
Early 1995 Iraq begins work on a turbo pump to simultaneously fuel four Volga/SA-2 missile engine combustion chambers. --United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.
1995 Iraq declares for the first time that it conducted four flight tests of missiles with indigenously produced engines under Project 1728. All tests took place in 1990. Iraq also declares that it succeeded in the indigenous production of the whole missile airframe and warhead as well as missile launchers. --United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.
1995 Iraq admits that it produced "major subsystems" of Scud-type engines and conducted a covert program to develop and produce a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) subsequent to the adoption of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687. --Thomas Stock, Maria Haug, and Patricia Radler, "Chemical and Biological Weapon Developments and Arms Control," CBW Year Book 1996, <http://www.sipri.org/>.
1995 UNSCOM finds 30 chemical warheads for Iraq's Scud missiles stored in the Dujael area, some 30 km away from the place Iraq previously declared. Sixteen of the warheads carry a unitary nerve agent and 14 carry binary agents. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, <http://www.un.org/>.
1995 Iraq declares that it successfully manufactured and tested virtually all major components except for gyroscopes for its indigenous Scud-type missiles. --"Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, JUN 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>.
1995 According to Iraqi scientists, Saddam Hussein becomes interested in drones and orders a crash program to manufacture new ones. [NOTE: UNSCOM discovered that Iraq had experimented with at least two unmanned aircraft before the 1991 war, including a modified version of the Russian-made MiG-21.] --Jody Warrick, "Uncertain Ability to Deliver a Blow; Iraq Cobbles together Weapons System with Mixed Results, Analysts Say," The Washington Post, 5 September 2002, p. A1, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>.
1995 Iraq and Libya conduct a series of tests in the southwest Libyan desert to increase the range of Russian-made Scud missiles. According to Western intelligence services, Iraq shipped between 48 and 100 missiles to Tripoli, Lebanon from Baghdad. --"Germans Involved in Libyan, Iraqi Missile Production," Hamburg Stern in German, 26 February 1998, p.3, in FBIS Document FTS19980226000293.
January 1995 Iraq concludes a framework agreement with Libya on the joint development of ballistic missiles. According to German investigators, those missiles aim to reach a range of 3,000 km. --"Germans Involved in Libyan, Iraqi Missile Production," Hamburg Stern in German, 26 February 1998, p.3, in FBIS Document FTS19980226000293.
January 1995 Iraqi missile experts from the Ibn Al-Haytham and Al-Karama missile facility visit the military firm Aerofina in Romania. The Iraqis sign a contract with Aerofina for 250 sets of missile-engine parts that Iraq cannot produce itself. Those missile parts include sealing rings, special valves, needles, and O-rings. [NOTE: See September 1995.] --Charles Recknagel, "Iraq: U.S. Researchers Detail Iraqi-East European Arms Smuggling Efforts," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 21 June 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/>.
4-17 January 1995 Two Iraqi missile experts groups visit Romania. Razooki Mowaffak leads one group to discuss turbines. Modher Al-Sadiq leads the other group that visits military facilities, including Ploiesti and Aerofina. Modher observes two types of missile engines that Ploiesti produces. The first type is similar to the Volga/SA-2 while the second has lower thrust of 1-2 ton. Modher asks the Romanians to submit offers for engines. Iraq provides a list of machine tools required to Uzinexportimport. [NOTE: See March 1995 for Ploiesti.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
7 January 1995 Aerofina signs the 2 October 1994 contract with Modern Technology for liquid propellant engine valves. Razooki Mowaffak states that Modern Technology signs the contract when the Iraqi delegation is in Jordan on its way to Romania. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
11 January 1995 A Romanian company Aerofina offers Iraq a centrifugal die casting machine and proposes a spring testing machine. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
12 January 1995 Razooki Mowaffak and Modher Al-Sadiq discuss a protocol with two Romanian companies GIA-RA and Romtechnica based on the August 1994 "Baghdad agreement." Mindruta Mircea and Apostol Dorin represent GIA-RA and Chelu Marian represents Romtechnica. Mowaffak and Modher visit GIA-RA factories and hold technical discussions with GIA-RA. Romania agrees to offer a feasibility study and J-V project in 60 days as well as technical assistance. Romania is to offer test benches for liquid propellant engine subsystems and supply 100 pieces of the afore-mentioned subsystems within 30 days. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
19 January 1995 Modher Al-Sadiq, Khalid Abood, and others hold the first meeting on the Volga/SA-2-based space launch vehicle in Ibn Al-Haytham. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
February 1995 UNSCOM decides to dispose of Project 1728 equipment. It claims that this project is intended specifically for the production of proscribed missiles, in particular their liquid propellant engines. Iraq protests the Commission's decision. --United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.
9 February 1995 Khalid Abood reports to Modher Al-Sadiq the results of the simulation of a satellite launch vehicle (SLV) based on clustered Volga/Ababil-100. They reach a conclusion that Iraq needs to develop a 4.5 to 5 ton thrust engine for the SLV. [NOTE: See End of 1994 or Early 1995 and August 1995.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
16 February 1995 GIA-RA submits to Iraq an offer to supply steel. The producer of steel is S.C. Blue Star SRL. [NOTE: See 1 March 1995] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
20 February 1995 A Romanian company Aerofina provides the second offer on a spring testing machine. It also provides offers on electrical standard parts and a gyro ball bearing tester. [NOTE: The gyro ball bearing tester is offered based on the 11 January 1995 agreement in Bucharest.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
25 February 1995 Aerofina provides initial specs for roll, pitch, and yaw gyros. It also proposes a rotary table. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
28 February 1995 Ibn Al-Haytham and Wi'am Gharbiyah sign a contract for standard electrical parts for $1.6 million, including $1 million inflated value. This is the second contract they sign. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
March 1995 The Romanian company Romtechnica attempts to provide Iraq with engine-testing facilities. --Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "Shopping with Saddam," The Review (August 2001), <http://www.aijac.org/>.
