6 March 2002
The United States presents the United Nations' Security Council (UNSC) with approximately one dozen satellite photographs and a videotape, which allegedly show that Iraq has modified hundreds of cargo and dump trucks and is using some components for missile systems as well as to create delivery vehicles capable of transporting heavy artillery pieces. Specifically, the United States says that Iraq has stripped the hydraulic systems from waste management vehicles for use in missile programs. US officials also claim that Iraq obtained these nearly 1,000 Russian and German trucks through a UN humanitarian program.
—"World; In Brief: The Middle East," Washington Post, 7 March 2002.

12 March 2002
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw says new British and US intelligence shows that Iraq has repaired, and is moving forward with, its ballistic missile program.
—"Straw struggles to convince MPs of need for attack," Guardian, 13 March 2002.

27 August 2002
A report in the Hindustan Times claims India is investigating five companies that may have supplied technology and equipment to Iraq for use in its missile and chemical weapons programs.
—"Briefs," Australian, 27 August 2002.

5 September 2002
US warplanes attack a missile site near Basra as well as other air-defense and communications targets.
—Barbara Slavin and Dave Moniz, "Iraq says U.N. can resume searches," USA Today, 17 September 2002.

9 September 2002
The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) releases its study on Iraq's WMD capabilities and intentions. Among their findings, researchers conclude that Iraq's ballistic missile programs have been severely degraded over the past 11 years.
—Kim Sengupta, John Lichfield and Ben Russell, "Downing Street Seizes on Iraq Weapons Report to Fuel War Talk," Independent, 10 September 2002.

12 September 2002
The White House releases a 20-page paper entitled "A Decade of Deception and Defiance," which seeks to summarize existing evidence about Iraq's ongoing efforts to develop WMD and make the case for going to war against Saddam Hussein's regime. Among the few previously undisclosed pieces of information included in the paper is an allegation that the Iraqis have constructed a new missile test stand at the Al-Rafah facility.
—Dana Priest and Joby Warrick, "Observers: Evidence For War Lacking; Report Against Iraq Holds Little That's New," Washington Post, 13 September 2002.

16 September 2002
Iraq agrees to allow UN weapon inspectors to re-enter Iraq for the first time since being withdrawn by UNSCOM chief Richard Butler in 1998.
—Barbara Slavin and Dave Moniz, "Iraq says U.N. can resume searches," USA Today, 17 September 2002.

24 September 2002
Prime Minister Tony Blair releases a dossier created by the British government, which states that Iraq has illegally retained up to 20 Al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km as well as the capacity to deliver chemical and biological weapons. The report also alleges Iraq has begun installing Al-Samoud liquid-fueled missiles that possess an extended range beyond the 150km range limit set by the UNSC. In addition, construction is reported to have begun on a new engine test stand at the Al-Rafah special weapons establishment in Shahiyat approximately 64km southwest of Baghdad, which will be used in the development of missiles able to travel more than 1,000km and that will be capable of reaching British bases in Cyprus, other NATO members, Israel, as well as the other Persian Gulf nations. According to the report, Iraq's missile program currently employs hundreds of people. Moreover, much of the missile production infrastructure that had been destroyed in the Gulf War I and Operation Desert Fox in 1998 has allegedly been rebuilt. The report also notes that the Iraqis have already begun to hide sensitive equipment and paperwork in anticipation of the return of the UN inspectors. Another assertion is that a new plant has been constructed at the Al-Mamoun factory southwest of Baghdad, which appears geared towards producing ammonium perchlorate, a key ingredient in the production of solid-fuel rocket motors. The Indian chemical engineering firm NEC Engineers Private Limited is said to be responsible for providing assistance in these and other efforts, including at the Fallujah 2 chlorine plant.
—"The Case Against Iraq Key Points of the Dossier," Independent, 25 September 2002; Michael Evans, "Longer-range weapons could hit British bases," Times (London), 25 September 2002.

4 October 2002
A report by US intelligence agencies is released. It alleges that Iraq has fortified its missile program since UN weapons inspections were terminated in 1998.
—"U.S. Report Cites Iraqi Threat; Intelligence Survey Projects a Nuclear Weapon in a Decade," Washington Post, 5 October 2002.

25 November 2002
The first group of UN weapons inspectors arrives in Iraq.
—Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Arms Inspectors Pledge Scrutiny in Iraq," Washington Post, 26 November 2002.

