1991
According to Richard Spertzel, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) Biological Weapon inspector (1994-1998), Iraq succeeds "in deploying biological weapons in aerial bombs as well as in Al-Hussein missiles fired toward Israel." [NOTE: Delivered in testimony before the US House Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services on 1 March 2002.]
--"UN Inspection Won't Stop Iraqi Bioweapons," Middle East Newsline, Afternoon Report, 7 March 2002, Vol. 4, No. 93.

1991
An Italian company, Fincantieri Shipyard Corrado Antonini, cancels a shipment of "two fast-missile corvettes" armed with surface-to-surface missiles for Iraq because of the UN arms embargo.
--United Press International, 26 October 1995, in "Malaysia Buys Two Italian Warships," Executive News Service, 26 October 1995.

1991
South Korea's Yonhap News Agency cites unnamed military sources saying that North Korea had transferred Scud-C missiles to Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya since 1991.
--Reuters, 19 August 1996 in "Syria Tests Long-Range Scud Missile--Israel Report," Executive News Service, 20 August 1996.

During the Gulf War
According to an Iraqi declaration, it possesses 14 operational mobile missile launchers (combat mobile launchers for Al-Hussein class missiles), including 10 imported prior to the 1991 Gulf War and four produced indigenously. [NOTE: Iraq also imported another launcher of this type for training purposes. The supplier confirmed the quantity of imported launchers. See Summer of 1991 and August-September 1997.]
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.

During the Gulf War
Babil reports that Iraq fires 84 Al-Husseins, three Al-Hussein Shorts, and one Al-Hijarah (with a cement warhead) missiles. Thirty-nine Scud missiles hit Israel.
--"Iraqi Commander on Artillery Improvements, Readiness to Bomb Israel upon Orders," Babil (Baghdad) (Internet version) in Arabic, FBIS, 31 January 2001; Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 295.

During the Gulf War
According to the Wall Street Journal, Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister Saadoun Hamadi attempts to expedite a deal made with North Korea in December 1990 for the delivery of Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs. North Korea refused delivery when Iraq could not offer cash or oil payments.
--"The Postwar Scud-Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991.

During the Gulf War
Iraq fires 60 Al-Hussein missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel.
--"Al-Hussein/Al-Hussein--Iraq Special Weapons," in Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/>.

During the Gulf War
Iraqi General Hazem Abdel Razzaq Shihab discloses that the Iraqi troops fire 93 Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia--43 at Israel and another 50 at Saudi Arabia.
--"Bomb Kills Baghdad Schoolboy, Wounds Three," AP Worldstream, 21 January 1999.

During the Gulf War
According to the Sunday Times, a 37-year-old Iraqi defector claims that Iraq is closer to launching a missile strike with chemical and biological weapons than had been thought.
-- Marie Colvin and Uzi Mahnaimi, "Saddam's Elite Troops Prime Poison Missiles," Sunday Times (London) 20 February 2000.

During the Gulf War
Iraq uses inhibited red fuming nitric acid as the oxidizer in several weapon systems, including the Scud, Guideline, Silkworm/Seersucker, and Kyle missiles.
--"Scud Missile Attacks and Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid," Gulf Link, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil>.

During the Gulf War
The Coalition B-52 bombers "pound" the Iraqi Saad-16 missile research center, near Mosul, to rubble. The bombers also "heavily damage" Scud assembly factories near Baghdad along with the Al Rufah missile test range.
-- "Counter-Force Operations in Desert Storm," Center for Defence and International Security Studies, <http://www.cdiss.org/>.

During the Gulf War
The Executive Chairman of UNSCOM's First Report to the Secretary-General confirms that coalition bombings destroyed several Iraqi missile repair and production facilities.
-- United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

January 1991
The Iraqi program for the production of unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) is discontinued. [NOTE: A UN document says "In 1987, Iraq began inquiring about and procuring facilities, equipment, training and materials concerning every aspect of the use and production of UDMH and related systems in missiles. Iraq established a plan to construct a factory in Iraq for the eventual production of 500 tons per year. Iraq initially denied plans to design a missile engine using UDMH. However, in 1995, Iraq admits that it had imported 10 tons of UDMH and ordered but did not receive more. Except for fuel used in the static test, the remaining quantity of imported UDMH had been declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed in 1991. UDMH is a liquid fuel which can improve the performance of liquid-propellant rocket engines. See May 1991 and August 1995.]
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/284, 10 April 1995.

January 1991
Fohla De Sao Paulo reports that French President François Mitterrand denies that Iraq purchased missile guidance equipment from the French firm Sagem. L'Express, a French magazine, reported that the Argentinean Intesa company passed Sagem components to Iraq.
--Fohla De Sao Paulo, 6 February 1991, p. A12, in "Training on Missile Guidance Systems," Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1991, p. 17.

January 1991
The Los Angeles Times reports that Iraq is thought to have 108 Scud missile launchers--about two-thirds of them mobile.
--John Broder, "Allied Raids Achieve 2 Goals but Miss Scuds," Los Angeles Times, 18 January 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

Early January 1991
According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the Sudanese government accepts Iraqi missile systems and targets them at Egypt. One of the targets is the Aswan High Dam. Russia has decided to resume "military cooperation" with Sudan and will probably send military advisers and equipment.
--Aleksandr Ivano, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), 18 April 1995, p. 2; "Resumption of Military Contacts with Sudan Criticized," in FBIS-SOV-95-079, 18 April 1995.

16 January 1991
US warplanes attack Iraqi facilities producing missile parts, nuclear weapons, and military electronics. US officials say that US planes destroy fixed missile launch sites known as H-2 and H-3 in western Iraq, bases for Scud missiles targeted at Israel. Some 22 F-15E Strike Eagles attack Iraq's fixed launch sites near Al Qaim; five other F-15Es bomb fixed sites around the H-2 airfield near the Iraqi-Jordanian border. Coalition warplanes also attack "all of the Iraqi fixed Scud launch pads."
--John Broder, "Allied Raids Achieve 2 Goals But Miss Scuds," Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Thomas B. Hunter, "Needles in a Haystack: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Hunting Tactical Ballistic Missiles During Operation Desert Storm," Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, 1 January 1999.

16-19 January 1991
According to The Washington Post, US military officials believe that coalition attacks destroyed some Iraqi Scud storage sites.
--Jeffrey R. Smith, "Compactness, Simplicity, Mobility of Scuds Complicate U.S. Search," The Washington Post, 20 January 1991, p. A31, in Proquest, <http//www.proquest.umi.com/>.

17 January 1991
Seven Iraqi Scuds strike Tel Aviv and Haifa in Israel.
--Thomas B. Hunter, "Needles in a Haystack: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Hunting Tactical Ballistic Missiles During Operation Desert Storm," Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, 1 January 1999.

17 January 1991
Iraq launches a ground-to-ground Scud missile, but an American Patriot missile intercepts it over the Saudi desert.[1] A barrage of six Scud missiles hit targets in Saudi Arabia. In response to these, US Air Force A-10A pilots destroy two Iraqi launchers and damage three more.[2]
--[1] Molly Moore, "U.S. Missile Intercepts Iraqi Scud; Saudi Base Protected from Rocket Attack," The Washington Post, 18 January 1991, p. A25, in Proquest, <http://www.proquest.umi.com/>. [2] Jack Nelson, "Iraqi Missiles Strike Israel; Others Reported Fired at Saudi Arabia Bases; Gulf War: Reports Say That Some of the Scuds Hitting Israel Carried Poison Gas But Citizens Were Told to Seal Their Rooms and Wear Masks," Los Angeles Times (Southland Edition), 18 January 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

18 January 1991
According to a spokesman at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Iraq fires a total of eight missiles at Tel Aviv from mobile launchers in the western desert; two land in Haifa, three land in unpopulated areas, and one strikes an unknown target. In the debris of several Scuds, Israeli specialists discover pipe systems made by the German company, Inwako on the Rhine.[1] An Israeli army official says that Iraqi missiles that exploded in and around Israel appear to contain conventional warheads.[2] After the Iraqi missile assault on Tel Aviv, the Los Angeles Times reports that some mobile launchers in western Iraq survived the allied attacks.[3][NOTE: See January 16, 1991]
--"Counter-Force Operations in Desert Storm," Center for Defence and International Security Studies, <http://www.cdiss.org/>. [1] Josef Hufelschulte, "Embargo Violations Reportedly Insufficiently Prosecuted," Munich Focus in German, in FBIS, 28 February 2000, pp. 44-46. [2] Jackson Diehl and William Claiborne, "Missiles Used in Attacks on Israel Were Conventional, Official Says," The Washington Post, 18 January 1991, p. A1, in Proquest, <http://www.proquest.umi.com/>; Jack Nelson, "Iraqi Missiles Strike Israel; Others Reported Fired at Saudi Arabia Bases; Gulf War: Reports Say That Some of the Scuds Hitting Israel Carried Poison Gas. But Citizens Were Told to Seal Their Rooms and Wear Masks," Los Angeles Times (Southland Edition), 18 January 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Thomas B. Hunter, "Needles in a Haystack: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Hunting Tactical Ballistic Missiles During Operation Desert Storm," Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, 1 January 1999. [3] John Broder, "Allied Raids Achieve 2 Goals But Miss Scuds," Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

18 January 1991
According to The Washington Post, US warplanes attack 11 previously undetected mobile missile launchers in Iraq, hitting at least six, including three loaded with missiles and pointed toward Saudi Arabia. A former US military officer says that US and allied forces destroyed several Iraqi Scud missiles. At least six Iraqi missile launchers were discovered near Basra.
--Jeffrey R. Smith, "Compactness, Simplicity, Mobility of Scuds Complicate U.S. Search," The Washington Post, 20 January 1991, p. A31, in Proquest, <http//www.proquest.umi.com/>.