Beginning of 1995 According to an Iraqi declaration, Iraq initiates work on a turbo pump to fuel simultaneously four Volga/SA-2 missile engine combustion chambers. [NOTE: Later, Iraq claims that this effort achieved no tangible results. A single stage missile with four engines of this type could have a range in excess of the permitted limit of 150 km.] --United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.
1 March 1995 Ibn Al-Haytham signs a protocol on the request for offer for injectors with two Romanian companies Turbomecanica and Romtechnica. Dr. Karim Ahmed (Ahmad Hassan) signs for Ibn Al-Haytham. Turbomecanica and Romtechnica are to submit an offer for disassembled parts for a fuel/oxygen injector, and bi-injector including tools, jigs, and fixtures. They are also to offer production technology for valves plunger, needle, and piston, test benches for air reducer valve and a supply of fuel/oxygen start valves (200 pieces). [NOTE: Iraq makes a similar request to Ukraine on 26 April 1995 (some quantities are different).] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
1 March 1995 Ibn Al-Haytham signs a protocol on the request for offer for a turbo pump with two Romanian companies Turbomecanica and Romtechnica. Dr. Karim Ahmed signs it for Ibn Al-Haytham. Regarding the meeting in Baghdad on 28 February 1995, Turbotecnica and Romtechnica are to offer disc (250 pieces) OR blade (25,000 pieces); TP test bench; ball bearings. [NOTE: Iraq made a similar request to Ukraine on 26 April 1995 but some quantities are different). Iraq receives an incomplete offer, date unknown, kY-01 (from T/R or other group?). Iraq asks for turbine blade and additional information on turbine disc, TP test, and bearings. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
1 March 1995 Two Romanian companies Hidrojet and Romtechnica sign a protocol with Ibn Al-Haytham on the request for offers for injectors and turbo pump. Iraq made the same request with Turbomecanica and Romtechnica. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
1 March 1995 Ibn Al-Haytham and GIA-RA sign a protocol for complete missile engines. GIA-RA offers two types of missile engines that Modher Al-Sadiq observed when he visited Ploiesti missile engine production factories from 4-17 January 1995. Iraq is to choose one type. GIA-RA agrees to provide 100 units of missile engines. Iraq provides overall design specifications for Ibn Al Haytham's Ababil-100. Ibn Al-Haytham and GIA-RA also sign a protocol regarding the 16 February offer for steel. Ibn Al-Haytham requests a fifty percent reduction in the price of the first offer. [NOTE: This protocol is conditionally linked to the 6 March 1995 contract with GIA-RA for testing facilities for engine subgroups: turbo pump, valves, start chamber (test benches first, followed by implementation of engine contract).] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
1995 Romania's Industrial Group of the Army agrees to help Iraq develop propellant for a solid-fueled missile for $1.36 million. --Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "Shopping with Saddam," The Review (August 2001), <http://www.aijac.org>; Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, "Supplier: Industrial Group of the Army," June 2000, <http:www.Iraqwatch.org/>.
6 March 1995 Dr. Karim from Contracting Investment Bureau (CIB) of Ministry of Industrial Commission (MIC), Romtechnica, and GIA-RA sign a contract for pumps and a request for offer on test benches in Baghdad. [NOTE: Hussein Kamel created CIB in MIC. CIB basically serves as an administrative office for smuggling activities that he controlled. It consists of Ministry staff. They supervise six to seven front companies, which are probably involved in some proliferation-related imports] These companies are to supply 100 pieces of V-750 (&V-755) pump ($231,000) and offer for test bench: afore-mentioned pumps, regulating valve, reducer, injectors and injection head, start chamber, gas generator, start valve, shut-off valve. Contract is to come into effect when Iraqi receives technical specs on pumps and a price list on test benches. [NOTE: Iraq asks Ukraine for the same items on 26 April 1995.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
6 March 1995 Ali H. Attawi of CIB-Modern Technology and Chelu Marin of CIB-Romtechnica (Romania) sign a contract for quality control equipment. Two of equipment are German-made and one is Swiss. Maximum value is $350,000. Delivery time for smaller measuring devices is to take six weeks. [NOTE: Iraqis say that MIC does not approve the contract. According to Mowaffak's memo, " ...likely, denial was post-16 June based on Mowaffak memo (see 16 June 1995 memo)."] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
9 March 1995 Mindruta Mircea and Dorbre Valeriu of Romanian Industrial Group of the Army R.A. and Dr. Asir A. Saleh sign an agreement on solid propellant in Baghdad. [According to the 12 August 1994 Baghdad protocol and 12 January 1995 protocol in Bucharest, there is a general framework for cooperation on R&D/Z-lot manufacture (including ground-to-ground tests). No specific guidance is mentioned. In 45 days, Romania is to provide offers for materials such as ethyl cellulose, AG-4V, Poly Methyl methacrylate (AMMA), Methyl methacrylate (MMA), Tricresyl phosphate, asbestos powder, and heat resistance glue. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
21 March 1995 Uzinexportimport of Romania offers Iraq: steam turbine manufacturing, air compressor manufacturing, electrical standard parts, turbines and generator plant, and machine tools. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
21 March 1995 Director General Matache Nicolai of Uzinexportimport offers Modher Al-Saiq and Razooki Mowaffak a steam turbine based on the 12 January 1995 protocol. The offer is worth $29.8 million. The manufacturer of the turbine is General Turbo. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
21 March 1995 Matache Nicolai of Uzinexportimport offers Modher Al-Sadiq and Razooki Mowaffak an air compressor based on the 12 January 1995 protocol. The offer is worth $1.18 million. Integral Project designs the compressor and Faur manufactures them. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
