Other Names: Al-Kindi Laboratory; Saad-16; Kindi Factory; Kindi State Company
Location: Mosul, about 5km north of the city center
Subordinate to: Military Industrialization Commission
Primary Function: Research, development, testing, and evaluation facility for propellants, gyros, and small solid rocket motors

Description:
Construction of the Al-Kindi facility (then known as Saad-16) began in 1984 with German companies as prime contractors; construction ended in 1989 without all the intended equipment in place and certified. Thus the site never became fully operational. It was bombed heavily during the first Gulf War but was re-built.

The site consisted of some 90 buildings, along with bermed explosives mixing and storage buildings. It was effectively divided into three areas: administration and support area; prototype production and laboratories; and propellant explosive and pyrotechnics area. More specifically, Kindi was organized by laboratory centers that support other military industrial plants in Iraq. These research centers were Badr, Qadisiyah, Hattin, Al Qa-Qa, Saddam, and Salahadin.

The capabilities at the site were extensive, though they have often—mistakenly—been associated with full production capabilities. These capabilities include a wind tunnel for model testing; pilot production for composite and double-base propellants; testing, validation, and qualification of small solid rocket motors; and a variety of test equipment for gyros and inertial systems, including moment of inertia, rotor imbalance, vibration, etc.

Given these capabilities, Kindi was involved in research as well as testing of subsystems for both the Al-Samoud and Ababil (later known as Fateh) ballistic missiles.

More generally, the facility suffered from a lack of technical documentation, damage, and uncommissioned or otherwise inoperable equipment. Moreover, facility personnel—while technically competent at the theoretical level—lacked to some degree practical experience in missile-related matters. In sum, while capable, the site never lived up to its potential or public billing, and Kindi never played a key role in the Iraqi missile program.

Key Sources: UN Inspection Data.

	Updated October 2003