The idea to extend the Scud's range even beyond that achievable by the Al-Hussein (approximately 650km) came early in the history of Project 144. The origin of the idea is unclear, however: on the one hand, it would appear logical that the armed forces viewed additional range capabilities as a military requirement, and thereafter requested missile engineers to develop such a system. On the other, the Iraqis told UN inspectors that the impetus for the missile came from within the Project 144 leadership, perhaps to include Gen. Amer Al-Saadi, one of the Deputy Directors of the Military Industrialization Commission.

Regardless of the specific origin, work on the concept for a longer-range ballistic missile—soon to be called "Al-Abbas"—began in November 1987, shortly after the formation of Project 144. Efforts were delayed by the preparation of combat missiles for the "War of the Cities," but it appears that by early 1988, engineers had determined the payload weight reductions and tank extensions required to achieve a 900km range.

The necessary modifications were completed, and on 25 April 1988, Project 144 was able to conduct the first test-flight of the Al-Abbas prototype from a fixed launcher located west of Mosul. A location near Basra was the intended impact point, but the missile disintegrated upon re-entry.

In response, the Iraqis made some modifications to the guidance set programming and moved the position of the air bottles (this modification was thereafter incorporated into the Al-Hussein design, as noted in that entry).

A series of three tests were conducted in late June, each of which had a different number of "impulses" for the 1SB12 accelerometer. The tests were not entirely acceptable, although Project 144 believed that they did allow for more effective accelerometer calibration for follow-on experiments.

The real problem, it was determined, was that the missile consistently broke apart during re-entry; further testing was, therefore, delayed until MIC and Project 144 could fix the flaws in the basic design of the missile.

Ultimately, it was agreed that the most expeditious solution would be to design a separable warhead for the Al-Abbas. Iraqi engineers discussed and debated problems that any missile team would encounter with such an undertaking, such as reducing or eliminating engine disturbances at or near separation. Two methods of separation were explored: linear charge and explosive bolts. For the former, Iraq imported a number of linear charges and a number of static experiments carried out with some assistance from Al Qa-Qa State Establishment.

Following these and other ground experiments, as well as other modifications to the missile, two modified Al-Abbas systems were flight-tested in early February 1989: one with a separable warhead, and the other with a "normal" warhead. The test with the separable warhead was only a partial success, as the warhead did not completely detach from the missile body; the test with the "normal" warhead basically repeated the same failure modes seen in the prior four experiments. Another test on 21 August 1989 using the linear charge method also failed; the missile was achieving a range of some 920km but it was still breaking up at around 10km altitude.

Thereafter, Project 144 determined that the explosives bolt technique offered the best hope of success, and thus a series of warhead static tests using this method were conducted. On 27 June 1990, an Al-Abbas was fired from Tall-Afar towards Najaf: this time, the break-up was at a much lower altitude and within the appropriate range specifications. Thus, the eighth test in the series was considered by engineers to have basically validated both the Al-Abbas concept and the use of explosive bolts for warhead separation.

The two final tests took place on 28 December 1990. These might be best considered as "operational" tests, given that Iraq used a combat Al-Nida launcher and a live warhead. The first missile exploded shortly after lift-off, while the second—though falling considerably short of the 900km range profile—was considered a success due to proper separation of the warhead.

The S-13

The exact nature of the so-called "S-13" missile remains clouded in some mystery. What appears to be the true is that Gen. Amer al-Saadi and MIC were closely associated with the design for the 1.25m diameter missile, viewing it as the best solution for nuclear weapon delivery. Given that the director of Project 144 said he had never even heard of the S-13 until his discussions with UN inspectors, it appears likely that work was compartmentalized within the Iraqi missile program and that Project 1728 would have been tapped to undertake the intensive engineering on the project, had it ever reached that stage.

The designation for the missile emerges from one of the several nomenclatures that Iraq used for its missile and rocket systems. For example, the "S-11" stood for the Scud, the "S-12" for the Al-Hussein, and the "S-13" for the Al-Abbas. Of course, the Al-Abbas had a 880cm diameter while the S-13 "nuclear" missile was to have a 1250cm diameter, and it therefore seems a completely new designator should have been used for the latter missile. It appears, however, that the senior leadership in MIC thought of the larger diameter missile as a modification to the Al-Abbas, rather than a completely new system; they may have, moreover, used the same designator for the Al-Abbas and this new missile as part of a denial and deception operation.

Though Iraqi experts declared that not much work was done on the S-13/1.25m diameter airframe, it does appear that Project 1728's efforts to develop a 30-ton thrust engine were related to the S-13. Using a UDMH and IRFNA propellant combination, this engine would have been appropriate for the S-13's performance requirements. Work began in early 1990 and, after enlisting the assistance of a foreign expert, designs were completed in the middle of 1990. Some technology imports were successfully made from a European company, but the onset of the Kuwait crisis effectively put an end to the undertaking.

	Updated October 2003