Introduction
On 19 December 2003, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) agreed to eliminate all materials, equipment, and programs resulting in the production of nuclear or other internationally proscribed weapons. Libya's leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi admitted that, in contravention of its international obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Libya had pursued a nuclear weapons program, allegedly to counter the covert Israeli nuclear program. Currently, the United States and Britain are dismantling Libya's nuclear weapons infrastructure with oversight from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Libya signed the NPT in 1968, ratified it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980. Despite these commitments, Libya under Qadhdhafi sought, with varying degrees of success, nuclear technologies, fissile materials, and weapons designs and know-how from several countries including, China, Pakistan, the Soviet Union/Russia, Belgium, and Ukraine. In 1979, a Soviet-supplied nuclear reactor was installed at a research center at Tajura. Prior to its December 2003 admission, the nuclear program that Libya had declared to the IAEA consisted of a 10MW IRT research reactor (a pool-type research reactor using 80% enriched uranium) in operation and a critical assembly (100W), both located at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center. The total quantity of declared nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards amounted to 20 kilograms of uranium-235 in highly enriched fuel and 1,000 metric tons of uranium ore concentrate.[1] In fact, Libya's nuclear weapons program, aided by the transfer from Pakistan and other countries of centrifuges and related equipment, depleted uranium hexaflouride gas (UF6), technical design data, and a fission weapon blueprint, was more advanced.
Qadhdhafi's decision in December 2003 to reveal the true scope of Libya's nuclear ambitions and progress resulted primarily from several factors: (1) his increasing desire to regain admission to the international community by renouncing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (2) his fear that Libya might be subject to a U.S. invasion, as had Iraq, on the grounds that it possessed WMD; (3) the interception in October 2003 of a ship bound for Libya with a cargo of Pakistani-designed centrifuge parts manufactured in Malaysia; and (4) the promise that long-standing international sanctions imposed because of Libya's terrorist activities would be lifted, leading to economic and other benefits.[2] In return for assurances from the United States and Britain, Libya admitted to the IAEA that it had been engaged for more than a decade in the development of a uranium enrichment capability and had acquired a Chinese-origin nuclear weapon design and fabrication documents. Following these admissions, the IAEA director general and Agency inspectors visited several sites involved in Libya's undeclared nuclear program. In a subsequent report, the IAEA concluded: "Starting in the early 1980s and continuing until the end of 2003, Libya imported nuclear material and conducted a wide variety of nuclear activities which it had failed to report to the Agency as required under its Safeguards Agreement."[3] These activities, which surprised Western intelligence services, included separating plutonium, and acquiring a significant amount of technical know-how regarding the key elements for nuclear weapons production.[4] Libya agreed to transfer sensitive nuclear-related materials, documents, and previously undeclared nuclear materials to the United States; conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA; and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In January 2004, U.S. and British teams dismantled Libya's facilities with the IAEA verifying the process, and on January 27, the United States airlifted documents and components of Libya's nuclear and ballistic missile program out of the country. In March, Libya sent 16 kilograms of highly enriched uranium fuel from its Tajura Nuclear Research Center to Russia to begin the conversion of its Tajura IRT-1 reactor to low-enriched uranium.[5] In response to these developments, U.S. President George W. Bush lifted most of the trade restrictions on Libya, allowing U.S. oil companies to explore Libya's large oil reserves; however, he did not remove Libya from the State Department's list of nations that support terrorism.[6]
History
1968-1990
While still under the rule of the pro-Western King Idris, Libya signed the NPT in July 1968. Even though Idris was overthrown in a 1969 coup led by the Revolutionary Command Council headed by Qadhdhafi, Libya still ratified the NPT in 1975. However, many reports indicate that Qadhdhafi, whose rise to power was partly driven by resentment over the 1967 defeat of the Arabs by Israel, began seeking a nuclear capability shortly after taking power and adopting a strong anti-Israel stance.
