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Nuclear Chronology

1956-1979

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1956
Under the auspices of the Atoms for Peace Program, the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) is established with US help and encouragement to foster and conduct research, development and training in nuclear science and technology. The IAEC is under the Ministry of Higher Education and is structured in two units, the Nuclear Research Center (NRC) and the Secretariat (primarily the administrative body of the IAEC). The United States donates most of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) unclassified reports from the Manhattan Project. The United States also provides training for the first generation of Iraqi nuclear scientist.
—David Albright, Corey Gay, and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What If the Public or the IAEA had Overhead Imagery?," Institute for Science and International Security, 26 April 1999; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 69.

1959
Iraq sends 375 students to the Soviet Union to study nuclear technology.
—"The Development of Iraq's Nuclear and Biochemical Weapons," Shijie Zhishi, 16 January 1999, No. 2, pp. 17-18.

1962
Construction begins on Iraq's first research reactor, the 2 megawatt IRT-5000 supplied by the Soviet Union. The Tuwaitha Site, located about 30 kilometers south of Baghdad, becomes the Nuclear Research Center after it is chosen as the location of the Soviet-supplied reactor and its associated facilities.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; David Albright, Corey Gay and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What if the Public or the IAEA Had Overhead Imagery?," Institute for Science and International Security>.

1967
The 2 megawatt IRT-5000 supplied by the Soviet Union goes critical and marks the beginning of nuclear research in Iraq.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.

1 July 1968
Iraq signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—UN Disarmament Resources website, Status of Treaties,
<http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf>.

17 July 1968
A Baath-led coup ousts General Abd-al-Rahman Muhamad Arif and Gen Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr becomes president. Saddam Hussein, a relative of Bakr, emerges as Vice President and deputy head of the Revolution Command Council (RCC).
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 48.

29 October 1969
Iraq ratifies the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) thereby pledging not to develop nuclear weapons.
—Situation on 31 December 1996 with respect to the conclusion of safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States in connection with NPT, 1996 Annual Report, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/safeguards/96tables/safenpt.html
safeguards/96tables/safenpt.html>.

Early 1970s
A newly published book, The Israeli Bomb, is widely read by the Arab intelligentsia. The author, Fouad Jabir, an American of Palestinian descent, asserts that the Arab world will face a bleak future of Israeli dominance unless it matches Israel's nuclear capabilities. The book proves influential among Iraq's top nuclear scientists.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 62.

1970
The Tuwaitha Site grows to include several buildings including an isotope production laboratory, power substation, workshop, physics and chemistry laboratories, and expanded office space for the Nuclear Research Center. The number of personnel has also expanded from a few dozen to a few hundred.
—David Albright, Corey Gay and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What if the Public or the IAEA Had Overhead Imagery?," Institute for Science and International Security,
<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html>.

1971
A secret nuclear weapons program is initiated by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). The newly appointed chairman of the physics department of the Nuclear Research Center (NRC) is Dr. Khidhir Hamza. Hamza is approached by the two men in charge of the IAEC, the secretary-general, Dr. Moyesser al-Mallah, and the newly appointed director of the NRC, Husham Sharif, both Baath party members. Al-Mallah and Sharif request that Hamza develop a plan for acquiring nuclear weapons, one that uses an ambitious and carefully designed civilian nuclear program as a guise to obtain the technology, skills, and infrastructure required to successfully create a nuclear arsenal. [Note: Whether at the direction of Saddam Hussein or simply as a ruse to generate revenue for the poorly funded nuclear program, it is unclear who or what prompted the two scientists to approach Hamza with the idea of building a nuclear weapon.]
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 64; "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.

1971
Dr. Khidhir Hamza is responsible for purchasing Iraq's first mainframe computer. The IBM 360/135 mainframe will eventually become the centerpiece of the clandestine nuclear weapons program.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 21, 72.

1972
The Iraqi nuclear weapons program begins in earnest. At the heart of Khidhir Hamza's plan is the acquisition of a foreign reactor for producing plutonium. The goal is to acquire a complete, safeguarded fuel cycle able to produce separated plutonium and duplicate the facilities clandestinely in order to produce unsafeguarded plutonium which in turn can be diverted towards a nuclear bomb.
—David Albright, Corey Gay, and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What If the Public or the IAEA had Overhead Imagery?," Institute for Science and International Security, 26 April 1999, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html>.

1972
Khidhir Hamza submits his comprehensive plan for developing nuclear weapons in the form of a 40-page report. The plan calls for acquiring a medium-sized research reactor from the French under the guise of a civilian nuclear program. The plan also calls for a clandestine reprocessing unit necessary to separate the plutonium. The report is reviewed by a group affiliated with the Revolutionary Council and is ultimately approved by Saddam Hussein.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 70; "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.

