Back to Country Index COUNTRY PROFILE
Nuclear Biological Chemical Missile
Access Newswire
Country Information
 
Missile Facilities

Al-Ma'moun Factory
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, October 2002.
Other Names: Taj Al Marik Plant, Balat Al-Shuhada' Factory; Latifiyah Solid Propellant Plant
Location: Babylon Governate, Al-Latifiyah, approximately 40km SW of Baghdad
Subordinate to: Rashid State Establishment, Military Industrialization Corporation
Primary Function: Production of solid rocket motors, including case insulation, propellant production, and motor casting and curing

Description:
Ma'moun made up one of the three facilities of the Rashid State Establishment, the others being Amin and M'utasim.

Ma'moun was located in the north central section of the Qa-Qa State Establishment, and occupied some 45 buildings, including workshops, nine propellant processing buildings, assembly/disassembly buildings, and explosive storage.

Ma'moun was originally constructed in the 1980s—it was then known as the Taj Al Marik Plant of the Balat Al-Shuhada' Factory—for the production of Badr 2000 first stage motors and Sakr 200 motors. Much of the equipment and technology was contained at Ma'moun to accomplish this goal, including that for APC grinding, filtering, and drying; 1,500 liter mixing bowls; and casting and curing chambers for Badr and Sakr-sized motors. According to the Iraqis, and based on available evidence, the facility was never able to produce the motors, due to certain supply problems with Egypt, the partner country. The site was bombed heavily during the Gulf War and the equipment sustained considerable damage. UN inspectors thereafter destroyed much equipment per the terms of UN resolution 687, including Badr mandrels, the large mixing bowls, purpose-built toolings and jigs, and casting chambers.

After the war, Ma'moun became involved in the on-again, off-again Ababil-100 project, Iraq's attempt to produce a solid-propellant, short-range ballistic missile. Towards this end, Iraq employed the capabilities remaining after Coalition and UN destruction activities. These included a 30 gal/120 liter mixer, a smaller casting pit, autoclaves and laboratory-scale mixing and related propellant research and production equipment. At the time of the departure of UNSCOM, not much progress had been made on the motor for the system in part because of technology and raw material limitations. Iraq was attempting to use four batches of propellant from the 30-gallon mixer for each Ababil motor. In addition to these activities, Ma'moun worked on the production of "base-bleed" charges, grain production for the Saham-Saddam air-to-air missile, and research and development for the Al-Mutasady (another air-to-air missile) motor.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported in October 2002 that following UNSCOM's December 1998 departure, Iraq rebuilt/repaired structures at Ma'moun previously damaged during the Gulf War or dismantled by inspectors. Further, the CIA charged, Iraq had built a new casting building and two new mixing buildings.

Finally, both the CIA and the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) noted that a new ammonium perchlorate production plant had been built at Ma'moun. According to the JIC, "This has been provided illicitly by NEC Engineer Private Limited, an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links to Iraq....After an extensive investigation, the Indian authorities have recently suspended its export license, although other individuals and companies are still illicitly procuring for Iraq." [Note: See also the entry for Ibn-Sina Center.]

According to Indian court records, NEC used false documents and customs declarations to export 10 shipments of materials—worth some $800,000—to Iraq between 1998 and 2001. According to the British and US intelligence reports, equipment was first shipped to companies in Jordan and Dubai and later traced to Ma'moun. According to a CNN report, the perclorate plant was built by NEC personnel in late 1999. Moreover, the various NEC shipments included three tons of aluminum powder to Ma'moun; aluminum powder is a key composite propellant ingredient.

For its part, UNMOVIC inspected the Ma'moun facility some 20 times during its four months in Iraq. During these inspections, UNMOVIC found that Iraq had indigenously developed casting chambers or had repaired chambers previously destroyed by UNMOVIC. More specifically, UNMOVIC stated that "Iraq declared an indigenously produced propellant casting chamber with a diameter that would be useful for the manufacture of composite propellant missiles with a range considerably in excess of what is permitted under resolution 687 (1991). During the inspection of...the Ma'moun factory, two additional casting chambers with an even larger diameter than the one mentioned above were discovered. Iraq declared that two of the casting chambers were provided by a foreign country and that, originally, these chambers were imported for the Badr-2000 programme project. Although UNSCOM had deemed them proscribed and supervised their destruction, Iraq had managed to reconstitute them. Iraq explained that the depth of the reconstituted chambers had been shortened from the original eight meters to six meters, which was sufficient to produce the rocket motor for Al 'Ubour [a solid-propellant air-to-air missile using a similar motor as the Fateh]."

Clearly, Iraq had progressed quite far since UNSCOM's departure; in December 1998, the Ababil (later named Fateh) solid-propellant missile program was still in a nascent stage. However, Iraq declared in late 2002 that it had produced 96 Al-Fateh missiles and 11 launchers, with 32 missiles declared as deployed. Moreover, 33 tests of the missiles had been conducted. It is evident, therefore, that the expansion of Ma'moun's capabilities—either through domestic or foreign sources—contributed immeasurably to the surprisingly rapid success of the Fateh program. Further, it was apparent that the large casting chambers provided Iraq with the capability to produce large motors to power proscribed-range missiles.

