Early 1992
Iraq admits that it imported some guidance and control instruments for proscribed missiles until November 1991.
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

Early 1992
Iraq attempts to modify the Volga/SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) for use as a surface-to-surface missile (SSM). At the Sadiq factory, work begins on liquid propulsion missile engines, including the reverse-engineering and production of the Volga/SA-2 missile engine. In addition, work focuses on manufacturing certain components such as missile engine shut-off valves. These are not part of the original Volga/SA-2 engine, but they are required for an SSM.
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

1992
Iraq spreads remnants of conventional warheads at the sites where it claims unilateral destruction of 45 declared "special warheads" for chemical and biological payload occurred.
--"Iraq Special Collection, Missile-Related Issues, Examples of Problems," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <http://cns.miis.edu/>.

1992
Iraq begins construction of a large air-defense system, called the "Mother of Battles System," which is under the direct supervision of Hussein Kamel. Engineers and technicians complete construction of two branch systems. [NOTE: According to the Iraqi Broadcasting Corporation which quotes informed Iraqi military sources, the air defense system consists mainly of French radar systems and short-range Roland-type missiles, in addition to Russian-made long-range SA-6 missiles. The system is called the three-dimensional radar.]
--"Iraqi Regime Acquires Russian-Made Air Defense System," Iraqi National Congress (Internet) in Arabic, 22 March 1999, <http://www.inc.org.uk/>.

1992
The Iraqi anti-missile unit begins operations. This is one of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Organization's various strategic projects. Iraq also develops surveillance radar using high-speed computers. This radar is able to track more than one missile at a time.
--"Strategic Projects of the Iraqi Military Industrialisation Organisation," Iraqi National Congress, 9 September 1997, <http://www.inc.org.uk/>; Iraqi National Congress WWW [Online], 10 September 1997, in "Iraq: IBC Cited On Strategic Projects, Military Capability," FBIS-TAC-97-253, 10 September 1997.

1992-1993
Iraq conducts a series of static missile tests as part of Project 1728, which is the Iraqi effort to develop and produce indigenous Scud engines. [NOTE: Iraq does not declare the first five tests to UNSCOM. The project required production of "five sets of engine hardware." Iraq declares that it produced a small number of engine parts and components, but claims no engines were ever assembled. Iraq shows some of these parts and components to an UNSCOM inspection team later, while it declares that Iraq unilaterally melted down others. Iraqi officials maintained little documentary evidence to support their declarations regarding the nature of missile engine production activities at the Sadiq Factory.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

1992-1993
The Iraqis fit a variety of air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles to Russian-built MiG and Sukhoi jets.
--"Iraqi Army at 40 Percent of Pre-Gulf War Strength: Jane's," Agence France Presse, 27 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1 January 1992
A South Korean defense report says that North Korea now produces indigenous SSMs and an improved version of the Scud-B for export to states in the Middle East, including Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
--The Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, "Defense White Paper 1991-1992," 1 January 1992.

January 1992
The United Nation's Special Commission (UNSCOM) discloses that German companies knowingly assisted in efforts to extend the range of Iraqi Scud missiles. The inspectors release a report which ties German firms to the Iraqi program using both photographic evidence and actual nameplates removed from Scuds. [NOTE: Three missiles in particular included German-made pressure gauges and electrical plugs manufactured by Hirschmann of Germany. Also, findings reveal that the Goldhofer firm supplied load-bearing chassis to Iraq. Siemens' electrical distributors were present as well, as was an electrical switch control board manufactured by Polyma. In addition, launchers were located containing parts manufactured by Mercedes Benz and the Swedish firm Saab. Further, portions of launch vehicles were of German origin.]
--"'Gotcha': U.N. Team Finds Germans Engaged in Missile Proliferation," Decision Brief, No. 92-D1, 2 January 1992.

14 January 1992
US President George Bush says that Iraq possesses a large number of undeclared ballistic missiles and may attempt to produce more based on the design of Scud missiles that were obtained prior to the Gulf War. He also says uncertainty lingers regarding whether UNSCOM discovered every aspect of Iraq's efforts both to produce Scud missiles indigenously and to develop a more capable solid-propellant missile.
--Terence Hunt, "Saddam Still Has Many Secret Missiles, Warns Bush," The Herald (Glasgow), 15 January 1992, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Terence Hunt, "Bush Says Iraq Still Has Many Ballistic Missiles," Associated Press, 14 January 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

15 January 1992
Flight International reports that the German intelligence service Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) confirmed in a confidential report that German companies were involved in the manufacture of Iraqi Scud missiles. The report identifies such firms as including C Plath, which supplied three million Deutsche marks worth of gyroscope components; Pressluft Franz, which delivered a test bench for turbo pumps through Saudi Arabia; Anlagenbow Contor, which provided quality control equipment; Heinrich Muller, which sold missile propulsion injectors; and Marrell, which sold 26 Mercedes-Benz tractor units that were allegedly used to haul Scud launchers. H&H Metalform, Havert Handels-Gesellschaft, and Leifeld companies allegedly provided other tooling and test equipment. The report also states that Thyssen Machinenbau firm was contracted to provide 305 turbo-pumps valued at 13 million Deutsche marks, but the company reportedly delivered only 35.
--"German Role in Iraqi Scud Project Proven," Flight International, 15 January 1992, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

15 January 1992
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Robert Gates testifies before a Senate subcommittee that Saddam Hussein could rebuild Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon programs, as well as its ballistic missile program, within a few years. Gates estimates that Iraq may still possess several hundred Scud missiles and a substantial quantity of missile production equipment. According to The Washington Times, Pentagon officials believe that Iraq may still hide up to 800 ballistic missiles.
--"Iraq Could Rebuild Weapons in A Few Years, Gates Says," San Jose Mercury News, 16 January 1992, p. 6A; "Arms-Happy Gulf Resists New Curbs," The Washington Times, 17 January 1992, pp. A1, A10.

16 January 1992
German authorities bring criminal charges against three managers of Thyssen Machinenbau GmbH who allegedly exported key components for Scud-B missile production to Iraq. The illegal exports allegedly occurred in 1990, and included 35 turbo pumps and other components which were used to manufacture the missiles in Iraq.
--"Thyssen Executives Charged with Supplying Scud-B Parts to Iraq," United Press Information, 16 January 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

24 January 1992
Moneyclips quotes the Kuwait daily newspaper Al Watan regarding a report that Jordan stores Scud missile launchers and 50 missiles for Iraq.
--"Kuwait Paper Claims Jordan Storing Iraqi Scuds," Moneyclips, 24 January 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

25 January 1992
UNSCOM submits a report to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, which says the group is satisfied that all declared ballistic missiles are destroyed. The report does note, however, that there are still some uncertainties regarding whether Iraq declared all missiles as per Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687.
--United Nations Security Council, U.N. Security Council Document S/23514, 25 January 1992.

31 January 1992
The German government believes that German companies provided approximately 25% of Iraq's Scud missile technology.
--Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 18 January 1992, p. 1; in "German Firms Implicated in Iraqi Nuclear Program," Proliferation Issues, 31 January 1992, pp. 59-60.

January-February 1992
US House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee investigators identify 13 US firms that supplied equipment for the Iraqi missile program, which is code-named Project 395. In a letter to President Bush, Committee Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez writes, "Numerous US companies provided critical support to Iraqi weapons programs, including missiles." [NOTE: A German intelligence report identifies Project 395 as Iraq's effort to develop the Condor II, a missile with a range of more than 960km that is capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.]
--"Iraq Arms Aid Traced to US Firms," Los Angeles Times, 4 February 1992, p. A4.

February 1992
US intelligence officials estimate that Iraq's arsenal includes an accumulation of more than 800 Scud missiles. Informed sources admit that they "severely" underestimated the number of Iraqi missiles and launchers at the beginning of the Gulf War. In addition, they say production continues on an "around-the-clock basis" in an as-yet unknown underground factory that escaped detection during the war.
--Charles Fenyvesi, "Cache on Hand," US News & World Report, 10 February 1992, p. 22.