18 January 1991
The US F-15Es attack the fixed (missile) sites around Al Qaim and the H-2 airfield. [NOTE: See 16 January 1991]
--Thomas B. Hunter, "Needles in a Haystack: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Hunting Tactical Ballistic Missiles during Operation Desert Storm," Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, 1 January 1999.

18-19 January 1991
Three Iraqi missiles hit Israel.
--"Counter-Force Operations in Desert Storm," Center for Defence and International Security Studies, <http://www.cdiss.org/>.

18 January-25 February 1991
Iraq fire 39 Scuds at Israel in 18 separate attacks.
--Michael Sheridan, "Iraq May Still Have Scuds," The Independent (London), 11 July 1991, p. 13, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 January 1991
US Marine Major General Robert Johnston, chief of staff for the US Central Command, estimates that Iraq possesses roughly 30 fixed missile launchers and more than 20 truck-mounted launchers.
--Jeffrey R. Smith, "Compactness, Simplicity, Mobility of Scuds Complicate U.S. Search," The Washington Post, 20 January 1991, p. A31, in Proquest, <http//www.proquest.umi.com/>.

19 January 1991
At least three Iraqi Scuds explode in Tel Aviv, Israel.
--"1991 Gulf War Chronology," USA Today, 3 September 1996, <http://www.usatoday.com/>.

19-20 January 1991
US F-15Es attack the Iraqi Scud sites around Al Qaim and shoot down one of the Scuds.
--"Counter-Force Operations in Desert Storm," Center for Defence and International Security Studies, <http://www.cdiss.org/>.

20 January 1991
Iraq fires 10 Scuds at Saudi Arabia. Nine are intercepted and one falls offshore.
--"1991 Gulf War Chronology," USA Today, 3 September 1996, <http://www.usatoday.com/>.

21 January 1991
The Pentagon announces that US Patriot missiles down nine Iraqi Scud missiles, including five fired in the direction of the US base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and four aimed at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia's capital.
--Michael Kennedy and David Lauter, "Iraq Shows Off Seven as POWs; 9 Scud Missiles Aimed at Saudi Arabia Shot Down; Gulf War: Three From U.S. Are Among Allied Flyers Reportedly Shown in Baghdad; Gen. Schwarzkopf Says Forces May Have Knocked out Iraqi Nuclear Capability," Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 January 1991
An Iraqi Scud strikes the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan.
--Thomas B. Hunter, "Needles in a Haystack: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Hunting Tactical Ballistic Missiles during Operation Desert Storm," Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, 1 January 1999.

22 January 1991
Iraq fires six Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia. A US Patriot missile destroys one of them; others fall harmlessly.
--"1991 Gulf War Chronology," USA Today, 3 September 1996, <http://www.usatoday.com/>.

23-26 January 1991
Iraq fires an unknown number of Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia.
--"1991 Gulf War Chronology," USA Today, 3 September 1996, <http://www.usatoday.com/>.

Late January 1991
According to the Financial Times, three Iraqis: Adnan Al Amiri, Hana Jon, and one unnamed man are released; they are among the 88 Iraqis detained in the United Kingdom under the Immigration Act. The British Foreign Office believes that all are connected with Technology and Development Group in Northern Ireland, the Iraqi-owned company that attempted to obtain technology useful to Iraq's missile program.
--Richard Donkin, "The Gulf War; UK Frees Three Detainees," Financial Times, 29 January 1991, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late January 1991
An Iraqi officer reports that the first priority of the Iraqi government is to determine the distance of the Scud missiles from their targets when they were destroyed by Patriot missiles. The purpose of gathering this information is to facilitate the employment of chemical warheads on the missiles.
--Thomas B. Hunter, "Needles in a Haystack: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Hunting Tactical Ballistic Missiles during Operation Desert Storm," Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, 1 January 1999.

30 January 1991
Responding to a statement by Foreign Minister Cavallo on evidence of an Argentine weapon sale to Iraq, former Defense Minister Horacio Juanarena calls the accusation "a total lie," denying the existence of such a sale. Cavallo sent a letter to Juanarena and the press regarding the alleged sale of Condor II missiles to Iraq by the former radical administration. His letter pointed out the previous government's folly in selling technology to Iraq, and affirms that an even greater error was made in allowing "the national territory to be used for the proliferation, production and sale of missiles which are strictly forbidden according to international law." Juanarena comments also that Argentine efforts to develop its own technology have been greeted by "heavy pressure, especially from the United States." In his opinion, "Argentina should renounce building missiles only if other countries agreed to do so too," and suggested that Cavallo's accusations were a move to divert the public's attention away from the government's decision to send troops to the Persian Gulf. [NOTE: See 8 February 1991]
--Buenos Aires Herald, 30 January 1991, p. 11 in "Juanarena Denies Condor II Sales to Iraq," Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1991, pp. 15-16.

End January 1991
Allegedly, Iraq starts to rebuild its Al-Kindi missile research facility in Mosul. Rebuilding work is completed in February 1995. [NOTE: This facility was formerly known as Saad-16.]
--Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 308.

2 February 1991
Two Iraqi Scuds hit central Israel. A US Patriot downs a Scud over Saudi Arabia.
Iraq fires an unknown number of Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia.
--"1991 Gulf War Chronology," USA Today, 3 September 1996, <http://www.usatoday.com/>.

6 February 1991
Fohla De Sao Paulo reports that between October 1988 and June 1990, Brazilian technicians from the company Engenteria de Sistemas de Controle e Automacao (ESCA) provided consulting services to Iraq for the installation of a simulation laboratory for missile and satellite guidance and control. Descartes de Souza Teixeira, the engineer who coordinated ESCA's work for Iraq, denied that experts involved in the project had been consulted by the Iraqis on how to improve the Scud missile. However, another ESCA engineer claimed he answered several Iraqi questions on missile guidance and control. The Scud, which originally had a range of 270km, was increased through Iraqi modifications to 600km. Retired Brigadier General Hugo de Oliveira Piva, president of the HOP consulting firm, does not think that Iraq has successfully established a guidance and control simulation lab. HOP experts have also been in Iraq assisting in the development of technology for the Piranha missile.
--Fohla De Sao Paulo, 6 February 1991, p. A12, in "Consulting for Installation," Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1991, p. 16.

6 February 1991
Fohla De Sao Paulo reports that the Iraqi military received training in missile guidance systems not only from Brazilian technicians, but also from US, French, English, Chinese, German, and USSR specialists. Brazilian contributions also included assistance in improving the guidance system of the Scud-B.
--Fohla De Sao Paulo, 6 February 1991, p. A12, in "Training on Missile Guidance Systems," Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1991, p. 17.

8 February 1991
Retired Brigadier and former Argentine Air Force Chief Ernesto Crespo states "the Condor II project was never sold to Iraq," citing as evidence the fact that the Argentine-Egyptian project used solid fuel while the Iraqi project used liquid fuel. He criticizes former Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo for "giving credence to ill-intentioned magazine reports and for not producing serious evidence." He affirms that Cavallo was wrong to blame the previous government for the alleged Condor sale because the Condor I already existed and the Condor II was under development when Alfonsin came into office. Crespo adds that the US, Germany, and France supplied Iraq with technology and that the US was among those countries that "seek to supply those materials (sensitive technology) and which want to be the absolute authorities on those issues." [NOTE: See 30 January 1991]
--Noticias (Buenos Aires), 8 February 1991, in "Ex-Air Force Chief Denies Iraqi Missile Deal," Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1991, p. 16.

9 February 1991
According to an unattributed report in Sawt Al Kuwait International, Jordan is stockpiling Scud missiles for Iraq. The missiles are subsequently transported to Iraq by truck via the Amman-Baghdad road. Storage fees are "estimated at tens of millions of dinars."
--Sawt Al Kuwait International (London), 9 February 1991, p. 1 in "Jordan Allegedly Storing Scud Missiles for Iraq," Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1991, pp. 32-33.

11 February 1991
Der Spiegel publishes an unattributed report claiming that the Anlagen Bau Contor company has designed plans for a missile engine testing and fuel mixing facility, including UDMH, for Iraq. The plans were ordered by the Liechtenstein-based, Iraqi-backed Transmerkur company. German investigators believe the plans were carried to the Middle East in August 1990 by Holger Beaujean, an Anlagen Bau Contor engineer, along with a formula for Scud missile fuel.
--Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 11 February 1991, pp. 16-17; "Company Developed Missile Engine Testing for Iraq," Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1991, p. 53.

16 February 1991
Xinhua cites a U.S. military official as saying that Iraq has launched the 66th missile attack of the Gulf War on Saudi Arabia's Jubail industrial port.
--"Iraq Launches Missile Attack on Saudi Port of Jubail," Xinhua News Agency, 16 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Scud Missile Attacks and Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid," Gulf Link, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil>.

24 February 1991
Iraq fires two Scud missiles at Israel.
--"1991 Gulf War Chronology," USA Today, 3 September 1996, <http://www.usatoday.com/>.