Owing to Libya's relatively low level of technical development, these efforts focused on foreign suppliers. In 1970, for example, Libya reportedly made an unsuccessful attempt to purchase nuclear weapons from China.[7] And in 1978, Libyan agents allegedly tried to buy nuclear weapons from India.[8] There are also many reports of nuclear dealings during the 1970s between Libya and Pakistan. These allegedly involved Libyan assistance to Pakistan in acquiring access to uranium ore concentrate from neighboring Niger in return for Pakistani nuclear assistance to Libya.[9] Whether these dealings laid the basis for later Libyan-Pakistani nuclear cooperation remains unclear.
Evidence released by the IAEA in 2004 suggests that during the 1970s and 1980s, Libya decided to pursue both the uranium- and plutonium-based pathways to nuclear weapons. Steps were taken in the 1970s to gain access to uranium ore, uranium conversion facilities, and enrichment technologies that together would have allowed Libya to produce weapons-grade uranium. This activity was conducted covertly and in violation of IAEA safeguards. Libya pursued foreign supplies of uranium ore (UOC), for example. Reports indicate that during the 1970s, Libya imported 1,200 tons of uranium ore concentrate from French-controlled mines in Niger without declaring it to the IAEA, as required by the NPT.[10] Libya admitted to the IAEA in 2004 that it had actually imported 2,263 metric tons of uranium ore concentrate from 1978 to 1981, but only declared the import of 1,000 metric tons.[11] The remaining 1,263 metric tons were thus not subject to IAEA safeguards and could be used in covert nuclear activities.
Libya also worked to acquire uranium conversion facilities, which would have enabled it to convert the UOC to a form more suitable for enrichment. In 1982, Libya attempted to purchase a plant for manufacturing uranium tetrafluoride from the Belgian firm Belgonucleaire. U.S. analysts suspected that the intended use for the plant was to produce uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for a centrifuge uranium enrichment program (like that pursued by Pakistan). At the time, Libya had no declared nuclear facilities that required uranium tetrafluoride, and the purchase was refused.[12] This refusal did not discourage Libya, however, which in 2004 admitted to the IAEA that it acquired a pilot-scale uranium conversion facility in 1984.[13] The IAEA report does not, however, identify the country that supplied Libya with this facility. The plant was fabricated in portable modules in accordance with Libyan specifications. These modules were received in 1986, but then placed in storage until 1998.[14] Libya has also admitted that during the 1980s, it conducted undeclared laboratory-scale uranium conversion experiments at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center.[15] Along these same lines, Libya has now reported exporting several kilograms of UOC in 1985 to a "nuclear weapon state" for processing into various uranium compounds. Libya subsequently received a variety of compounds back from the state in question, including 39 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride. This export was also not reported to the IAEA by either Libya or the nuclear weapon state.[16] The IAEA report does not name the nuclear weapon state involved in this transaction, but David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security said the Soviet Union and China were the most likely suspects, although he added, "I think it's hard to know...It was a time when people weren't scrutinizing these things very carefully."[17]
Uranium enrichment equipment and technology was also sought by Libya during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1973, Libya tried to purchase 20 calutrons to enrich uranium from the French company Thomson-CSF. The deal, apparently supported by top company officials, was blocked by the French government because of the obvious use enrichment technology would have to an undeclared nuclear weapons program.[18] Later, in the 1980s, a foreign expert began a research and design program at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center in Libya aimed at producing gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.[19] The foreign expert was reportedly a former employee of a German firm.[20] However, Libya has told the IAEA that by the time the foreign expert concluded his work in 1992, Libya was not yet able to produce an operating centrifuge, and no centrifuge experiments involving nuclear materials had been conducted. However, technical expertise useful for the next stage of centrifuge development and design had been acquired.[21] According to the IAEA, after the German expert left, the uranium enrichment program lost momentum, and was not reinvigorated until after 1995.[22]
As another way to build its nuclear expertise, however, Libya also pursued "peaceful" cooperation with the Soviet Union, under IAEA safeguards. The main result of Soviet-Libyan nuclear cooperation was the completion in 1979 of the 10 MW research reactor at Tajura. This reactor offered Libya the opportunity to explore plutonium production technology, which Libya did, while evading IAEA safeguards intended to detect such activities. Between 1984 and 1990, Libya produced several dozen small uranium oxide and uranium metal targets, a number of which were irradiated in the Tajura reactor to produce radioisotopes. Thirty-eight of these targets were dissolved and the radioisotopes extracted in hot cells. Libya has reported to the IAEA that very small amounts of plutonium were extracted from at least two of these targets.[23] Presumably the data gathered in these experiments would have proved useful if Libya had decided to pursue plutonium production more actively.
