes the possibility that WMD were transferred to Syria or any other country.]
--Janine Zacharia, "Bush concedes Iraq had no WMDs," Jerusalem Post, 8 October 2004, p. 1, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 October 2004
UNMOVIC remains concerned about the destruction of WMD sites and facilities in Iraq and the subsequent disappearance of dual-use equipment. It recommends that Iraq set up an inventory system to track the location and condition of such equipment and indicates that UNMOVIC is ready to assist in this effort. Iraq had no immediate comment on UNMOVIC's concerns, but the US State Department, which has been helping Iraq set up methods to restrict the movement of these materials, said that Iraq has put new export controls in place to prevent WMD materials or technology from leaving Iraq.
--Robert McMahon, "Iraq: UN Mission hopes for tighter controls on Iraqi 'dual-use' sites," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 October 2004.

29 November to 2 December 2004
An Iraqi representative attends the ninth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in The Hague as an observer. Iraq has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.
--List of Participants to the Ninth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, 29 November - 2 December 2004, C-9/INF.3/Rev.1, 2 December 2004, p. 41, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/csp9/c9inf03rev1.pdf>.

14 January 2005
White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, rules out the possibility that Iraqi WMD may have been moved to Syria.
--Brian Knowlton, "Search for banned weapons in Iraq ends quietly," International Herald Tribune, 14 January 2005, p. 3.

17 January 2005
US Intelligence and congressional officials say they have not seen any evidence that WMD components or equipment were moved from Iraq to Syria, Jordan or elsewhere before or after the March 2003 US invasion. In a separate statement Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) says: "What I can tell you is that I believe we know a lot of materials left Iraq and went to Syria. There was certainly a lot of traffic across the border points. But whether in fact in any of these trucks there was WMD-related materials, I cannot say."
--Katherine P. Shrader, "US intelligence found no evidence WMD moved from Iraq," Associated Press, 17 January 2005, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 April 2005
The Secretariat of the Iraqi Council of Ministers authorizes the establishment of a multi-agency committee chaired by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consider the question of Iraq's accession to the CWC.
--“Foreign Ministry Invigorates Efforts of Iraq's Accession to CWC,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq website, 21 May 2006, <http://www.mofa.gov.iq/english/news/display.aspx?NewsID=1720>.

27 April 2005
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) publicly releases the Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisors to the DCI on Iraq's WMD. On the question of purported transfers of Iraqi WMD to Syria the report says: "There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation. ISG was unable to complete its investigation and it is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war. It should be noted that no information from debriefing of Iraqis in custody supports this possibility." The report concluded that "based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials."
--"Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisors to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Duelfer Report)," March 2005,
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/addenda.pdf>; Dana Priest, "Report finds no evidence Syria hid Iraqi arms," Washington Post, 26 April 2005; Katherine Shrader, "Weapons inspector ends WMD search in Iraq," Associated Press, 26 April 2005; Rowan Scarborough, "CIA can't rule out WMD move to Syria," Washington Times, 27 April 2005, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050427-121915-1667r.htm>; "Puncturing another weapons myth," New York Times, 30 April 2005, p. A12; Anders Strindberg, "Report finds no evidence of WMD transfers to Syria," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 June 2005.

13 to 15 June 2005
An Iraqi government representative attends the “Second OPCW Workshop to Promote the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention among States in the Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East, and Neighboring Regions” in Nicosia, Cyprus.
--“Cyprus Workshop on a Universal Chemical Weapons Ban in the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East,” Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 2005), p. 12.

6 to 9 July 2005
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) conducts an implementation training workshop for nine representatives of the Government of the Republic of Iraq at the OPCW's Hague headquarters. The training course was structured to provide the Iraqi participants with the expert guidance needed to prepare obligatory declarations, establish and efficiently operate a National Authority, enact national implementing legislation and put in place the required regulatory measures to eliminate chemical weapons and to prevent their spread in accordance with the CWC. In a statement at the opening of the training course the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, H.E. Mr Siamand Banaa, stated "that his Government and the States Parties to the CWC shared a common desire and purpose in seeking to accede to the CWC, in particular to ensure that the horrors of chemical warfare will never occur again in Iraq, and stated that Iraq, which had suffered greatly from abuses of chemical weapons, will take a leading part in the OPCW in the future."
--"OPCW Trains Iraqi Officials in CWC Implementation," Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 2005), p. 12.