February 1992
Bavarian police seize containers bound for Iraq that contain fuses for Scud missile warheads. The police arrest the managing directors of the firm involved.
--Munchner Merkur, 20 February 1992; in "More on the German Scud Scandal," Peace News Bulletin, p. 4.

February 1992
UNSCOM inspectors identify at least 17 facilities as sites where the Iraqis conducted research, production, testing, and repair of ballistic missiles, launchers, and rocket fuel. Iraq procured much of the equipment for these programs from Soviet or West European sources, although the Iraqis modified the equipment to suit their objectives.
--"U.S. Pledges to Support Effort to Destroy Iraq Missile Plants," The Washington Post, 14 February 1992, p. A33.

February 1992
UN officials suspect that Iraq has hidden up to 50 Scud-B, Al-Hussein, and/or Al-Abbas missiles.
--"How Saddam is Picking up the Pieces a Year after 'Storm,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 February 1992, p. 284.

February 1992
Iraq promises to return Kuwait's Hawk SAMs and launchers, which were acquired during the Iraqi incursion into Kuwait. Iraq also provides a detailed list of the Hawk launchers, missiles, and radars in its possession. [NOTE: The return of the Hawks is important as these missiles are currently the most advanced component of an Iraqi air-defense arsenal that is heavily reliant on aging Soviet SA-2, SA-6, and SA-7.]
--"Iraq Vows to Return Weapons," Defense News, 15 February 1993, pp. 3-4.

7 February 1992
In his letter to the UN Security Council, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus states that "substantial uncertainty" remains about whether Iraq has declared all missiles subject to SCR 687, primarily Scud or Scud variants, as required.
--"U.N. Says Iraq May Still Have Scuds," Associated Press, 8 February 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

11 February 1992
Clinton administration sources say, "Iraq still possesses some components to produce nuclear weapons and retains an arsenal of ground-to-ground missiles."
--Steven Heilbronner, "U.S. Continues Pressure against Iraq," United Press Information, 11 February 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

February 1992
US administration officials say that the United States has observed several highly provocative Iraqi military movements, including the sighting to the north of Baghdad of approximately 20 special tank trucks used to fuel Scud missiles. The number of these trucks constitutes a greater quantity than US intelligence previously estimated had been built or had survived allied bombing. Additionally, Iraq has added a battalion of up to 16 Frog-7 missiles, with a range of approximately 80km, to internal security forces deployed around Baghdad. According to a defense official, intelligence reports also indicate that the Iraqis frequently move covertly deployed Scuds in a manner resembling a "shell game." Further, the officials claim that Iraq conceals ballistic missiles that are supposed to be slated for destruction.
--"Saddam's Moves Force Bush to React," The Washington Times, 11 February 1992, pp. A3, A9.

14 February 1992
Rolf Ekeus sends a letter to the Iraqi Advisor to Foreign Affairs Minister Wissam Al-Zahawi. Ekeus writes that the UN Security Council could consider allowing Iraq to reuse some equipment, materials, and facilities related to ballistic missile production as Iraq requested, provided that appropriate monitoring arrangements are made to verify compliance with SCRs 687 and 715. The letter specifies the Al Qa-Qa State Establishment, the Dhu Al Fiqar factory, the Taj Al Marik factory, and the Al-Yawm Al-Azim factory as "integral important parts of these missile capabilities."
--United Nations Security Council, U.N. Security Council Document S/23673, 4 March 1992.

21 February 1992
UNSCOM-28/BM8 (Ballistic Missile Team 8) arrives in Baghdad. The team is instructed to verify the destruction of items used for missile repair, in production facilities, and other such related equipment, all of which was identified to Iraq in a letter dated 14 February. The items to be verified at the Dhu Al-Fiqar Factory include a DEA computer, an INSTRON cooling chamber and measurement equipment, motor case transport dollies, and a cooler. At the Taj Al Marik Factory, two 1,135-liter mixers and three 1,135-liter mixer bowls are listed. The items for verification at the Al-Yawn Al-Azim Factory include a cradle for Badr-2000 as well as electronic test equipment.
--United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth Report under Resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994; United Nations Security Council, U.N. Security Council Document S/23673, 4 March 1992.

21 February to 24 March 1992
UNSCOM-29 chemical munitions team destroys 463 chemically-tipped rockets at Iraq's Al-Khamisiyah site.
--Agence France Presse (Paris), 24 March 1992, in "UN Official on Chemical Missiles," Proliferation Issues, 3 April 1992, p. 5; United Nations, "Third Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," S/24108, 16 June 1992, in Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/>.

22 February 1992
UNSCOM-28/BM8 inspects Al-Karama Center. This facility was undeclared by the Iraqis and therefore not inspected previously by UNSCOM. [NOTE: The team inspects Al-Karama Center using what is known as a "Notice of Inspection." This involves the UNSCOM chairman providing his signature on a "Notice of Inspection," which in turn provides license for inspectors to enter undeclared sites.] The team also inspects the Al-Karama Gyroscope and Stabilizer Establishment, a neighboring factory and a Mercedes service area.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

22 February 1992
UNSCOM-28/BM8 views a site where Iraq claims to have destroyed substantial quantities of missiles and other weapons in May 1991.
--"U.N. Team Sees Where Iraq Says It Destroyed Missiles," The Washington Times, 23 February 1992, p. A9.

23 February 1992
UNSCOM-28/BM8 inspects the declared Al Taji facility, particularly the sections related to Project 144/1, 2, and 4. The team seals some items which are marked for destruction. [NOTE: Project 144/1 and Project 144/2 are related to Iraqi efforts to modify Al-Hussein missiles. Project 144/4 is an effort to manufacture gyros.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

24 February 1992
UNSCOM-28/BM8 inspects the Taj Al Marik Factory and Al Qa-Qa State Establishment. The team also inspects a facility which supports production, or intended production, of the Ababil-100 and Sakr-200 rockets, with maximum ranges of 100km and 120km, respectively. Iraq informs the team of several proposals for conversion of equipment to either civilian uses or for military rocket programs with a maximum range of less than 150km. Iraq proposes to use the rest of the production line to produce Ababil-100 and Sakr-200 rocket motors.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

24 February 1992
The German authorities arrest two managers of the German firm Neue Magdeburger Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik GmbH on the suspicion that they illegally exported machine tools for the manufacture of missile parts to Iraq.
--DPA (Hamburg), 25 February 1992; in "Businessmen Arrested for Arms Exports to Iraq," Proliferation Issues, 13 March 1992, p. 39.

25 February 1992
UNSCOM-28/BM8 inspects the Dhu Al-Fiqar and Al-Yawm Al-Azim Factories. The team inspects Building 8 at Dhu Al-Fiqar, which specializes in the production of motor cases and flexible nozzles. The director of the factory says this building was intended not only for uses relevant to the Badr-2000 program, but also for production related to the Ababil-100 and Sakr-200 rockets. The team asks to see fixtures at the facility relevant to the Ababil and Sakr programs as the Iraqis had not previously mentioned either of these systems in connection with Dhu Al-Fiqar. In response, Iraq claims that the Ababil-100 and Sakr-200 are part of their future proposals for the factory. They explain their plan is to convert the site into a low pressure gas vessel and chlorine gas tank production plant. Also at Dhu Al-Fiqar, construction of a large horizontal test stand at Building 54 is underway. Iraq says the test-stand would be re-designed to accommodate rocket motors with up to 30-ton thrust.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

26 February 1992
UNSCOM-28/BM8 inspects bunkers at the Taji ammunition depot and verifies the destruction of items sealed on 23 February.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

26-28 February 1992
Iraq rejects UN plans for the destruction of Iraqi ballistic missile production facilities. Instead, the Iraqis say the UN should allow them to convert their Scud missile program to civilian-oriented programs.
--Victoria Graham, "Iraq Rejects U.N. Plan for Weapons Destruction," Associated Press, 28 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Main Events in Iraqi Weapons Program Inspections," Associated Press, 29 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

28 February 1992
The UN Security Council condemns Iraq for refusing to allow UN inspectors to destroy missile production and repair equipment. Rolf Ekeus orders UNSCOM-28/BM8 to withdraw from Iraq as a result of Iraq's non-cooperation.
--United Nations, "UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events," <http://www.un.org/>; Nabila Megalli, "U.N. Team Confident Pressure Will Force Iraq to Comply," Associated Press, 29 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Victoria Graham, "Iraq Rejects U.N. Plan for Weapons Destruction," Associated Press, 28 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; United States Information Agency: U.S. Policy on Iraq; United Nations, "3rd Report under UNSCR 687," S/24108, 16 June 1992.