Libya did make efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to buy a reactor larger than the one at Tajura. In 1976, negotiations were held between France and Libya for the purchase of a 600 MW reactor. A preliminary agreement was reached, but strong objection by the international community led France to cancel the project.[24] In the 1970s and 1980s, Libya discussed the construction of a nuclear power plant with the Soviet Union. At one point, the Belgian firm Belgonucleaire was in discussions to provide engineering support and equipment for this proposed project, but in 1984, U.S. pressure led the firm to refuse the contract.[25] Discussions with the Soviet Union about power reactor projects continued, but never produced a final agreement. By the late 1980s, Libya's nuclear program began to be hampered by economic sanctions prompted by Quadhdhafi's support of terrorism. In 1986, for example, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Libya, which were later expanded in 1992 and 1996.[26]
1990-2003: Nuclear Weapons Program Intensifies
By the early 1990s, Libya's support of international terrorism, in particular the 1988 bombing of a U.S. airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, had prompted the imposition of UN economic sanctions. These sanctions restricted Libya's foreign trade, and probably restricted the funds available to the Libyan nuclear program. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, reports indicate that Libya was trying to exploit the chaos generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union to gain access to former Soviet nuclear technology, expertise, and materials. In 1992, for example, an official of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, one of Russia's leading nuclear research centers, claimed that Libya had unsuccessfully tried to recruit two of his colleagues to work at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center in Libya.[27] Other reports also suggested that Russian scientists had been hired to work on a covert Libyan nuclear weapons program. These reports may be substantiated by the current IAEA investigation into Libya's nuclear activities.
Throughout the 1990s, Qadhdhafi renewed calls for the production of nuclear weapons in Libya[28] and pursued new avenues for nuclear technology procurement,[29] while publicly, if grudgingly, supporting the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Libya initially rejected an indefinite extension because Israel had never joined the treaty; however, Libya eventually supported the extension. In 1996, Qadhdhafi stated that Arab states should develop a nuclear weapon to counter Israel's presumed nuclear weapons capability. Nonetheless, in April 1996, Libya signed the African-Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Later the same year, Libya voted against the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the UN General Assembly because it did not provide a deadline for nuclear disarmament. (Libya eventually signed the CTBT in November 2001 and ratified it in January 2004.)[30]
According to the IAEA director general's report of February 2004, "[i]n July 1995, Libya made a strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities" including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. In 1997, foreign manufacturers, including Pakistan, provided 20 pre-assembled L-1 centrifuges[31] and components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges and related parts. One of the 20 pre-assembled rotors was used to install a completed single centrifuge at the Al Hashan site, which was first successfully tested in October 2000. Libya reported to the IAEA that no nuclear material had been used during tests on L-1 centrifuges.[32]
In 1997, Libya began receiving nuclear weapons-related aid from Dr. A.Q. Khan, the chief architect of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and confessed proliferator of nuclear technologies to several countries of concern, including Iran and North Korea. (This cooperation continued until fall 2003 when Khan's clandestine collaboration with these countries became public following Libya's disclosures about its efforts to build nuclear weapons.) In 1997, Khan supplied Libya with the 20 assembled L-1 centrifuges[33] and components for an additional 200 more for a pilot facility. In 2001, Libya received almost two tons of UF6; while some reports claim that the UF6 was provided by Pakistan,[34] others cite evidence that it originated in North Korea.[35] IAEA sources believe that amount of UF6 is consistent with the requirements for a pilot enrichment facility. If enriched, the UF6 could produce a single nuclear weapon.[36]
