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Missile Chronology

1997

1997
Iraq declares that it has removed 10 chemical warheads from hiding near Fallujah and brought them to Nabai. However, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) possesses aerial photographic imagery which indicates there was no activity at the professed site near Fallujah at the time Iraq claims the warheads were moved.
--"Summary of UNSCOM Presentation to UNSC on Iraq WMD," Washington File, 25 June 1998, <http://usinfo.state.gov/>.

1997
Iraq claims that it removed biological weapons warheads stored at a site along the Tigris Canal on 7 July 1991 and transported them to another location for decontamination. UNSCOM again uses aerial photographic imagery to dispute this claim.
--"Summary of UNSCOM Presentation to UNSC on Iraq WMD," Washington File, 25 June 1998, <http://usinfo.state.gov/>.

January 1997
Iraq's Military Industrial Commission orders that work stop on the Ababil-600 solid propellant motor.
--UN reports and interviews with UN personnel.

January 1997
UNSCOM inspectors discover a copy of a software package from an Iraqi computer that simulates the launch and probable trajectory of long-range ballistic missiles. This is considered evidence that Iraq continues to conduct research and development of these missiles. [NOTE: The software was apparently obtained illegally after the 1990-1991 Gulf War. According to UN officials, the software could help Iraq develop missiles with ranges of up to 1,600km.]
--Barbara Crossette, "UN Says Iraq May Be Hiding More Missiles Than Suspected," The New York Times, 19 December 1996; R. Jeffrey Smith, "UN Finds New Evidence of Iraqi Long-Range Missile Research," The Washington Post, 5 February 1997, p. A20.

5 January 1997
Amer Hammoudi al-Saadi, an adviser to Iraq's presidential office, says efforts are underway in Baghdad to produce evidence that will counter UNSCOM's assertions about Iraq's possession of banned missiles.
--Leon Barkho, Reuters, 7 January 1997 in "Iraq Digs for Missile Parts under Eyes of UN," Executive News Service, 8 January 1997; Leon Barkho, "UN Experts to Oversee Iraqis Dig for Missiles," Reuters, 5 January 1997, in Executive News Service, 8 January 1997.

6 January 1997
UNSCOM-177/BM47 (Ballistic Missile Team 47) arrives in Iraq to supervise the excavation of a ballistic missile site near Baghdad. Their objective is to verify that Iraq did in fact destroy all of its operational Soviet-made long-range missiles by the end of 1992.
--United Nations, "Third Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/301, 11 April 1997; Charles Aldinger, Reuters, 4 February 1997, in "US Dampens Speculation on Iraq Attack," Executive News Service, 5 February 1997.

7 January 1997
UN experts believe Iraq may possess more than 100 Scud missile engines.
--Leon Barkho, Reuters, 7 January 1997; in "Iraq Digs for Missile Parts under Eyes of UN," Executive News Service, 8 January 1997.

13 January 1997
The Iraqi Foreign Ministry issues a statement claiming that an inspection team comprised of UNSCOM inspectors and Iraqi authorities has discovered four dismantled missile engines at the same excavation site near Baghdad where UNSCOM uncovered some destroyed missiles in 1992. In the statement, a Ministry spokesman states that the discovery confirms Iraq's claim that it destroyed all prohibited missiles. [NOTE: See 28 January 1997]
--Ed Blanche, "Iraq Says Missile Dig Will Prove It Has No 'Scuds,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 January 1997, p. 5; "UN Teams Discover Four Engines of Destroyed Missiles in Iraq," Xinhua News Agency, 13 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Four Missile Engines Discovered," Baghdad INA in Arabic, 13 January 1997, in FBIS Document FTS19970113000343, 13 January 1997; "Iraq Says Missing Missile Engines Found," United Press International, 13 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

13-18 January 1997
The United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) says it has received reports from British companies regarding suspected Iraqi arms orders. It is believed that Iraq is covertly attempting to purchase British machines for possible use in the production of Scud missiles.
--David Leppard, Tim Kelsey, Jason Burke, "Saddam in Secret UK Arms Offensive," The Sunday Times (London), 19 January 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

24 January 1997
UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus says UNSCOM is confident that Iraq is not currently producing long-range missiles, nor is it capable of doing so.
--David Leppard, Tim Kelsey, Jason Burke, "Saddam in Secret UK Arms Offensive," The Sunday Times (London), 19 January 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

25 January 1997
UNSCOM-177/BM47 leaves Iraq. UNSCOM and Baghdad disagree over where and how to analyze the more than 100 missile parts extracted from sites near Baghdad. [Note: UNSCOM insists that the items be analyzed in the United States, while Iraq wants them shipped to Russia or France for analysis. UNSCOM seeks to determine if the missile parts were substitutions or the original Scud missile engines.]
-- Leon Barkho, Reuters (Baghdad), 28 January 1997; in "UN Still Not Satisfied with Iraqi Disarmament," Executive News Service, 29 January 1997.