28 February 1992
In a letter to UNSCOM, Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Muhammad Said al-Sahhaf requests that UNSCOM wait to destroy the equipment used in the Badr-2000 program to allow the UN Security Council to consider permitting Iraq to keep this equipment for use in non-military programs. [NOTE: See 14 February 1992.]
--United Nations Security Council, "U.N. Security Council Document S/23673," 4 March 1992.

29 February 1992
UNSCOM-28/BM8 departs Baghdad due to the absence of a breakthrough with the Iraqis regarding the destruction of the Badr-2000 equipment.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; "U.S. Warship Ready for Action on Iraq," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 1 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

End of February-March 1992
US administration sources say that the United States is searching for more than 100 Iraqi Scud missiles that Iraq may be hiding underground near Baghdad. According to intelligence reports, Iraq has constructed underground storage sites, possibly for the purpose of sheltering missiles from UNSCOM. Also, US intelligence sources claim the exact number of Scuds remaining in Iraq may be as many as 800.
--"Hidden Iraqi Missiles Sought," The Washington Times, 5 March 1992, pp. A1, A8.

March 1992
Iraq establishes the Ibn Al-Haytham Center and delivers SA-2 SAMs there.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

March 1992
Iraq declares to UNSCOM the unilateral destruction of undamaged semi-trailer components for its indigenous missile engine production. [NOTE: 1991- March 1992.]
--"Iraq Special Collection, Missile-Related Issues, Examples of Problems, Special Warheads," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <http://cns.miis.edu/>.

March 1992
Iraq discloses that it has concealed from UNSCOM the greater part of its operational missile force. The missile force includes 85 operational missiles, over 130 warheads (both conventional and chemical,) 8 operational mobile launchers, and missile force support equipment, as well as a "significant" amount of other proscribed items and materials.
--United Nations, "Second Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/848, 11 October 1996.

March 1992
Brazilian Brigadier General Hugo de Oliveira Piva says that Brazil participated in the design of an Iraqi air-to-air missile. He denies, however, that Brazil transferred technology which can be used in long-range missile production.
--Istor Senhor (Sao Paulo), 18 March 1992, pp. 5-7; in "Piva Discusses Past Cooperation with Iraq," Proliferation Issues, 29 April 1992, pp. 9-11.

March-April 1992
According to Iraq's 1997 UNSCOM declaration, Iraq covertly removes remnants of complete, indigenously produced engines from a site where allegedly they had been destroyed unilaterally by the Iraqis.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

2 March 1992
Saddam Hussein reportedly reinstates his son-in-law, General Hussein Kamel, as chief of Iraq's arms and oil industries. Hussein Kamel is the main architect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear, chemical warfare, and long-range missile programs.
--"Hussein Said to Rehire Son-in-Law to Battle U.N.," Los Angeles Times, 3 March 1992, p. A8.

6 March 1992
Former UNSCOM inspector David Kay claims: "The productive capacity in the chemical, biological, Scud missile production and in the nuclear areas still exists to a considerable extent."
--"Hurd: Britain Would Consider Military Strike at Iraq," The Washington Post, 6 March 1992, p. A18.

9 March 1992
The United States seeks detailed information regarding the solid fuel motors and guidance technology for the Argentine Condor II missile, which was developed at a plant in Falda del Carmen, Argentina, then shipped to Iraq. The plant had a parabolic antenna that the United States believes was used to send microwave data transmissions to Iraqi procurement agents working at front companies in Austria and Switzerland. [NOTE: The Condor II is a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) developed in Argentina, and financed in part by the Iraqis.]
--"US Concern over Argentine Missile Links to Baghdad," Financial Times, 9 March 1992, p. 3.

10 March 1992
German authorities arrest six former high-ranking Polish government officials in Germany at a Frankfurt hotel, including a former third-ranked general in the Polish army and two former deputy Cabinet ministers. These officials allegedly signed a $96-million deal with Iraq to provide 4,000 grenade launchers, 1,000 portable anti-aircraft missiles, and 73,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles. Two Americans, Ronald James Hendron and alleged financier Jehmin Lah, were also involved in the deal. [NOTE: Arrested in Germany are Jerzy Napiorkowski, deputy minister of finance in the last Polish Communist government; Wojciech Baranski, former deputy chief of staff in the Polish army; Jan Gorecki, a former Polish diplomat in Washington; Zbigniew Grabowski, former director of the Polish technology office; Jerzy Brzostek, former deputy minister of the Polish Housing Ministry; and Rajmund Szwonder, general manager of the Lucznik armament factory in Radom, Poland.]
--Paul Richter, "8 Arrested in Scheme to Sell Arms to Iraq," Los Angeles Times, 28 March 1992, p. 1, in ProQuest, <http://proquest.umi.com/>.

12 March 1992
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz asks the UN to allow Iraq to keep its weapons factories and convert them to civilian uses. Rolf Ekeus, however, states that UNSCOM will continue to insist not only on the destruction of long-range missiles, but also launchers, production and repair facilities, and cruise-type non-ballistic missiles.
--"Security Council Warns Iraqis to Halt Cease-Fire Violations," The Washington Post, 13 March 1992, pp. A16-A19; Steve Doughty, "We Want to Make Peace at Our Arms Plants, Says Iraq," The Daily Mail (London), 13 March 1992, p. 9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 March 1992
US President George Bush says that the US maintains its belief that Iraq still possesses large numbers of undeclared ballistic missiles.
--Reuters, 16 March 1992; in "Bush Says Iraq Still Has Many Ballistic Missiles," Executive New Service, 17 March 1992.

18 March 1992
Rolf Ekeus receives a letter from the Iraqi government in which Iraq reveals a "concrete" number of ballistic missiles that it claims to have destroyed unilaterally in the summer of 1991. UN officials refuse to disclose the number of missiles allegedly destroyed because UNSCOM must first work to verify the Iraqi declaration.
--J.T. Nguyen, "Iraq Discloses More Ballistic Missiles Destroyed," United Press International, 20 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 March 1992
US military officials plan a series of potential air and missile attacks against Iraqi weapons sites that may be undertaken if Iraq continues to disregard UN resolutions. According to a Pentagon official, military officials plan air strikes against Al-Atheer nuclear weapons establishment and approximately 14 other sites where Iraq allegedly manufactures or stores Scud missiles.
--John M. Broder and Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Prepares for Strikes on Iraqi targets in Persian Gulf: Air, Missile Attacks Could Be Ordered If Baghdad Fails to Meet U.N. Deadline on Arms Destruction," Los Angeles Times, 19 March 1992, p. 1.