21 March 1995 Matache Nicolai of Uzinexportimport offers Modher Al-Saiq and Razooki Mowaffak turbines and generator plant based on the 12 January 1995 protocol. The offer is worth $315 million. Uzinexportimport also offers Iraq machine tools based on the list Modher Al-Sadiq provided in January 1995. The offer is worth $12.46 million. The machines are intended for Ibn Al-Haytham, but there is no planning for a specific number. Modher just wanted to get price quotes. He finds the offer price is too high hence, requests more information. However, he does not get a response. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
26 March-10 April 1995 The Iraqi delegation led by Naim visit Ukraine. The delegation includes Dr. Modher Al-Sadiq of Ibn Al-Haytham, Col. Khalid Abood of Ibn Al-Haytham, Dr. Rawa (SRC), Col. Asir Ali Assour (AK), Col. Mahmood of Ibn Al-Haytham, Lt. Col. Abdul Salaam (AK), and Dr. Assad (SRC). This is their third trip to Ukraine. They discuss valves, discs, CNC machines, etc. The Iraqis ask Ukraine to supply them with those items. Modher discusses TEA plant. SRC is interested in satellite cooperation. They draft no contracts, except for the TEA plant. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
26 March-10 April 1995 Iraq negotiates a contract with Ukraine for a triethylamine production plant. [NOTE: Triethylamine is used as an ingredient (with xylonite) in the rocket fuel known as TG-02. TG-02 is the main fuel for the SA-2 and Al-Samoud missile and is the "start fuel" for the Scud missile.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
April 1995 China along with North Korea continues to transfer missile technology to Iraq. China also maintains a recipient/supplier relationship with Israel, that Israel could exploit by persuading China not to sell more weapons in the Middle East. --Pamela Pohling Brown, "Checkered Chums," Strategic Digest (April 1995), pp. 493-494.
April 1995 According to the US Department of Defense's fiscal year 1996 Electronic Warfare Plan, approximately 30 countries incorporate lasers into military systems including target designators and range finders. According to the plan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria are all thought to be interested "in converting commercial-grade lasers into antihuman/electro-optic sensor weapons." --"Proliferation of Electronic Warfare Systems Expanding," Defense Daily (On-line), 2 February 1996.
April 1995 Iraq prepares a test launch for a 150km-range SSM. Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Al-Sahaf says, "We are at the moment producing missiles for our defense." He also says that Iraq prepares missiles, including Al-Samoud and Ababil, for tests. Iraqi scientific adviser General Amer Al-Saadi says that UNSCOM is aware of these missile programs. --Ed Blanch, "Iraq Set to Test Maximum-range Missiles Allowed," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 December 1998, p.3.
10 April 1995 UNSCOM concludes that Iraq produced no completed Badr-2000 missile. It believes that Iraq did not acquire any technology or equipment for the production of any other aspects or components of that system, such as guidance and control (G&C) and launchers. [NOTE: Iraq began the Badr-2000 program in 1985. It is a high-technology, two-stage missile system designed for a range of approximately 1,000 km.] --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/284, 10 April 1995.
Early April 1995 Naim Bakr Ali signs a draft contract with Yuriy Orshansky of Ukraine for machine tools in Kharkov. The value of the deal is $607,000. The break-down is $457,000 for goods, $150,000 for freight/insurance. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
15 April-1 May 1995 The Iraqi missile experts led by Razooki Mowaffak visit Ukraine for the fourth time. Mowaffak is from Turbines & Compressors Department of the Ibn Al-Haytham. The Iraqi delegation includes Engineer Maki (Al-Hartha power station), Engineer Raadi (Director of Bashra power station), Dr. Karim of Ibn Al Haytham, Major Khalid of Ibn Al-Haytham, Engineer Asir of Ibn Al Haytham. No Karama representatives are invited. They discuss liquid propellant engine materials, solid fuel, and power turbines. Discussions regarding missiles are to follow. Draft contracts for machine tools and raw materials are completed but never signed. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
17 April 1995 Iraq finalizes a contract with Ukraine for machine tools in Baghdad. Yuriy Orshansky sign the contract. Declared value of the deal is $644,000. The break-down is $537,000 for goods, 80,000 for transportation, and $26,000 for customs. Iraq also signs contracts with Ukraine for steel. The declared value of the transaction is $4,375,000. The break-down is $4,100,000 for goods, $123,000 for transportation, and $512,000 for customs. --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
21 April 1995 Wi'am Gharbiyah visits NIIKhSM in Moscow to finalize the deal that they initiated in November 1994. He purchases from Zagorsk 120 gyroscopes and 120 accelerometers from long-range Russian SS-N-18 missiles and other guidance system components from dismantled submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This dismantlement plant is located in Zagorsk (now called Sergiyev Posad). Gharbiyah is to pay part of the purchases by a line of credit established at the Moscow branch of Turkey's Yapy Toko Bank. Gharbiyah promises to pay his suppliers $120,000 as soon as the end-user in Iraq accepts the goods. [Ghabiyah stays in Moscow until 30 June 1995.] -- UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter, "The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 (November/December 1998), <http://www.bullatomsci.org/>; Charles Recknagel, "Iraq: U.S. Researchers Detail Iraqi-East European Arms Smuggling Efforts," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/>; Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "Shopping with Saddam," The Review (August 2001), <http://www.aijac.org/>.
1995 A Moscow-based company Mars Rotor tests 120 accelerometers and gyroscopes Niikhism sold to Wi'am Gharbiyah in April 1995. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, "Supplier: Mars Rotors," June 2001, <http:www.Iraqwatch.org/>; Jeffrey Smith, "Did Russia Sell Iraq Germs Warfare Equipment? Document Seized by UN Inspectors Indicates Illicit Deal," Washington Post, 12 February 1998, p. A1, in ProQuest, <http://www.proquest.umi.com/>.