In late 1997, Libya also renewed its nuclear cooperation with Russia and in March 1998, Libya signed a contract with the Russian company Atomenergoeksport for a partial overhaul of the Tajura Nuclear Research Center.[37]
In late 2000, Libya's nuclear activities accelerated. Libyan authorities informed the IAEA that at that time, Libya began to order centrifuges and components from other countries with the intention of installing a centrifuge plant to make enriched uranium. Libya also imported equipment for a fairly large precision machine shop (located at Janzour) and acquired a large stock of maraging steel and high strength aluminum alloy to build a domestic centrifuge production capability.[38] In September 2000, Libya received two L-2 centrifuges (European-designed centrifuges more advanced than the L-1). In late 2000, Libya began to progressively install 9-machine, 19-machine, and 64-machine L-1 centrifuge cascades into a large hall at Al Hashan.[39] (Only the 9-centrifuge machine was completely assembled in 2002.[40]) Libya also ordered 10,000 L-2 centrifuges from Pakistan. By late December 2002, component parts for the centrifuges began arriving in Libya.[41] However, in October 2003, U.S. intelligence agencies seized a subsequent consignment of centrifuge-related equipment bound for Libya in a northern Mediterranean port.[42] Subsequent investigations revealed that many of these components were manufactured by the Scomi Precision Engineering SDN BHD plant in Malaysia with "roles played by foreign technical, manufacturing, and transshipment experts, including A.Q. Khan and his associates at A.Q. Khan Laboratories in Pakistan, B.S.A. Tahgir in Malaysia and Dubai, and several Swiss, British, and German nationals."[43]
Libya sought not only the capability to enrich uranium to weapon-grade but also the know-how to design and fabricate nuclear weapons.[44] In either late 2001 or early 2002, A.Q. Khan provided Libya with the blueprint of an actual fission weapon.[45] According to the February 2004 IAEA report, Libya acknowledged receiving from a foreign source in late 2001 or early 2002 documentation related to nuclear weapon design and fabrication. "The documents presented by Libya include a series of engineering drawings relating to nuclear weapons components, notes, (many of them handwritten) related to the fabrication of weapon components. The notes indicate the involvement of other parties and will require follow-up."[46] U.S. intelligence analysts believe the documents include a nuclear weapon design that China tested in the late 1960s and later shared with Pakistan. Apparently the design documents produced by Libya were transferred from Pakistan and contained information in both Chinese and English, establishing their Chinese lineage. The weapon blueprint sets forth the design parameters and engineering specifications for constructing an implosion weapon weighing over 1,000 pounds that could be delivered using aircraft or a large ballistic missile; Pakistan has most likely graduated to building more advanced nuclear weapons.[47] Libya told IAEA investigators that it had no national personnel competent to evaluate these designs and it would have had to ask the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear weapon.[48] The IAEA is still investigating the extent of Libya's knowledge in the weapons-design area. Along with their other assistance, Pakistani nuclear scientists offered briefings for their Libyan counterparts in Casablanca and Istanbul.[49]
Current Status
Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons
At the same time that Libya pursued centrifuge technology and nuclear weapons designs, its leader Colonel Qadhdhafi began to make overtures to the West in hopes of having economic and other sanctions lifted. Reportedly, Libya had established secret communications regarding terrorist activities and WMD with the United States as early as 1999 during the Clinton administration.[50] According to some analysts, the September 11 attacks, which Qadhdhafi denounced, and the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq increased Libya's desire to make peace with the United States.