15 October 2005
The permanent Constitution of Iraq is ratified by popular referendum. Article 9, paragraph 1 (e), provides that "the Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and associated equipment, materiel, technologies and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production and use of such weapons".
--Letter dated 5 February 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, UN Document S/AC.44/2004/(02)/116/Add.1, 10 February 2006, p. 2, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/241/33/PDF/N0624133.pdf>.

7-11 November 2005
Four Iraqi representatives attend the tenth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in The Hague as observers. Although Iraq has not yet acceded to the CWC it has publicly declared its intention of doing so and is making preparations for CWC implementation.
--List of Participants to the Tenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties The Hague, 7 - 11 November 2005, C-10/INF.4, 11 November 2006, p. 47, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/csp/csp10/en/c10inf04.pdf>.

15 December 2005
In an interview with the New York Sun, Lieutenant General (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) claims that in the period preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq "he [Saddam Hussein] transferred the chemical agents from Iraq to Syria.
--Ira Stoll, "Saddam's WMD Moved to Syria, An Israeli Says," The New York Sun, 16 December 2005, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>

17 to 26 January 2006
Two Iraqi government representatives participate in the Foundation Course for National Authorities involved in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The course was jointly organized by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, and the OPCW. The course's purpose was to assist state party personnel in fulfilling their nation's obligations under the CWC.
--"Foundation Course for CWC National Authorities Held in Swindon, UK," Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2006), p. 8.

26 January 2006
Georges Sada, formerly second in command of the Iraqi Air Force, claims that in June 2002 Iraq transported WMD to Syria aboard several refitted commercial jets, under the pretence of conducting a humanitarian mission for flood victims. He says that two commercial jets were converted to cargo jets, in order to carry raw materials and equipment related to WMD projects. The passenger seats, galleys, toilets and storage compartments were removed and new flooring was installed. Hundreds of tons of chemicals were reportedly included in the cargo shipments. Sada says he obtained the information from two Iraq Airways captains who were reportedly flying the sorties. The allegations are included in Sada's newly published book, "Saddam's Secrets" which he is promoting in the United States.
--Ira Stoll, "Iraq's WMD Secreted in Syria, Sada Says," The New York Sun, 26 January 2006, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>

6 to 9 February 2006
In Amman, Jordan, the OPCW conducts its second in-depth implementation training workshop for Iraqi officials in preparation of Iraq's accession to the CWC. The training course focused on practical issues related to implementation of the Convention. The course addressed the specific requirements of the Iraqi Government to ensure that it would be able to effectively fulfill its obligations once Iraq accedes to the Convention. The first training course was conducted at the OPCW headquarters in The Hague in July 2005.
--"Update on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)," Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2006), p. 16.

9 March 2006
Speaking at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, former CIA official, Mr. Paul Pillar, speculates that Iraq will be seeking WMD again within the next five to ten years. He explains this as a necessary reaction to threats posed to Iraqi security by regional neighbors possessing or seeking WMD themselves.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 72+73 (September 2006), p. 13.

14 to 17 March 2006
The Executive Council of the OPCW invites Iraq to participate in its 44th Session as an observer. The action follows a request from Iraq, a State not Party to the CWC. The Council took the decision as part of the OPCW's ongoing effort to encourage the universality of the Convention in the Middle East. The decision also noted the "special circumstances of the requesting State not Party, which has also clearly indicated its intention to join the Convention and is actively working towards that end."
--"Summary of the Forty-Fourth Session of the Executive Council," Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2006), p. 4.

7 April 2006
The Permanent Representative of Iraq to the UN writes to the Acting Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC stating that Iraq intends to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention. He also requests that UNMOVIC provide to the government of Iraq the full, final and complete disclosure relating to chemical weapons that was provided by the National Monitoring Directorate of Iraq to the United Nations Special Commission in 1996."

[The clear implication of this request is that the Iraqi government intends to reduce the considerable burden associated with preparing its initial CWC declaration by submitting a copy of the earlier declaration submitted to UNSCOM.]
--Twenty-fifth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2006/342, 30 May 2006, p. 3, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/quarterly_reports/
s-2006-342.pdf>.

30 May 2006
In response to an April 2006 request by the Iraqi government for a copy of the full, final and complete disclosure relating to chemical weapons that was provided by the National Monitoring Directorate of Iraq in 1996 and after receiving instructions from the UN Security Council UNSCOM takes the following action. It "provide[s] the government of Iraq with the relevant sections of the "Currently accurate, full and complete declaration", transmitted by the National Monitoring Directorate in December 2002 and circulated to the Security Council, which is an updated document, having due regard to issues related to the disposition of proliferation-sensitive documents and materials." UNSCOM also annexes a nine-page overview of the chemical weapon program of Iraq to its regular quarterly report. [See 7 April 2006]
--Twenty-fifth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2006/342, 30 May 2006, p. 3, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/quarterly_reports/
s-2006-342.pdf>.