3 December 2002
In a speech delivered at the Pentagon, US President George Bush demands that Saddam Hussein reveal every detail related to his missile and WMD programs.
—David E. Sanger and Richard W. Stevenson, "Threats and Responses: The President," New York Times, 3 December 2002.

14 December 2002
UN weapons inspectors visit a Scud missile factory where bomb casings for chemical weapons were fabricated in the final days of the 1991 Gulf War. This government-owned company is 30 miles north of Baghdad.
—Sameer Yacoub, "UN Inspectors Visit Disease Centre Again," Scotland on Sunday, 15 December 2002.

19 December 2002
A German newspaper reports that Iraq's 12,000-page declaration to the UN regarding its WMD and missile programs reveals the names of 150 companies from around the world, which allegedly aided Iraq in developing its missile and other weapons programs.
—Stephen Fidler and Hugh Williamson, "British suppliers 'named in Iraqi dossier'," Financial Times, 19 December 2002.

December 2002
The US State Department issues a list of inadequacies in Iraq's 7 December declaration of its weapon and missile programs. Regarding ballistic missiles, the State Department says Iraq disclosed having manufactured new energetic fuels, but its admissions do not include recognition that these fuels are suited only to missile systems which remain undeclared by the Iraqi government. The list also questions the Iraqi claim that a flight-test of a larger diameter missile remains within the UN proscribed range limit of a 150km. In addition, the State Department expresses doubts about Iraq's denial of links between its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs and WMD dispersal programs.
—"Threats and Responses; The U.S. Catalogs "Material Omissions'," New York Times, 20 December 2002.

29 December 2002
Iraq provides the UN with a list in Arabic of more than 500 scientists who have been involved in the development of ballistic missile and WMD programs. Iraq's submission of this information was required under UNSC Resolution 1441.
—Neil MacFarquhar, "Iraq gives U.N. list of 500 weapons experts," Toronto Star, 29 December 2002.

9 January 2003
Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix reports to the UNSC that although Iraq has violated UN sanctions by importing certain material for its weapons programs, no weapons stockpiles or other such "smoking guns" have yet been discovered in Iraq. However, Iraq's illicit imports, according to Blix, have included missile engines and raw material for the production of solid missile propellant.
—Melissa Radler, "Inspectors haven't found 'smoking gun,' says Blix," Jerusalem Post, 10 January 2003.

14 January 2003
British officials say that smuggled missile engine parts uncovered by UN inspectors in recent weeks in Iraq may eventually be linked to a prohibited long-range missile program and could serve as the crucial evidence of Iraq's suspected illicit weapons programs.
—Michael Evans, "Smuggled parts may be the missing clue," Times (London), 15 January 2003.

27 January 2003
Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix strongly criticizes Iraq for failing to reveal all details regarding its long-range missile programs and its chemical and biological weapons programs. Blix also chides the Iraqi regime for its lack of cooperation with UN weapons inspectors in Iraq. Blix notes that specific findings in Iraq so far include two missiles which have been tested and shown to exceed the range of 150km permitted by the UN, and machinery that has been rebuilt since inspections ended in 1998 for the manufacture of missiles.
—Bronwen Maddox, "How a cynic revealed his weapon of mass inspection," Times (London), 28 January 2003; Evelyn Leopold, "Arms inspector sharply critical," Toronto Star, 28 January 2003.

4 February 2003
The Washington Post reports that chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix will invite a team of international rocket scientists to the United Nations to help determine whether Iraq's suspect missile programs actually violate the country's international disarmament obligations. The team of experts will assess whether the missiles in question represent a "material breach" of past UNSC resolutions.
—Colum Lynch, "Blix Gets Aid on Iraq Missile Issue," Washington Post, 4 February 2003.

5 February 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell speaks before the UNSC about Iraq's non-compliance with UN disarmament demands, as well as Iraq's alleged links to terrorism. Regarding ballistic missiles, Powell states that Iraq has been attempting to develop missiles with a range surpassing 700 miles and has already built a test-stand for longer-range missile engines. He claims Iraq has also created short-range systems that breach the UN range limit of 150km, and it has illicitly imported rocket engines. He cites intelligence reports assessments that Iraq retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles, in addition to its stocks of Al-Samoud 2 and Al-Fatah missiles that violate UN proscriptions. In addition, Powell's presentation includes the playing of a video clip to illustrate that Iraq had developed methods to disperse deadly biological agents using remote-piloted aerial vehicles.
—Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, New York City, 5 February 2003, <http://www.state.gov/>; "Threats and Responses: The Presentation; How Powell's Evidence Compares to Findings From Prior Intelligence," New York Times, 7 February 2003.