28 January 1997
Roger Knight, assistant director of the UN's Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Center (OMV) in Baghdad, says UNSCOM is skeptical of Iraq's claim that all of its banned missiles have been destroyed.
--Leon Barkho, Reuters (Baghdad), 28 January 1997; in "UN Still Not Satisfied with Iraqi Disarmament," Executive News Service, 29 January 1997.

28 January 1997
CIA director George Tenet testifies before the US Senate Intelligence Committee regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Tenet asserts that Iraq continues to hide equipment and materials critical for its WMD program from UN inspectors.
--"Hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee: World Threat Assessment," Federal News Service, 28 January 1998.

29 January 1997
Rolf Ekeus estimates that Iraq possesses 18 to 25 Scud, or Scud variant, missiles.
--Howard Diamond, "UNSCOM Head Says Iraq Has Operational' Missile Force," Arms Control Today (January/February 1997), <http://www.armscontrol.org/>.

23 February 1997
Iraq agrees to allow the removal of the remnants of prohibited missile engines from the country for technical analysis by UN inspectors.
--"Iraq, UN Reach Accord," The Washington Post (Online), 24 February 1997, p. A20, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>.

Spring 1997
Iraq reaches an agreement to purchase 120 accelerometers, the principal components of advanced guidance and control systems, from a Russian company. A Jordanian company named al-Khayrat reportedly serves as an intermediary in the deal.
--Michael Evans, "Russian Deal to Sell Saddam Key Missile Parts," The Times (London), August 4, 1998.

March 1997
Iraq reportedly transfers production plans for the Al-Taw'han (Fire Ray) medium-range air-to-air missile to Yugoslavia's state-owned Vazduhoplovna Industryja firm, based on the terms of a military technology cooperation agreement signed in 1996 by Saddam Hussein and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. [NOTE: Twenty-one missile experts from a Brazilian firm directed by Hugo de Oliveira Piva traveled to Iraq in the late 1980s to develop the Fire Ray missile for use with Iraqi fighter aircraft. Military Industry Minister Kamal al-Majid, cousin and son-in-law of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, headed the project to develop the 40-km-range Fire Ray.]
--Roberto Godoy, "Saddam Passes Brazilian Missile Technology to Milosevic," Sao Paulo O Estado de Sao Paulo (Internet Version) in Portuguese, 30 April 1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990430001254, 30 April 1999.

8-9 March 1997
UNSCOM sends parts from approximately 130 destroyed Iraqi missiles in Iraq to the US Department of Defense laboratory in Huntsville, Alabama, for analysis. The lab is responsible for determining if the parts came from Soviet-made systems and if critical components that Iraq is unable to produce indigenously were removed before the missiles were destroyed.
--"Iraq Missile Parts Arrive in US for Tests," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p. 29.

May 1997
UNSCOM establishes the requirement that Iraqi officials provide monthly declarations of missile component production in an attempt to track Iraq's production of non-proscribed missiles more effectively.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

2 May 1997
Richard Butler of Australia is appointed the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.
--"Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Alexander Downer MP Appointment of Richard Butler as Chair of UNSCOM," <http://www.dfat.gov.au/isecurity/pd/pd_july_97/pand_july97_3.html#16>.

3 May 1997
The German government launches 16 criminal proceedings against individuals involved in arms transfers to Iraq. Thirteen German companies are suspected of having assisted Iraq in the construction of nuclear facilities and the development of its Scud missile program. Illegal exports from Germany to Iraq include missile parts, aluminum pipes for producing gas ultracentrifuges, and design plans for nuclear technology.
--Richard Voelkel, "Did 16 German Company Bosses Help Iraq?," Hamburg Bild in German, 3 May 1997, p.1, in FBIS Document FTS19970503000370, 3 May 1997; "Secret Report: German Companies Investigated for Illegal Iraq Trade," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

10 June 1997
Iraqi officials prevent UNSCOM-188/BM56 from entering what inspectors suspect is a prohibited weapons-procurement facility.
--United States Information Agency: U.S. Policy on Iraq, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/>; "Iraqis hamper U.N. inspection flights, Ekeus says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

18 June 1997
Rolf Ekeus tells the UN Security Council that UNSCOM inspectors witnessed Iraqis burning, shredding, and fleeing with stacks of documents while inspectors were blocked from entering the site.
--United States Information Agency: U.S. Policy on Iraq, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/>.