Accordingly, and based on the advice of a Panel of Experts convened in February 2003, UNMOVIC determined that the re-constituted and indigenously produced casting chambers; the casting chambers were, therefore, destroyed.

Key Sources: UN inspection data; Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>; "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government," 24 September 2002, p. 20, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/files/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf>; "Indian company alleged source of illicit Iraqi goods," Los Angles Times, 19 January 2003; Satinder Bindra and Amol Sharma, "Probe into illegal Indian exports to Iraq," CNN, 26 January 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/>; Satinder Bindra and Amol Sharma, "Indian documents suggest Iraq violated U.N. resolutions," CNN, 5 February 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/>; UNMOVIC, "Unresolved Disarmament Issues," 6 March 2003,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/cluster_document.pdf>; CNS UNMOVIC Inspection Database, <http://cns.miis.edu/Iraq-Inspections>.



 

Updated October 2003



7 Nissan State Establishment
17 Nissan Factory
Al-Amin Factory, Rashid State
Al-Fida'a Factory
Al-Harith State Establishment
Al-Kindi State Establishment
Al-Ma'moun Factory
Al-Numan Factory
Al-Qadisiya State Establishment
Al Qa-Qa State Establishment
Al-Quds Factory
Al-Radhwan Factory
Al-Tahrir Institute of Welding Technology
Badr State Establishment—Khan Azad Dies Factory
Fateh Company
Fateh Factory
Hutin Fuze Assembly and Submunition Workshops
Ibn-Sina Center—Tarmiya Site
Jaber Bin Hayan State Establishment
Karama State Establishment—Qadhimiya Site
Karama State Establishment—Wazeriyah Site
Military Research and Development Corporation
M'utasim Factory
Nasser State Establishment, Dies Factory
Nida State Establishment—Moulds and Dies Factory
Mansour Electronics Plant
Rafah Test Stand; Project 1728 site (pre-Desert Storm)
Saddam General Establishment
Salah Al-Din State Establishment
Samoud Factory
South Taji Metallurgical Plant
Space Research Center
Taji Aircraft Engine and Repair Facility


Iraq Maps
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Addressing the Spread of Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)
To Comply or Not to Comply: Outline of the UN Inspections Mechanism in Iraq
WMD in the Middle East
Dusty Agents and the Iraqi Chemical Weapons Arsenal
U.S. and Hostile Powers: Iraq
Limiting the Use of WMD between Regional Powers: Iran vs. Iraq—Options
Treaties and Organizations
Senate Intel Panel Releases Two Iraq Reports (2006)
In Focus: IAEA and Iraq (2005)
UNMOVIC 21st Quarterly Report (2005),
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (2004)
Saddam's Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq as a Case Study of a Middle Eastern Proliferant (2004)
Duelfer Report (BW & CW sections) [70 Mb] (2004)
18th quarterly report of UNMOVIC to the UN Sec General from 27 Aug 2004
17th quarterly report of UNMOVIC to the UN Sec General from 28 May 2004
Redirection of WMD Scientists in Iraq and Libya (2004)
16th quarterly report of UNMOVIC to the UN Sec General from 27 Feb 2004
WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (2004)
The War in Iraq: An Intelligence Failure? (2003)
Disarming Iraq by Force: WMD Stakes and Scenarios (2003)
Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Capable Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (2003)
International Atomic Energy Agency: Iraq Action Team (2003)
Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes (2003)
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment (2002)
Federation of American Scientists: Iraq Missile Guide (2000)
The Future of Chemical and Biological Disarmament in Iraq: From UNSCOM to UNMOVIC (1999)
UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review
Strengthening the BWC: Lessons from the UNSCOM Experience (1997)
Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq (1996)
Bill of Indictment: German Court Case Involving Iraq's Weapon Procurement (1993)
Iraq's Chemical and Biological Capability in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (1990)



Search for:


Enter query terms separated by spaces.
Match:
Search in: Select any one of the following databases and archives or search any combination.
Click here for more details.
Entire Web Site
Global Security Newswire
Country Profiles
WMD 411
Issue Briefs & Analysis
Securing the Bomb
NTI Press Room
Source Documents
HEU Reduction and Elimination Database
Submarine Proliferation Database
Russian Language Resources
NIS Nuclear and Missile Database
NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database

Country Information
Argentina
Belarus
Brazil
China
Cuba
Egypt
France
India
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Japan
Kazakhstan
Libya
North Korea
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
South Korea
Syria
United Kingdom
United States
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
Other


Research Library
Country Information Glossary
Issues & Analysis Source Documents
Databases Warheads & Materials
 

back to top

About This Section  CNS Experts 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

HOME   | CONTACT US   | GET INVOLVED   | SITE MAP