12 February 2003
US and UN officials state that the panel of international missile experts assembled by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix have determined that an Iraqi ballistic missile program is in violation of UN mandates.
—Colin Lynch and Dana Priest, "Panel: Iraq Broke Limit on Missiles," Washington Post, 13 February 2003.

14 February 2003
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz discounts claims that Iraq's missile program is in violation of UNSC resolutions. He states that the absence of a guidance system within the missiles in question causes them, on occasion, to fly some distance beyond their target.
—Paddy Agnew and Frank Millar, "Iraq not in breach of council's resolution, says Aziz," Irish Times, 14 February 2003.

14 February 2003
UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix reports to the UNSC that while Iraq continues to disobey UN mandates, he has noted some improved cooperation from Saddam Hussein's regime. Blix reports that UN inspectors in Iraq have carried out 400 inspections at 300 sites since November and that private interviews with three Iraqi scientists had yielded useful information. He also says inspectors have not yet uncovered WMD but have found missiles that exceed range limits set by the UN. In addition, he accuses Iraq of not living up to its responsibility to fully disclose its chemical and biological weapons programs. US Secretary of State Colin Powell later responds by expressing disappointment with Blix's lack of toughness about Iraq's failures to disarm.
—Geneive Abdo, "Confronting Iraq; Report Complicates US Stand in Mixed Verdict, Blix Faults Iraq, Cites Cooperation," Boston Globe, 15 February 2003.

23 February 2003
Iraq test-fires a short-range missile in an attempt to show inspectors that the missile's range is in fact within UN limits. Iraq also says that it is considering UN inspectors' demands to destroy 100 of its 120 Al-Samoud 2 missiles.
—John Diamond and Susan Page, "U.S. presses toward war resolution," USA Today, 24 February 2003.

25 February 2003
CBS News begins airing portions of anchorman Dan Rather's interview with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, which was recorded in a Baghdad palace. Among his comments, the Iraqi leader denies that his nation possesses missiles with ranges beyond that which is permitted under UN mandates.
—Bill Carter, "Threats and Responses; Iraqi Denies Missiles Break Rules," New York Times, 26 February 2003.

27 February 2003
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein agrees to comply with UN inspectors' demands that Iraq destroy Al-Samoud 2 missiles and facilities.
—Ewen MacAskill and Michael White, "Saddam backs down on missiles," Guardian, 28 February 2003.

1 March 2003
Iraq begins to destroy its proscribed Al-Samoud 2 missiles under the supervision of UN inspectors. Four missiles are destroyed after Iraqi officials and UN inspectors agree to a timetable for the complete elimination of the missile program.
—Rajiv Chandraasekaran, "Iraq to Destroy Illegal Missiles," Washington Post, 1 March 2003; Phillip Coorey, "Iraq claims to have destroyed missiles," Sunday Telegraph (Sydney), 2 March 2003.

2 March 2003
Iraq destroys six more Al-Samoud 2 missiles but threatens to suspend these efforts if the United States continues to signal that it is going to war nevertheless.
—Bassem Mroue, "Iraq slowly destroys its missiles but more remain," Toronto Star, 3 March 2003.

7 March 2003
Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix issues a report that states Iraq's cooperation in the past has not been as proactive or immediate as required under UNSC resolutions, but the country has made significant recent efforts towards UN disarmament goals. Among its findings and its list of remaining unanswered questions, the 167-page report suggests that Iraq could be producing proscribed missiles besides the Al-Samoud stockpile currently being destroyed. The report also questions what happened to unaccounted for Iraqi Scud/Al-Hussein warheads and missiles.
—Guy Dinmore and Mark Turner, "Complex Blix report gives hope to both sides in UN Iraq's Weapons Programme," Financial Times, 8 March 2003; "Where are the Missing Weapons?" Chicago Sun-Times, 8 March 2003.

25 March 2003
Russia denies that Russian companies sold proscribed military equipment Iraq. This denial follows a 23 March 2003 Washington Post report that three Russian companies were involved in illicit sales to Iraq of anti-tank guided missiles, night-vision goggles, and jamming devices.
—"Kremlin denies equipment sales," Gazette (Montreal), 25 March 2003.