29 February 1972
In accordance with Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iraq agrees to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The agreement is designed to monitor and prevent Iraqi fissionable material from being diverted towards a nuclear weapons program.
—IAEA INFCIRC 172, 22 February 1973, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc172.pdf>.

1973
French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and Saddam Hussein reach an agreement in which France will provide Iraq with a nuclear reactor in exchange for petroleum concessions, imports of French automobiles, and options on future military aircraft purchases.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 81.

September 1973
Ordered by Saddam Hussein to "get inside and turn it to our purposes," an Iraqi delegation visits the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Dr. Moyesser al-Mallah, Dr. Khidhir Hamza, and minister of higher education Dr. Hisham al-Shawi, travel to Vienna to lobby for an Iraqi to have a seat on the IAEA board of governors. They are successful, and al-Shawi takes the seat. To further penetrate the IAEA's operations, a special intelligence office is created at the Iraqi embassy in Vienna. The position of "scientific attaché" is created and filled by Suroor Mahmoud Mirza, a brother of Saddam Hussein's senior bodyguard. Al-Shawi eventually succeeds in getting Iraqi nuclear physicist, Abdul-Wahid al-Saji, appointed as an IAEA inspector. Insider knowledge of IAEA operations proves invaluable in circumventing IAEA's detection of Iraqi cheating.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 74-77.

Late 1973
In a move to tighten his control over Iraq's nuclear weapons program, Saddam Hussein transfers oversight of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) to the Revolutionary Council. IAEC Secretary-General Dr. Moyesser Al-Mallah and NRC Director Husham Sharif are removed and Saddam Hussein appoints himself chairman of the IAEC (this appointment is never disclosed to the IAEA). Hussein installs 33-year-old Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Saeed as deputy chief for overseeing the IAEC and the nuclear weapons effort.
—David Albright, Corey Gay and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What if the Public or the IAEA Had Overhead Imagery?," Institute for Science and International Security,
< http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html>.

April 1974
Dr. Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, an experimental physicist who had previously headed the IAEC reactor and physics departments and later moved to Europe to work at the Geneva based European nuclear physics laboratory, (CERN), is enticed by Dr. Saeed to return to Iraq. Jaffar eventually becomes the principal and one of the most well known scientists working on Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 79-80.

June 1974
A delegation from the IAEC, including Hamza, Jaffar, and Hussein al-Shahristani, travel to Paris to negotiate the purchase of a reactor based on the French-designed Osiris reactor. Dr. al-Shahristani is a high-ranking nuclear physicist at the NRC, educated at the University of Toronto, he is an expert in neutron activation. The Osiris design is a pool-type reactor fueled by 93% enriched uranium. The French eventually dub the reactor Osirak, a play on the words Osiris and Iraq. [Iraq is spelled with a "k" in French and thus both spellings—Osiraq and Osirak are prevalent.] The Iraqis, however, call the reactor "Tammuz-1," after the month of the Islamic calendar when the Baath party came to power in 1968. At 40 megawatts (thermal), Tammuz-1 is a large materials test reactor (MTR), totally inappropriate for beginning a peaceful nuclear energy program but ideal for irradiation of target materials which is how Iraq plans to produce Pu-239. Iraq also contracts for a second lower power reactor called Tammuz-2 (designated Isis by the French). The total cost for the entire reactor package is estimated at $300 million. This is nearly double the initial estimate given by the French. The Iraqis are aware they have no other choice than to pay the exorbitant sum.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 22, 80-83.

1975
Saddam Hussein appoints Humam al-Ghafour as one of his primary advisors regarding Iraq's nuclear weapons effort. In his early thirties, Al-Ghafour, has only a master's degree in physics but quickly becomes prominent at IAEC due to his party connections and loyalty to Hussein. One of al-Ghafour's primary goals is to implement a uranium enrichment program which utilizes atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) technology.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 93-94.

1975
Under a very secretive operation at the Al-Hazen Ibn Al Hayatham Center for Research, work is conducted on the laser and optics technology necessary for the AVLIS enrichment process. Under the direction of Humam al-Ghafour, the research is conducted by Serwan al-Satidah, a Palestinian considered to be a protégé of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. Utilizing extensive contacts with British and American universities, al-Satidah is able to procure significant funding from Saddam Hussein to further research at Al-Hazen.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 95; "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.

1975
Dr. Khidhir Hamza and Dr. Hadi al-Obeidi, an Iraqi scientist specializing in laser optics, attend a conference on nuclear developments in Sante Fe, New Mexico. During this conference, they inquire about rumors of Israeli success in utilizing the AVLIS process for uranium enrichment. Most experts at the conference concur that the rumor is false since it is improbable that the Israelis have overcome key technical barriers. During the same trip, the two scientists pay a visit to National Electrostatic Corporation (NEC) headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin. The scientists explore the possibility of purchasing a Pelletron accelerator for an estimated $1.5 million; however, no deal is made at the time.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 97-100.