24 February 1991
Hundreds of US, British, Kuwaiti, and Saudi Arabian warplanes bomb Iraqi air bases and aircraft, chemical and nuclear plants, and missile sites. The Latifiyah (Taj Al-Marik) rocket solid fuel plants and rocket motor production facilities at Shahiyat are targeted with multiple strikes and heavily damaged. [NOTE: As part of the joint Condor missile program, the Abu Zaabal Specialty Chemical company helped Iraq build the Taj al-Marik solid fuel propellant plant in Latifiyah (al Hillah). The Shahiyat site is one of four associated with Project 1728 (project 144/3, Mutawakel) production of Al-Hussein class missile engines.]
--Thomas B. Hunter, "Needles in a Haystack: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Hunting Tactical Ballistic Missiles during Operation Desert Storm," Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, 1 January 1999; "Al Rafah/Shahiyat," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/>.

25 February 1991
According to the Financial Times, Iraq launches a Scud missile (Al-Hijarah) at the Negev desert region near the Israeli nuclear facility of Dimona. This is the 38th extended-range Scud-B rocket attack, carrying conventional explosives.
--Hugh Carnegy, "The Gulf War; Baghdad in Scud Attack on Israel," Financial Times, 25 February 1991, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Al-Hussein/Al-Husayn Al- Hijarah," Federation of American Scientists website, <http://www.fas.org/>.

25 February 1991
An Iraqi Scud missile hits a US barracks at Khobar City, near Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia killing 28 Americans. According to Brigadier General Richard I. Neal of the United States Command, the US Patriot missile radar system failed to intercept the Iraqi Scud-because it fragmented when it entered the atmosphere.
--Donatella Lorch, "War in the Gulf: the Scud Attack; Twisted Hulk of Warehouse Tells a Grim Story of Death," The New York Times, 27 February 1991, p. A18.

25 February 1991
Iraq launches a Silkworm anti-ship missile. Allied warships shoot it down.
--"1991 Gulf War Chronology," USA Today, 3 September 1996, <http://www.usatoday.com/>.

25 February 1991
Iraq launches a Scud at Bahrain but "US-supplied" Patriot defense missiles intercept it.
--George Esper, "Deadliest Scud Attack Kills 28 U.S. Soldiers, Injures 100," The Associated Press, 26 February 1991.

26 February 1991
According to the official Qatari news agency, Iraq fires its first Scud at Qatar. It crashes in a deserted area and causes no damage.
--George Esper, "Deadliest Scud Attack Kills 28 U.S. Soldiers, Injures 100," The Associated Press, 26 February 1991.

28 February 1991
Israel demands that any cease-fire agreements include the destruction of Iraq's missile launchers and stockpiles of non-conventional weapons.
--"The Gulf: Iraqi Arsenal Has To Be Destroyed," The Daily Telegraph, 1 March 1991, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

At the end of the war
UNSCOM finds 62 complete Al-Hussein missiles, six MAZ-543 TELs, and four other TELs, along with parts of 88 other missiles and 9 TELs. The Iraqis are also suspected of hiding other missiles from the UN inspection teams. [14 of 28 fixed sites were also destroyed.]
--Thomas B. Hunter, "Needles in a Haystack: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Hunting Tactical Ballistic Missiles during Operation Desert Storm," Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, 1 January 199.

March 1991
A Federal Republic of Germany internal government report states that, contrary to press reports, German companies did not help extend the range of Iraqi Scud missiles. Dismantled Iraqi Scuds revealed no Western parts. In late March, the Stuttgart public prosecutor's office said it would not investigate Daimler-Benz in connection with the delivery to Iraq of Scud missile transport vehicles.
--"Probe Confirms German Role in Iraq's Chemical Weapons Buildup," Christian Science Monitor, 2 April 1991, p. 5.

March 1991
The US Department of Commerce releases documents that show that it approved 771 export licenses between 1985 and 1990 for $1.5 billion worth of dual-use items to Iraq. One New Jersey firm received export approval for furnaces that Iraq could have used to cast highly enriched uranium into nuclear bomb cores. The report said that Commerce did not inform the Defense Department, but the sale was stopped by a presidential order. In two other cases, Commerce approved the sale of machine tools and lasers to Iraq.
--Douglas Frantz, "Flaws In US Export Policy Helped Iraq, Report Says," Los Angeles Times, 27 June 1991, p. A14.

4 March 1991
Israeli experts believe that a number of intact mobile Scud launchers remain in western Iraq.
--Bradley Burston, "Iraq Still Retains Mobile Launchers," The Jerusalem Post, 5 March 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

By April 1991
Iraq makes significant progress in its indigenous production of the Al-Hussein missile.
--"Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, June 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>.

April 1991
Iraq retains technological and know-how documentation required for the production of proscribed missiles, particularly of the Al-Hussein class. The documentation includes detailed plans, procedure manuals, and drawings. [NOTE: See 20 August 1995]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

April 1991
The United States delays the shipment of an IBM Model 3090 computer, sold to the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer in December 1990, with President Bush's approval. The US claims that it needs Brazil's guarantee that the technology will not be used for military purposes or transferred to other nations. Brazil is active in missile design and cooperated with Iraq in the creation of tactical missiles and space satellites in the late 1980s. [NOTE: In 1988, Embraer participated in a consortium that supplied Iraq with missile technology. It also provided engineers for a project headed by retired Brazilian General Hugo de Oliveira Piva in which the Iraqis received training in rocket dynamics, flight testing, and rocket trajectory control, along with assistance in extending the range of Iraq's Scud missile. See 6 February 1991]
--Clyde H. Farnsworth, "A Standoff with Brazil on Computer," The New York Times, 12 April 1991, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Brazil," Milavnews, May 1991.

April 1991
Iraq begins carrying out an undeclared program to modify the Volga/SA2 surface-to-air missile system to a surface-to-surface application with a range of over 100 kilometers. Iraq is undertaking efforts to conceal the extent of its success in the indigenous production of missiles. [NOTE: Iraq admits this secret program in August 1995]
--United Nations, "Second Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/848, 11 October 1996.

April-November 1991
Iraq continues to import guidance and control instruments for its Al-Hussein missiles. [NOTE: See August 1991. Iraq admits this in early 1992.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

3 April 1991
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 687 (SCR 687). Section C of the resolution "decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept, under international supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range over 150 km, and related production facilities and equipment." It also establishes a system of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the ban on these weapons and missiles. Resolution 687 requires Iraq to declare the location, amounts, and types of all such items within 15 days. After the adoption of SCR 687, Iraq maintains a project to construct a facility dedicated to the indigenous production of proscribed missile propellants for Al-Hussein missiles. Al-Hussein is a liquid fuel missile with a range of 600-650km. [NOTE: Iraq admits the existence of this project in 1996.]
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>; United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

3 April 1991
Iraq retains a parachute device for "retarding" Al-Hussein warheads. [Iraq does not provide technically consistent explanations for the procurement of such systems prior to the adoption of Resolution 687 nor for the retention of the set until 1995.]
--United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.

5 April 1991
Iraqi forces are detected retrieving equipment for missiles and weapons of mass destruction, as well as cleaning up suspected sites.
--Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 291.

6 April 1991
Iraq formally accepts the terms of a permanent cease-fire agreement as stipulated in Resolution 687. The agreement includes UN supervised destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and Iraq's agreement to contribute to a reparations fund.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

After 6 April 1991
After the adoption of SCR 687, Iraq decides to retain two-thirds of its proscribed missile "operational force" and seeks to retain all available capabilities, components, materials, tooling, and machines for its indigenous production of missile engines and guidance and control (G&C) components. Iraq attempts to conceal the actual scope of its pre-Gulf War missile program including its capability to indigenously manufacture proscribed missiles with liquid propellant engines.
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

11 April 1991
The UN Security Council declares a formal end to the war after reviewing Iraq's message to ensure it has accepted the unconditional UN terms.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

13 April 1991
According to Radio SPLA sources, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz personally conveys a message from Saddam Hussein to the Sudanese President Umar Al-Bashir in Khartoum, regarding the transfer of Iraqi Scud missiles, long-range artillery, and chemical weapons to those Arab countries that supported the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The Al-Bashir government agrees to receive these weapons. [NOTE: See 22 July 1991]
--"Radio SPLA Says Iraq Transferring Chemical Weapons and Scuds to Sudan," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 April 1991; "Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Visits Sudan after Yemen," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1991; "Sudan Said Ready to Hold Iraq's Chemical Arms," Nuclear Developments, 31 May 1991, p. 23; Sawt Al-Kuwait International, 30 April 1991, p. 1 in "Sudan Said Ready To Hold Iraq's Chemical Arms," Nuclear Developments, 31 May 1991, p. 23.

18 April 1991
Iraq provides an initial declaration required under SCR 687. Iraq declares its possession of 53 Al-Hussein missiles and one operational Scud with a range of 320km, and 30 chemical warheads for Scuds as well as five conventional Al-Hussein missile warheads, four missile launchers, two mobile missile erectors, and 32 platforms. Iraq also declares that 28 fixed Scud launch platforms remain in operation in western Iraq. Iraq does not declare any weapon production facilities. The declaration includes a pledge "not to use, introduce, build or acquire any chemical weapons or missiles." The declaration does not mention the Tammuz-I, which is under development, or Al-Abbas. The Al-Abbas missile is a modified Scud with an extended range of 900km. [NOTE: The inventory of Iraqi missile holdings includes: one 8K14E, 30 300km range Scud missile, 50 650km Al-Hussein missiles, five 8F44 warheads, and 18 Al-Hussein conventional warheads, all located at Taji; 30 Al-Hussein chemical warheads at Dujayl; two 9M117M missile launchers, two Al-Walid missile launchers and two Al-Nida missile launchers at Rashid Camp, and 28 fixed and four 9M117M missile platforms in the Western Zone. Iraq has also produced Sarin for 2,500 Sakr-30 "missiles."]
--United Nations, "UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>; Melissa Healy and James Gerstenzang, "Iraq Says It Has 11,131 Chemical Warheads in Stock," Los Angeles Times, 20 April 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Iraq Admits To Chemical Warheads For its Scuds," Financial Times, 20-21 April 1991; "Gulf War Cease-Fire Established; Iraq Complies With First Step," Arms Control Today (May 1991), pp. 19, 23; "Iraq Tells Of Chemical Arms Cache," Los Angeles Times, 19 April 1991, pp. A1, A10; "Iraqi Report Says Chemical Arsenal Survived the War," New York Times, 20 April 1991, pp. 1, 4; "Iraq Declares Its Missile Inventory," Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 April 1991, p. 677.