29 April 2003
The US-led coalition announces the surrender of General Amir Rashid Muhammad al-Ubaydi in Iraq, who was the former Iraqi oil minister and an important adviser to Saddam Hussein. General Rashid also supervised Iraq's secret missile programs. He is the husband of Rihad Taha, a microbiologist known as Dr. Germ due to her suspected involvement in Iraq's past secretive efforts to produce biological weapons.
—Elaine Monaghan, "Coalition captures 'Missile Man'," Times (London), 30 April 2003.

6 May 2003
Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix tells the UNSC that apart from the Al-Samoud missile infractions detailed in his previous reports, UN inspectors had, up until their 18 March 2003 withdrawal, found no evidence of proscribed WMD programs in Iraq.
—"UN Inspectors Found No Evidence of Prohibited Weapons Programmes as of 18 March Withdrawal, Hans Blix Tells Security Council," United Nations Press Release SC/7777, 6 May 2003, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc777.doc.htm/>.

2 October 2003
A newly issued interim report from the US Central Intelligence Agency-run Iraq Survey Group (ISG) states that Saddam Hussein's regime successfully concealed parts of its WMD programs, although it remains unclear whether weapons stocks existed prior to the US-led invasion in the spring of 2003. In his testimony before a congressional hearing concurrent to the report's release, ISG chief weapons inspector David Kay says that Iraq was committed to improving its delivery systems prior to the invasion and had that invasion not occurred, Iraq would have "dramatically breached UN restrictions" placed on it after the 1991 Gulf War. The report's other findings include information about illicit work since 2000 on ballistic missiles with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1000km, as well as on a clustered engine liquid propellant missile and the conversion of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles into ballistic missiles with a desired range of 250km. Studies were reportedly underway regarding proscribed-range solid fuel missile designs. The report quotes one Iraqi prisoner as having said that Iraq maintained a small number of Scud-variant missiles until at least 2001. Iraq is also described as having maintained two related programs to develop unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which may have been geared for use in surveillance and decoy missions, or possibly to disperse chemical or biological weapons. Several Iraqi officials interviewed by ISG investigators reportedly said that one type of UAV was capable of flying further than Iraq stated in its declaration to the UN in 2002. The ISG report also details information about Iraq's purported engagement with North Korea about sharing missile technology, including possibly long-range missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of 200 miles. The ISG alleges that between 1999 and 2002, North Korea attempted to transmit such missile technology to Iraq clandestinely. Other foreign assistance for Iraq's delivery system programs besides that from North Korea is also detailed in the report. This includes significant levels of assistance from a foreign firm and affiliate companies, which supplied and supported the solid rocket propellant and dual-use chemical programs. Another foreign country allegedly shipped guidance and control systems for the Ababil-100 missile. Other foreign experts operating as independent consultants in Iraq were aiding in the development of Iraq's liquid propellant missile program and various design plans.
—"Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," Central Intelligence Agency, 2 October 2003, <http://www.cia.gov/public_affairs/speeches/2003/>; Mark Huband, "Evidence points to concealment of elements of WMD programme Iraq Survey Group Report," Financial Times (London), 3 October 2003; Richard Beeston, "Ballistic plans were concealed," Times (London), 3 October 2003.

3 October 2003
ISG chief inspector David Kay says that UN inspections and international sanctions established against Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War were more effective than the United States had realized prior to its 2003 invasion. The sanctions reportedly led Pyongyang to tell Baghdad that delivery of missile-related items was impossible due to the international attention focused on Iraq. Kay also tells reporters that North Korea was paid $10 million prior to the war for equipment to produce ballistic missiles, but the equipment was never received in Iraq.
—Bryan Bender, "Rebuilding Iraq; US Inspector Touts Iraqi Sanctions in Report, Bush and Democrats See Vindication," Boston Globe, 4 October 2003.

November 2003
Reports emerge that Dr. Modher Sadeq-Saba al-Tamimi, the Iraqi scientist who led Saddam Hussein's long-range missile program, has fled to Iran.
—Dafna Linzer, "Top missile scientist flees to Iran," Toronto Star, 17 November 2003.

19 December 2003
The US State Department announces a new program to hire Iraqi scientists that had been involved in Iraq's WMD programs prior to the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. This effort is meant to keep scientists from selling their technical expertise to other countries.
—Robin Wright and Peter Slevin, "U.S. to Hire Scientists in Iraq to Aid in Rebuilding," Washington Post, 19 December 2003.

	Updated May 2006