26 April 1995 Iraq signs an agreement on a request for offer of mechanical parts with Ukraine. Yuriy Orshansky and Abdul Karim sign the agreement in Kharkov. Iraq submits drawings listed for 162 mechanical parts such as plungers, injectors, and rings to be manufactured per an earlier agreement between Modher Al-Sadiq and Orshansky. By 1 July 1996, Orshansky is to submit offer for tools, jigs, dies, attachments required to manufacture the parts on machines are to be supplied based on the Modher-Orshansky agreement. By 1 July, Orshansky is also to submit an offer for manufacturing these parts and to develop a high-speed test bench for existing machine. [NOTE: These requests for offer are similar to the 1 March 1995 one with Romania.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
26 April 1995 Iraq signs an agreement on a request for an offer for turbo pump and solid rocket motor with Ukraine. Yuriy Orshansky, Abdul Karim, Iraqi missile engineer Asir Ali Assour from Ibn Al-Haytham sign the agreement in Kharkov. Orshansky is to submit offers for disc (250 pieces) and suggests welding technique, blade root design, etc. or 5000 blades; TP test bench; ball bearings (for 18500 rpm); injectors; prod means for swirler-oxygen injector, valve test benches (reducer, start, shut off, gaz generator, injector head). As for solid rocket motor, there is a request for offers for mandrel, battery 1/2, P cartridges, materials, calcium strips. Orshansky is to suggest possible cooperation for solid rocket motor design and technology. [NOTE: These are similar to the 1 March 1995 request for offer with Romania, but some quantities are different.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
May-July 1995 UNSCOM addresses issues regarding Iraq's undeclared missile designs and components, missile fuels activities, and the connection between the missile program and other proscribed activities. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
June 1995 Romania Industrial Export offers Iraq several production lines capable of producing 247,000 tons of nitric acid per year and 1,000 tons of ammonium nitrate per day. Iraq can use these materials for rocket propellant and high explosives. --Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, "Supplier: Romania Industrial Export," September 2000, <http:www.Iraqwatch.org/>.
June 1995 Wi'am Gharbiyah takes 10 samples of gyroscopes that he bought from the Russian Research and Testing Institute of Chemical and Building Machines (NIIKHhSM) with him to Jordan and then goes on to Iraq. --Anna Otkina, "Lessons of 'the Gyroscope Deal,'" Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 7 (Spring 1998), pp. 3-18.
June 1995 Rolf Ekeus visits Egypt to discuss with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Umar Musa his country's prior missile cooperation with Iraq. Ekeus seeks to examine information received from Iraq regarding the Egyptian-Iraqi-Argentinean Condor II missile program and the Egyptian-Iraqi chemical weapons programs. --Voice of the Iraqi People (Clandestine), 7 June 1995, in "UN's Ekeus Investigates Past Weapons Cooperation," FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-110, 7 June 1995.
June 1995 Hussein Kamel orders work on a seven-ton engine project. [NOTE: Such an engine could increase substantially the propulsive force of the then-declared missile system under development, which already has a range just below 150 km. As of 25 January 1999, Iraq had provided no documentation regarding this activity.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.
30 June 1995 Wi'am Gharbiyah leaves Moscow. Two Iraqi "experts" inspect his purchases. Some of the first batch of gyros, accelerometers, and other devices are forwarded to Baghdad. --Anna Otkina, "Lessons of 'The Gyroscope Deal,'" Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 7 (Spring 1998), pp. 3-18; UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
End of June 1995 The senior management at NIIKhSM of Moscow signs a contract with a front company, "SPM-Systema," registered in the name of Sergeyev Posad. NIIKhSM agrees to transfer approximately 800 sets of strategic inertial instruments (gyros and accelerometers) to SPM-Systema, which is to transfer the goods to Moscow in two lots. [NOTE: See By July 1995.] --Anna Otkina, "Lessons of 'The Gyroscope Deal,'" Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 7 (Spring 1998), pp. 3-18.
By July 1995 NIIKhSM of Russia makes a final agreement with Wi'am Gharbiyah to sell him "a large amount of non-liquid equipment as well as gyroscope instruments from the command modules of decommissioned 3M-40 ballistic missiles." --Anna Otkina, "Lessons of 'The Gyroscope Deal,'" Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 7 (Spring 1998), pp. 3-18.
1995 Wi'am Gharbiyah shows samples of gyroscopes to Kamel Hussein, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and the Minister of Industry, Trade, and Oil. The Russian gyroscopes are far more advanced than what Iraq is looking for. --Anna Otkina, "Lessons of 'The Gyroscope Deal,'" Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 7 (Spring 1998), pp. 3-18.
July 1995 Iraq sends representatives from its Badr State Establishment to visit Belarusian Belstroyimpex in Minsk. They inspect production lines for manufacturing high-end machine tools, diamond-cutting tools, and for powder metallurgy. --Charles Recknagel, "Iraq: U.S. Researchers Detail Iraqi-East European Arms Smuggling Efforts," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/>.
Early July 1995 Rolf Ekeus tells the UN Security Council that Iraq has procured five pieces of machinery that could be used to manufacture ballistic missiles to produce proscribed missile systems. --Barbara Crossette, "Iraq Asks Delay on Destroying Missile-Linked Machinery," The New York Times, 9 July 1995, p.7.
7 July 1995 Iraq's representative to the UN, Nizar Harndoon, submits a letter to the UN Security Council requesting a delay in the destruction of five pieces of machinery that could be used to manufacture ballistic missiles. The letter indicates that Baghdad wants to postpone the destruction of these machines until the issue of Iraq's biological weapons has been resolved. --Barbara Crossette, "Iraq Asks Delay on Destroying Missile-Linked Machinery," The New York Times, 9 July 1995, p.7.