19 March 1992
Rolf Ekeus meets the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdul Amir al-Anbari. Al-Anbari hands over new information concerning Iraq's ballistic missile and chemical weapon programs. He states that Iraq is willing to make a full, final, and complete disclosure of its proscribed weapons programs. Iraq also agrees to the destruction of missile production facilities and associated equipment as was demanded by UNSCOM in the letter of 14 February 1992. In addition, Iraq reveals that it unilaterally destroyed 89 Al-Hussein missiles, three training missiles, 135 warheads, and associated equipment and vehicles, including mobile missile launchers. Iraq claims these items were destroyed at the Al-Alam site in the summer of 1991. [NOTE: UNSCOM team leader Derek Boothby says Iraqi officials claim that these items were destroyed in June 1991.]
--"Statement by Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of the UN Special Commission on the Disposal of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Federal News Service, 20 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis,<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;United Nations, "Third Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," S/24108, 16 June 1992; "UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events; United Nations, "Report to Secretary-General," 22 May 1992; UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; Charles Laurence, "Iraqis Say They will Destroy Missiles," The Daily Telegraph, 21 March 1992, p.10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Paul Lewis, "Iraq Agrees to Destroy Missiles to Meet U.N. Cease-Fire Terms," The New York Times, 21 March 1992, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "U.N. Inspectors Find No Scuds Hidden in Iraq," Associated Press, 30 March 1992, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; United Nations, "Eighth Report under Resolution 715," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995; "U.N. Still 'Concerned' About Iraq," The Washington Post, 4 April 1992, p. A19; "Iraq Agrees to Destroy Missile, Nuclear Equipment," Arms Control Today (April 1992), p. 18; Nabila Megalli, "U.N. Ballistic Team Arrives In Iraq to Confirm Baghdad's Disclosures," Associated Press, 21 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 March 1992
UNSCOM holds talks lasting four hours with Iraqi officials regarding the location at which Iraq unilaterally destroyed substantial quantities of missiles and chemical weapons in June 1991. Iraq revealed this unilateral destruction on 18 March 1992 but did not disclose the exact site of these activities at that time.
--"U.N. Weapons Inspection Team Begins Onsite Verification," Xinhua News Agency, 22 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

20 March 1992
Iraq tells the United Nations that it destroyed "long-range Scud missiles and their modified Al-Hussein versions, missile launchers, chemical bombs including nerve gas warheads, and ammunition and spare parts."
--Nabila Megalli, "U.N. Ballistic Team Arrives in Iraq to Confirm Baghdad's Disclosures," Associated Press, 21 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

20 March 1992
The post-war Rafidain project begins. The Rafidain project is the Iraqi effort to reverse-engineer the SA-2 air-defense missile for conversion to a SAM. [NOTE: Iraq had a similar program before the Gulf War.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

20 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 announces that it destroyed 500 warheads, rockets, and "partial missiles" that contained sarin in Nasiriya.
--Paul Lewis, "Iraq Agrees to Destroy Missiles to Meet U.N. Cease-Fire Terms," The New York Times, 21 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

21 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 arrives in Baghdad. The group's original objective was to carry out inspections at undeclared sites. However, the group's objectives are changed as a result of Iraq's provision of new information concerning its declared unilateral destruction of Al-Hussein missiles.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

22 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 conducts interviews with Iraqis at Dawrah. The team also inspects a missile destruction site at Niba'i.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

23 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 inspects designated Taji sites. At the Project 144/4 site, the Iraqis indicate indigenous research and development have occurred in an effort to convert and/or reverse-engineer the gyro element of the SA-2 for use in SSMs such as the Al-Hussein. [NOTE: The head of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate, General Hossam Amin, later forcefully denies this.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

23 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 confirms that Iraq destroyed and buried a number of Scud missiles and other weapons, as related in the Iraqi declaration to the United Nations on 21 March. The team views pieces of missiles and guidance components at each of three sites visited, although most of the missile parts are buried and therefore will require further excavation for a complete verification. UNSCOM spokesman Tim Trevan says that Iraq also submitted plans for the destruction of the equipment used for missile production.
--"Iraq Scrapped Scuds, U.N. Probers Confirm," The Washington Times, 24 March 1992, p. A1; "U.N. Inspectors Confirm Iraq Has Destroyed Terror Weapons," Associated Press, 23 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

24 March 1992
UN officials study plans submitted by the Iraqis for the destruction of manufacturing equipment related to its Scud missile program. [NOTE: Iraq refused to destroy the equipment during a previous UN inspection.]
--Mark Nicholson, "UN Says Iraq Has Destroyed Scud Missiles," Financial Times, 24 March 1992, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

25 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 implements operations for the destruction of equipment at Taj Al Marik. The group also supervises the destruction of missile production facilities and repair equipment, which includes three technical facilities at Al-Yawm Al-Azim and Dhu Al-Fiqar . Equipment destroyed includes missile fuel and precursors, missile machinery, missile body production, transport equipment, precision lathes and electronic testing items. The team also conducts an inspection of inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) containers at Latifiyah.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; Nabila Megalli, "Missile Inspectors Examine Scud Remains," Associated Press, 26 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Nabila Megalli, "U.N. Starts Destroying Missile Production Equipment," Associated Press, 25 March 1992; Nabila Megalli, "Missile Inspectors Examine Scud Remains," Associated Press, 26 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "U.N. Iraqis Destroy Scud Goods," The Washington Times, 26 March 1992, p. A7; "Iraq Agrees to Destroy Missile, Nuclear Equipment," Arms Control Today, April 1992, p.18.

27 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 confirms destruction at Taj Al Marik and Dhu Al-Fiqar. The team also inspects an Iraqi missile destruction site at Bismayah. In addition, the group conducts follow-on inspections at the Dawrah and Niba'i sites.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

27 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 team leader Derek Boothby confirms that "the nine equipment facilities used in producing and maintaining ballistic missiles in Iraq are totally destroyed." He adds, "there is sufficient evidence to believe that Iraq has destroyed missiles and related equipment as Iraq had promised it would last July."
--"Iraq's Missile Production Equipment Destroyed," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 27 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

27 March 1992
CIA Director Robert Gates asserts that Iraq still hides several hundred Scuds and other weapons. He adds that Iraq has maintained "significant elements of each of its special weapons programs."
--"Arab Accuses Jordan of Hiding Iraqi Scuds," The Washington Times, 2 April 1992, pp. A1, A9; "U.N. Inspectors Find No Scuds Hidden in Iraq," Associated Press, 30 March 1992, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Iraq Has Scuds, Nuke Equipment, CIA's Gates Says," The Washington Times, 28 March 1992, p. A7.

28 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 inspects the Al-Fao Establishment offices. [NOTE: The Technical Corps (TECO) for Special Project Headquarters was formerly located at this site. The Iraqis apparently vacated this site in July 1991.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

29-30 March 1992
UNSCOM-31/BM9 inspects designated Taji sites and the Abu-Gharib destruction site.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

30 March 1992
Derek Boothby confirms that Iraq apparently destroyed between 80-100 Scud missiles in June 1991 as Iraqi officials had earlier claimed. However, he also states that Iraq may possess other Scuds that remain intact.
--"U.N. Confirms Iraq Destroyed Scuds," The Washington Post, 31 March 1992, p. A13.

Late March 1992
The Yugoslavian Federal Army deploys a new multiple rocket launcher, the M-87 Orkan, which was reportedly developed with financial and technical assistance from Iraq. The missiles are able to carry three types of cluster munitions, disperse up to 30 antitank mines, and scatter up to 300 antipersonnel bomblets or 288 antipersonnel mines.
--"Yugoslavs Field New Rocket," Defense News, 30 March 1992, p.2.