3 August 2006
The Iraqi Council of Ministers approves a Foreign Ministry recommendation that Iraq accede to the CWC. Following this decision, a bill for CWC ratification is proposed to the Council of Representatives (Parliament) for discussion and adoption at its next session which begins on 5 September 2006.
--“Cabinet Approves Foreign Ministry’s Recommendation on Accession to CWC,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq website, 3 August 2006, <http://www.mofa.gov.iq/english/news/display.aspx?NewsID=2122. >.

18 August 2006
As part of its ongoing process of preparation for accession to the CWC the Iraqi government requests that UNMOVIC provide it with copies of "certificates of destruction" of the chemical weapons-related material and equipment that had been destroyed under United Nations supervision. Iraq also requests a copy of the handover protocol signed in 1994 between Iraq and UNSCOM concerning the transfer of the Muthanna chemical warfare agent production site to the custody of Iraq. The protocol provides a full account of destruction activities conducted at Muthanna between 1992 and 1994 and sets out safety and security measures to be applied at the site. The documents are provided to the Iraqi government on 15 October 2006 after being edited to remove proliferation-sensitive content.
--Twenty-seventh quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2006/912, 22 November 2006, p. 2, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/quarterly_reports/
s-2006-912.pdf>.

25 to 27 October 2006
An Iraqi government representative attends the Third OPCW Workshop to Promote the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention among States in the Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East, and neighboring regions held in Rome, Italy.
--"Rome Workshop on Chemical Weapons Ban in the Middle East," Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2006), p. 17-18.

30 to 31 October 2006
The Iraqi government participates in the twenty-fifth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) interdiction exercise which takes place in international waters off the north-eastern coast of Bahrain. [Iraqi participation does not appear to include the deployment of military assets and may to be limited to an observation role.]
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 74 (December 2006), p. 61-62.

5 to 8 December 2006
Three Iraqi representatives attend the eleventh session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in The Hague as observers. Although Iraq has not yet acceded to the CWC it has publicly declared its intention of doing so and is making preparations for CWC implementation.
--List of Participants to the Eleventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties The Hague, 5 - 8 December 2006, C-11/INF.3/Rev.1, 8 December 2006, p. 37, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/csp/csp11/en/c11inf03r1(e).pdf>.

11 to 14 December 2006
Twelve Iraqi officials attend a CWC implementation training course in Amman Jordan coordinated by the OPCW. The officials, represented Iraqi stakeholder ministries including Defense, Foreign Affairs, Health and the National Monitoring Department of the Ministry of Science and Technology. The four-day intensive training course provided the Iraqi officials with the expert guidance, knowledge and skills needed to prepare mandatory declarations and to efficiently put in place the required regulatory measures to implement the Convention. The four-day intensive training course, which was a continuation of the February 2006 session provided the Iraqi officials with the expert guidance, knowledge and skills needed to prepare mandatory declarations and to efficiently put in place the required regulatory measures to implement the CWC.
--"OPCW Conducts Third CWC Training for Iraqi Officials," Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2007), p. 14.

13 to 16 March 2007
The Executive Council of the OPCW invites Iraq to participate in its 48th Session as an observer. The action follows a request from Iraq, a State not Party to the CWC. The Council took the decision as part of the OPCW's ongoing effort to encourage the universality of the Convention in the Middle East.
--"Summary of the Forty-Eighth Session of the Executive Council," Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2007), p. 4.

29 to 31 October 2007
Eleven Iraqi officials attend a CWC implementation training course in Amman Jordan coordinated by the OPCW. This training session, intended to assist Iraq is its preparations for CWC accession is the fourth in a series. [see also 11 December 2006, 6 February 2006 and 6 July 2005]
--OPCW Conducts Fourth Workshop on the CWC for Iraqi Officials, Press Release #117, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 15 November 2007, <http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR117_2007.html>.

22 November 2007
The Iraqi presidential council approves the law on Iraq’s accession to the CWC which had been passed earlier by the Council of Representatives (Parliament).
--“Chief of Organizations and International Cooperation Department at Foreign Ministry Stresses Presidency's Endorsement on law of Iraq's Affiliation to Agreement of Prohibition, Storage and Using of Chemical Weapons,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq website, 22 November 2007, <http://www.mofa.gov.iq/english/news/display.aspx?NewsID=3980>.

	Updated December 2007