This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

12 January 1992
IAEA officials accuse Iraqi Foreign Ministry officials of failing to declare large quantities of materials and components Iraq had obtained for its gas centrifuge program.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Shop-till-you-drop Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1992, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1992/a92/a92.albright.html>.

13 January 1992
Iraq acknowledges that it had imported German materials and components and had acquired 100 tons of maraging steel and other raw materials needed to manufacture centrifuge components.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Shop-till-you-drop Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1992, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1992/a92/a92.albright.html>; UN Security Council, "Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>, p. 80.

Week of 24 February 1992
Eight managers from three German firms (H & H Metalform GmbH, Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeugbau GmbH & Co KG, and Neue Magdeburger Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik GmbH) are arrested and suspected of aiding Iraq's clandestine nuclear and non-conventional weapons program. IAEA inspectors find equipment from all three companies at various clandestine sites in Iraq. [Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeugbau supplied the State Electrical Industries Establishment in Baghdad with 240,000 dual-use ferritic spacer magnets for the motor stators of gas centrifuges. Neue Magdeburger Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik is named as the manufacturer of computer-numerically-controlled (CNC) machines which are equipped with fixtures and program to manufacture centrifuge parts. H & H supplied the Iraqis with numerous flow-forming machines for cold-pressing thick metal cylinders into thin-walled tubes.]
—Mark Hibbs, "Eight German Executives Arrested on Dual-Use Exports to Iraq," Nuclear Fuel, 2 March 1992, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

April 1992
A group of nuclear weapons designers from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Russia meet to assess the progress of Iraq's nuclear program before the Persian Gulf War, based on documents obtained through subsequent IAEA inspections. These designers conclude that bottlenecks in the program could have delayed completion of a working bomb for at least three years, assuming Iraq had continued its multifaceted strategy and design approach.
—"Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of Atomic Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm>.

April 1992
Iraq reluctantly allows the destruction of Al Atheer and the adjacent Al Hatteen high-explosive test establishment after the IAEA reveals two Iraqi documents that disclose plans to develop a nuclear explosive device at Al Atheer. The decision to destroy Al Atheer's main buildings means that even if Iraq later acquires or purchases fissile materials, it would lack a site where they could be fabricated into weapons.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq: It's All Over at Al Atheer," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1992, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1992/j92/j92.reports.html>; David Albright and Robert Kelley, "Has Iraq Come Clean at Last?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1995, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/nd95/nd95.albright.html>.

14-21 July 1992
The destruction of the Al Tarmiya and Al Sharqat facilities is completed.
—UN Security Council, "Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>, p. 63.

February 1993
The IAEA and the AEC sign a memorandum of understanding on the removal of the spent fuel inventory from Iraq's research reactors at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.
—"Iraq," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 October 1993
Iraq gives chief UN Weapons Inspector Rolf Ekeus a list of foreign suppliers that assisted its nuclear weapons program.
—"Iraq Owns up to Weapons Suppliers," Press Association, 8 October 1993, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 December 1993
The first consignment of Iraq's irradiated fuel is flown to Russia for disposal.
—"First Consignment of Irradiated Fuel Flown to Russia," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 December 1993, cited in
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1994
The IAEA completes the removal of all weapon-usable nuclear material (primarily research reactor fuel) under IAEA safeguards.
—"IAEA and Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of Atomic Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/iaea.htm>.

August 1994
Khidhir Abdul Abas Hamza, former director of Iraq's nuclear weapons programs, defects to the West. In response to his defection, Iraq provides an official explanation that Hamza retired from the nuclear program in 1990, entered in the food business, and became a millionaire.
—Khidhir Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 13; Mark Hibbs, "Suspected Informer Was Physicist in Iraq's Uranium Enrichment Program," Nuclear Fuel, 24 April 1995, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

August 1994
As a result of Hamza's defection, Iraq admits that it had enriched uranium using the diffusion method.
—Khidhir Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 336.

15 October 1994
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 949 demanding that Iraq "cooperate fully" with UNSCOM and that it withdraw all military units deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions. [Iraq thereafter withdraws its forces and resumes its work with the Commission.]
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

2 April 1995
The Sunday Times of London publishes an erroneous story reporting that Hamza had been killed by the Iraqi intelligence service after sneaking out secret documents exposing Iraq's reconstituted nuclear weapons program.
—Khidhir Hamza, "Inside Saddam's Secret Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998, (54) 5, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/so98/so98hamza.html>; Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 295.