Late March-April 1992
Iraq conducts a covert operation to remove remnants of complete, indigenously produced missile engines from the site of their destruction by the Iraqis. [NOTE: The name of this site is missing from Iraqi declarations. Iraq later reveals the site name in a 1997 declaration.]
--United Nations, "The Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

April-May 1992
Iraq excavates the Al-Alam site, where Iraq claims proscribed items were destroyed without UNSCOM's supervision. Iraq also removes the majority of missile components from Al-Alam and melts them at foundries. Iraq aims to conceal the extent of its missile engine production achievements from UNSCOM.
--United Nations, "The Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

2 April 1992
Arab diplomats stationed in Amman claim that Iraq secretly moved Scud missiles to Jordan to escape destruction by UNSCOM. Sources claim Iraqi soldiers hide and maintain the Scud missiles near two air bases, known as H-4 and H-5, in an area called Al-Ruweished. They also state that Iraq has moved the disassembled missiles in trucks disguised as refrigerated tractor-trailers. In addition, they claim that Iraqi Scud technicians have recently been spotted in Amman. US intelligence agencies are following up on the claims, but they have not found further evidence yet.
--"Arab Accuses Jordan of Hiding Iraqi Scuds," The Washington Times, 2 April 1992, pp. A1, A9.

3 April 1992
Rolf Ekeus states that Iraq has yet to indicate acceptance of long-term monitoring of its chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic weapons capabilities. He also notes that Iraq has failed to offer a complete disclosure of its activities, and continues to avert complete destruction of weapons and associated equipment. Ekeus tells reporters: "We're still concerned that there are missiles out there, the information on chemical weapons is inconsistent, and we're concerned that with biological weapons we don't have enough information."
--"U.N. Still 'Concerned' About Iraq,'" The Washington Post, 4 April 1992, p. A19.

4 April 1992
Iraq establishes a "dedicated" missile facility, known as the Ibn Al-Haytham Missile Research and Design Center. This is intended to serve as the main center for research and design activity involving ballistic missiles not prohibited by SCR 687. The Center is involved not only in the maintenance of permitted missile systems, but also in the design of new missile systems, including the Ababil-100, which has a range of approximately 150km. The Center employs many of the scientists and technicians who were involved in the proscribed ballistic missile programs prior to the Gulf War.
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/25977, 21 June 1993.

9 April 1992
Iraq requests a cessation of UNSCOM's aerial surveillance flights, and hints that the aircraft and their pilots could be in danger.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

10 April 1992
The UN Secretary-General submits a report to the Security Council regarding the status of the implementation of UNSCOM's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with SCR 687. In his report, the Secretary-General concludes that Iraq has not been in compliance with Security Council resolutions or the plans to enforce these resolutions.
--United Nations, "Report to Secretary-General," 22 May 1992.

April 1992
An official from the Brazilian firm Avibras says that Iraq owes more than $40 million for the Astros-2 multiple rocket launchers.
--"Avibras Escapes Bankruptcy," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 April 1992, p. 609.

12 April 1992
According to US President Bush's national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, Iraq has installed some SAMs in a prohibited zone.
--Harry F. Rosenthal, "Scowcroft Says Iraq Making 'Ominous Preparations,'" Associated Press, 12 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

13 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 arrives in Baghdad. The primary mission of the team is to resume the activities previously undertaken by UNSCOM-28/BM8. The team is also tasked to examine the Iraqi claim that Building 168 at Taji Al-Marik, which was cited as Building 165 in previous reports, was built for Sakr-200 production and not for production related to the Badr-2000's second stage capabilities. [NOTE: UNSCOM28/BM8 was unable to complete this mission due to Iraq's refusal to carry out destruction orders.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

14 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 inspects Al Qa-Qa and destroys Al-Hussein warhead filling equipment there. The team also visits Taj Al-Marik and Al-Yawm Al-Azim, where they view destruction activities in progress.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

15 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 visits Dhu Al-Fiqar and views the destruction process there.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

16 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 supports UNSCOM-35 during its "Notice of Inspection" activities within Baghdad. The team visits the Taji site to inspect and verify Iraqi declarations that missile-related materials from Dawrah, Bismaya, Nabai, and Abu Gharib were destroyed. The team visits the Project 144/1/2/4 Facility at the Taji site to inspect components indicated in Iraq's 19 March unilateral destruction notification. The team "confirms with confidence" that the Iraqis destroyed 85 declared operational missiles and three training Scud/Al-Hussein missiles. Other remnants at the site likely represent the full complement of 89 operational missiles declared unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. Iraq presents a letter, signed by General Hossam Amin, which affirms that "there are no more missiles or missile-related items, either active or destroyed, in Iraq's possession."
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

16 April 1992
A Pentagon spokesman says that Iraqi missile crews in northern Iraq track allied aircraft by radar. He claims that these actions are "provocative and should cease."
--Susanne M. Schafer, "Pentagon Says Iraqi Movement of Missiles 'Provocative,'" Associated Press, 16 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 April 1992
Iraq says that it moved ground-to-air missiles into Kurdish areas only for purposes of self-defense. In an official statement, Iraq hints that it would not move the anti-aircraft missiles.
--"Iraqi Official Says Missiles for Self-Defense," Associated Press, 16 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

17 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 visits Taj Al-Marik and Al-Yawm Al-Azim to confirm that the majority of items listed in the 14 February letter were in fact destroyed. The team requests further details about the Sakr-200 program at Taj Al-Marik.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

18 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 visits Dhu Al-Fiqar to confirm that the majority of items listed in the 14 February letter were destroyed. The team visits Bismaya to inspect and verify that two vehicles are MAZ-543 launchers. The team also notes that the Iraqis plan to install equipment at Dhu Al-Fiqar to manufacture motor cases and nozzles for the Sakr-200, as well as for the Ababil-100 at a later date.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

19 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 inspects the Mansouriah site and verifies two vehicles there are MAZ-543 launchers.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

19 April 1992
Iraq establishes Ibn Al-Haytham as a missile research facility. [NOTE: The production of missiles has not yet begun.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

20 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 confirms the destruction of four Al-Nida trailers. The team also visits Taj Al-Marik to verify that prohibited missile-related items are destroyed.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

21 April 1992
UNSCOM-34/BM10 observes a large quantity of chemicals used in the production of solid rocket propellant being moved to Muthanna for destruction. Also, the team is able to verify Iraqi claims of its unilateral destruction of missile-related equipment in the summer of 1991. Further, the team confirms the destruction of four MAZ-543 mobile missile launchers and four Iraqi-made Al-Nida mobile launchers, bringing the total confirmed number of destroyed units to 10 MAZ-543 and six Al-Nida launchers. Additionally, an UNSCOM-34/BM10 sub-team visits Taj Al-Marik and Dhu Al-Fiqar to verify completed destruction. The sub-team also visits Taji to complete an inspection of Scud components. UNSCOM-34/BM10 departs Baghdad.
--"Update on Inspections of weapons in Iraq," Disarmament Newsletter, June 1992, p. 14; United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth Report under Resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994; UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

21 April 1992
US intelligence believes that the main delivery system for Iraqi biological agents would be Iraq's arsenal of ballistic missiles, several hundred of which apparently have not yet been found or destroyed.
--"Biological Arms Elude Inspectors," The Washington Times, 21 April 1992, pp. A1, A5.

24 April 1992
Ibn Al-Haytham Center is inaugurated under the Military Industrial Commission. Experienced personnel, including main engineers, are transferred from other canceled projects, which leads to the re-activation of the Ababil-100 project at this Center.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

24 April 1992-February 1993
Ibn Al-Haytham Center workers develop two additional concept designs, for a total of four, for the Ababil-100 short-range missile.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

25 April 1992
Rolf Ekeus says that UNSCOM's efforts to locate and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have been highly successful. He states that while coalition bombing during the Gulf War destroyed only 10 Scud missiles, "UN inspectors since have found and destroyed 62."
--Reuters in "U.N. Official Praises Iraqi Weapons Destruction," Executive News Service, 25 April 1992.

27 April 1992
A UN inspector states that Iraq is no longer able to produce ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km at three of its major production sites.
--"Update on Inspections of weapons in Iraq," Disarmament Newsletter, June 1992, p. 14.