18 April 1991
UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar submits a report to the Security Council regarding the establishment of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).
--United Nations, "UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

19 April 1991
The UN Security Council accepts the 18 April request by Perez de Cuellar and establishes UNSCOM to carry out the tasks laid out in SCR 687. The UN Secretary-General appoints Swedish ambassador Rolf Ekeus as the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.
--United Nations Special Commission, "UNSCOM Basic Facts," < http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/>.

19 April 1991
The United States claims that the declaration Iraq submitted on 18 April leaves out key details of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and missile programs. US State Department deputy spokesman Richard Boucher states, "The declaration delivered in New York shows clearly that the Iraqis have significant stocks of chemical munitions, ballistic missiles, and warheads for these missiles, but their responses fall short of reality."
--"US Rips Iraq Weapons Report," San Francisco Chronicle, 20 April 1991, p. A5; "Iraqi Report Says Chemical Arsenal Survived the War," The New York Times, 20 April 1991, pp. 1, 4.

May 1991
Iraq unilaterally destroys 10.5 tons of unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH). [NOTE: UNSCOM is unable to verify the quantity of the unilaterally destroyed UDMH as of January 1999. All of the Iraqi Scuds use kerosene as fuel. UDMH is liquid fuel more powerful than kerosene. Iraq needs to modify its Scud engine in order to use UDMH rather than kerosene. Iraq used some of the 10.5 tons of UDMH in the static test for a modified Scud-B engine.]
--United Nations, "Seventh Report under Resolution 715," S/1995/284, 10 April 1995; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999; US Department of Defense, "Information Paper: Iraq's Scud-Ballistic Missiles," 25 July 2000 <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/scud_info/>.

May 1991
US prosecutors along with officials from several other executive agencies investigate the activities of International Signal and Control (ISC), a Pennsylvania-based electronics firm. The primary allegation against ISC involves illegal shipments of ballistic missile technology, including telemetry tracking antennae, gyroscopic equipment, and highly sensitive photo-imaging film reactors to South Africa from 1984 until November 1989. Federal officials believe that some of the technology was later shipped to Iraq.
--"Saddam's Secret South African Connection," Financial Times, 24 May 1991, p. 6.

13 May 1991
Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem faces opposition from the Argentine Air Force over the dismantling of the Condor-II missile project. Menem says that civilian applications should be found for the project's technology, but US military experts insist that the Condor-II cannot be transformed into a space satellite launcher. [NOTE: Since Iraq used Scuds in the Persian Gulf War, the United States has set a higher priority on monitoring missile technology exports and, thus, has placed the Condor-II project under greater scrutiny. The ultimate goal of the project was to establish production facilities in Iraq and Egypt, allowing both nations to offset Israel's arsenal through indigenous production.]
--"Argentina's President Battles His Own Air Force on Missile," The New York Times, 14 May 1991, pp. A1, A5.

14 May 1991
The exchange of letters between the UN Secretary-General and the Iraqi Foreign Minister comes into force. This exchange sets out the rights, privileges and immunities of UNSCOM and its personnel in Iraq.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

16 May 1991
Iraq submits revised declarations regarding missiles and additional chemical weapons.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>; "Missile Proliferation Chronology," Arms Control Reporter, June 1991, pp. 706, B, 55-706, E, 4.

17 May 1991
Rolf Ekeus claims that it will take approximately three months for UNSCOM to certify Iraqi compliance with SCR 687. UNSCOM solicits information from regional intelligence sources and suspected pre-war suppliers of military-related material.
--"Inspectors Find Iraq's Nuclear Material," Washington Post, 23 May 1991, p. A46.

23 May 1991
The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) high level meeting takes place in Paris. The meeting establishes a new "core list" for the export of high technology and related goods to former Soviet Bloc countries. Among the items "decontrolled" are all civilian avionics and aircraft; certain liquid fuel rocket engines; composite materials; 1.5 micron semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and sales of sophisticated 50 MHz minicomputers. According to Defense Electronics, there is concern that nations like Iraq and Libya could purchase these technologies through front countries in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Romania, or elsewhere.
--"COCOM Drops Controls on Allied High-Tech," Defense Electronics, July 1991, p. 14.

29 May 1991
Argentina's Defense Minister Erman Gonzalez announces the cancellation of the Condor-II missile project. He says that the project will be "deactivated, dismantled, reconverted and/or rendered unusable." Iraq had provided $200-$300 million for the project. [NOTE: Prior to cancellation, Condor hardware reached final development stages, but the missile still lacked an effective guidance system.]
--"Argentina," Milavnews, June 1991, p. 2; "Argentina to Scrap Condor Missile Project," Financial Times, 30 May 1991, p. 8.

29 May 1991
In pointing out the urgent danger of weapons proliferation in the Middle East, US President George Bush reveals his Middle East arms control proposal, which includes a freeze on buying, building, and testing of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) by Middle Eastern nations. The proposal affects Iraq's Scuds and Israel's Jericho missiles.
--"Bush seeks Curb on Mideast Arms," Los Angeles Times, 30 May 1991, pp. A1, A10.

June 1991
Iraq destroys "substantial quantities" of weapons of mass destruction, according to the statement by Iraq's delegate to the United Nations on 20 March 1992.
--"U.N. Team Confirms Iraqi Claims Destroyed Missiles Found Buried at Several Sites," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. 6A, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

June 1991
Iraq acknowledges that it has more than 52 ballistic missiles, which contradicts its initial 18 April 1991 declaration.
--"UN Aides Say Iraq May Be Concealing Nuclear Material," The New York Times, 15 June 1991, pp. 1, 15.

1 June 1991
German firms are under investigation regarding their involvement in arms trade with Iraq: Anlagen Bau Contor, for the purchase of high-performance propulsion systems on behalf of Iraq; Havert Handelsgesellschaft, for engineering and technical improvements on the Scud-B; Inwako, also for Scud-B technical improvements; and MBB Transtechnica, for the supply of missile research calibrating instruments. Criminal proceedings are currently underway against Saad 16 general contractor Gildemeister Projekta and against PBG Projekt-Betreuungs for the supply of missile technology.
--"The Iraqi Connection," International Defense Review (June 1991), pp. 567-570.

3 June 1991
UNSCOM-3 Ballistic Missile Team 1 (UNSCOM-3/BM1) arrives in Iraq. Its activity includes the destruction of ballistic missiles and support equipment Iraq declared in the Baghdad, Al-Taji, and Habbaniyah areas. The team inspects three of eight declared repair and production facilities. The team destroys warheads; launchers; support vehicles; propellants located at Habbaniyah; and missiles including Al-Hussein, Scud-B, and Fahd. Fahd missiles are SSMs that Iraq modified from Volga/SA2 surface-to-air missiles.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

6 June 1991
UNSCOM-3/BM1 destroys five damaged missiles at Taji.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

17 June 1991
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 699. [The resolution confirms that UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency have the authority to conduct activities under section C of Resolution 687, for the purpose of the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in that resolution.]
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

Summer 1991
The Iraqi "high authority" orders the directors of the sites involved in Iraq's proscribed programs to protect "important documents" by packing them immediately, and delivering them on demand to representatives from Iraq's special security organizations.
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.

26 June 1991
The US House Government Operations Committee adopts a report that a subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary affairs prepared. The report criticizes US export control policy and is most critical of the US Commerce Department, which approved exports to Iraq of US technologies that helped Saddam Hussein develop his missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, despite objections from the US Defense Department. US Representative Doug Barnard Jr., the subcommittee chairman, calls for the creation of an independent agency that would streamline the licensing process and set up a consistent export policy for sensitive technologies and equipment.
--Douglas Frantz, "Flaws In US Export Policy Helped Iraq, Report Says," Los Angeles Times, 27 June 1991, p. A14.

26 June 1991
At the US State Department regular briefing, Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler says that Iraq has defied UN resolutions either by under-reporting or not revealing details of its ballistic missiles. US intelligence photos indicate Iraq still has at least 700 Scud-type SSMs, mostly at Taji, north of Baghdad, where Iraq refurbishes and places them on new launchers.
--"State Department Regular Briefing," Federal News Service, 26 June 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

28 June 1991
The "imagery" taken on this day shows that the Iraqis removed 15 biological warheads from a Tigris Canal site and transported them to "another" location. [NOTE: See 7 July 1991.]
--"Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, June 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>.

30 June 1991
Saddam Hussein sets up a special high-level committee to plan the concealment of weapons, materials, and plans from UNSCOM inspectors. Tariq Aziz is chairman of the committee.
--Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 102.