July 1995
Iraq threatens to end all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA if there is no progress towards the lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo by 31 August 1995.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

August 1995
Iraq acknowledges that Karl-Heinz Schaab, a former German expert in the Urenco gas centrifuge enrichment program, provided Iraq with top-secret design know-how. It also admits that he had manufactured and exported a carbon fiber filament winding machine to Jordan, where it was awaiting re-export to Iraq at the advent of the Persian Gulf War.
—Mark Hibbs, "Future of IAEA in Iraq at Stake after Middle East Tension Rises," Nuclear Fuel, 23 September 1996, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 August 1995
Iraq informs UNSCOM that it is withdrawing its deadline to halt its cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

August 1995
Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, defects to Jordan, revealing to Western intelligence sources more than was previously know about Iraq's WMD programs.
—Shyam Bhatia and Daniel McGrory, "Brighter than the Baghdad Sun: Saddam's Race to Build the Bomb," (London: Little Brown and Company, 1999), pp. 235-240.

20 August 1995
Following the defection of Hussein Kamel, Iraq divulges information about its crash program during high-level technical talks. The Iraqi government denies that it had made a decision to manufacture nuclear weapons by stating that Kamel had tricked the Iraqi government and had developed a nuclear weapons program without the consent of the Iraqi government as evidenced by documents on Iraq's program found in Kamel's chicken farm. Nonetheless, Iraq's failure to declare its crash program and to give the IAEA all nuclear-related documents and materials constitute violations of Iraq's obligations under pertinent UN Security Council resolutions.
—UN Security Council, "Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>, pp. 65, 92; UN Security Council, "Eighth Report of the Director General of the IAEA on the Implementation of the Agency's Plan for the Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Paragraph 12 of Resolution 687 (1991)," S/1995/844, 6 October 1995, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1995_844.pdf>, p. 4; David Albright, "Iraq's Programs to Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons Prior to the Gulf War," Institute for Science and International Security, October 2002, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/iraqs_fm_history.html>; Khidhir Hamza, "Inside Saddam's Secret Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998, (54) 5, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/so98/so98hamza.html>; Ann Scott Tyson, "How Arms Sleuths Battle Iraqi Deceit," Christian Science Monitor, 20 November 1997, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

September 1995
Saddam's second son, Qusay Hussein, assumes the responsibility of concealing Iraq's nuclear program.
—U.S. Department of State, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction," U.S. Government White Paper, 31 February 1998, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html>.

December 1995
Moayad Hassan Naji al-Janabi, an engineer in the Iraqi nuclear program, is shot dead in Amman, Jordan while seeking asylum from the United States or the United Kingdom.
—Jon Swain, "Mystery of Iraqi Nuclear Expert," Sunday Times, 2 April 1995, cited in <http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear/1995/n9513210.html>.

1996
Iraq provides a summary of enriched uranium output at Al Tarmiya which shows that less enriched material was produced than it declared in 1991.
—David Albright, "Iraq's Programs to Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons Prior to the Gulf War," Institute for Science and International Security, October 2002, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/iraqs_fm_history.html>.

January 1996
Hussein Kamel returns to Baghdad and is subsequently assassinated.
—Khidhir Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 330.

8 Feburary 1996
In an interview with Al-Majallah, Iraqi nuclear scientist Hussein al-Shahristani reveals that Saddam Hussein changed the peaceful nature of Iraq's nuclear program soon after taking power in July 1979 and instructed all scientific facilities to develop nuclear weapons. Al-Shahristani describes how Iraq has come close to enriching uranium to 93 percent with assistance from Western companies. He describes how during the 1980s, Iraq established 15 "major nuclear installations" capable of enriching uranium through centrifuge, electromagnetic separation (EMIS), and laser techniques. Western companies helped the Iraqi military develop complex detonation devices crucial to the successful explosion of a nuclear weapon. Al-Shahristani asserts that scientists who worked on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program are, for the most part, still in Iraq. [Al-Shahristani escaped detention in Iraq during the Gulf war. The date and location of this interview is not given.]
—"Scientist Views Iraq's, Iran's Nuclear Programs," FBIS-TAC-96-002,
12 February 1996, Original Source: Ghalib Darwis, Al-Majallah (London), 28 January 1996, pp. 22, 24.

27 March 1996
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1051 requiring UN members to provide the IAEA and UNSCOM with information on materials exported to Iraq that may be applicable to WMD production, and requiring Iraq to report imports of all dual-use items. [Later, Iraq continues to negotiate contracts for procuring dual-use items with WMD application outside of UN controls.]
—U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 4.

12 June 1996
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1060 demanding that Iraq cooperate with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and access to Iraq officials for interviews. [In reality, however, Iraq consistently sought to impede and limit UNSCOM's mission in Iraq by blocking access to numerous facilities throughout the inspection process, often sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and routinely attempting to deny inspectors access to requested sites and individuals.]
—U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 4.

