Iraq invested considerable resources in both purchasing and developing tactical rockets and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). This investment began in parallel with the purchase of the Scud/8K-14 missile from the Soviet Union. As part of—or in connection with—the Scud contract, Iraq purchased the Luna (FROG) system. A Luna operational unit was formed thereafter, which eventually became Brigade 225.

Iraq conducted several studies to add to the Luna's capabilities. In the summer of 1988, Iraq studied the feasibility of equipping the Luna with a chemical warhead; another study was done concerning the use of sub-munitions/bomblets in the warhead. The former project was called Luna-S, or "Luna Special," while the latter was known as the "Laith." Iraq declared that the studies were short-lived, and that no flight-testing was involved.

In 1980, Iraq signed a contract with Yugoslavia to "jointly" develop an MLRS under the KOL-15 project: in Iraq, the system was known as the Ababil-50, while in Yugoslavia it was the M-87 Orkan. The system consists of a 12-tube launcher and a 262mm diameter rocket of some 50km in range. Iraq's efforts to domestically produce the system did not bear fruit until after the first Gulf War.

Shortly after the Yugoslav deal was concluded, Iraq signed a somewhat similar contract with Brazil's Avibras to jointly develop an MLRS with rockets of 30, 40, and 60km in range fired from a common launcher. Iraq purchased a number of the systems, which in Brazil are known as the ASTROS. In 1989, Project 144 tried to extend the range of the SS-60 rocket to 100km under a project known as Sejeel-100. Two flight-tests were conducted: the first flew to less than 60km, while the second achieved range requirements but had a high drift error. Given the difficulties and general lack of interest from the military, the program was cancelled at the end of 1989.

In addition to these MLRS systems, Iraq attempted to reverse-engineer a variety of smaller caliber rockets, including the 81mm and 107mm versions.

It appears that the rationale for developing two rockets of similar capability can be found in the habit within Iraq's military industry to place teams of engineers in competition with one another. This management practice is reflected in the work done during the initial stages of the Al-Hussein project, as well as post-war efforts surrounding the Ababil-100/Al-Samoud program. An additional rationale may be found in the political machinations between teams of various engineers as each tried to "one up" the other; Iraq's oil bounty allowed this type of competition to take place in an atmosphere of resource abundance.

	Updated October 2003