May 1992
Iraq begins a survey of available liquid propellant engines, including the units from HY-2, KH-28, and Volga, for potential use in the Ababil-100 project.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

3 May 1992
Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, is appointed the presidential advisor to oversee the Military Industrialization Commission. The Commission is now responsible for supplying the Iraqi market with new civilian products.
--Reuters in "Iraq to Convert Arms Industry to Civilian Use," Executive News Service, 3 May 1992.

7 May 1992
Britain, France, and the United States issue a new warning to Iraq to prevent the deployment of missiles or aircraft travel north of the 36th parallel.
--"New Missile Warning for Iraq," Agence France Presse, 7 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

May 1992
UN inspectors visit the large-scale missile fuel production site near Baghdad. They accept Iraq's claim that the fuel is for Soviet-made SA-2 missiles. The fuel, an oxidizing agent, is identical to that which is used in Scud-type missiles.
--"Iraq Still Defying U.N. on Truce," The Washington Times, 8 June 1992, p. A3.

14-22 May 1992
UNSCOM-36/BM11 searches for undeclared ballistic missile-related equipment. The group's tasks include the verification of Iraqi claims that scores of Scud missiles were secretly destroyed following the Gulf War, along with the supervision of destruction of buildings and equipment related to Iraq's missile program. The team also inventories equipment designed for the production of nozzles for the Badr-2000.
--Reuters, 14 May 1992 in "U.N. Missile Inspectors Head for Iraq," Executive News Service, 14 May 1992; United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth Report under Resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

15 May 1992
UNSCOM-36/BM11 inspects the plants at Dhu Al-Fiqar and Taj Al-Marik, as well as in the Mahawil area. The team destroys items related to the Badr-2000 project at Dhu Al-Fiqar.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

16 May 1992
UNSCOM-36/BM11 conducts inspections at the Taji facility in an effort to verify elements of the 19 March declarations. The team verifies destruction of two pieces of production equipment, as mandated by UNSCOM.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

17 May 1992
UNSCOM-36/BM11 conducts inspections at the Al-Tarmiya, Al-Nabai, Al-Haswa, and Al-Saklawiah facilities in an effort to verify elements of the 19 March declarations.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

18 May 1992
UNSCOM-36/BM11 inspects sites at Al-Alam and Dawrah in an effort to verify elements of the 19 March declarations.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

20 May 1992
UNSCOM-36/BM11 collects guidance systems at the Taji facility. The team inspects three undeclared sites, which are the Taji Building Production Plant, the Baghdad Barracks and Depot, and Batra Grain Storage.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

21 May 1992
UNSCOM-36/BM11 inspects two undeclared sites, which are the Baghdad Military Electronics Facility and the Baghdad Railway Station.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

22 May 1992
UNSCOM-36/BM11 returns to Taji to exchange guidance components. The team completes its verification that all items declared were destroyed, including a second mock-up of the Badr-2000 ballistic missile, miscellaneous components, and missile transport dollies. The team also verifies the destruction of two horizontal test vehicles, two independent test vehicles, two independent training test vehicles, one missile maintenance vehicle, the erector arm of the training launcher, nine oxidizer and four propellant vehicles, a spot welder, and a rolling machine. The group also completes the identification of five sets of Iraqi manufactured missile guidance components, which will be removed from Iraq for technical analysis. In addition, the team finds other guidance component pieces in and around a 10km stretch of canal where the Iraqis scattered them after unilateral destruction. Further, the team inspects remains of previously destroyed "TONKA" fuel starter systems. The group also finds a number of documents relating to the construction of facilities associated with, or suspected of association with, missile systems. The team departs Baghdad convinced that Iraq's March 1992 claim of its unilateral destruction of Scud missiles and related equipment following the Gulf War was truthful.
--Reuters, in "U.N. Team Says Iraq Appears to Have Destroyed Scuds," Executive News Service, 22 May 1992; United Nations, "Third Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," S/24108, 16 June 1992, in Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/>; UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

June 1992
The Ibn Al-Haytham Center begins research on "converting C-601 to a ship-to-ship missile." [NOTE: C-601 is China's first generation air-to-ship missile. The YJ-6 is the original Chinese name for this missile, although C-601 is its designated name when exported.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

June 1992
Iraqi officials go to Beijing to purchase anti-ship missiles.
--"Sneaking in the Scuds," Newsweek, 22 June 1992, pp. 42-46.

June 1992
US intelligence analysts believe Iraq may still possess 200-300 hidden Scud missiles and maintain the capacity to produce more.
--Gerald Seib, "Missile Race in Middle East Countries Despite U.S. Efforts to Stall Buildup," Wall Street Journal, 8 June 1992, p. A6.

5 June 1992
Iraq transmits documents to UNSCOM that contain what the Iraqis characterize as a "comprehensive and complete version of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic missiles activities."
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General; Corrigendum," S/24108/Corr.1, 25 June 1992.

8 June 1992
The Washington Times cites a recent US intelligence report in stating that Iraq continues to undertake large-scale production of missile fuel at a plant near Baghdad. The newspaper reports that Iraq is believed to possess several hundred hidden Scud missiles. Though not covered by UN resolutions, US intelligence also reports new deployments of Frog-7 missiles near Baghdad. The missiles are being protected by SA-6 air-defense missiles. A senior US official notes that Iraq's continued resistance to the dismantlement of its weapons programs is part of a strategy to test the limits of allied resolve.
--"Iraq Still Defying U.N. on Truce," The Washington Times, 8 June 1992, p. A3.

15 June 1992
US authorities announce that the new Supplement 6 list to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), Part 778, places tighter export controls on items related to missile production for several countries along with "the Middle East."
--"BXA Publishes Long Awaited Missile List," Export Control News, 30 June 1992, pp. 15-17.

16 June 1992
UNSCOM Deputy Director Derek Boothby says that Iraq is "not in compliance" with UN resolutions and may be harboring up to 200 Scud missiles.
--"Iraq Ignoring Sanctions on Nukes, Inspector Says," The Washington Times, 17 June 1992, p. A8.

20 June 1992
UNSCOM chemical weapons expert Garth Whitty says that large quantities of warheads and chemical agents remain at various locations in Iraq.
--"Large Quantities of Warheads, Chemical Agents Left in Iraq," Agence France Presse, 20 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

24 June 1992
UN officials note that Iraq has yet to fully comply with UN demands to supply a "full, final and complete disclosure" of its chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic weapons programs.
--"Iraq Lags on Renewal of U.N. Accord," The Washington Post, 25 June 1992, p. A35.

26 June 1992
The US Department of Defense (DOD) reduces its previous estimate of damage to Iraqi mobile Scud launchers during the Gulf War. According to a Pentagon spokesman, the revised assessment, which DOD forwarded to Congress, states that intelligence estimates confirm the "actual damage to Scud production and storage facilities... is less than previously thought."
--"Pentagon Says It Overestimated Destruction of Scuds during Gulf War," Agence France Presse, 26 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

27 June 1992
Iraq formally submits to the UN Security Council what it terms a "report on future compliance verification."
--"The Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)," S/24661, 19 October 1992.

30 June 1992
Mohammed Bakir Hakim, the leader of the Tehran-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), says there are still Scud missiles in Iraq. He claims to know the location of some hidden missiles as well as chemical weapons.
--"Opposition Leader Says Iraq Still Has Scuds," Executive News Service, 1 July 1992.

July 1992
Iraq begins new concept studies for the Ababil-100 liquid propellant engine. The studies include 10 concepts: jet cane, vertical and aero-fin, rail control, launch modes and others.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

5 July 1992
Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM inspectors to search its Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation for documents related to its weapons program. According to UNSCOM spokesman Tim Trevan, the team is looking mostly for information on missiles.
--"Iraqis Continue to Stymie U.N. Team," The Washington Times, 7 July 1992, p. A8; Jose Katigbak, Reuters, 14 July 1992, in "Arms Inspector Knew Iraq Wouldn't Allow Ministry Search," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 15 July 1992.