July 1995 The Romanian company Aerofina reportedly agrees for $1.16 million to supply Iraq with 20 sample gyroscopes for the Ababil-100 missile and the equipment needed to produce and test them. --Charles Recknagel, "Iraq: U.S. Researchers Detail Iraqi-East European Arms Smuggling Efforts," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/>; Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, "Supplier: Aerofina," June 2001, <http:www.Iraqwatch.org/>.
8 July 1995 Iraq signs a contract with Romania in Baghdad on missile components such as covers roll, pitch, yaw gyros; accelerometer, electrical parts, spring tester, torque motor, rotary table, and ball-bearing tester. The Romanian Investment & Contracting Bureau and Danila Vasile and Apostol Dorin of Aerofina represent the Romanian side. [NOTE: Although in his letter to Aerofina, Modher Al-Sadiq originally had asked for 100 units of gyros, he asks only for 20 because the price Aerofina offered--$2 million for 50 sets--was too high. Iraq would receive gyros as instruments not as part of a complete system. It also would receive all equipment and tools needed for producing for Ababil-100, not Al-Samoud.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
15 July 1995 Wi'am Gharbiyah's shipment which contains gyros and accelerometers arrives in Amman. [See 27 April 1995 and July 27 1995.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "Shopping with Saddam," The Review, August 2001, <http://www.aijac.org/>.
19 July 1995 A UN official says that Iraq agreed to the destruction of five machines and the establishment of a prohibition on the use of eleven machines in any missile-related production. --"Iraq Agrees to Destroy Arms-Making Equipment," The New York Times, 20 July 1995, p. A4; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.
20-24 July 1995 Iraq destroys five machine tools at an undisclosed location. It could have used those tools in the production of ballistic missile components. --James Bruce, "Iraqis in Surprise Move over Missile Tooling," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 July 1995, p.13; Reuters, 24 July 1995, in "UN Says Iraq Has Destroyed Missile Equipment," Executive News Service, 24 July 1995.
20 July 1995 The United States claims to have satellite photos indicating that Baghdad has rebuilt its Al-Kindi missile research and development facility since the 1991 Gulf War. --James Bruce, "Iraqis in Surprise Move over Missile Tooling," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 July 1995, p.13.
27 July 199 Some of the gyroscopes, accelerometers, and other devices that Wi'am Gharbiyah purchased from Russia arrive in Baghdad from Jordan. [See 27 April 1995, 15 July 1995.] --Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter, "The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 (November/December 1998), <http://www.bullatomsci.org/>; UNSCOM report, S/1996/258, 17 December 1996; Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "Shopping with Saddam," The Review, (August 2001), <http://www.aijac.org/>.
30 July 1995 UNSCOM-122/BM33 completes the destruction or rendering harmless of pieces of equipment used for Project 1728. --United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051,"S/1996/258, 11 April 1996; United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General,"S/1996/848, 11 October 1996; United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
August 1995 Iraq makes disclosures to UNSCOM about its effort to develop a multi-stage space launch vehicle (SLV). It provides UNSCOM with simulations of the system's trajectory, some minutes of meetings, and a portion of the final report as supporting evidence. The chief engineer of the project states that he knew that UN SCR 715 prohibits Iraq from working on clustering and multi-stage techniques as well as separation techniques. [NOTE: See Late 1994 or Early 1995 and 9 February 1995.] --United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.
8 August 1995 Iraqi General Hussein Kamel Hassan defects to Jordan. In light of his defection, Iraq admits that it achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range missiles than it had declared previously. --UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.
Until mid-August 1995 Iraq denies the existence of any biological warheads, any test activity with chemical warheads, any work on advanced liquid propellant missile systems, any use of new materials for missile airframes (like aluminum), and missile fuels such as unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
1995 According to Rolf Ekeus, Iraq disposes of propulsion manufacturing plants because of technical failures. However, it succeeds in launching some of the missiles and in the production of a good number. --Reuters, 10 June 1996 in "More U.N. Arms Inspectors Arrive in Iraq," Executive News Service, 10 June 1996; Leon Barkho, Reuters, 14 June 1996; in "U.N. Destroys Iraqi Germ Warfare Plant," Executive News Service, 17 June 1996; "U.N.'s Inspector Wary of Iraqis," The Washington Times, 25 June 1996, p. A 15.
August 1995 Iraq reveals that it produced missile engines under its Project 1728 and carried out some 20 static and flight tests with these engines. --UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>; United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.
August 1995 Uday Saddam Hussein takes over the air-defense system development program, called the "Mother of Battles System" after Iraqi General Hussein Kamel Hassan defects to Jordan. Iraq freezes its air-defense system due to the lack of some high precision equipment and spare parts and to other problems. --"Iraqi Regime Acquires Russian-Made Air Defense System," Iraqi National Congress (Internet) in Arabic, 22 March 1999.
13 August 1995 Rolf Ekeus receives a letter from the Iraqi General Amer Rashid Al-Ubeidi, Minister of Oil and former Director of the Military Industrial Commission. This letter states that the Iraqi government ascertained that the defector General Hussein Kamel Hassan was responsible for hiding important information on Iraq's prohibited programs from UNSCOM and the IAEA. Hassan had ordered Iraqi technical personnel not to disclose such information and also not to inform Tariq Aziz or General Amer about his instructions. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
14 August 1995 Tariq Aziz withdraws the deadline that Iraq set up previously with regard to its cessation of cooperation with the Security Council and UNSCOM. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
August 1995 Iraq admits that it destroyed only 83 missiles instead of 89 in 1991. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
15 August 1995 Director of the Ibn Al-Haytham Missile Center Modher Al-Sadiq orders his crew to dump some of the Russian guidance systems in the Tigris River. --Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter, "The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 (November/December 1998), <http://www.bullatomsci.org/>; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.