[51] In March 2003, days before the invasion of Iraq, Qadhdhafi's personal envoys contacted President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair about Libya's willingness to dismantle all WMD programs. Subsequently, at Qadhdhafi's direction, Libyan officials provided British and U.S. officers with documentation and additional details on Libya's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile activities.[52] In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility for the 1988 bombing of a U.S. commercial airliner, Pan Am 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland, and agreed to pay millions of dollars to each of the victims' families. In response, the UN Security Council voted to end international sanctions, but the Bush administration abstained, saying that Libya still had to answer questions about its WMD and meddling in African conflicts.[53]
Despite its ongoing negotiations with the West, Libya continued to procure nuclear technologies from other countries. In October 2003, British and U.S. ships operating pursuant to the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, intercepted a German cargo ship heading to Libya from Dubai with a cargo of centrifuge parts allegedly based on Pakistani designs.[54] Following the seizure of the ship, Libya reportedly allowed U.S. and British officials to visit 10 previously secret sites and dozens of Libyan laboratories and military factories to search for evidence of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities and for chemical and missile programs. Finally, on December 19, Qadhdhafi announced his commitment to disclose and dismantle all WMD programs in his country. In a letter to the UN Security Council, Libya reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT and agreed to abide by the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (allowing for additional and more intrusive inspections of nuclear-related sites), and to receive inspections teams to verify its new commitments.[55] President Bush stated that with Qadhdhafi's announcement, "Libya has begun the process of rejoining the community of nations."[56] One news source quotes Qadhdhafi as claiming that his decision to forego WMD programs was based on national security and economic interests. In an address to the Libyan People's National Congress, he reportedly said, "Today it becomes a problem to have a nuclear bomb. At the time, it was maybe the fashion to have a nuclear bomb. Today, you have no enemy. Who's the enemy?"[57]
Several factors probably contributed to Libya's decision to renounce its nuclear program. First, 30 years of economic sanctions significantly limited oil exports and hurt the Libyan economy. Second, Libya's nuclear program progressed fairly slowly and at a great cost to the country, both economically[58] and politically. Third, the elimination of WMD was a prerequisite to normalizing relations with the West, and ending Libya's pariah status reportedly had become particularly important to Qadhdhafi. Fourth, according to U.S. officials, Libya wanted to avoid the fate of Iraq, which allegedly was invaded to prevent its further development of WMD.[59] Finally, the October 2003 seizure of the ship with centrifuge-related cargo and ensuing investigations may have persuaded Libya to give up its weapons program.[60]
IAEA Inspections and Nuclear Facility Dismantlement
Following the December announcement, a Libyan delegation informed the IAEA director general that "Libya had been engaged for more than a decade in the development of a uranium enrichment capability."[61] Libya admitted importing natural uranium, centrifuge and conversion equipment and nuclear weapons design documents. However, the Libyan officials said that the enrichment program was at an early state of development, no industrial scale facilities had been built, and Libya lacked the technical know-how to interpret the weapons design documents. Libya acknowledged that some of these activities put it in violation of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. With Libya's consent, in December and January, the IAEA director general and Agency teams made several visits to 18 locations related to possible nuclear weapons-related activities and began the process of verifying the previously undeclared nuclear materials, equipment, facilities, and activities. The Agency concluded that "initial inspections of these locations did not identify specific facilities currently dedicated to nuclear weapon component manufacturing."[62] However, it also noted that further analytical and field activities would be necessary to determine how far Libya had progressed in weapons design activities.