21 June 1997
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1115 (SCR 1115), which condemns the Iraqis' repeated denial of access to UNSCOM inspectors at various sites in Iraq. This is noted to be a clear and flagrant violation of the provisions of SCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

1 July 1997
Richard Butler of Australia replaces Rolf Ekeus as Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.
--"Composition Reporting Requirements Mandate," United Nations Special Commission, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/General/basicfacts.html>.


Mid-July 1997
Richard Butler visits Iraq and addresses UNSCOM's discovery that, contrary to a 1992 declaration, the Iraqis had not destroyed 14 missile launchers in July 1991.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

July 1997-June 1998
Iraq declares all purported sites where warhead remnants are located. UNSCOM surveys and excavates the sites. [NOTE: As of 25 January 1999, UNSCOM cannot account for approximately 25 imported warheads and approximately 25 Iraqi-manufactured warheads that were allegedly destroyed unilaterally by the Iraqis. See 1-6 February 1998, July 1998 and November 1998.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

August 1997
In response to the issue Richard Butler raised during his visit to Iraq in July 1997 regarding the timing of destroying mobile missile launchers, Iraq admits that it destroyed five imported launcher chasses in October 1991, not in July 1991 as it had previously reported.
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

August 1997
UNSCOM identifies remnants of 10 imported launcher vehicle chasses, launching arms, and stools. [NOTE: UNSCOM supervised the destruction of five launchers, and Iraq unilaterally destroyed the other five.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

August 1997
UNSCOM inspectors find a few remnants of undeclared chemical and biological warheads at the P3 site in Nabai.
--"Summary of UNSCOM Presentation to UNSC on Iraq WMD," Washington File, 25 June 1998, <http://usinfo.state.gov/>; "Ambassador Richard Butler's Presentation to the UN Security Council, JUN 3, 1998," <http://www.fas.org/>.

August 1997
Iraq provides a new declaration concerning its proscribed weapons in an attempt to eliminate uncertainties about their movement and concealment prior to their destruction.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

September 1997
Richard Butler visits Iraq. He requests that Iraqi officials carry out specific actions to enable UNSCOM to verify the accounting of special missile warheads.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

September 1997
UNSCOM asks Iraq to explain the "operational requirements" for the proscribed missile assets that Iraq had retained and concealed after the adoption of SCR 687. However, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq orders the Iraqi experts not to discuss such issues with the Commission.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997; United Nations, "Final Compendium," S/1999/94, 25 January 1999.

10 September 1997
An Iraqi Broadcast Corporation (IBC) correspondent in Baghdad reports that Iraq's Military Industrialization Organization (MIO) is involved in several strategic projects, including an "anti-missile unit" in operation since 1992 that can track more than one missile at a time. The system is being developed to counter cruise missiles. Another project is the modification of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into surface-to surface missiles (SSMs). This project is centered at the Al-Karama facility near Baghdad. There is also a project to improve the Russian- made "Volga" (NATO designation SA-5) missile. This project, based at the Al-Harith facility in Baghdad, is focused on the replacement of analog controls with digital controls.
--Iraqi National Congress (On-Line), "Iraq: IBC Cited on 'Strategic Projects,' 'Military Capability,'"10 September 1997, in FBIS Document TAC-97-253, 10 September 1997.

September 1997
Richard Butler says that the Commission has located and destroyed or incapacitated "all but a handful" of Iraq's Scud SSMs.
--Betsy Pisik, "Counting Missiles," The Washington Times, 22 September 1997, p. 14.

September 1997
UNSCOM attempts to verify Iraq's claim that it had been unable to produce engines for banned liquid-fueled missiles. An inspection team finds the remains of missile engine components that Iraq claimed to have unilaterally destroyed at a site in Al-Alam, north of Baghdad. However, the remnants account for just 10-15 percent of the quantities that should have been found there based on Iraqi declarations. After UNSCOM's inspection, Iraqi officials claim that the majority of engine components had been removed from the Al-Alam site and melted down at foundries. Iraqi government officials provide a list of guidance components that they claim were destroyed. UNSCOM officials assert that the Iraqis' list is incomplete.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997; Paul Mann, "Iraq's Stratagem: Conceal and Comply," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 November 1997.

