Introduction

During the past 25 years, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (more commonly known as Libya) has pursued the development and production of ballistic missiles. Through the mid 1990s, and due to a host of organizational and internal and external political factors, this effort has only progressed spasmodically and has produced few tangible results. Since the late 1990s Libya, however, has received increasing assistance from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the form of ballistic missile technology, components and systems. Despite considerable potential to date this assistance has not resulted in a significant increase in either the ballistic missile development effort or real world military capabilities. If Libya's potential is realized (e.g., deployment of a Nodong class missile) it would threaten most of Southern Europe. Beginning in the late 1980s Libya has pursued both a gradually expanding chemical and nascent biological weapons programs. This is of concern because Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi views ballistic missiles as the delivery system of choice for such weapons.

Today, Libya possesses the potential to employ short-range ballistic missiles and/or long range artillery rockets against its regional neighbors. This potential can be developed into a real military capability only if Libya can overcome a host of internal organizational and political obstacles. Given favorable conditions, Libya might be able to extend its ballistic missile capabilities to include Southern Europe and North Africa by 2005-2010. These estimates could be somewhat accelerated or easily delayed dependent upon a host of international and domestic factors which cannot be accurately predicted.

A large number of Libya's short-range ballistic missiles and/or long-range artillery rocket systems currently possess the capability to delivery convention high explosive, submunition, chemical, biological and radiological dispersion warheads. Unless a foreign nuclear weapons state provides it with a weapon Libya will not possess a nuclear weapons delivery capability during the next 5 years.

However, in December 2003, after nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American, and British officials, Tripoli disclosed its WMD capabilities and pledged to eliminate all of its WMD-related materials and ballistic missiles with more than a 300 km range and 500 kg payload. Since December 2003, Libya's government has cooperated extensively with the IAEA and OPCW personnel, and also with experts from the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the elimination of WMD and missile materials. In spite of this extensive cooperation, comprehensive reports on the history and achievements of Libya's missile capabilities have yet to appear in open sources. What is known so far is that during inspections in October and December 2003, U.S. and UK experts observed Hwasong 6 ballistic missiles (a.k.a. Scud-C), which have a 550 km range and 500 kg payload. According to some reports, five Scud-C missiles, together with various nuclear materials, have already been removed from Libya's stockpiles.[1]

History

In 1969, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi led a military coup that ended the West leaning monarchy of King Idris I and proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic. Qadhdhafi seeking to establish himself as a leader within the Arab world, and an enemy of Israel and the West, quickly drew close to the Soviet Union. In 1977 he renamed the country the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.[2] A key element of the closer relations with the Soviet Union were several major arms agreements between the two nations in which Libya acquired approximately 24 FROG-7 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), an estimated 100 FROG-7 rockets, 27 MAZ-543P TELs and an estimated 50-100 R-17E (Scud B) missiles.

Concurrent with the acquisition of the Scud B Qadhdhafi initiated what has evolved into a longstanding series of expensive and generally unproductive programs to design and produce an indigenous ballistic missile. These efforts began in 1979 when Qadhdhafi invited the West German company Orbital Transport-und Raketen Aktiengessellschaft (Orbital Transport and Rocket Corporation, or OTRAG) to move its booster rocket development program to Libya after it had be expelled from Zaire. In March 1980 OTRAG reached an agreement with Libya to allow the company to set up operations in the isolated southern section of the country. In exchange OTRAG would provide Libya with the infrastructure and technology to develop and produce ballistic missile systems, and a missile system itself. This effort resulted in the creation of a missile development center 750 km south of Tripoli near the oasis town of Gawat.[3]

By 1980 Libya's rocket and missile forces had expanded to approximately 48 FROG-7 TELs, an estimated 200 FROG-7 rockets, 72 MAZ-543P TELs and an estimated 200-300 Scud B missiles.[4] Although details are unclear it appears that these were organized into ten independent battalions—four FROG-7 and six Scud B. With each independent battalion having twelve TELs. These battalions appear to have been deployed primarily around the coastal cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. Although one Scud B battalion, or elements of it, may have been deployed in the southern portion of the country at Sebha. Command and control of these units originated with the General People's Congress (lead by Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi), through the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces and to the individual battalions.