Pursuant to understandings with Britain and the United States, Libya agreed to transfer to the United States "sensitive design information, nuclear weapon related documents, and most of the previously undeclared enrichment equipment, subject to Agency verification requirements and procedures."[63] On January 22, Libya's nuclear weapons design information, including the Chinese blueprint purchased from Pakistan, was sent to the United States, and on January 26, U.S. transport planes carried 55,000 pounds of documents and equipment related to Libya's nuclear and ballistic missile programs to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. The nuclear portion of this shipment "included several containers of uranium hexafluoride (used as feedstock for enrichment); 2 P-2 [L-2] centrifuges from Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories and additional centrifuge parts, equipment, and documentation."[64] In March, over 1,000 additional centrifuge parts as well as missile parts were shipped from Libya.[65] IAEA inspectors tagged and sealed most of the equipment sent to the United States, and they will be involved in its evaluation. In addition, Agency teams continue inspection, monitoring, and dismantling efforts in Libya. On February 18, Libya gave the IAEA written confirmation of its intention to conclude an Additional Protocol and to act as if the protocol had entered into force on December 29, 2003.[66] In January, it had ratified the CTBT.
On 8 March 2004, Russia, the United States, and the IAEA removed 16 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel from Libya's Tajura Nuclear Research Center; the HEU fuel was airlifted by a Russian company to Dimitrovgrad, where it will be down-blended into low-enriched uranium fuel. The Tajura Soviet-supplied IRT-1 reactor will soon be converted to low-enriched uranium; costs of fuel removal and conversion will be paid by the United States and the IAEA.[67]
IAEA Report and Resolution
On 20 February 2004, the IAEA director general issued a report[68] on the implementation of Libya's IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The report recounts Libya's decision to reveal its nuclear program, sign an Additional Protocol, and allow IAEA inspections of previously undeclared nuclear-related facilities. The report also recounts what Libya revealed about its nuclear procurement and development activities and the findings of the IAEA inspection teams that visited Libya in December and January. The report finds, "Starting in the early 1980s and continuing until the end of 2003, Libya imported nuclear material and conducted a wide variety of nuclear activities, which it had failed to report to the Agency as required under its Safeguards Agreement."[69] Such violations included failure to declare the import and storage of UF6 and other uranium compounds; failure to declare the fabrication and irradiation of uranium targets, and their subsequent processing, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium; and failure to provide design information for the pilot centrifuge facility, uranium conversion facility, and hot cells associated with the research reactor. The report states that these failures and Libya's acquisition of nuclear weapon design and fabrication documents are "matters of utmost concern." However, the report also notes Libya's cooperation with the ongoing investigation and its policy of full transparency.
The IAEA director general's report also touches on the larger issues—support from foreign sources and a nuclear proliferation network—related to Libya's acquisition of nuclear weapons-related technologies. "As part of verifying the correctness and completeness of Libya's declarations, the Agency is also investigating...the supply routes and sources of sensitive nuclear technology and related equipment and nuclear and non-nuclear materials. At this early stage in the Agency's investigation, it is evident already that a network has existed whereby actual technological know-how originates from one source, while the delivery of equipment and some of the materials have taken place through intermediaries, who have played a co-ordinating role, subcontracting the manufacturing to entities in yet other countries."[70] The Agency plans to take steps to ensure that sensitive nuclear technologies found in Libya will not be proliferated further.
On 10 March 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution[71] commending Libya for its cooperation with the Agency, but noting with concern the breach of its Safeguards Agreement and its acquisition of nuclear weapons designs. The resolution requests that the Director General report Libya's past failures to meet its Safeguard Agreement obligations to the UN Security Council for information purposes while commending the efforts Libya has taken to remedying its non-compliance. The resolution also requests that Libya continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
As a result of Libya's cooperation with the IAEA, on 23 April 2005, President Bush lifted most of the remaining restrictions on doing business with Libya, although he did not remove Libya from the State Department's list of nations that support terrorism. For the first time in decades, the United States will have a diplomatic mission in Tripoli and U.S. oil companies, barred from Libya for 18 years, will have an opportunity to help develop Libya's rich oil fields. Bush suggested that Colonel Qadhdhafi was beginning to meet his goal of acceptance by the international community and that his actions might serve as a model for North Korea and Iran: "Through its actions, Libya has set a standard that we hope other nations will emulate in rejecting weapons of mass destruction and in working constructively with international organizations to halt the proliferation of the world's most dangerous systems."[72] Under Bush's order, Libyan students will be able to study in the United States and financial transactions and investments will be permitted. However, export controls will remain, Libyan government assets frozen in the United States will not be released, and direct air service will not be allowed between the two countries. The United States and Britain are lobbying for an announcement at the Group of Eight (G8) summit in June 2004 that some of the G8's global partnership's programs against the spread of WMD should be used to redirect Libyan weapons scientists to peaceful activities.[73]
Currently, Libya has traded its nascent nuclear weapons development activities for acceptance by the international community and new economic opportunities for the country. The on-going investigations by the IAEA, the United States, and other countries have yet to reveal the full legacy of Libya's nuclear ambitions and of their abandonment.