24 September 1997
Iraq declares that it secretly excavated the Al-Alam site between April and May 1992 without UNSCOM's supervision. Iraq states in its declaration that "the majority of components have been removed from the site and melted at foundries, in an effort to conceal from UNSCOM the extent of Iraq's missile engine production accomplishments." [NOTE: This is the first time that Iraq offers this version of its concealment activity.]
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

October 1997
UNSCOM reports that Iraq "continues to conceal documents describing its missile propellants and the material evidence relating to its claims to have destroyed its indigenous missile production capabilities." UNSCOM suspects that Iraq "might have destroyed less than a tenth of what it claimed."
--Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Iraqi Military Forces Ten Years after the Gulf War," Center for Strategic Studies, August 2000, p. 81.

October 1997
The Russian Federal Security Service decides to close its investigation into the shipment of Russian missile-guidance gyroscopes and accelerometers to Iraq.
--Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter, "The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 (November/December 1998), <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/nd98orlovpotter.html>.

October 1997
Iraq conducts its first declared flight test of the Al-Samoud missile and pronounces it a success.
--"Ababil-100/Al-Samoud," in Iraq Special Weapons Program, <http://www.fas.org/>.

October 1997
According to the Czech Defense Ministry, Turkish security forces warn the United States that Iraq is trying to acquire the Czech Tamara radar with the help of Kurdish extremists operating in the Czech Republic and in Russia.
--"Iraq Trying to Get Tamara Radar despite Embargo," Czech News Agency (CTK) National News Wire, 24 August 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

6 October 1997
In his first major report to the UN Security Council, Richard Butler says that 817 out of a total 819 Iraqi-imported Scuds are now accounted for, indicating verification of nearly all of Saddam's former missile force. However, UNSCOM continues to be unable to establish verifiable material balances for many critical missile components and materials from Iraq's indigenous missile production program.
--United Nations, "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," S/1997/774, 6 October 1997; Evelyn Leopold, "UN Arms Report Raps Iraq for Concealing Arms Data," Reuters, 6 October 1997.

16 October 1997
A UN official says that Iraq has threatened to ban UN weapons inspections and cut off all cooperation with the Security Council if the Council imposes further sanctions. UN officials say that Iraq appears "more upset than expected" over a report by Richard Butler. The report states that Iraq has made progress in some areas, but it also identifies problems that Butler describes as "numerous and grave." The report accuses Iraq of hiding information on ballistic missiles.
--"Iraq Threatens to Ban Weapons Inspections," USA Today (On-Line), 16 October 1997.

23 October 1997
The UN Security Council adopts SCR 1134, which condemns the Iraqis' repeated denial of access to UNSCOM inspectors at certain sites in Iraq. The Council decides that such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of SCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

3 November 1997
Iraq says it will no longer cooperate with UN weapons inspection teams.
--"Attack on Iraq," The New York Times, 17 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

3 November 1997
Saddam Hussein threatens to shoot down the US U-2 planes used by "international disarmament monitors." After meeting with the UN Security Council, Richard Butler says that inspectors are "fairly close to being sure" that Iraq no longer has any of the 819 long-range missiles it purchased from the former Soviet Union before the Gulf conflict.
--Barbara Crossette, "Iraq Threatens to Shoot down U.S. Spy Planes," The New York Times, 4 November 1997, pp. 1, 11; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

5 November 1997
The Sunday Times reports that German prosecutors opened the trial of four businessmen accused of exporting missile launchers for Scud SSMs to Iraq. The lead prosecutor says the former managers at Havert Industrie sold 35 missile launchers, along with the components for an additional 50 launchers, to Iraq's arms industry between 1988 and 1990. The accused -- Gerhard Paul, Hans-Jurgen Urner, Hans Friedrich, and Jurgen Bauer -- used faked documents to secure government export guarantees. In customs documentation, the managers described components for the missiles as "seamless pipes, round in diameter," while communications equipment was labeled as "erasers and school notebooks."
--"Germans 'Sold Scud Parts to Baghdad,'" The Sunday Times (London), 5 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

5 November 1997
In a report to the UN Security Council, Richard Butler asserts that Iraqi officials appear to have moved "significant pieces of dual-capable equipment, subject to monitoring by the commission's remote camera monitoring system, out of view of the cameras." The dual-capable equipment is said to include devices used to balance precision gyroscopes for ballistic missiles. The report also notes there is evidence that indicates tampering with surveillance cameras occurred, such as covered camera lenses and diminished lighting in areas subject to monitoring.
--John M. Goshko, "Iraqis May Be Acting to Avoid Surveillance," The Washington Post (On-Line), 6 November 1997.