5-26 July 1992
Iraq refuses UNSCOM-36/BM11's attempts to gain access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture in an effort to prevent any removals of documents or other materials.
--United Nations, "UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/>.

6 July 1992
The UN Security Council officially demands that Iraq grant UNSCOM-36/BM11 immediate access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.
--"Iraqis Continue to Stymie U.N. Team," The Washington Times, 7 July 1992, p. A8.

7 July 1992
Iraq rejects the UN Security Council's demand that UNSCOM-36/BM11 be permitted to enter the Agriculture and Irrigation Ministry to search for ballistic missile documentation. The UN Security Council labels the rejection a breach of SCR 687.
--"Iraq Rebuffs U.N. Inspection Order," The Washington Times, 8 July 1992, p. A9.

July 1992
UN sources say that Iraq has shredded documents related to its nuclear weapons program, which allegedly were kept in the Agriculture and Irrigation Ministry. These documents purportedly reveal incriminating information regarding Iraq's ballistic missiles and nuclear weapon programs, as well as the names of foreign suppliers, and technological and interim development information.
--United Press International, 8 July 1992; in J.T. Nguyen, "U.N. Says Iraq Shredding Nuclear Weapons Documents," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 9 July 1992.

11 July 1992
UNSCOM-40A&B/BM12 initiates its mission. The inspectors maintain surveillance outside the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation building to ensure the Iraqis do not remove any items.
--United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth Report under Resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

20 July 1992
Iraq secretly conducts a flight simulation of a three-stage space launch vehicle (SLV) with a 50-kg payload at an unknown site. The simulated SLV is based on Scud missile designs.
--United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999; UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

21 July 1992
US Representative Henry B. Gonzalez criticizes the Bush administration for allowing sales of dual-use goods and technology from US-based firms to Iraqi entities involved in the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Gonzalez lists the Nasser State Establishment for Mechanical Industries, the Badr General Establishment, the Saddam State Establishment, the Al-Kindi Research Complex, the Salah Al-Din State Establishment, the Al Qa-Qa State Establishment, and the Hattin State Establishment as installations whose engagement in nuclear and missile weapons research and development was well-known by the United States, but to which the US government still allowed shipments of controlled dual-use items to be exported.
--"Gonzalez Escalates Scrutiny of Licensed Exports to Iraq," Export Control News, 30 July 1992, pp. 3, 4.

22 July 1992
UNSCOM inspectors withdraw from the vicinity around the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation due to mounting tension in Iraq. UNSCOM Executive Director Rolf Ekeus strongly criticizes the Iraqi government, stating that the Iraqi government's denial of access to the Ministry is a breach of the cease-fire agreement. He claims that Iraq hides materials related to its WMD, including ballistic missiles.
--"U.N. Inspectors Leave from Iraqi Ministry," Xinhua General News Service, 22 July 1992.

24 July 1992
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France set a deadline for Iraq to allow a UN inspection team into the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. The Ministry allegedly houses documents related to ballistic missiles and other weapons.
--Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "US, Allies Plan Ultimatum to Iraq; Defiance Would Be Met with Force," The Washington Post, 24 July 1992, p. A1, A32.

26 July 1992
Iraq allows inspectors into the Ministry of Agricultural and Irrigation.
--"Iraq Allows Inspections, Claims Victory," Associated Press, 27 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Scarborough and F. Murray, "Iraq Backs Down, Allows Inspections," The Washington Times, 27 July 1992, pp. A1, A8.

7 August 1992
UNSCOM-42/BM13 begins its mission to investigate Iraq's ability to acquire or to produce indigenously proscribed ballistic missile technology, especially missile guidance and control systems.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 687," S/24984, 17 December 1992; United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth report under resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

7-18 August 1992
UNSCOM-42/BM13 visits the newly established Iraqi research and development facility, where Iraq conducts all research and development related to non-prohibited ballistic missiles. The team conducts inspections at eight other sites in order to assess the scope of Iraq's ability to produce missile guidance and control systems indigenously. The group also focuses on Iraqi programs to acquire or produce prohibited ballistic missiles and components. Findings include information related to previously undisclosed projects for computer support and missile fuel production, the interrelationship between the various projects in the ballistic missiles program, the involvement of different Iraqi organizations in the programs, and foreign involvement in certain aspects of the programs.
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/24984, 17 December 1992; "U.N. Finds Further Information on Iraq's Missile Program," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 25 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/24984, 17 December 1992; "U.N. Inspectors Uncover Information on Iraq's Missiles," United Press International, 17 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

15 August 1992
UNSCOM-42/BM13 conducts lengthy discussions with Iraqi officials regarding ballistic missile program information discovered by the inspectors.
--"U.N. Inspectors Uncover Information on Iraq's Missiles," United Press International, 17 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

August 1992
Iraq declares the existence of Ibn Al-Haytham Center to UNSCOM.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

17 August 1992
Iraqi General Raad Ismail states that the repair of Volga and HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles are the most important of Ibn Al-Haytham's current activities. Dr. Raad further states that the second priority at the facility is the Ababil-100 program. Three hundred employees and 50 engineers currently work at the facility, and these numbers are expected to increase to 1,100 and 300 respectively.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

August 1992
UNSCOM-42/BM13 recovers a document from the Space Research Corporation in Iraq entitled, "Preliminary Study Called Ababil-100 'Ballistic Missile.'" The document describes Ababil-100 as "a kind of SSM mid-range, non-directed missile." It is also offers an aerodynamic coefficients study of five configurations of missiles with ranges up to more than 200km, including information related to their vertical launch, booster, and sustainer. [NOTE: In February 1993, Iraq states that this study is a preliminary study of five aerodynamic configurations to simply modify existing SA-2 boosters and sustainers to SSM mode. The SA-2 is reportedly only marginally stable, although this statement is untrue given that Iraq conducts J-1 tests in 1992-93. Iraqis say the document is inconsequential, because it only examines options.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

August 1992
Iraq says that the Al-Karama Center belongs to the General Establishment for Electrical Industries. However, this statement contradicts other information obtained by UNSCOM, including that regarding Project 144/4. The Iraqis claim Project 144/4 is part of the Al-Karama Center, but UNSCOM has learned that reports about the project go directly to the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization. Project 144/4 was developed from the Taji workshop's research and development on Al-Hussein guidance and control components.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

August 1992-
Iraq studies guidance concepts for its missiles. Iraq has difficulty manufacturing components for control surfaces. The current Ababil-100 concept is unguided. The Iraqis do not plan to use a solid sustainer, but it remains an option under study.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

August 1992
Subjects of interest at the Ibn Al-Haytham Center include the modification of the C-601 missile to surface-to-surface mode. Technicians study a project to modify booster and guidance systems for this purpose. The Center also has "ambitions" to increase the 35km range P-15 cruise missile to a 50km range.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

18 August 1992
UNSCOM-42/BM13 ends its mission. The team discovers no weapons or components prohibited under SRC 687, nor is there evidence that Iraq is able to complete indigenous production of guidance and control systems for ballistic missiles, including gyroscopes.
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/24984, 17 December 1992; United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth report under resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

20 August 1992
The trial begins of three Thyssen Industrie AG managers charged with the violation of German export laws. They are accused of purposefully supplying Iraq in 1990 with 35 turbo-pumps used for manufacturing Scud missiles. [NOTE: A Thyssen spokesman says the firm stopped exporting the pumps to Iraq in June 1990 when German authorities told the company they suspected Iraq was using the pumps to build missiles. The spokesman says Iraq claimed it intended to use the pumps for their petrochemical industry. Thyssen board member Ulrich Bertzen confessed to having shipped 35 turbo-pumps from Germany to Iraq, which he knew would be used in Scud missiles. The shipment was part of a deal for 305 turbo-pumps worth 13.2 million Deutsch Marks.]
--"Thyssen Industrie Managers on Trial for Alleged Iraqi Sales," AFX News, 20 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Thyssen Executives Convicted," Mednews, 28 September 1992, pp. 2-3.

