8 January 2004
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishes a report accusing the Bush Administration of hyping Iraq's WMD and missile programs prior to the 2003 war. The report also assesses that until 2002, the intelligence community had, in general, accurately judged Iraq's nuclear and missile capabilities.
—James Bone, "Americans scale back hunt for weapons," Times (London), 9 January 2004.

5 March 2004
The New York Times reports that, according to US government officials, Russian engineers secretly provided technical assistance to Saddam Hussein's long-range ballistic missile program in the years before the 2003 US-led invasion. The Russian engineers allegedly worked for a private company, not the Russian government.
—James Risen, "Russian Experts Reportedly Gave Iraq Missile Aid," New York Times, 5 March 2004.

28 March 2004
An Israeli parliamentary subcommittee criticizes Israel's intelligence services, saying that they lacked evidence to support their overestimations of Iraq's weapons programs before the 2003 invasion, including relating to Iraq's missile capabilities.
—Greg Myre, "Lawmakers Rebuke Israeli Intelligence Services Over Iraq," New York Times, 29 March 2004.

30 March 2004
In his testimony before the US Congress, the chief inspector for the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), Mr. Charles Duelfer, confirms past ISG findings that Iraq maintained a hearty delivery system program, which was pursued outside the purview of the United Nations. He also says that new information continues to be collected with regard to secretive long-range ballistic missile development and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs. Specifically, Duelfer reports that the Iraqis sought North Korean and other foreign support for their delivery system programs. In addition, other foreign technical assistance was apparently provided to Iraqi engineers and designers from 1998 until the invasion by coalition forces in 2003. This foreign assistance included information used to redesign production data, as well as contracts with foreign firms for the fabrication of several key Al-Samoud missile subsystems.
—"Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer, Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs," Central Intelligence Agency, 30 March 2004, <http://www.cia/gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/>.

28 April 2004
The Times of London reports that a British-Iraqi businessman involved in the UN's "oil-for-food" program in Iraq claims to have witnessed an Iraqi diplomat paying off UN personnel in order to get a dozen containers full of possible missile engines into Iraq from Jordan in 1997.
—James Bone, "'I saw UN staff take bribes,' says trader," Times (London), 28 April 2004.

9 June 2004
The acting head of the UN weapons inspection team, Demetrius Perricos, tells a closed-door meeting of the UNSC that inspectors have discovered 20 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles in a scrapyard in Jordan, as well as other equipment probably linked to banned weapons programs. These items are believed to have been exported from Iraq since the US-led invasion. The equipment includes a mixer for solid rocket fuel and other processing equipment. The UN inspectors were reportedly alerted to the material outside Iraq after an SA-2 rocket engine was discovered in a Rotterdam scrapyard.
—Stephen Fidler, "Iraqi weapons looted for scrap, UN says," Financial Times, 11 June 2004.

17 September 2004
The New York Times says that a draft report being prepared by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) will state that Iraq had an intention to restart its weapons programs when, and if, sanctions were ever lifted, but that the Iraqis did not maintain an active large-scale weapons program at the time the US-led coalition invaded the country in 2003.
—Douglas Jehl, "Study Finds Desire for Arms, But Not Capacity," New York Times, 17 September 2004.