30 June-14 October 1991
UNSCOM Ballistic Missile teams (1-5) conduct inspections in Iraq to make an inventory, identify for destruction, and monitor the destruction of all declared ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, their related parts and components, and all research, development, support and manufacturing capabilities. Also the teams supervise the destruction of "62 ballistic missiles, 18 fixed Scud missile launch pads, 10 launchers, 11 decoy missiles, 32 ballistic missile warheads, 127 missile storage support vehicles, a substantial amount of rocket fuel, and assembled 350mm type supergun, components for 350 and 1,000 millimetre superguns and 1 tonne of supergun propellant."
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

Between 30 June 1991 and February 1992
UNSCOM teams destroy over 80 missiles, 11 missile decoys, dozens of fixed and mobile launchers, eight missile transporters, and 146 missile storage units.
--Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 308. [Original: Washington Post, February 14, 1992, p. A33; Washington Post, January 15, 1992, p. A18..

Early July 1991
According to a later Iraqi declaration, Iraq unilaterally destroys 45 "special warheads" (20 for chemical weapons, 25 for biological weapons).
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

Early July 1991
UNSCOM supervises the destruction of 52 tons of imported missile oxidizer (AK27I) and 20 tons of imported missile main fuel (TM185). [NOTE: Iraq declared the importation of 2,895 tons of this oxidizer (AK271) and 818 tons of main fuel, but has yet to provide any supporting documents to substantiate this declaration.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

Early July 1991

According to a report submitted by UNSCOM executive chairman Rolf Ekeus to the UN Secretary-General, UNSCOM supervises the destruction of 48 missiles that Iraq declared operational, 14 conventional warheads, six operational mobile launchers, and other support equipment and materials.
--United Nations, "Second Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/848, 11 October 1996; United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

July 1991
According to the March 1992 Iraqi declaration, Iraq destroys some missile launchers unilaterally at Bismayah. [NOTE: Prior to March 1992, Iraq claimed that several launchers had been destroyed during the Iraq-Iran War. Then, Iraq changed its claim. UNSCOM establishes in July 1997 that Iraq's statement on the unilateral destruction of missile launchers in the summer of 1991 was false.]
--"Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, June 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>; United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

July 1991
Iraq confirms the existence of its five "superguns" development project, called the "Babylon" project. Iraq acknowledges that it pursued a program to develop a "supergun" capable of firing shells up to 800km and its possession of a long-range "supergun" and components to build additional larger caliber weapons. This type of gun is capable of delivering prohibited munitions beyond 150km. [In response to SCR 687, Iraq declared components that it had acquired for both the 350mm and 1,000mm guns.]
--"Iraq Has Destroyed Its Declared Ballistic Potential: U.N. Inspector," Agence France Presse, 9 December 1991; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999; "U.N. Releases Iraqi 'Supergun' Photos; Device to Be Destroyed," Los Angeles Times, 24 August 1991, p. A18; "Iraq," Milavnews, August 1991, pp. 15-16.

July 1991
According to an Iraqi declaration, Iraq sends 10 semi-trailers of undamaged components for its indigenous missile engine production to the Tikrit area to conceal them from UNSCOM. A week later, Iraq decides to destroy the components from 9 of 10 of the semi-trailers by exploding and burying them at the Al-Alam site. The tenth semi-trailer is diverted from destruction for retention and concealment at a farm near Baghdad.
[See March 1992.]
--"Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, June 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>.

July 1991
According to a later Iraqi declaration, Iraq unilaterally destroys 20 imported turbo pumps not used since April 1991. It explodes nine of them, buries them in the desert, then excavates and melts the metal in a foundry; the remaining 11 are also melted in a foundry [NOTE: Iraq has provided no documentary evidence to confirm this declaration]. According to the UN report, "Iraq declared that it had not been able to indigenously produce turbo pumps for proscribed missile engines. Iraq attempted to acquire them by importing complete turbo pumps or by importing their components for final assembly in Iraq. Iraq declared that it had failed to assemble any complete turbo pumps from imported components. All turbo pump components were declared as unilaterally destroyed. Iraq stated that it had imported 34 turbo pumps from the specific foreign supplier. The importation was part of the implementation of an overall order for 305 turbo pumps from this supplier. The commission has been able to obtain data on the quantity of the turbo pumps ordered and imported by Iraq directly from this supplier. See April or May 1992, in conflict with the Iraqi declaration, inventory records of the unilateral destruction of July 1991 list eight turbo pumps."
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

1-7 July 1991
UNSCOM-3 Ballistic Missile Team 1 begins destruction of Iraqi ballistic missiles. The team visits seven different sites and facilities. Three of the sites are former production and repair facilities that were destroyed by coalition bombing. The team carries out the initial inventory and supervision of the destruction of all declared missiles, launchers and support equipment.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

2-6 July 1991
UNSCOM-3/BM1 supervises the destruction of "61 Scud-type missiles, 28 live warheads, 10 mobile launchers, two fixed launchers, nine liquid-fuel transporters and eight missile transport vehicles."
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991; "28 Iraqi Missile Warheads Destroyed," Xinhua News Agency, 6 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Michael Hirsh, "U.N. Team to Hunt for Nuclear Equipment; Scud Warheads Destroyed," Associated Press, 6 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

2 July 1991
UNSCOM-3/BM1 inspects and supervises the destruction of 12 Al-Hussein missiles at Taji. Destruction activities also take place at the Al-Taji military base north of Baghdad. UNSCOM plans to destroy all 61 Iraqi declared missiles by July 7th.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; "U.N. Experts Destroy 39 Iraqi Ballistic Missiles," Agence France Presse, 3 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>;"U.N. Team Declaring Dissatisfaction, Set To Leave Iraq," Washington Post, 3 July 1991, p. A3.

3 July 1991
UNSCOM-3/BM1 conducts inspections at Taji and Habbaniyah. At Taji, the team supervises the destruction of 27 Iraqi ballistic missiles, including 18 Al-Hussein and nine Al-Fahd.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; "U.N. Experts Destroy 39 Iraqi Ballistic Missiles," Agence France Presse, 3 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

4-5 July 1991
UNSCOM-3/BM1 conducts inspections and destruction activities at Taji and Habbaniyah.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

5 July 1991
According to an Iraqi declaration disclosing the status of its ballistic missile force, some of the 819 missiles imported in the period ending in 1988 are unilaterally destroyed. [NOTE: Iraq claimed that it destroyed 85 missiles in July and October 1991. However, UNSCOM found only 83 missile engines from destruction sites.]
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997; United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997; United Nations, "Second Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," S/23268, 4 December 1991; United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

6 July 1991
UNSCOM-3/BM1 inspects and conducts destruction activities at Nabai. The team also inspects undeclared sites in the immediate vicinity of Taji (Nasser Plant and FROG missile systems). The team supervises the destruction of 28 Iraqi conventional missile warheads for the Al-Hussein and Al-Fahd missiles at the Al-Taji launch site.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; "28 Iraqi Missile Warheads Destroyed," Xinhua News Agency, 6 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Iraq Destroys Scud Warheads; Nuclear Team Arrives," Associated Press, 6 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

7 July 1991
UNSCOM-3/BM1 completes its mission.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

7 July 1991
According to a 1997 Iraqi declaration, 15 biological weapons warheads stored at a Tigris Canal site are transported away for decontamination at another location. [NOTE: The imagery displayed shows that warheads were removed from the site some 10 days before the declared date.]
--"Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, June 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>.

7 July 1991
US intelligence believes Iraq possesses more than 40 gas warheads.
--"To Bomb or Not To Bomb," San Jose Mercury News, 7 July 1991, p. C7.

8-9 July 1991
According to a March 1992 Iraqi declaration, 15 special missile warheads arrive at Nibai and are destroyed.
--"Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, June 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>.

10 July 1991
US State Department officials say Iraq attempted to conceal its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and Scud missiles in spite of the UN ceasefire agreement. UN inspectors, following US intelligence leads, are searching for an underground bunker near Baghdad where 400 Scud and Scud-variant missiles are reportedly hidden.
--"Satellite Spots Iraq Burying Atomic Gear," Washington Times, 10 July 1991, pp. A1, A10, <http://www.nti.org/>.

11 July 1991
The Independent quotes the daily Haaretz report: Israel sources believe that Iraq still has Scud missiles and has not handed over all its long-range missiles to UNSCOM inspectors.
--Michael Sheridan, "Iraq May Still Have Scuds," The Independent (London), 11 July 1991, p. 13, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

15 July-20 July 1991
Iraq destroys 89 missiles unilaterally. The Iraqis carry the missiles to the destruction site on board triple carriers and trucks from missile storage sites at Taji, Dawrah, Abu-Gharaib, Bismayah, and other locations prior to the destruction.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

18 July 1991
UNSCOM-10/BM2 arrives in Baghdad. The team inspects the southeast corner of the Taji camp and the Al-Harith surface-to-air (SAM) refurbishment plant. The objective of the mission is to investigate information about additional missiles and related equipment previously undeclared by Iraq. The team discovers 11 decoy Al-Hussein and additional support equipment.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

18 July 1991
In a document filed with UNSCOM, Iraq acknowledges that it has a 35.5cm supergun with a 50m-long barrel at the Jabal Hamrayn military base. The document says that Iraq "tested" the gun. Iraq also admits having steel tubes, including one it intended to use as part of a separate 39-inch supergun.
--Peter James Spielmann, "Iraq Acknowledges It Was Building 'Superguns,'" Associated Press, 19 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

18-20 July 1991
UNSCOM-10/BM2 finds undeclared decoy missiles and additional support equipment in the vicinity of a site previously inspected by the first ballistic missile team.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

20 July 1991
UNSCOM-10/BM2 completes its mission.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

22 July 1991
US intelligence strongly believes that Iraq transferred a large number of Scud missiles to other Arab countries, presumably to avoid their discovery by UN inspection teams. The sources say that Iraq has allegedly stored 400 Scud missiles in Yemen and Sudan. [NOTE: See 13 April 1991]
--"Iraqi Nuclear Equipment Said Sent to Algeria," Proliferation Issues, 8 August 1991, p. 16, <http://www.nti.org/>. [Original source Al-Ahrar (Cairo), 22 July 1991, p. 1..