26 August 1992
US President Bush announces a ban on Iraqi military flights over southern Iraq in order to protect Shiite Muslims. He says that the coalition has established a "no-fly" zone for all Iraqi fixed and rotary aircraft, which will begin in 24 hours.
--"Crucial Events in the Confrontation between Iraq, U.S.," Associated Press, 17 December 1998; Helen Thomas, "Bush Announces 'no-fly' zone in Southern Iraq," United Press International, 26 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

August-September 1992
Rolf Ekeus says that allied bombing during the Gulf War likely only destroyed a few Scud missiles. He also believes that UNSCOM has found most of Iraq's dangerous weapons since then, particularly Iraq's ballistic missiles. He adds that Iraq has no "capability to exercise any long-range warfare; they have no missile capability and no launching capability."
--"Allied Bombings 'Failed To Destroy Deadly Iraq Arms,'" Asian Defence Journal (September 1992), p. 117.

September 1992
Iraq copies the input and output data, as well as the simulation program of the three-stage SLV, to floppy diskettes. [NOTE: See 20 July 1992.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

September 1992
The German Federal Intelligence Service Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) says that Iraq recruited 50 former Soviet nuclear experts, including a Russian laser expert from the Arzamas-16 nuclear arms development center and a multiple missile warheads expert from Ukraine.
--Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 27 September 1992, p. 7, in "Ex-USSR Nuclear Experts Said Working in Iraq," Proliferation Issues, 7 October 1992, p. 2.

18 September 1992
Rolf Ekeus reports data gaps regarding Iraq's missile programs, including Scud missiles and nuclear deliverable missile systems.
--"U.N. Official: Iraq Behaves Better on Weapons," Xinhua News Agency, 18 September 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

October 1992
The Ibn Al-Haytham Center acquires the Al-Rafah test stand, which previously was a part of the "Rafah Project." Iraq establishes the Propulsion Directorate, as an independent unit from the Research and Development Directorate.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

October 1992
General Raad decides to completely cancel the Al-Khalil project. He transfers the best missile experts to Ibn Al-Haytham's Programming Directorate.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

12 October 1992
Three former executives of the Matrix Churchill group of companies are accused of violating export bans by supplying Iraq with machinery for weapons, including missile parts.
--Richard Norton-Taylor, "Officials 'Duped in Iraq Deals,'" The Guardian (London), 13 October 1992, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 October 1992
UNSCOM-45/BM14 initiates its mission. The two main goals of the mission are to determine whether Iraq retains an inventory of or a capability to produce fuels for ballistic missiles, and to obtain information on the "operational use" of these missiles.
--United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/24984, 17 December 1992; United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051, S/1996/25811 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth Report under Resolution 715," S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

16-30 October 1992
Iraq adopts a more open approach to providing data on the "operational use" of its ballistic missiles since 1980. UNSCOM-45/BM14 obtains information regarding Iraq's past plans to acquire fuel and oxidizers for prohibited missiles.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 687," S/24984, 17 December 1992.

17 October 1992
UNSCOM-45/BM14 inspects Iraq's missile fuel and guidance equipment production facilities to corroborate whether their production capacities are consistent with Iraq's declared missile arsenal.
--Jon Wolfsthal, "Security Council Extends Iraqi Sanctions; Inspections Continue," Arms Control Today (November 1992), p. 28.

18 October 1992
UNSCOM-45/BM14 searches areas around Baghdad for possible hidden Scud missiles.
--Dilip Ganguly, "Ballistic Missile Inspectors Scan Areas around Baghdad," Associated Press, 18 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

26 October 1992
UN officials suspect that Iraq still hides "some 200 Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles, or Iraqi-made variants."
--Dilip Ganguly, "U.N. Asks Iraq to Reveal If It Has Hidden Arms Sites," Associated Press, 26 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Dilip Ganguly, "U.N. Team Suspects Iraq May Still Have Missile Capability," Associated Press, 26 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

30 October 1992
UNSCOM-45/BM14 ends its mission. The team finds no evidence that Iraq possesses the capability to produce fuels for ballistic missiles indigenously.
--United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051," S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Sixth Report under Resolution 715," S/1994/1138 7 October 1994.

November 1992
Former members of the Mujihadeen-e-Khalq say that their former Baghdad-based Iranian opposition movement aids Iraq in its attempt to hide its weapons of mass destruction. These Mujahideen-e-Khalq dissidents state that some arms are hidden "in very large pits" at the Al-Khalis military base, and at an agricultural center in Al-Kut, which is located near the border of Kuwait. Claims are also made that weapons are stockpiled in Jalawlah, a town northeast of Baghdad.
--Reuter, 15 November 1992, "Iran Opposition Said Helping Iraq Hide Arms," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 15 November 1992.

November 1992
An IAEA inspection team finds an Arburg jet molding machine, which was acquired for manufacturing centrifuge motor stators, at the Iraqi Ash Shakyli warehouse. Iraqi officials indicate that they do not know of a purported second Arburg machine in Iraq. UNSCOM asks the Iraqis to investigate the second missing Arburg machine. It is believed that Iraqis obtained the second Arburg machine for their missile program. IAEA inspectors also determine that Building 159 of the Taji-Nasser State Establishment houses crates containing flow forming pre-forms about 28cm in diameter composed of 25% chromium and 4% moly-steel for the construction of Ababil-100 rocket casings.
--Hans Blix, "Report on the Seventeenth IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)," U.N. Security Council Document S/25411, 13 March 1993.

8 November 1992
According to Western intelligence sources, Iraq works to modernize missiles with conventional warheads at one of the secret Iraqi military plants in Baghdad's northwestern suburbs.
--"Iraq Smuggles Arms Spares from China and Iran," ITAR-TAS, 8 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

2 December 1992
Iraq conducts a Volga/SA-2 sustainer static test at Rafah. The test is reportedly successful without instrumentation.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

14 December 1992-14 June 1993
UNSCOM teams destroy 265 of Iraq's 122mm rockets, 6,152 Iraqi 122mm rocket warheads, 873 of Iraq's 122mm rocket motors, 16,855 Iraqi 122mm rocket propellant grains, 1,977 of Iraq's 12mm rocket motor tubes, 1,492 of Iraq's 155mm mustard projectiles, 21 empty 155 projectiles, and 29 Al-Hussein warheads capable of delivering sarin (GB) and/or cyclosarin (GF).
--United Nations, "Fifth Report under Resolution 687," S/25977, 21 June 1993.

15 December 1992
CIA Director Robert Gates states that Iraq still possesses "significant residual" missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. He also states that Saddam Hussein apparently intends to resume these programs after UN inspections cease. In addition, he says that Iraq still hides mobile Scud missiles.
--George Lardner Jr. and Jeffrey Smith, "Gates Warns of Iraqi Nuclear Aspirations," The Washington Post, 16 December 1992, p. A6.

16 December 1992
Russian Space Agency chief Yuri Koptev tells US negotiators that Russia will sell its rocket technology to nations like Iraq if Russia is prevented from entering the commercial launch market.
--Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Lockheed, Khrunichev to Market Proton Launcher," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 January 1993, pp. 24-25.

27 December 1992
Iraq reinforces its "air defense missile system." It claims that this is a defensive measure.
--"The Iraqi Missile Crisis; Tariq Aziz Says Iraq will Respond to Any Attack on Its Air Defence Systems," British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 11 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

End of 1992-Early 1993
The Sadiq Factory, which is dedicated to the production of liquid propellant missile engines, moves to Darwah. Iraq changes the facility's name to the Darwah Industrial Engine Factory. [NOTE: See Early 1993.]
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

	Updated August 2005