17 August 1995 Rolf Ekeus visits Baghdad in response to an Iraqi invitation. During his visit, Iraq admits that it inserted biological warfare agents into 166 bombs and 25 Al-Hussein missile warheads immediately prior to the outbreak of the 1991Gulf War. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
17-20 August 1995 Iraq admits for the first time its work on advanced rocket engines, including those with increased thrust or using unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) fuel. Iraq also acknowledges "the production of proscribed rocket engines made of indigenously produced or imported parts and without cannibalization of the imported Soviet-made Scud engines." Furthermore, Iraq admits that it previously misrepresented "the number and the purpose of static and flight tests of proscribed missiles." --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
18 August 1995 A leader of the Iraqi opposition claims in an interview on Israeli Television Channel 1 that Iraq possesses 37 operational Scud missiles, and Saddam Hussein will launch them against Israel in a "farewell barrage" if his regime collapses. The unnamed opposition leader, exiled in London, says Saddam Hussein is capable of arming his Scud missiles with chemical or biological warheads. Other unnamed security sources claim that Iraq is not capable of firing dozens of missiles or of fitting them with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. --Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), 20 August 1995, pp.1, 2, in "Security Sources: 'No Chance' Saddam will Fire Scuds," FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-162, 20 August 1995.
20 August 1995 Iraqi General Amer Rashid Al-Ubeidi asks Rolf Ekeus to visit a "chicken farm" that the he claims belonged to General Hussein Kamel. At the farm, Ekeus finds a number of shipping containers with miscellaneous equipment in them. The wooden boxes are packed with documentation, together with microfiches, computer diskettes, videotapes, photographs, and prohibited hardware components. The documentation includes detailed plans, procedure manuals, and drawings for the production of proscribed missiles and their components. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.
20 August 1995 The Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv quotes Israeli security sources as saying that there is no chance that Saddam Hussein will launch Scud missiles against Israel. According to other unnamed security sources, it is difficult to believe that Iraq possesses the capability to fire dozens of missiles or to fit them with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. --Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), 20 August 1995, pp.1, 2 in "Security Sources: 'No Chance' Saddam will Fire Scuds," FBIS-NES-95-162, 20 August 1995.
August 1995 An unnamed source close to Iraqi defector General Hussein Kamel says that Kamel told Rolf Ekeus that Iraq had hidden a quantity of long-range SSMs. The source says that Iraq had concealed information regarding these missiles and the Supergun, the manufacture of which was entrusted to General Kamel in the Al-Fathah area near Kirkuk Governorate in northern Iraq. Unnamed sources estimate work on the Supergun project cost Iraq more than $3 billion. UNSCOM "dismantled the Supergun before it could be assembled." --Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 24 August 1995, p.2, "Hasan Said to Take Arms Program Documents to Jordan," FBIS-NES-95-164, 24 August 1995.
Until the last quarter of 1995 Iraq seeks contracts for the foreign procurement of gyroscopes. --"Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, JUN 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>.
September 1995 Three sample pieces, such as a regulator valve pin and body arrive in Iraq from Romania. Modern Technology and Aerofina implement this transaction based on the 7 January 1995 contract. Iraq intends to use these parts for a "regulator," which maintains a missile engine's thrust at the required level. [See January 1995.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel; Charles Recknagel, "Iraq: U.S. Researchers Detail Iraqi-East European Arms Smuggling Efforts," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/>; Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, "Supplier: Aerofina," June 2001, <http:www.Iraqwatch.org/>.
September 1995 Iraq tells Rolf Ekeus that it has indigenously produced its own Scud missile engines through reverse engineering. [NOTE: Before this Iraqi revelation, it was widely believed that the only Scud missile engines available to Iraq had been Soviet-supplied.] --Allan George, "Iraq Reveals Capability to Manufacture Scud Engine," Flight International, 20 September 1995-9/26/95, p.19.
September 1995 Wi'am Gharbiyah guides an Iraqi delegation through Moscow on a successful hunt for a powerful missile, the Soviet SS-N-18. --Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "Shopping with Saddam," The Review (August 2001), <http://www.aijac.org/>.
October 1995 UNSCOM cannot verify Iraq's records regarding its production of guidance and control systems, liquid propellant fuels, and ground support equipment due to inconsistencies in Iraqi declarations. --"UNSCOM Report, December 1995," Disarmament Diplomacy ( January 1996), pp. 22-29.
October 1995 Iraq turns over to UNSCOM 18 "gyro-instruments" for Scud-B/Al-Hussein missiles and related technical drawings. Iraq acknowledges that it has used one of them at a missile facility. -- United Nations, "10th Report under UNSCR 687," S/1995/1038, 17 December 1995; "UNSCOM Report, December 1995," Disarmament Diplomacy (January 1996), pp. 22-29; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.
October 1995 UNSCOM reports that Iraq renewed its efforts to acquire technology from abroad for its missile development program. The Commission currently investigates a shipment of "high-grade missile components," possibly for long-range missiles that Jordanian authorities seized en route to Iraq. UNSCOM hopes to identify the precise type of missile components transferred, the origin of this shipment, the path it followed, and its final destination. Iraq acknowledges that it has secretly continued to develop and manufacture UN-prohibited SSMs since the adoption of SCR 687. --"UNSCOM Report, December 1995," Disarmament Diplomacy (January 1996), pp. 22-29.
11 October 1995 Rolf Ekeus reports that Iraq deceived UN inspectors by failing to disclose that Iraq had previously possessed an indigenous Scud missile engine production capability and had flight-tested a chemical missile warhead. --Evelyn Leopold, "U.N. Official Accuses Iraq Of Hiding Powerful Arms," The Washington Times, 12 October 1995, p. A.17.