7 November 1997
Richard Butler reports that Iraqis move equipment beyond the range of surveillance cameras and obstruct camera operations. US State Department spokesman James Rubin says, "Iraqi President Saddam Hussein continues to exploit this period, to raise the prospect that he is hiding and moving weapons of mass destruction." In response, Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Said Sahaf denies that Baghdad obstructed UN arms monitoring. However, Sahaf says that equipment has been moved to protect it from US air strikes and that a UN surveillance camera was damaged when a short-range missile engine exploded.
--John M. Goshko, "UN Diplomats Say Baghdad Resistant," The Washington Post, 7 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

November 1997
Western analysts say that Iraq could have deployed chemical and biological weapons in the past using either a warplane or a warhead fitted to a long-range missile. Iraqi sources say that privately hired Russian scientists assisted in a project to enable up to 16 Al-Hussein long-range missiles to carry anthrax. It is estimated that Iraq could still be in possession of 12-16 Al-Hussein missiles with a range of 640km.
--Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Puts Carrier Group in Place, Considers Force against Iraq," The Washington Times (Online), 7 November 1997; Marie Colvin and Uzi Mahnaimi, "Saddam Invents Germ Warfare Crop-Duster to Spray Cites," The Sunday Times (London), 9 November 1997; Marie Colvin and Uzi Mahnaimi, "Saddam's Doomsday Option," The Sunday Times (London), 9 November 1997.

7 November 1997
US President Bill Clinton says that Saddam Hussein denies UN inspectors access to his weapons facilities because they are close to finding a hidden store of weapons. Kenneth Bacon, spokesman for US Secretary of Defense William Cohen, says, "the UN commission overseeing the inspections believes it has destroyed nearly all of Iraq's Scud missiles, but not the country's ability to start up a production line."
--Rowan Scarborough, "US Puts Carrier Group in Place, Considers Force against Iraq," The Washington Times (On-Line), 7 November 1997.

10 November 1997
UNSCOM produces a list documenting Iraq's noncompliance with Security Council resolutions.
--United States Information Agency: U.S. Policy on Iraq, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/>.

11 November 1997
Iraq strikes a deal with Czech military officers and Bulgarian arms dealers for the purchase of radar systems capable of detecting radar-evading US stealth warplanes. Bulgarian arms dealers, working together with members of the Czech military, intend to sell five Tamara radar systems, with a total value of $375 million, to Iraq.
--"Czech Leader Denies Czech-Iraqi Arms Deal Report," Agence France Presse, 12 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Jamie Dettmer, "Russia Becomes Saddam's Military Superstore," Insight on the News, 15 March 1999, p. 6.

12 November 1997
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1137, which condemns the limited access the Iraqis have provided to UNSCOM and restricts the international movement of Iraqi officials.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

12 November 1997
During a meeting with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, US Vice President Al Gore raises the issue of allegations that Bulgarian arms dealers, in conjunction with members of the Czech military, plan to sell five Tamara radar systems to Iraq. Klaus denies the reports.
--"Czechs to Try to Prevent Sale of Anti-Stealth System to Iraq," Agence France Presse, 13 November 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

13 November 1997
Iraq says that weapons inspectors must leave Iraq immediately.
--"Attack on Iraq," The New York Times, 17 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

13 November 1997
Pavel Musela, a CEO of Omnipol, the largest Czech arms exporter, denies to the Czech News Agency (CTK) that his company made a deal with Iraq related to the Tamara radar system.
--"Tamara Radar Exports Never Discussed--Omnipol," Czech News Agency (CTK) Business News Wire, 13 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 November 1997
US Defense Secretary William S. Cohen says Iraq possesses missiles capable of traveling 3,000km.
--John F. Harris, "Cohen Cites Iraqi Ability on Weapons; 'Millions' Have been At Risk; Resumption of Production Feared," The Washington Post, 17 November, 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

17 November 1997
The Iraqi National Congress reports that Iraq is concealing as many as 32 missiles in an orchard south of Baghdad. The report states that 32 "large missile transporters" left the Hattin facility near Baghdad and were dispersed into fruit orchards near the Tigris River in Al-Sulimaniyah. The missiles are reportedly being watched over by Iraq's Special Republican Guard.
--Iraqi National Congress, "INC Reports Iraqi Regime Hiding 32 Missiles Near Baghdad," 17 November 1997, in FBIS Document FTS19971118000912, 17 November 1997.