10 September 1975
Saddam Hussein travels to Paris to meet with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to negotiate the export of the two Tammuz research reactors to Iraq in a deal sweetened by cheap Iraqi oil. Prior to his trip to Paris, Hussein tells the Lebanese news magazine Al Usbu Al-Arabi that the agreement is "the first concrete step toward the production of the Arabic atomic weapon" and that Iraq should be helped to obtain nuclear weapons in order to balance the Israeli nuclear arsenal.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 105.

1976
Iraq and France conclude the contract for the Iraqi purchase of the nuclear research reactors. The French agree to supply a 40MWth MTR reactor called Tammuz-1 or Osirak, a zero-power reactor called Tammuz-2, a materials testing hot laboratory (called LAMA), workshops, and a radioactive waste treatment station (RWTS).
—David Albright, Corey Gay, and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What if the Public or the IAEA Had Overhead Imagery?," Institute for Science and International Security,<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html>; "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.

1977
At the direction of Humam al-Ghafour, Iraq continues to invest millions of dollars on laser enrichment techniques although no tangible results are produced. Department 6240, the Laser Section of the Physics Department at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, is established.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 103-104.
Mark Hibbs, "Baghdad Steered Dedicated Effort To Enrich Using MLIS, AVLIS," NuclearFuel, 21 November 1994.

1978
The IRT-5000 research reactor originally purchased from the Soviets in 1962 is upgraded from 2MW to 5MW output.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.

1979
Iraq imports from Italy 4,006kg of UO2 powder and 508kg of uranium as UO2 in the form of pressed fuel pellets. The UO2 powder and the pellets are used in the Experimental Research Laboratory for Fuel Fabrication (ERLFF) for research and development activities. Iraq also imports from Italy, 6,005kg of depleted uranium as UO2 powder.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 25,
<http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.

1979
Iraq signs a contract with the Italian firm SNIA-Techint for a pilot plutonium separation and handling facility, and a uranium refining and fuel-manufacturing plant. Neither facility is subject to IAEA safeguards.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.

1979
Jaffar Dhia Jaffar becomes Vice Chairman of the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission. The principal scientists on the program are now Jaffar, Khidhir Hamza —who is responsible for the reactor program —and Husayn al-Shahristani who heads the plutonium separation program.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superpowers in a Fragmented World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 37.

1 February 1979
The Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, returns to Iran following a 15-year exile. The collapse of the shah and the ayatollah's return mark the beginning of the Iranian Revolution, which eventually results in a Shiite fundamentalist Iran. This has significant implications for Iraq's security environment as Shiite demonstrations spill over the border into southern Iraq.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York. NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 106-107.

6 April 1979
The reactor cores for Tammuz I (Osirak) and Tammuz II (Isis) are damaged by saboteurs in an explosion while they are awaiting shipment to Iraq in a warehouse in the French Mediterranean town of Seyne-sur-Mer. Initially, French environmentalists claim responsibility. Authorities, however, concluding that the bombing was done by professionals, suspect the Mossad is most likely responsible for the sabotage. The French inform the Iraqis that manufacturing new reactors would take at least two years. The Iraqis in turn are forced to accept the damaged reactors, which have hairline fractures.
—Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb; the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York, NY: Times Books, 1981), pp. 227-233; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York. NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 110.

16 July 1979
Iraqi President Al-Bakr is forced to resign. Saddam Hussein takes over as president, secretary general of the Baath party, and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 22; "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.

18 September 1979
Saddam Hussein holds a surprise meeting at al-Tuwaitha with the heads of the nuclear program, Jafar Dhia Jafar and Husayn al-Shahristani, and demands a report on the plutonium program and when delivery for a bomb is expected. Later it is learned that Saddam's demands for quick progress are linked to his plan for attacking Iran.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz,"
<http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 22.

December 1979
Saddam, alarmed by the storming of the US embassy in Iran and the growing power of the Shiite extremists, demands further updates on the status of the nuclear weapons program. Saddam's principal nuclear advisor, Dr. Husayn al-Shahristani, is arrested after he challenges the bomb program and for what are perceived as indiscreet political views against the regime. He is repeatedly beaten and tortured and remains in prison for 11 years until his escape during the Gulf War. Saddam's other science advisor, Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, attempts to intervene on al-Shahristani's behalf and is also jailed and beaten until he recants and is allowed back to work.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 22, 70; "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz."



 

Updated November 2003


1956-1979

1980-1989

1990-1991

1992-2002

2003-2004

2005

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