13 October 1995 UN and US officials accuse Iraq of covertly purchasing missile components from companies in Russia and Europe via a sophisticated network of "purchasing agents and dummy companies." Those components include accelerometers and gyroscopes, special metals and machine tools, and a French-supplied furnace worth more than $1 million which is capable of manufacturing missile engine parts. According to Rolf Ekeus, Iraq has also lied about indigenously manufacturing certain missile-associated materials that it had imported. Ekeus asserts that Baghdad has placed orders for other missile-related "technologies, supplies, and material." UN officials assert that Iraq does not appear to have assembled any new Scud ballistic missiles, but has stockpiled and concealed materials, possibly to manufacture them in the future. According to UN officials, these materials could be utilized in the production of both short- and medium-range missiles. Iraq has disclosed to UNSCOM that it had attempted to broaden its Ababil-100 missile development program to include the manufacture of surface-to-surface missiles with ranges of between 100 and 150 km. --Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Buying Missile Parts Covertly," The Washington Post, 14 October 1995, pp. A1, A20.
Late 1995 Iraq admits that it attempted to conceal the "covert" undeclared J-1 project from inspectors with "open" work being done at declared missile facilities. --"Al Fahd 300/J-1," in Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/>.
November 1995 Iraq provides a second full, final, and complete disclosure of its prohibited missile program, which includes an inventory of the components for proscribed missile guidance instruments that Iraq destroyed unilaterally from July to November 1991. The document refers to seven indigenously produced missiles in addition to 85 imported missiles. Regarding the seven missiles, Iraq explains that the army's Surface-to-Surface Missile Forces received them for training purposes and later the Iraqis destroyed them together with the 85 imported missiles. However, Iraq provides no documentation to confirm this. [NOTE: UNSCOM cannot recover remnants of the indigenous missiles or their engines from the declared destruction site.] --UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>; United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.
November 1995 Iraq provides inventory lists as supporting documentation for the destruction of components of missile engines and the means for their production. According to Iraq, the items on the lists were loaded on 11 vehicles (some 35-ton capacity each) for concealment but were eventually destroyed at Al-Alam, near Tikrit. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.
November 1995 Iraq acknowledges in its "full, final, complete disclosures" that the main purpose for Project 1728 was the reverse-engineering and production of proscribed missile engines. Iraq also admits that it used or acquired the equipment UNSCOM identified for use in proscribed activities. --United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.
November 1995 Iraq turns over an SS-21 short-range ballistic missile launcher that it had not declared to UNSCOM. Iraq acquired this launcher from Yemen before the Gulf War. --Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Iraqi Military Forces Ten Years after the Gulf War," Center for Strategic Studies, August 2000, p.81; "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Program," U.S. Government White Paper, 13 February 1998 in Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/>.
November 1995 The Iraqis send a letter, through Modern Technology, to Aerofina to temporarily halt shipment on the 7 January 1995 valve contract. [NOTE: There is no response from Aerofina so Iraq sends the second letter directly to them but Aerofina still does not respond.] --UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.
10 November 1995 The Jordanian government intercepts a shipment of 240 Russian missile-guidance gyroscopes and accelerometers bound for Iraq. UNSCOM conducts an investigation, which confirms the involvement of Iraqi authorities and missile facilities in acquiring sophisticated guidance and control components for proscribed missiles. --Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter, "The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 (November/December 1998), <http://www.bullatomsci.org/>; UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.
November 1995 Iraq acknowledges that it procured and used in proscribed activities the missile equipment UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless. --United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General,"S/1996/848, 11 October 1996.
16 November 1995 Iraq submits a 2,500-page report to UNSCOM including supporting documentation such as offers, contracts, orders, and minutes of meetings related to Iraq's dealings with its main foreign suppliers in the missile area. Iraq confirms in the report that it had used a large radar that UNSCOM destroyed in 1995 for prohibited purposes. [Iraq had previously claimed it used the radar for only legitimate purposes and that UNSCOM's actions were unjustified.] UNSCOM claims the report alone will not be enough for the Commission to confirm the Iraqi claim because Iraq did not include "original documents to account for the expenditure of all imported proscribed missile systems." The report also fails to document the production and disposal of missile systems that were reportedly produced in Iraq, although it does supply more information regarding rocket engines whose major components were reportedly produced in Iraq. Iraq acknowledges the production of approximately 80 Scud-type engine subsystems, 53 of which had been judged unsuitable for use, and 17 of which had been destroyed during testing. According to Baghdad, the remaining 10 engines have been destroyed, although no evidence exists to back up this claim. Iraq also claims to have produced 120 warheads, but again gives no evidence to prove this. In the report, Iraq fails to include information regarding tests involving specially adapted SAMs that could potentially have a range beyond the UN-set limits. --"UNSCOM Report, December 1995," Disarmament Diplomacy, January 1996, pp.22-29.
November 1995 Iraq declares that it indigenously produced some 80 combustion chamber and nozzle (CC/N) assemblies for proscribed missile engines. --United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.
Late 1995 Iraq admits that it conducted a covert program to develop and produce SAMs and carried out a number of tests with modified SSMs for this project. According to UNSCOM, this missile would have prohibited ranges. According to Flight International, Western officials assume that the "surface-to air missiles" in question are Soviet-made SA-2s. --United Nations, "10th Report under UNSCR 687," S/1995/1038, 17 December 1995; Alan George, "UN Uncovers secret Iraqi Ballistic Missile Project," Flight International, 3 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
5 December 1995 Rolf Ekeus announces that after examining Iraqi documents he has come to the conclusion that Iraq had produced 80 Scud-type missiles and 10 missile engines remained unaccounted for. He adds that 53 of the 80 Scud-type SSMs Iraq manufactured were inoperable. --Jack Redden, Reuters, 8 December 1995, in "Iraqi Missile Parts Worth $25 Mln-Jordan Official," Executive News Service, 12 December 1995; Evelyn Leopold, Reuters, 5 December 1995, in "UN Official Unsatisfied with Iraqi Missile Data," Executive News Services, 5 December 1995.