20 November 1997
Iraq accepts the return of UNSCOM inspectors following the intensive diplomatic activity of Russian officials.
--UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events, <http://www.un.org/>.

21 November 1997
UNSCOM holds an emergency session at the request of the UN Security Council in an effort to improve the efficiency of UNSCOM activities. UNSCOM determines that accounting for seven indigenously produced missiles is one of the priority objectives for the Commission as this may involve operational missiles produced indigenously in Iraq. UNSCOM asks Iraq to provide verifiable physical evidence of the unilateral destruction of combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies for such missiles, along with documentary evidence that will permit a full accounting of all indigenously produced major missile parts and the verification of their unilateral destruction. [NOTE: Iraq previously declared that it destroyed these seven missiles unilaterally, although UNSCOM found no remnants which could prove such destruction. As of 25 January 1999, UNSCOM cannot verify the material balance of major proscribed components for indigenous missile production.]
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

22 November 1997
In a letter to the president of the UN Security Council, Richard Butler reports on the Commission's emergency session concerning proscribed missiles that took place on 21 November 1997. He reports that UNSCOM accounted for 817 of the 819 proscribed missiles Iraq imported from the Soviet Union. He also points out that Iraq must account for major missile parts and indigenously produced proscribed missiles, including seven missiles that Iraq claims were used for training. Butler also addresses the issue of unaccounted for conventional warheads, and warheads for chemical and biological agents.
--United Nations, "Report of UNSCOM Emergency Session," S/1997/922.

24 November 1997
UNSCOM attempts to verify Iraq's claim that it was unable to produce engines for banned liquid-fueled missiles.
--Paul Mann, "Iraq's Stratagem: Conceal and Comply," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 November 1997.

November 1997
Iraq declares that one of four 50 ton trailers suitable to accommodate an Al-Nida mobile launcher has been stolen.
--United Nations, "Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm/>.

17 December 1997
Iraq rejects a UN offer to work out special arrangements that will allow UNSCOM to inspect its numerous presidential sites.
--D. Evans, "Iraq rules out UN inspections of its top security sites," COURIER-MAIL, 17 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Aziz denies experts' access to presidential sites," Xinhua News Agency, 17 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

 

Updated May 2006


1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999
2000
2001
2002-2003
2004
2005
2006


Iraq Maps
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Addressing the Spread of Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)
To Comply or Not to Comply: Outline of the UN Inspections Mechanism in Iraq
WMD in the Middle East
Dusty Agents and the Iraqi Chemical Weapons Arsenal
U.S. and Hostile Powers: Iraq
Limiting the Use of WMD between Regional Powers: Iran vs. Iraq—Options
Treaties and Organizations
Senate Intel Panel Releases Two Iraq Reports (2006)
In Focus: IAEA and Iraq (2005)
UNMOVIC 21st Quarterly Report (2005),
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (2004)
Saddam's Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq as a Case Study of a Middle Eastern Proliferant (2004)
Duelfer Report (BW & CW sections) [70 Mb] (2004)
18th quarterly report of UNMOVIC to the UN Sec General from 27 Aug 2004
17th quarterly report of UNMOVIC to the UN Sec General from 28 May 2004
Redirection of WMD Scientists in Iraq and Libya (2004)
16th quarterly report of UNMOVIC to the UN Sec General from 27 Feb 2004
WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (2004)
The War in Iraq: An Intelligence Failure? (2003)
Disarming Iraq by Force: WMD Stakes and Scenarios (2003)
Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Capable Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (2003)
International Atomic Energy Agency: Iraq Action Team (2003)
Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes (2003)
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment (2002)
Federation of American Scientists: Iraq Missile Guide (2000)
The Future of Chemical and Biological Disarmament in Iraq: From UNSCOM to UNMOVIC (1999)
UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review
Strengthening the BWC: Lessons from the UNSCOM Experience (1997)
Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq (1996)
Bill of Indictment: German Court Case Involving Iraq's Weapon Procurement (1993)
Iraq's Chemical and Biological Capability in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (1990)



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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