30 September 2004
A report detailing the facts uncovered during the Iraq Survey Group's (ISG) investigation into Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery system programs is published. Among its key findings, the report says that between 1997 and 2003, Iraq likely maintained a number of undeclared programs to convert SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) with ranges up to 250km and 500km. In addition, by 2000 or 2001, Iraq began focusing its efforts on developing a long-range, solid-propellant ballistic missile that would have exceeded the 150km range limit imposed by the UN Security Council. This program was undertaken quietly and with little documentation. Creating a timeline of Iraq's procurement and development efforts, the ISG reports that, by 1991, Iraq had acquired the missiles and infrastructure from a number of suppliers that in turn formed the basis for Iraq's indigenous development of future missile systems. The first Gulf War and subsequent sanctions imposed on Iraq by the international community caused many of Iraq's delivery system programs to be curtailed after 1991. UN inspections also led to the destruction of a large portion of Iraq's long-range missile stocks and production infrastructure, although Iraq reportedly concealed some items with the aim of facilitating the programs' restart at a later date. Between 1995 and 1998, any remaining secretive work on long-range missile systems was effectively curtailed due to the defection of high-level regime insider Hussein Kamil. The report uncovered increased activity related to delivery system development after the onset of the 1996 Oil-for-Food program, as well as following the end in 1998 of the regime's cooperation with UN inspectors. This activity included the hiring of outside expertise and the development of plans for three long-range ballistic missile systems. These three systems were in development, not production, up until the 2003 invasion of Iraq by US-led forces. The design of these long-range missiles was in clear violations of UN Security Council Resolution 687. Iraq also sought to acquire missile systems during this period from North Korea and Russia sources, as well as missile guidance and control systems from entities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Russia and Belarus. Moreover, a new liquid-rocket engine test, which would have permitted testing of more powerful engines or clusters of engines, had also been built in this period but probably had not yet been used for testing. Overall, the inspectors determined that international inspections did offer some insight to the Iraqi delivery system programs in the years leading up to the 2003 invasion by US-led forces, but without the inspections, Saddam would surely have continued his efforts to reconstitute long-range delivery systems. Moreover, the ISG assesses that Saddam purposely sowed confusion about Iraq's arsenal and capabilities in order to deter enemies, especially Iran and Israel.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programs alleges that, since 1991, widespread corruption and secret dealings involving foreign government entities, private companies and various individuals, allowed Saddam Hussein's regime to acquire goods and services to aid in the development of undeclared missile systems. The assistance provided to the regime by foreign entities included technical expertise and training, as well as equipment and spare part transfers. Entities from France, Russia, Poland, Romania, Belarus, and Ukraine allegedly participated in these schemes. In the majority of cases, the inspectors uncovered no proof that government officials provided official sanction of these activities. The report also says that Saddam Hussein's regime and these suppliers managed to circumvent international sanctions using a network of front companies in various Middle East countries. While a few countries allowed such activity due to their political closeness or sympathy towards Iraq, the report finds that most were motivated by financial gain. Specific cases include transactions with a Polish front company named Ewex, which was set up by Iraqi intelligence officers. Between 2001 and 2003, they reportedly gathered approximately 280 engines and guidance components for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from various Polish sources. The report alleges that these engines were intended for a new missile that would violate the range limitations established by the United Nations. Polish authorities later arrested Ewex officials in 2003 for their illicit activities. In addition, the Bulgarian firm JEFF Co. is alleged to have delivered warheads, missiles, and launcher units to Baghdad in 2002. A Ukrainian company supplied Iraqi intelligence agents in 2001 with five motors for Iraq's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. The motors were allegedly shipped within diplomatic pouches in order to avoid scrutiny. The report also details other transfers of missile engines and motors from at least one Ukrainian firm, which received compensation in the form of vouchers and credits for oil purchases under the UN's Oil-for-Food Program. Government complicity with such deals was identified in Ukraine. Also, illegal trade was commonplace between Russia and Iraq, according to the report, with weekly charter flights from Moscow to Baghdad transferring items such as small missile components. One Russian company inked a contract with the Iraqis to supply $20 million worth of items for the Iraqi missile program.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
Regarding Iraq's efforts to convert SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) into ballistic missiles, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) reports that Baghdad restarted these efforts in 1997. The project was subsequently canceled in 1998 but possibly restarted again in 2000. Documents uncovered by the inspectors dated August 2000 show two missiles with either two or five SA-2 engines. These designs may have resulted in missiles with ranges between 500km and 1,000km, although the program appears to have stalled due to a lack of approval from Saddam Hussein. However, contracts examined by the inspectors also show that Iraq imported 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant engines from Poland and maybe Russia or Belarus. Inspectors report that the SA-2 conversion project led by Al Kindi State Establishment was abandoned prior to the arrival of UN inspectors in 2002. Another group was secretly involved in a crash program designed to convert SA-2s to surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) although none were fired during the subsequent war.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
According to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report, Iraq began flight-testing the composite solid-propellant Al-Fateh missile in 2000. The Al-Fateh was produced with materials permitted under UN Security Council resolutions, although its range capability exceeded that which was allowable under UN decree. The ISG uncovered no evidence to suggest the Al-Fateh was intended to carry a weapon of mass destruction warhead. The Al-Fateh high explosive (HE) warhead design was derived from a Scud HE warhead. Unable to acquire or produce an appropriate guidance system, Iraq deployed the unguided Al-Fateh--which is therefore a rocket, not a missile--with the Iraqi Army in late 2001. They likely possessed between 40 and 60 Al-Fateh rockets at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom and fired between 12 and 16 during the war.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report states that the Iraqis began to develop the Al-'Ubur surface-to-air missile (SAM) system in 1999 or 2000. The conceptualization for this solid-propellant SAM was that it would use a modified Al-Fateh rocket motor. The Iraqis also considered using the Al-'Ubur motor within a single-stage surface-to-surface ballistic missile (SSM) that would have exceeded UN range limitations. The Iraqis did not, however, follow through with its development as an SSM.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report finds that sometime after 2000 or 2001, Iraq sought to extend the life span of the solid-propellant FROG-7 and Ababil-50 rockets, as well as some surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Iraqi efforts to increase the shelf life of the FROG-7 and Al-Nida' was determined to have aided in Iraq's efforts to advance its composite solid-propellant manufacturing infrastructure.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
Iraq replaced the Al-Samoud missile program with the Al-Samoud II in 2001 due to instability problems. August 2001 flight tests led to the deployment of the Al-Samoud II missiles to the Iraqi Army in December 2001, according to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report. Iraq hired technicians and engineers from Russian firms to assist in the Al-Samoud II's development. Iraq reportedly launched five Al-Samoud II missiles against US-led invading forces in the 2003 war.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report states that following the departure of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998, Iraq carried on with one cruise missile program and commenced another. In the former case, Iraq continued to seek the extension of its HY-2 cruise missile range to 150km after 1998. The second program was known as the Jinin Project. In this program, Iraq sought to convert the HY-2 anti-ship cruise missile into a 1,000-km-range land attack cruise missile. By the time UN inspectors returned in 2002, the Jinin Project may have been three to five years from completion. Inspectors uncovered no evidence linking this project to weapons of mass destruction programs.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
Iraq began to develop a new, longer-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program in early 2000, named Al-Quds. This program was still in a development stage when the US-led invasion began in 2003. Evidence uncovered by Iraq Survey Group (ISG) inspectors suggests that these UAV programs were likely meant to perform reconnaissance or electronic warfare functions.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) reports that no evidence was uncovered during its investigation to demonstrate that Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles after 1991. In fact, the ISG report states that it appears all 819 Scud missiles Iraq acquired from the Soviet Union prior to 1991 were destroyed.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, Volume II, 30 September 2004.