Late July 1991
According to a March 1992 Iraq declaration, Iraq unilaterally and secretly destroys 85 operational missiles, over 130 warheads (both conventional and chemical), eight operational mobile launchers, and missile force support equipment, without UNSCOM's supervision of the destruction, as required by Resolution 687.
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General,"S/1996/848, 11 October 1996.

August 1991
Iraq unilaterally destroys "regenerated" oxidizer it produced and "non-regenerated" oxidizer it collected together with propellants for Scud-B/Al-Hussein class missiles. [NOTE: Iraq does not use its nitric acid production facility to manufacture oxidizer for Al-Hussein class missiles. Instead, Iraq engages in "refurbishment" of residues of AK271 remaining in storage tanks after fuelling missiles during 1990. Iraq collected some 55 tanks of oxidizer residues, which is over 150 tons of oxidizer.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

August 1991
Iraq initiates a secret project to construct a surface-to-surface missile called "J-1" (based on the Volga/SA2 with certain modifications, particularly to its engine and guidance and control system) without notifying UNSCOM as required by the UN Security Council resolutions. According to an Iraqi statement, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamil issues the orders both for the project itself and for the requirement to keep it a secret from UNSCOM. [NOTE: The Iraqis tell UNSCOM, regarding the ongoing J-1 project, that Iraq is merely developing a non-proscribed Ababil-100 missile that it had declared to UNSCOM. Iraq does not declare any aspect of the J-1 program--from design to parts manufacturing to flight-testing--to UNSCOM until August 1995.]
--United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.

August 1991
UNSCOM discovers a facility in Iraq for the development and production of guidance and control instruments for Al-Hussein class missiles. [NOTE: Iraq did not declare efforts to produce guidance and control instruments for its Al-Hussein class missiles. See April-November 1991]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

August 1991
Iraq admits its reverse-engineering efforts in developing and producing guidance and control instruments for Al-Hussein class missiles.
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

1 August 1991
Rolf Ekeus confirms the existence of chemical warheads containing Sarin nerve gas for Iraq's Scud missiles.
--"Iraq," Milavnews, August 1991, pp. 15-16.

8-15 August 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM3 undertakes a survey of the declared supergun, propellant, and unassembled parts at three different sites. The team obtains a significant number of documents and blueprints related to the construction and development of this system.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

8 August 1991
UNSCOM-8 BM3 inspects and identifies production, repair, and test equipment and machinery associated with the Scud, Al-Hussein, and Badr-2000 missiles for destruction at five declared and seven undeclared sites. At one undeclared site, the team discovers an additional 187 Scud fuel, oxidizer, and starter storage tanks. The team also finds 30 Scud warhead canisters containing chemical-filled warheads at Al-Dujayl. [NOTE: See 31 August -9 September 1991]. [NOTE: Iraq declared seven ballistic missile facilities at Fallujah, Latifiyah, Al-Dawrah, Al-Musayyib, and Al Qa-Qa State Establishment as destroyed, inspected, and confirmed as heavily damaged. However, Iraq reconstructed several facilities.]
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

8 August 1991
According to a senior US State Department official, Iraq probes the black market in order to replace weapons destroyed during the Gulf War. The official also states that Iraq probably is still hiding several hundred Scud missiles around the country.
--Times Wire Services in "Iraq Reportedly Taps Black Market to Rebuild Banned Arms Programs," Los Angeles Times, 8 August 1991, p. A10.

9 August 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM3 inspects declared Balat Al-Shuhada' Plant and Dhu Al-Fiqar Factory at Fallujah (Habbaniyah Solid Motorcase Production Facility) and the undeclared Al-Amer Plant (Fallujah Scud Assembly Plant).
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

10 August 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM3 inspects the undeclared Batra Scud Assembly Plant at Al-Radwan and the Shabiyat Liquid Engine Research, Development, Testing and Engineering Facility at Al-Rafah Project 328 (Shahiyat Unidentified Facility under Construction) and the declared Al-Dawrah facility, in particular Launcher Workshop 144/5.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

11 August 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM3 inspects the declared Jabal Hamrayn supergun and undeclared sites at Al-Dujayl, such as the Sumaykah SSM support facility, Southeast, Southwest, and Orchard.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

12 August 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM3 inspects declared Balat Al-Shuhada' Plant and Taj Al-Ma'arik Factory at Latifiyah. In building 40 (128) at Taj Al-Ma'arik, the team finds the following items; two-inch diameter motor casting chamber and propellant transport container; one inert sub-scale motor with mandrel for Al-Ababil; and two Badr-2000 mandrels. In building 28 (148) at Taj Al-Ma'arik, the team observes oxidizer conditioning in two APC transport containers, one larger for the Badr-2000/Sakr-200 and one smaller for Al-Ababil. In building 26/27 (161) at Taj Al-Ma'arik, the team observes an undamaged micromotor casting/curing facility, a contained bowl for the 3.8 liter mixer and 500 mm diameter mock-ups of Al-Ababil. The Iraqis request that UNSCOM eschew the destruction of at least one 1,135 liter mixer so it can be "modified for civilian uses."
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

13 August 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM3 inspects the declared Al Qa-Qa State Establishment at Latifiyah, and supergun items at Iskandariyah. The team verifies the destruction of equipment at the Al-Rafah Plant and Balat Al-Shuhada' Plant, and Dhu Al-Fiqar Factory at Fallujah.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

14 August 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM3 inspects the declared Balat Al-Shuhada' Plant, Al-Yawm Al-Azim Factory at Al-Musayyib. Plant officials say future static testing and final assembly of 120km-range Sakr-200 ballistic missiles and future testing of unguided ASTROS and 122mm rockets would take place at the site.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

15 August 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM3 verifies the destruction of equipment at the Al-Dawrah Launcher Workshop 144/5, Balat Al- Shuhada' Plant, the Taj Al-Ma'arik Factory at Latifiyah, and the Balat Al-Shuhada' Plant and Al-Yawm Al-Azim Factory at Al-Musayyib.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

18 August 1991
The United Nations attempts to retrieve 11 Silkworm missiles that Iraq took in May 1991 from a naval base formerly maintained by Iraq in Kuwait.
--"Gulf Foe's Tensions Escalate to Gunfire," San Jose Mercury News, 18 August 1991, p. 18A.

August-September 1991
Iraq unilaterally destroys 137 out of a of total 818 tons of imported missile main fuel (TM185) and 407 out of a total of 2,895 tons imported missile oxidizer (AK27I). [NOTE: Iraq has yet to provide any supporting documents as of 25 January 1999.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm>.

August-October 1991
According to the November 1995 Iraqi declaration, the Iraqis unilaterally melt, in foundries: (1) 54-57 indigenously produced combustion chamber and nozzle (CC/N) assemblies that are "rejected for integration into complete engines"; (2) 12 indigenously produced CC/N assemblies integrated into complete engines and used in static tests; (3) 7-10 indigenously produced CC/N assemblies accepted for integration into complete engines and not used as of April 1991. [NOTE: Iraq indigenously produced some 80 CC/N in total. According to UNSCOM's analysis, ingots presented by Iraq as evidence of the unilateral destruction do not show expected evidence of the destroyed CC/N assemblies. See November 1995.
--United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.

15 August 1991
UNSCOM-8 BM3 completes its mission.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

15 August 1991
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 707. It demands that Iraq provide full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by Resolution 687, of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

16 August 1991
Iraq provides UNSCOM-8/BM3 with a declaration of additional Scud fuel and oxidizer storage tanks. [NOTE: See 8-15 August 1991 and 16-30 October 1991.]
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

31 August-9 September 1991
UNSCOM-11 Chemical Weapons inspection team 3 examines the 30 chemical-filled ballistic missile warheads declared by Iraq and found by UNSCOM-8 in the Al-Dujayl area. [NOTE: See 8-15 August 1991.]
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

September 1991
Ambiguity exists concerning the activities of the Al Qa-Qa State Establishment. According to Iraqi officials, Iraq developed bridge wires at Al Qa-Qa for "fire-set" components used to separate missile stages with precision. [NOTE: Such devices are also crucial for precise detonation of high explosives in a nuclear implosion device.]
--"Unresolved Questions Loom on Iraqi Centrifuge Effort," Nucleonics Week, 12 September 1991, pp. 7-9.

6 September 1991
UNSCOM-13/BM4 initiates its mission. It plans to inspect declared fixed launch sites in the Western Zone as well as other undeclared possible missile support facilities using UN helicopters, but Iraq rejects the use of helicopters.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

6-13 September 1991
UNSCOM-13/BM4 observes the destruction of Scud fuel and oxidizer storage tanks located during the third ballistic missile inspection. The team finds four previously destroyed missile transport vehicles from Al Taji that have been spot welded together and moved to that location. Also, the team observes an additional undeclared Scud missile storage support/carrier. [NOTE: See 8-15 August 1991 and 16-30 October 1991.]
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

7 September 1991
UNSCOM-13/BM4 inspects the declared Al-Dujayl open storage facility and undeclared Tikrit and Al-Sahra Air Base.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

9 September 1991
UNSCOM-13/BM4 verifies the destruction of missile-related equipment at the undeclared Khan Al-Mahawil Barracks.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

11 September 1991
Rolf Ekeus says that UN inspectors do not think they have located all of Iraq's Scud missiles. Ekeus also says Iraq had declared 800 Scud-type missiles and, despite UN-supervised destruction of 53 Al-Hussein and Al-Fahd type Scuds and the large number used in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, more may still exist.
--Reuters in "Some Scuds Still Not Found, U.N. Inspectors Fear," Washington Times, 12 September 1991, p. A8.