9 December 1995 The Russian Foreign Ministry denies the reports that the shipment of guidance components intercepted in Jordan originated in Russia and emphasizes Moscow's compliance with UN sanctions on Iraq. --Jack Redden, Reuters, 8 December 1995 in "Iraqi Missile Parts Worth $25 Mln-Jordan Official," Executive News Service, 12 December 1995.
Early December 1995 Jordan finds that Iraq smuggled missile components through Jordan. Components include 115 Russian-made gyroscopes in 10 crates, and material for making chemical weapons. The shipment is worth an estimated $25 million. Iraq claims that the gyroscopes are for oil exploration but they are similar to those used in the Soviet SS-N-18 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). A senior Jordanian official says that a Palestinian imported the missile components. According to documents obtained by the United Nations, the Karama research center ordered the missile parts. --Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Iraqi Military Forces Ten Years after the Gulf War," Center for Strategic Studies, August 2000, p.81; Jack Redden, Reuters, 8 December 1995, in "Iraqi Missile Parts Worth $25 Mln-Jordan Official," Executive News Service, 12 December 1995; James Bruce, "Jordan Confirms Missile Parts Were Iraq-Bound," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 January 1996, p.3; R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. Is Said To Find Russian Markings on Iraq-Bound Military Equipment," The Washington Post, 15 December 1995, p. A30.
December 1995 According to Jordan's Foreign Minister Abdul-Karim Kabariti, Jordan intercepts a computerized milling machine used to produce spare missile parts that is bound for Iraq. An Amman-based Iraqi front company imported the machine into Jordan. --"Jordan Grabs Chemicals, Machine Headed for Iraq," The Washington Times, 28 December 1995, p.A13; Al-Dustur (Amman), 28 December 1995, pp.1, 16, in "Jordan Seizes 'large Amount of Chemical Material,'" FBIS-TAC-96-001, 28 December 1995; Reuters in "Chemicals for Iraq Intercepted," Financial Times, 28 December 1995, p. 3 in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
December 1995 A source from the National Supervision Department (NSD) of Iraq's Military Industrialization Organization (MIO) denies allegations it has attempted to import missile components through Jordan. --Iraq Television Network (Baghdad), 8 December 1995 in "Source Denies Report on Smuggling Operation," FBIS-NES-95-237, 8 December 1995. 9 December 1995 UNSCOM finds six missile instruments from the bottom of the Tigris River, near Baghdad. Yuli Vorontsov, Russia's Ambassador to the United States immediately denies that they were from Russia, despite the revealing serial numbers. It is then assumed that the gyroscopes had been stolen from the manufacturer in Ukraine. --Anna Otkina, "Lessons of 'The Gyroscope Deal,'" Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 7 (Spring 1998), pp. 3-18.
Late 1995 Iraq provides UNSCOM with an inventory of proscribed missiles that it destroyed unilaterally. The inventory contains a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles. Iraq explains that there were missiles or missile engines that have been given to the army's surface-to-surface missile forces as "training" missiles. [NOTE: Iraq has not provided any document to confirm that these indigenous missiles were destroyed together with 85 imported combat missiles.] --United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.
9 December 1995 UN weapons inspectors pull out gyroscopes allegedly transferred from Russia in a Tigris River canal near Baghdad. --David Hoffman, "Russian Missile Gyroscopes Were Sold to Iraq; Smuggling Spotlights Holes in Moscow's Defense-Industrial Complex, The Washington Post, 12 September 1997.
14-17 December 1995 UNSCOM/MG6A conducts its mission. The Group conducts the third check for the year of 1995 of tagged operational missiles. UNSCOM detects no modifications on missiles inspected during 1995. --United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051,"S/1996/258, 11 April 1996.
16-30 December 1995 A team of Iraqi scuba divers directed by UNSCOM pulls out 210 missile instruments and components in the Tigris River near Baghdad. Many of these parts bear clearly identifiable serial numbers in Cyrillic script, included gas pressure regulators, 26 accelerometers, GIMBAL position indicators, and 33 gyroscopes. According to Vladimir Orlov and William Potter, these items originated from dismantled Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SS-N-18s) designed to deliver nuclear warheads. UNSCOM assesses that such components are used in missiles with ranges over thousands of kilometers. --Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter, "The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 (November/December 1998), <http://www.bullatomsci.org/>; United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051,"S/1996/258, 11 April 1996.
December 1995 Iraq publicly denies that it acquired missile-related items pulled from the Tigris River. --United Nations, "First Report under Resolution 1051,"S/1996/258, 11 April 1996.
17 December 1995 The Iraqi law enforcement arrests Wi'am Gharbiyah in Iraq "on suspicion of involvement in the illegal supply of missile components." --Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter, "The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 (November/December 1998), <http://www.bullatomsci.org/>.
21 December 1995 Rolf Ekeus presents to the UN Security Council a missile gyroscope retrieved from the Tigris Canal in Baghdad. It appears that Iraq hid the gyroscopes in the river. According to Ekeus, the recovered missile gyroscopes are similar to those in a consignment destined for Iraq but intercepted in Jordan in November 1995. --Barbara Crossette, "Iraq May Be Trying to Make Missiles, A U.N. Report Says," The New York Times, 22 December 1995, p. A6.
December 1995 Jordan seizes a large consignment bound for Iraq of toxic chemicals and equipment for producing missile parts. --Reuters in "Chemicals for Iraq Intercepted," Financial Times, 28 December 1995, p. 3 in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Jordan Seizes Chemical Shipment Going to Iraq," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 26 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
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