21 June 1997
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1115 condemning Iraq's actions, and demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any sites for inspection and officials for interviews by UNSCOM. The Council also calls for an additional report on Iraq's cooperation with the Commission and suspends the periodic sanctions review.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

23 October 1997
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1134, which demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission, continues the suspension of the periodic sanctions reviews and foreshadows additional sanctions pending a further report on Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

November 1997
Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz pays Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov $800,000 for strategic materials from Moscow to build up its nuclear weapons stockpile.
—Seymour Hersh, "Saddam's Best Friend," New Yorker, 5 April 1999, <http://www.shmoo.com/mail/cypherpunks/apr99/msg00225.html>.

12 November 1997
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1137 condemning the continued violation by Iraq of its obligations, including its unacceptable decision to seek to impose conditions on cooperation with UNSCOM. It also imposes a travel restriction on Iraqi officials who are responsible for, or participated in the instances of non-compliance.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

1998
Iraq recalls its experienced nuclear scientists from Iraqi universities and civilian scientific centers to its nuclear program.
—"Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Assessment of the British Government," <http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/featurenews/iraqdossier.pdf>, p. 24.

2 March 1998
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1154 demanding that Iraq comply with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary General's memorandum of understanding with Iraq, providing for "severest consequences" if Iraq fails to comply.
—U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 4.

Spring 1998
Iraq produces a document containing a summary of the technical achievements of its crash program which the IAEA regards to be consistent with its own assessment of the Iraqi crash program.
—"IAEA and Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of Atomic Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/iaea.htm>.

9 September 1998
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1194 condemning Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM, deeming Iraq's actions as a totally unacceptable contravention of its obligations. It also demands that Iraq rescind its decision and decides not to conduct the 60-day sanctions reviews until Iraq does so.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

16 December 1998
Iraq ousts UN inspectors and prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraq facilities by UN aircrafts. Consequently, IAEA inspectors leave Iraq while stating that they are confident that Iraq's indigenous nuclear weapons program has not produced more than a few grams of weapons grade material.
—David Albright, "Iraq's Programs to Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons Prior to the Gulf War," Institute for Science and International Security, October 2002, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/iraqs_fm_history.html>; Dr. John Chipman, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment," IISS Strategic Dossier, 9 September 2002; US Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 5.

16-19 December 1998
A few hours after the withdrawal of UN weapons inspectors, the United States and the United Kingdom launch Operation Desert Fox that targets industrial facilities related to Iraq's ballistic missile program and a suspected biological warfare facility as well as military airfields and sites used by Iraq's security organizations that are involved in its WMD programs.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Gulf," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 June 2002; "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Assessment of the British Government," <http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/featurenews/iraqdossier.pdf>, p. 40.

15 June 1999
German engineer Karl-Heinz Schaab confesses to illegally selling blueprints for a gas ultra-centrifuge to Iraqi buyers in September 1989. [Later, he pays a $32,000 fine and receives a five year suspended sentence in Germany.]
—Robert Jaquet, "Construction Plans Sold to Iraq," Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 16 June 1999, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de>; "Six Years Jail Time Demanded for Nuclear Spy," Taz (Munich), 22 June 1999, <http://www.taz.de>; Jonathan Rhodes, "Saddam's Nuclear Quest: 1980-1991," efreedomnews, 22 September 2002, <http://www.efreedomnews.com/News%20Archive/Iraq/SpecialReportWaronIraq/M26NuclearQuest_I.htm>.

17 August 1999
IAEA Director-General Hans Blix says that there is evidence that Iraq is close to producing an operational nuclear weapon.
—Touraj Shiralilou, "Defuse Saddam," Iran Daily (Tehran), 17 August 1999, <http://www.iran-daily.com>.

25 August 1999
A classified US White House Report concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs is sent to Congress, The reports states that US intelligence is monitoring activities at Iraqi facilities "capable of producing WMD and long-range ballistic missiles." It is also examining possible Iraqi efforts to covertly purchase dual-use materials, substances and technologies that have both civilian and weapons applications.
—Matthew Campbell, "West Fears Saddam is on Brink of Building Nuclear Missile," Sunday Times (London), 5 September 1999, <http://www.sunday-times.co.uk>; Jonathan S. Landay, "Is Iraq Building Weapons Again," Christian Science Monitor, 30 August 1999, p. 1.

17 December 1999
In an attempt to enforce Iraqi compliance with UN disarmament and monitoring obligations, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 1284, reaffirming all previous UN Security Council resolutions, disbanding UNSCOM, and establishing the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Iraq denounces the resolution on the grounds that it does not set a clear timetable or criteria for lifting sanctions.
—Dr. John Chipman, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment," IISS Strategic Dossier, 9 September 2002; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 4; "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction—The Assessment of the British Government," <http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/featurenews/iraqdossier.pdf>, p. 41.