12 September 1991
Thomas Brock, head of UNSCOM-13/BM4, says that the team would leave Iraq without completing its mission. The group planned on visiting sites in western Iraq, but Iraqi authorities denied them permission to use UN helicopters for the inspections. Iraq's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, says the use of foreign helicopters poses a threat to Iraq's security.
--Reuters in "U.N. Team Giving up Iraq Missile Inquiry," The New York Times, 13 September 1991, p. A5.

13 September 1991
UNSCOM-13/BM4 departs Baghdad without completing its mission because Iraq denied it permission to use UN helicopters for the inspections.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

19 September 1991
Rolf Ekeus states that there is concern that Iraq retains ballistic missiles and nuclear materials. UNSCOM is unable to account for 100 to 150 Scud missiles.
--"U.N. May Send Aide to Iraq on Inspection Issue," Los Angeles Times, 19 September 1991, p. A13, A14.

20 September 1991
US President George Bush reasserts his intention to take military action, if necessary, to force Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. According to analysts, Iraq retains several hundred Scud missiles hidden from inspectors. They also believe that a significant proportion of the 819 Scuds originally sold by the Soviet Union to Iraq still exist and. note that several mobile Scud launchers and some missile production equipment have not been located or destroyed.
--"Hussein Secretly Arranging New Weapon," Los Angeles Times, 21 September 1991, pp. A 1, A16.

23 September 1991
The President of the UN Security Council states that Iraq has failed to fulfill requirements under Resolution 707.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

23-24 September 1991
Iraqi troops detain UN weapons inspectors in Baghdad on two separate occasions.
-- "Iraq Blocking Weapons Inspections by UN Team," USIA Report, 23 September 1991, in <http://www.fas.org/>.

25 September 1991
An IAEA inspection team led by David Kay finds extensive documents linking the nuclear weapons development program to an SSM project. [NOTE: See 8 October 1991.]
--"Dogged Nuclear Inspectors in Global Spotlight," Los Angeles Times, 25 September 1991, p. A10; United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

28 September 1991
Iraq frees 44 UNSCOM inspectors from detention. Iraq sends a letter to Rolf Ekeus to discuss the use of UN helicopters for inspections. Rolf Ekeus calls the letter "a positive step" towards agreement on the use of helicopters, which will allow inspectors to cover more ground and enable them to spot Scud missile launching sites and other banned installations.
--"44 U.N. Inspectors Return to Hotel after Baghdad Lets Them Go Free," The New York Times, 28 September 1991, pp. 1, 6, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

30 September 1991
The Pentagon believes Iraq has operational Scud missiles, but is not sure if any Scud launchers still work.
--"Two Patriot Battalions," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 September 1991, p. 71.

Fall 1991
Iraq stops receiving proscribed Scud missile gyroscope components. [NOTE: Iraq reveals this in December 1994.]
--United Nations, "Second Report under Resolution 1051,"S/1996/848, 11 October 1996.

October 1991
According to an August 1997 Iraqi declaration, Iraq unilaterally destroys five imported missile launcher chassis. [NOTE: Prior to March 1992, Iraq claimed that those launchers were destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War. In March 1992, it declared that Iraq unilaterally destroyed them in the summer of 1991.]
--United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.

October 1991
Iraq states that it had a limited, unsuccessful effort within Project 1728 to reverse engineer proscribed missile engines and had imported some components and equipment for that purpose. [NOTE: For years, Iraq insisted that the main purpose of Project 1728 had not been missile production, but the development of welding and other technologies for manufacturing agricultural pumps.]
--United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.

October 1991
Iraq states that it considers the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Plans, adopted as Resolution 715, to be unlawful and declares that it is not ready to comply with that resolution.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

1 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 arrives in Baghdad and inspects an undeclared site at the Al-Taqaddum (Habbaniyah) Airfield SAM support area. The team discovers derelict SA-2 oxidizer vehicles. The team also searches for more than 24 Iraqi Scud missile launchers near the Syrian border and plans to use helicopters to search western Iraq and supervise the destruction of 28 fixed-site Scud launchers declared by Iraq.
--"U.N. Team Departs for Wide Searches of Iraqi; Helicopter Flights Approved," Washington Post, 2 October 1991, p. A25; "UN Inspector Prepare to Leave Iraq," Monterey Herald, 30 September 1991, p. 2; "U.N. Team Flies to Iraq; Copters Are Due Today," Los Angeles Times, 2 October 1991, p. 4, in Proquest, <http://proquest.umi.com/>; United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth Report under Resolution 715,"S/1994/1138, 7 October1994; UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

1-14 October 1991
UNSCOM-8/BM5 conducts inspections of fixed launch sites in the Western Zone. [NOTE: Although Iraq declared 25 out of a total of 28 launch sites as destroyed, additional destruction is prescribed and carried out.] The team inspects a number of partially constructed fixed launch sites at undeclared sites and destruction procedures are agreed upon. The team also returns to the supergun and supervises the destruction of the gun in the Jabal Hamrayn Mountains, north of Baghdad, as well as the propellant for the supergun located south of Baghdad. The team initiates the destruction of the other supergun components at Iskanderiyah but is not yet completed. The team inspects several undeclared sites revealing no "observable ballistic missile activity."
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

2 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 inspects Al-Dujayl (Sumaykah -West), Al-Abaychi, Shahab Ahmad, and Tikrit (Al-Sahra) Airfield. At Al-Dujayl, the team attempts to verify destruction of 187 oxidizer tanks for the second time. [NOTE: It is not known whether the 187 tanks include fuel tanks as well.] The team finds 78 oxidizer tanks at Abaychi (that Iraq declared during UNSCOM-8), and verifies their destruction. At Shahab Ahmad, the team finds no proscribed items. At Tikrit Airfield, the team finds six Scud warhead canister halves and 173 FROG-7 missiles in shipping containers.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

3 October 1991
UNSCOM inspectors begin over-flights of Iraqi territory to search for Scud missiles and launchers using helicopters provided by Germany.
--"U.N. Begins Air Searches for Iraqi Scuds," Los Angeles Times, 4 October 1991, p. A4, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

3 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 inspects Jabal Hamrayn and Iskandariyah as well as Western Zone launch sites.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

4 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 subteam inspects two sites at Al-Qaim and H-2 Airfield Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) complex. The other subteam inspects Wadi Al-Jabariyah and verifies the destruction of proscribed missile-related equipment at Wadi Ar Ratqa.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

5 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 inspects the Wadi Amij SRBM and the Qasr Amij SRBM complexes. The team conducts short-notice inspections of the Zawr Hawran and Wadi Hawran SRBM complexes and attempts to verify destruction of proscribed missile-related equipment at Wadi Al-Jabariyah.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

6 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 conducts a short-notice inspection of the ammunition storage facility Ar Rutbah, and SRBM complexes at Shuayb Al-Awaj and Qasr Amij East.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

7 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 inspects the Al-Karama Electronics Production Plant adjacent to the State Electrical Industries Enterprise. The team also visits Iskandariyah and Al Qa-Qa to witness the process of destruction of supergun components and propellant.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

8 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 verifies the destruction of an installed 350mm supergun at Jabal Hamrayn.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; "Allies to Detail Ban on Iraqi Arms," The New York Times, 9 October 1991, p. A6.

8 October 1991
The IAEA submits its 6th on-site inspection report to the UN Security Council. In the report, the IAEA says that the documents found by its inspection team on 25 September 1991 suggest Iraq worked on revising a nuclear weapons design and link the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) to an SSM project, presumably the intended delivery system for a nuclear weapon. The team also found a document suggesting the parallel development of a missile delivery system for the ongoing nuclear weapons program. In the document, the Ministry of Defense instructed the IAEC to postpone an experiment until after SSM testing. [NOTE: See 25 September 1991.]
--United Nations, "Report on the 6th IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq under UNSCR687," S/23122, 8 October 1991.

9 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 witnesses the destruction of hydraulic and starter fuel delivery components of two Scud launch control vehicles at Ramad. The team then returns to Bahrain.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

9 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 supervises the destruction of Iraq's 350mm "supergun" located 120km north of Baghdad. [NOTE: According to Iraqi officials, Iraq test fired this "supergun."]
-- UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; "Allies to Detail Ban on Iraqi Arms," The New York Times, 9 October 1991, p. A6.

12 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 completes discussions of questions related to the Iraqi missile program.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

13 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 visits Al-Anbar Space Flight Center. The team finds the Center largely stripped of equipment and fixtures.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

5 October 1991
The New York Times states that a preliminary UNSCOM report indicates that Iraq tested a surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying an atomic bomb. However, according to the quote by The New York Times of comments by David Kay, chief of the inspection mission, the test was for the missile itself. Kay further says that this missile project is "beyond the drawing stage."
--"Iraq Tested Missile to Carry A-Bomb, U.N. Report Says," The New York Times, 5 October 1991, p. A2, in Proquest, <http://proquest.umi.com/>.

9 October 1991
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens says that Israel will take all steps necessary to ensure the security of Israel given that "according to our assessment the Iraqis are still capable of launching missiles against Israel."
--"Iraq Complains to US about Israeli Reconnaissance," Flight International, 16 October 1991, p. 16, <http://www.nti.org/>.