In May 2004 the IAEA revealed that centrifuge components were successfully shipped to Libya three months after Libya decided to discontinue its nuclear program, highlighting the need to continue to strengthen anti-proliferation security measures. Recent reporting also revealed that North Korea and several South African, German, and Swiss nationals have been implicated in the extensive illegal network that fed Libya's nuclear program.
Throughout 2005, Libya continues to strengthen foreign diplomatic relations and engage in bilateral agreements that facilitate cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Libya maintains cooperative relations with the IAEA and aids the investigation into the clandestine network that supplied its nuclear weapons program.
During his first official visit to Libya as president, Nicolas Sarkozy, newly elected President of France, signed a framework agreement on a comprehensive Libyan-French partnership on 25 July 2007. The agreement outlines cooperation in the field of defense and a defensive industrial partnership, and was signed along with a controversial memorandum of understanding on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The nuclear memorandum creates a framework for plans to build a nuclear reactor in Libya, which is to be used for water desalination.
The German government has been very vocal in expressing their concerns over the deal as Germany’s Siemens has a 34% stake in a subsidiary of the French Atomic firm Areva, the firm most likely to supply the nuclear technology to Libya. The German Ministry for the Environment went so far as to warn Siemens against participating in the deal. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier was quoted as saying, "I would have wished that the European partners would have been briefed on the agreements and would have been involved."[74]
Key Sources:
[1] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," (GOV/2004/12), February 20, 2004, p. 1.
[2] Carla Anne Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2004, p. A1.
[3] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 7.
[4] "IAEA report on Libyan nukes stuns the West," World Tribune.com, March 4, 2004, http://216.26.163.62/2004/me_libya_03_03.html.
[5] "Libya sends Tajura HEU to Russia, prepares to convert reactor to LEU," NuclearFuel, March 15, 2004, p. 4.
[6] David E. Sanger, "U.S. Lifts Ban on Libyan Trade, but Limits on Diplomacy Remain," New York Times, April 24, 2004 (on-line).
[7] Joseph Cirincione with Jon Wolfstahl and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307; John Pike, "Libyan Nuclear Weapons," Global Security.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org;wmd/world/libya/nuclear.htm.
[8] Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, Simon Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992, 89.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 3.
[12] Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, p. 89.
[13] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 4.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Joe Fiorill, "Nuclear Weapon State Processed Uranium for Libya, IAEA Says," Global Security Newswire, February 23, 2004.
[18] Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, p. 89.
[19] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.
[20] Peter Slevin, "Libya Made Plutonium, Nuclear Watchdog Says," Washington Post, February 21, 2004, p. A15.
[21] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid., p. 6.
[24] Barnaby, Frank, The Invisible Bomb, The Nuclear Race in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1993), p. 98.
[25] Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 15, 2003.
[26] Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 306.
[27] Jack Kelley, "Russian Nuke Experts Wooed," USA Today, January 8, 1992; "Libya Denies Offers to Soviets," Washington Post, January 11, 1992.
[28] Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 97.
