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Chemical Chronology

2005-2007

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

January 2005
David Richmond, director-general for Defence and Intelligence of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and current chair of the G8 Senior Nonproliferation Officials Group, describes UK priorities on bioterrorism under its chairmanship of the G8 during 2005: "The UK is already engaged in a biological non-proliferation project in Georgia intended to redirect plant health scientists previously employed in the Soviet anti-crop programme. We are working in close collaboration with the US and Canada and other donors on identifying similar areas of potential work in Libya and Iraq."
The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 67 (March 2005), p. 27.

5-6 January 2005
Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka visits Libya to discuss bilateral cooperation. Belka met with Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi and Libyan Prime Minister Shakri Ghanem. A bilateral cooperation accord concerning the nonproliferation of WMD was signed. Poland also agreed to help Tripoli in the conversion of its chemical weapons plant production from military to civil use and to assist in liquidating Libya's chemical weapons stockpile.
—"Opening a New Chapter - The First Day of Prime Minister Marek Belka's Visit to Libya"
The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Event Archive, 5 January 2005. <http://www.kprm.gov.pl/english/2130_7102.htm>; "Poland-Libya: Thawed Relations," The Warsaw Voice, 16 January 2005, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

15-18 March 2005
The Executive Council of the OPCW holds its 40th session in the Hague. In the course of its discussions the Executive Council adopts a decision establishing specific extended deadlines for the destruction of 1%, 20%, and 45% of Libya's Category 1 chemical weapons stockpiles. [see 30 November 2004]
Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 3 No. 2 (June 2005), p. 4.

4 July 2005
Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter attended the opening of the Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Sirte, Libya, on Tuesday. During his time in Sirte, the director-general met the chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Alpha Oumar Konare, to discuss developments in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The director-general's attendance at this meeting was part of the OPCW's continuing push to promote universality and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Africa.
OPCW Director-General attends opening of the African Union Summit in Libya, meets Chairperson Konare, Press release #29, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 5 July 2005, <http://www.opcw.org/html/global/press_releases/2005/PR29_2005.html>.

10 November 2005
The Tenth Session of the OPCW CSP grants, in principle, a Libyan request for extensions of the intermediate deadlines for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapon stockpiles. The Executive Council of the OPCW will establish specific dates for the 1%, 20%, and 45% deadlines at its next regular meeting in March 2006. Libya is still required to meet the final destruction deadline of 29 April 2007 and must make regular reports to the Executive Council of the OPCW detailing progress made in meeting its CW destruction obligations.
Decision: Request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for Extensions of the Intermediate Deadlines for the Destruction of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons Stockpiles C-10/DEC.10, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 10 November 2005, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/csp/csp10/en/c10dec10.pdf>.

13 to 23 March 2006
A Libyan representative attends the third Basic Course for OPCW National Authorities implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Paris, France. The course which is jointly organized by the OPCW and the French government is conducted at the French Training Centre for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Centre français de formation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques CEFFIAC).
Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 4 No. 2 (June 2006), p. 21.

30 March 2006
In Washington D.C. James Tegnelia, Director of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), states that the U.S. government is considering a Libyan request to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile. Tegnelia notes that that destroying the Libyan stockpile of CW agent and precursors would be a difficult proposition given the harsh climate and isolated location of the current storage site. He also notes that the cost could be as high as 100 million U.S. dollars. Tegnelia observed that the Libyan government has both the responsibility and the financial resources to undertake CW demilitarization without U.S. financial assistance.
The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 72+73 (September 2006), p. 19.

16 to 26 October 2006
A Libyan representative attends the fourth Basic Course for OPCW National Authorities implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Paris, France. The course which is jointly organized by the OPCW and the French government is conducted at the French Training Centre for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Centre français de formation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques CEFFIAC).
Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 4 No. 4 (December 2006), p. 37.

8 December 2006
The Eleventh Session of the OPCW CSP grants a Libyan request to extend its final deadline for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapon stockpiles to 31 December 2010. The formal decision also establishes new intermediate deadlines for the destruction process. Phase 1 (1%), is to be completed by 1 May 2010; phase 2 (20%), is to be completed by 1 July 2010; and phase 3 (45%), is to be completed by 1 November 2010. Libya is also required to complete the destruction of its Category 2 chemical weapons as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 31 December 2011.
Decision: Proposal by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the Establishment of Specific Dates for Intermediate Destruction Deadlines, and Its Request for an Extension of the Final Deadline for the Destruction of Its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, C-11/DEC.15, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 8 December 2006, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/csp/csp11/en/c11dec15(e).pdf>.

December 2006
The United States and Libya signed a contract to cooperate in carrying out the destruction of Libya’s remaining stockpile of chemical weapons: believed to include 23 metric tons of old mustard gas and 1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals. Under the terms of the contract the United States will pay $45 million or about 75 percent of the estimated destruction costs. Most of the money will be spent on the construction of a specialized incineration facility at the chemical weapons storage site in the Libyan Desert south of Tripoli. The remaining 25 percent of the project cost is to be paid by the Libyan government.
—Carol Giacomo, “U.S.-Libya chemical arms-related deal in doubt”, Washington Post, 8 June 2007.

May 2007
The Libyan government gives notice that it is withdrawing from a cooperative contract for the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile signed with the United States in late 2006.
—Carol Giacomo, “U.S.-Libya chemical arms-related deal in doubt”, Washington Post, 8 June 2007; Alex Bollfrass, Arms Control Today, Vol. 37 No. 6 (July / August 2007), <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/Libya.asp>.

11-22 June 2007
Libyan representatives attend basic and advanced practical training courses on chemical weapons response. The courses, provided by the Republic of Serbia and the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW are offered as part of a new chemical weapons response capacity-building initiative specifically targeted at North African member states. States benefiting from the program are Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. In addition to the contributions of the OPCW and Republic of Serbia the initiative is supported by the European Union (EU), through its third Joint Action in support of OPCW activities.
Chemical Weapons Response Capacity-Building Training Course for North African Member States Conducted in Kruševac, Serbia, Press Release #72, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 6 July 2007, <http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR72_2007.html>.

18 June 2007
Libya formally withdraws from an agreement with the United Stats to share the costs of destroying the remaining Libyan stocks of chemical warfare agents and precursors. In announcing their decision to withdraw from the agreement Libyan representatives express “concerns about indemnification, cost-sharing, and the disposition of the equipment used to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles.” In discussing the end of the contract United States officials “expressed confidence that Libya is dedicated to destroying its stockpile.”
—Alex Bollfrass, Arms Control Today, Vol. 37 No. 6 (July / August 2007), <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/Libya.asp>.

 

Updated September 2007


1920-1989

1990-1999

2000-2003

2004

2005-2007



Maps
Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Centrifuge Components
Was Libyan Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?
WMD in the Middle East
Treaties and Organizations
An Account Of Chemical And Biological Weapons In Some African Countries: Potential for Acquisition and Usage (2006)
GlobalSecurity: Libyan Nuclear Weapons
Libya is the Acid Test for Bolton Nomination (2005)
In Focus: IAEA and Libya
ISIS: Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market (2004)
CRS: Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004)
RANSAC: Redirection of WMD Scientists in Iraq and Libya: A Status Report (2004)
ISIS: Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered (2004)
Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Programme (2004)
U.S. Government’s Assistance to Libya in the Elimination of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (2004)
VERTIC: Verifying Libya's Nuclear Disarmament (2004)
CNS: Libya and Nonproliferation (2003)
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
CNS: Libya’s Chemical Weapon Program (1998)
Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (1997)



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About This Section  CNS Experts 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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