9 October 2004
The Guardian publishes an editorial written by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter who worked in Iraq between 1991 and 1998. In it, Ritter criticizes the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report for failing to provide documentation regarding Saddam's supposed intent to restart WMD and missile programs once sanctions were ended. He also writes that ISG head Charles Duelfer is not an unbiased reporter on the matters of Iraq's disarmament, as he, during his tenure as deputy executive chairman of the UN inspections teams, participated in discussions with senior US government officials about removing Saddam from power. Iraq spies were aware of Duelfer's conversations and, as a result, were intransigent towards UN inspectors who were suspected of collaborating against Saddam. Ritter calls for a full declassification of the ISG report and its supporting documentation in order to, in his opinion, demonstrate that Saddam's regime's actions may be explained by its desire to protect itself in the face of US government efforts to oust it.
—Scott Ritter, "The source Duelfer didn't quote," Guardian, 9 October 2004.

24 October 2004
Iraq's interim government announces that approximately 380 tons of powerful conventional explosives, suitable for making missile warheads and detonating nuclear weapons, are unaccounted for from the Al Qaqaa facility, one of Iraq's most sensitive military installations. The explosives, mainly HMX and RDX, had been monitored by UN weapons inspectors prior to the 2003 US-led invasion. The IAEA says it informed coalition forces about the location and danger of these explosives before the war began.
—James Glanz, William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Huge Cache of Explosives Vanished From Site in Iraq," New York Times, 25 October 2004.