11 October 1991
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 715. It approves the plans for Ongoing Monitoring and Verification submitted by the UN Secretary-General and the International Atomic Energy Agency Secretary-General. [NOTE: Iraq accepts the Resolution on 26 November 1993.]
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

14 October 1991
UNSCOM-18/BM5 completes its mission.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

21 October 1991
The German authorities accuse the German company Thyssen Machine Building GmbH of illegal transactions with Iraq. The Federal Republic of Germany's Economics Ministry documents show that Thyssen Machine Building GmbH signed a contract with Iraq to deliver turbopumps for use in Project 1728. The Ministry reports that export licenses for the pumps "may have been obtained fraudulently on the basis of incorrect information and the presentation of altered documents."
--Das Bild (Hamburg), 21 October 1991, pp. 1, 6 in "Companies Suspected In Iraq Weapons Production: Large Companies Involved," 7 November 1991, Proliferation Issues, 7 November 1991, pp. 1, 6.

24 October 1991
In his report to the UN Secretary-General, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus claims that UNSCOM inspection teams cannot account either for all the relevant missiles that Iraq obtained or constructed, or obtain a full disclosure of plans and progress in future ballistic missile development.
--United Nations, "First Report of the Executive Chairman UNSCOM: Note by the Secretary-General," S/23165, 25 October 1991.

November 1991
UNSCOM inspectors discover that sophisticated German technology and parts were essential to the development of Iraq's missile programs. Some of the equipment found in Iraq still bore the stamp of the German Technical Control Board. Iraq used all aspects of German technology in the modification of Soviet-made Scud-B missiles, doubling their range to approximately 600km. [NOTE: See 21 October 1991.]
--Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 18 November 1991, pp. 41-52, in "Iraq Missile Program Involvement Detailed," FBIS-WEU-91-225, 21 November 1991, pp. 11-14.

November 1991
UN inspectors allege that Soviet and Austrian firms played a role in Iraq's supergun project, which appears on a list that Iraqi officials provided. They refute claims made by the supergun's designer, Brussels-based Space Research, that the project was intended only for a satellite launch. Iraqis tells inspectors that missiles fired by the guns were intended to be accurate within 800 km. The documents reveal Iraq's intention to produce indigenously the projectiles and their guidance systems.
--"More Countries Named in Supergun Affair," Flight International, 13 November 1991, p. 4.

1 November 1991
In his report submitted to the UN Security Council, Chairman of UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus accuses the Iraqi government of a pattern of misinformation, concealment, and lack of cooperation in failing to account for 300 Scud missiles formerly in its arsenal. UNSCOM spokesman Johan Molander says that the United Nations knew Iraq obtained 800 Scuds from the Soviet Union prior to the Gulf War and an accounting of those fired during the war or destroyed afterward leaves 300 unaccounted for. Molander also says UN inspectors have differing opinions on the issue and some believe the Scuds could have been destroyed in tests or launchings. He says inspectors found evidence that Iraq had ordered equipment on behalf of civilian firms and diverted it to military use once it arrived.
--"300 Iraq Scuds Missing, U.N. Team Reports," Los Angeles Times, 2 November 1991, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

18 November-1 December 1991
The UN inspectors find three vehicles used to transport Scud missiles which "had apparently been discarded and overlooked." [NOTE: the Iraqis acknowledge that the site where the Scud carriers were found had been used to store Scud missiles during the Gulf War.]
--"U.N. Inspectors Find Chemical Bomb Making Equipment in Iraq," Agence France Presse, 12 December 1991.

19 November 1991
The Iraqi government proposes to the United Nations that it "be permitted to modify its Badr-2000 Project, which produces Scuds, to produce liquid fuel tanks and rubber insulators for the oil industry, explosives for road construction, cement quarries, and to produce Al-Ababil missiles, which have a 62-mile range."
--Victoria Graham, "Iraq Rejects U.N. Plan for Weapons Destruction," The Associated Press, 28 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

25 November 1991
UNSCOM inspectors uncover a "more complete" story behind Iraq's "supergun" project and evidence linking its designer, Gerald Bull, to Baghdad's largest missile. Iraq had planned to construct five "superguns," two of which would have been 150mm long and 1,000mm in diameter. UNSCOM teams also find a proposal from Bull's company, SRC Engineering (Belgium), to build a long-range missile so that Iraq can launch a satellite or deliver a warhead by clustering between five and eight liquid-fueled rockets together. The program is called Project Bird.
--"Iraq's Doomsday Weapon," U.S. News & World Report, 25 November 1991, p. 40.

27 November 1991
US Senator Dale Bumpers introduces a bill (S.2124) which would place a 10-year prohibition on imports from any companies that the president certifies have "knowingly participated in the Iraqi or North Korean programs to develop ballistic missiles." The bill also directs the president to present a report, in open and classified versions, listing companies that provided "financial services, transportation and other essential services, as well as hardware and software support" to Iraq's ballistic missile program, and detailing these companies' impact on the program.
--"Ballistic Missile, Nuclear, Chemical & Bio Weapons Nonproliferation," Arms Sales Monitoring No. 9-10, 102nd Congress, 11-12/91, p. 5.

2-8 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 supervises the destruction of 32 fixed missile sites in western Iraq as well as 288 launch platforms. The team verifies "the destruction of components of a 1,000-mm super cannon and carries out the operation on the steel tubes at a base at Iskandariyah, 50 kilometers south of Baghdad.
--"Iraq Has Destroyed Its Declared Ballistic Potential: U.N. Inspector," Agence France Presse, 9 December 1991.

2 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 verifies the destruction of fixed missile launch sites in the Western Zone of Iraq. The sites include H-2, Zawr Hawran complex, Wadi Ar Ratqa complex, and Wadi Al-Jabariyah complex.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

3 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 conducts a short-notice inspection of undeclared Saad-16 at Mosul. The team finds high-level rebuilding activities at the site.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

4 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 continues the inspection at Saad-16. The team verifies the destruction of a fixed missile launch site at Saddam Airfield. It conducts a short-notice inspection of Salah Al-Din General Establishment at the Saad-13 facility.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

5 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 verifies destruction of launcher bases at the Al-Dawrah workshop. The team inspects Al- Musayyib Rocket Motor Test Facility, Khan Al-Mahawil Barracks, and the Iskandariyah Facility.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

6 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 verifies the destruction of fixed missile launch sites and triple carriers at Taji. The team inspects a storage area at Taji, the Taji refurbishment plant, Al-Matuwakel (Project 1728), Taji military installation (Project 144/3), Taji Steel Fabrication plant (Central Tool Room Plant), Al-Mutawakel evacuation area, and Sabiyat facility. The inspectors find laboratory equipment at a research and development center in Mosul and at a factory site in Al-Taji, which they judge to be primarily intended for use in ballistic missile production and testing. The team also destroys "two trailers for transporting Al-Hussein and Scud missiles, which UNSCOM previously destroyed but Iraq subsequently welded together for carrying shorter-range missiles, and six other trailers."
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; "Iraq Has Destroyed Its Declared Ballistic Potential: U.N. Inspector," Agence France Presse, 9 December 1991; "Iraq's Destruction of Missile Launch Sites Verified," Xinhua News Agency, 18 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

7 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 inspects the Badr General Establishment and Khan Azad facility. The team conducts further inspections of the Al-Nur facility, storage area for Al-Nasser facility.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

8 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 verifies the destruction of supergun component at Iskandariyah. The team also verifies the destruction of Al-Hussein trailers in the Al-Nabai area.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

9 December 1991
UNSCOM-23/BM6 completes its mission.
--United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth Report Under Resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994; S/1996/848 of 11/10/1996.

9 December 1991
UNSCOM-24/BM7 initiates its mission to verify Iraq's destruction of long-range missiles and superguns.
--United Nations, "Sixth Report under Resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994; S/1996/848 of 11/10/1996; "U.N. Overseer Says Iraq's Long-Range Missile Stock Destroyed," Xinhua News Agency, 9 December 1991.

9 December 1991
The Head of a UN inspection team, Patrice Palanque of France reports that "Iraq has destroyed the components of a giant cannon, one meter in diameter, and has now eliminated all its declared ballistic weapons of mass destruction." He says, "The destruction of everything the Iraqis had identified as part of their ballistic capacity has been verified."
--"Iraq Has Destroyed Its Declared Ballistic Potential: U.N. Inspector," Agence France Presse, 9 December 1991.

9 December 1991
A UN overseer to monitor Iraq's disarmament says that "Iraq's long-range missile stock has been destroyed under the UN resolution." Alastair Livingston, the Bahrain-based regional representative of the UNSCOM says, "...theoretically, we have destroyed Iraq's long-range missile stock."
--"Iraq Has Destroyed Its Declared Ballistic Potential: U.N. Inspector," Agence France Presse, 9 December 1991.

9-17 December 1991
UNSCOM-24/BM7 oversees the destruction of missile launch sites in western Iraq and monitors the destruction of 22 parts from a 1,000mm supergun.
--"U.N. Inspectors Oversee Destruction of New Missile Sites in Iraq," Agence France Presse, 19 December 1991.

11 December 1991
UNSCOM-24/BM7 inspects Hadithah Ammunition Storage Depot West and Hadithah Revetted Storage Area for concealed Scud activity. Both are undeclared sites.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

11 December 1991
UNSCOM-24/BM7 finds three undeclared Scud missile carriers "which had apparently been discarded and overlooked" at an ammunition dump 64 km west of Karbala.
--Peter James Spielmann, "Iraqi Chemical Bomb Plant Found Hidden at Sugar Factory," Associated Press, 11 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

12 December 1991
UNSCOM-24/BM7 inspects the following seven undeclared sites: the T-1 Pumping Station, the Al-Qaim SA