[29] Reports from the early 1990s allege that Libya tried to acquire nuclear materials or know-how from China (R. Jeffrey, "U.S. Complains to China About Libyan Arms Shipment," Washington Post, 28 April 1992); Russia (N. Mengel, Courier-Mail, 20 January 1992; Lee Michael Katz, "Nuclear Threat Different, Not Gone, Panel Warned," USA Today, 23 January 1992; "Soviet Scientists," USA Today, 23 January 1992); Iraq (Tom O'Dwyer, "Libya Helps Iraq Dodge Weapons Supervision," Jerusalem Post, 1 November 1995); and Ukraine (Barbara G.B. Ferguson, "Libya, Ukraine Sign Deal on Nuclear Technology Transfer," Saudi Gazette, 12 June 1996).
[30] Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.
[31] The L-1 centrifuge is also referred to as G-1 or P-1. It is an old design of European origin. ("IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.)
[32] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.
[33] Khan stole the L-1 designs from the European enrichment consortium URENCO in the mid-1970s to launch Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. (David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered," March 1, 2004; Gaurav Kampani, "Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," CNS Research Story, February 23, 2004 http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm, p. 1.)
[34] Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm, p. 3.
[35] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Evidence is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium," New York Times, May 23, 2004, p. A1.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Cirincione with Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, p. 307.
[38] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, p. 6.
[39] Ibid., p. 5.
[40] Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. CRS-2.
[41] Ibid., p. 5; Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm, p. 3.
[42] Ibid.
[43] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered," March 1, 2004.
[44] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, p. 6.
[45] Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm, p. 4.
[46] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 6.
[47] Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm, p. 4.
[48] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 6.
[49] David Rhode and David E. Sanger, "Key Pakistani Is Said to Admit to Atom Transfers," New York Times, February 1, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com.
[50] Barbara Slavin, "Libya's Rehabilitation in the Works Since Early '90s," USA Today, April 27, 2004.
[51] Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," p. A1.
[52] "President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 19, 2003.
[53] Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," p. A1.
[54] Samia Amin, "Recent Developments in Libya," February 10, 2004, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Factsheets/
developemntsinlibya.htm.
[55] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 2.
[56] "President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 19, 2003.
[57] "IAEA report on Libyan nukes stuns the West," World Tribune.com, March 4, 2004, http://216.26.163.62/2004/me_libya_03_03.html.
[58] According to Libya's top oil official, if the country had continued its nuclear program, it would "find it adding up to the billion [of dollars] quite easily." (Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," p. A1.)
[59] Carla Anne Robbins and Tom Hamburger, "PSI Helped Push Libya to Ditch Pursuit of Arms," Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2003, p. A4.
[60] Ibid.; Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. CRS-2.
[61] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 2.
[62] Ibid., p. 7.
[63] Ibid., p. 3.
[64] Squassoni and Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. CRS-4.
[65] Ibid., p. CRS-5.
[66] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 3.
[67] "Libya sends Tajura HEU to Russia, Prepares to Convert Reactor to LEU," NuclearFuel, March 15, 2004, p. 4-5.
[68] IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya."
[69] Ibid., p. 7.
[70] Ibid., p.8.
[71] IAEA Board of Governors Resolution "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" (GOV/2004/18), adopted March 10, 2004.
[72] David E. Sanger, "U.S. Lifts Ban on Libyan Trade, but Limits on Diplomacy Remain," New York Times, April 24, 2004 (on-line).
[73] Roula Khalaf and Stephen Fidler, "Safe Jobs Sought for Libya's Weapons Scientists," The Times (London), April 30, 2004.
[74] "Libya, France sign defence, nuclear energy agreements," JANA, in OSC Document GMP20070725950064, 25 July 2007. "German Ministry Warns Siemens Against Participating in Libya Nuclear Deal," AFP, in OSC Document EUP20070730102008, 30 July 2007. "Germany’s Steinmeier Views US Arms Deliveries to ME, France’s Deal with Libya," Handelsblatt, in OSC Document EUP20070802072012, 2 August 2007.
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Updated October 2007 |
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