25 October 2004
IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei sends a letter to the UN Security Council regarding a letter submitted to the IAEA from the General Director of the Planning and Following Up Directorate of the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology on October 10, 2004. The Iraqi letter informs the IAEA of the loss after April 9, 2003, of explosives previously under IAEA monitoring, namely large quantities of HMX and RDX. According to the letter, the losses appear to have resulted from the theft and looting of governmental installations where security was lacking.
—"Letter dated 25 October 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," United Nations Security Council, S/2004/831, 25 October 2004.

26 October 2004
The Pentagon identifies a period of time during the spring of 2003 during which it suspects that powerful conventional explosives were removed from a bunker at the Al Qaqaa facility. This time period includes several weeks prior to the US-led invasion and extending up through several weeks following the capture of Baghdad by coalition forces.
—Bradley Graham, "U.S. Thinks Explosives Vanished in Spring '03," Washington Post, 27 October 2004.

4 November 2004
The Los Angeles Times reports that several US army reservists and national guardsmen claim they saw vast looting of explosives at the Al Qaqaa facility after the fall of Baghdad. The soldiers are not able to confirm that these explosives were the stocks of HMX and RDX first publicly reported missing in late October. However, one soldier says he saw bags labeled "hexamine" among those being carted away by looters. Hexamine is an ingredient of HMX. The soldiers say they were unable to prevent the theft of the explosives because they lacked adequate forces in comparison to the number of looters. The soldiers' calls to superiors for reinforcements apparently went unheeded.
—Mark Mazzetti, Los Angeles Times, 4 November 2004, in "Soldiers Describe Looting at Iraqi Al-Qaqaa Site," Global Security Newswire, 4 November 2004, <http://www.nti.org/>.

5 November 2004
American intelligence agencies release a new formal estimate of the number of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems suspected to be outside the control of any government around the world. The new estimate, wherein a total of 6,000 of these weapons may be at large, represents a tripling of previous approximations. The rise is attributed to the unknown status of at least 4,000 such weapons from Iraq's prewar arsenal.
—Douglas Jehl and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Expands List of Los Missiles," New York Times, 6 November 2004.

16 November 2004
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says that his country does not plan to provide weapons to Iraq at this time. However, he says that Russia is willing to resume supplying weapons and military equipment to Baghdad if the government requests it. He adds that Russia would be willing to consider training Iraqi servicemen in the use of such weapons in Russia, not Iraq. Iraq was formerly one of the Soviet Union's largest purchasers of weapons.
—Yevgeniy Kolomeyets and Tamara Frolkina, "Russia not plan to supply weapons to Iraq," ITAR-TASS, 16 November 2004.

7 December 2004
U.S. bases around the Iraqi city of al-Fallujah are attacked by 49 Ababil type missiles. The insurgents within Fallujah, who are known as the Muhammad Army Brigades in Iraq, are claiming responsibility. The missiles were fired at 1:30 am and aimed for U.S. military barracks within the bases and runways for use by U.S. aircraft and helicopters.
—"Iraqi Resistance Fires Missiles at US Bases near Al-Fallujah," BBC, 7 December 2004.

14 December 2004
A U.S. Air Force effort to reduce the risk of ground travel on the most dangerous roads in Iraq is being criticized due to insurgent possession of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The Air Force is increasing its frequency of air travel and cargo transportation in an attempt to shift transportation from the ground to the air, reducing the number of personnel traveling on dangerous routes by 180 people per day. Some officials say that this change actually increases the risk for traveling people and cargo, citing insurgent possession of shoulder-fired SAMs that are able to target low-flying aircrafts. Evidence of this claim is supported by an instance last year when a civilian cargo jet was hit by an SAM in Baghdad.
—John J. Lumpkin, "To Reduce Risk to Trucks, Air Force Steps Up Cargo Flights Over Iraq," Associated Press, 14 December 2004.

4 January 2005
Following the revelation of Polish involvement in a missile engine transaction between former Polish employees of the Military Property Agency and Saddam Hussein's regime, 15 Polish businessmen are charged with supplying arms to Iraq between 2000 and 2002. The evidence for such charges are 280 scrapped engines for Volkhov antiaircraft missiles that were purchased from the businessmen by Amir Ibrahim Jasim al-Tikriti, a cousin of Saddam Hussein and head of the Iraqi missile construction program.
—"Fifteen Poles Face Trial for Supplying Saddam Regime with Missile Engines," Financial Times, 4 January 2005.

	Updated May 2006