December 1999-October 2002
UNMOVIC screens Iraqi contracts pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1284 and finds more than 100 contracts containing dual-use items that could be diverted into WMD programs.
—U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 25.

12 January 2000
Iraq reports that it will allow inspectors from the IAEA visit Iraq to inspect its stockpiles of uranium.
—Barbara Crossette, "Iraq to Allow Nuclear Inspections Again," New York Times, 13 January 2000.

25 January 2000
IAEA inspectors resume nuclear inspections in Iraq.
—Barbara Crossette, "Iraq to Allow Nuclear Inspections Again," New York Times, 13 January 2000.

September 2000
Saddam Hussein publicly exhorts his "Nuclear Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy," contributing to the growing concern about a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons program.
—Bill Gertz, "Iraq Seeks Steel Use to Make Nukes," Washington Times, 26 July 2002.

15 April 2001
Iraqi scientist Hussein al-Shahrastani, who escaped from an Iraqi prison in 1991, affirms that Saddam Hussein would have been able to produce a nuclear bomb, had he delayed the invasion of Kuwait by six months. Al-Shahrastani also asserts that Iraq still maintains a nuclear weapons program saying, "I know very well that the Iraqi regime had built and laid the foundation for nuclear installations. It had also developed a nuclear program under Jabal Himrin in northern Iraq. This project was extremely secretive, and the inspection committees did not visit it. No information is available about it or about the equipment and installations that exist there. The information I have is that Iraq is currently developing its atomic program at the nuclear installations under Jabal Himrin and not at the nuclear research center in the Al-Tuwaythah district where such facilities no longer exist." [Khidhir Hamza also concurs with the assertion that Saddam's invasion of Kuwait thwarted an Iraqi nuclear bomb, writing in his book, "[N]ow we had all the pieces in place to make it [a bomb] work, I assured [Hussein] Kamel. The bomb was in sight. The only problem was Saddam. On August 2, he invaded Kuwait. And everything came to a halt."]
—Mu'add Fayyad, "Iraqi Nuclear Scientist Reveals Iraq's Nuclear Installations, Capabilities," Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 15 April 2001; cited in FBIS 20010415000047; "Interview with Husayn Shahrastani," al-Majalla (London), 28 January-3 February 1996.

6 February 2002
Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet testifies before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He says, "We believe Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons program. Iraq retains a significant number of nuclear scientists, program documentation, and probably some dual-use manufacturing infrastructure that could support a reinvigorated nuclear weapons program. Baghdad's access to foreign expertise could support a rejuvenated program, but our major near-term concern is the possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material."
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Gulf," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 38 June 2002.

Mid-June 2002
Procurement agents from Iraq's covert nuclear-arms program are detected as they attempt to purchase stainless-steel tubing, that could used in gas centrifuges and a key component in making nuclear bombs. [Stainless-steel tubing is considered "dual-use" with non-nuclear uses for developing artillery, anti-tank rockets, and multiple rocket launch systems. Thus, the dispute is whether enough evidence exists to state that the tubes were definitely ordered for the gas centrifuge program.]
—Bill Gertz, "Iraq Seeks Steel Used to Make Nukes," Washington Times, 26 July 2002; "Aluminum Tubing Is an Indicator of an Iraqi Gas Centrifuge Program: But Is the Tubing Specifically for Centrifuges," Institute for Science and International Security, 9 October 2002, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/aluminumtubes.html>.

9 September 2002
Institute for Science and International Security (IISS) Director Dr. John Chipman notes the following regarding the Iraq's current nuclear capacity: (1) Iraq does not possess facilities to produce fissile material in sufficient amounts for nuclear weapons; (2) Iraq would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to build such fissile material production facilities; (3) It could, however, assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained; and (4) It could divert domestic civil-use radioisotopes or seek to obtain foreign material for a crude radiological device.
—Dr. John Chipman, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment," IISS Strategic Dossier, 9 September 2002.

14 November 2002
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1441 demanding that Iraq comply with its obligations to disarm as required by this resolution and other UN Security Council resolutions.
—David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Now for the Hard Part: Implementing Strengthened Inspections in Iraq," Institute for Science and International Security, 14 November 2002,
<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/implementing1441.html>.

25 November 2002
UN inspectors arrive in Baghdad to begin inspections.
—Richard C. Hottelet, "Inspectors Due Monday, Hussein Inspects Remaining Trump Cards," Christian Science Monitor, 18 November 2002, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; James Dao, "U.N. Inspectors Arrive in Iraq," New York Times, 25 November 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/25/international/25CND-IRAQ.html>.

	Updated November 2003