As a result of a 1983 agreement Libya agreed to provide Iran with training for Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force personnel, MAZ-543P TELs, and Scud B missiles for use in its ongoing war with Iraq. The IRGC personnel arrived in Libya during 1984 and shipments of TELs and Scud B missiles began during January or February 1985. These missiles were transported to Iran both by Boeing 747 airlift over Turkey, and by sea to Turkey and then overland to Iran. It is estimated that Libya provided approximately two MAZ-543P TELs and 20 Scud B missiles. In March–June 1985 Iran and Iraq engaged in the first "War of the Cities." During this campaign Iran fired 14 of the Libyan provided Scud Bs against Iraqi cities. Immediately following this campaign Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Libya and the Soviet Union placed considerable political pressure upon Libya to prevent further Scud B transfers. The effect of the Soviet pressure upon Libya was typically Libyan—they asked Iran to return the Scud Bs saying that it "had only lent" them to Iran.[5]

Lampedusa, 1986

On April 14, 1986, in retaliation for a Libyan assisted terrorist bombing of a Berlin discotheque in which an American serviceman was killed, the U.S. bombed "terrorist-related targets" in Tripoli and Benghazi. The following day Libya retaliated by launching two Scud B missiles at U.S. facilities on the Italian island of Lampedusa.[6] The missiles were launched from the Tripoli area, however, due to the extreme range (290 km) the missiles impacted approximately four kilometers short in the Mediterranean Sea.[7] Concerning the attack Qadhdhafi would later state that "We did not try to hit Italy but a base of the Sixth Fleet"[8]

Lampedusa wasn't the only target considered by Qadhdhafi for retaliation. He also considered launching a Scud attack against two U.S. facilities on the island of Crete.[9] Such an attack would have been just within the maximum range of a Scud unit deployed near the coastal town of Darnah east of Benghazi. Qadhdhafi later stated that he would have warned the population of such an attack to allow them to evacuate. The attack was not conducted because Qadhdhafi valued Libya's close relations with Greece and the danger that civilians might be hit.[10] Qadhdhafi had grander visions of retaliation and stated that if he possessed the long-range ballistic missile capability he would have struck New York,

"If we had a deterrent force of missiles able to reach New York we would have directed them at that very moment..."[11]

The inability to effectively strike back at the U.S. or its allies was a source of great frustration to Qadhdhafi and gave added impetus to his desire to acquire long-range ballistic missiles and WMD,

"If the world enjoys the missiles and bombs we must be able to enter this game... We therefore must have this force so that the Americans and others would not think to attack us once again."[12]

In 1995, while discussing the 1986 U.S. attack on Libya and the retaliatory Scud B attack on Lampedusa, Qadhdhafi stated that should a similar U.S. attack on Libya occur,

"As things stand today I would attack every place from where aggression against Libya was being planned. I would even be prepared to hit Naples where there is a NATO base."[13]

Despite numerous threats over the years the Lampedusa attack was the only time that Libya has launched ballistic missiles in anger.

Reorganization of the Missile Program

A number of Libyan ballistic missile developments occurred during the 1980s. Most were not initially related to one another, however, as the decade wore on these seemingly disparate developments would weave themselves together.

Although OTRAG officially ended its efforts in Libya in late August 1981, due to Western political pressure, its personnel continued work in Libya under direct contract. During 1982 the former OTRAG management was fired and Libya's entire ballistic missile development effort was reorganized under the code name Ittisalat (a.k.a., Ittissalat or Ittisalt).[14] Ittisalat was reportedly under the direction of Abd al-Majid al-Kaoud and Ahmad Mahmoud Swai.[15] Initially, it appears that the primary object of this project was to produce a 500-700 km ballistic missile known as al-Fatah (a.k.a., al-Fatih). As this project was making little progress Qadhdhafi initiated repeated approaches to the Soviet Union seeking to purchase longer ranged ballistic missiles. On each occasion, however, he was re-buffed. He also approached the PRC seeking to purchase the DF-3A, but they were unwilling to discuss the matter.

These failures, coupled with the continued lack of progress with the al-Fatah, resulted in a series of reorganizations for the Ittisalat program. Although there would be numerous projects associated with the various reorganizations it would eventually evolve into three primary projects,[16]

Al-Fajer: Little information is available concerning the al-Fajer program. Some sources suggest that it was a 300 km project. Others appear to indicate that it was a solid fuel project—perhaps it was related to the Brazilian MB/EE-300 or SS-300.
Al-Fatah: This was to eventually produce a 800-1,000 km missile. It would build, in part, upon earlier missile research and technology but would also incorporate newly acquired resources. This project, or subcomponents of it, may have focused upon Libyan efforts with regards to the Brazilian MB/EE-600 or MB/EE-1,000 and the Argentine Condor II programs.
Al-Jadid: This is believed to have initially focused upon maintaining the existing inventory of Scud B missiles and then into the design and production of extended range variants of the system.

Other important subcomponents of the Ittisalat program included development or acquisition efforts in, chemical and biological warheads, missile guidance, solid fuel rocket engines, telemetry, and mobile-erector-launchers (MEL).

During 1988 Libya successfully entered into negotiations with the PRC for the purchase of the M-9/DF-15. These negotiations were apparently linked with similar Iranian and Syrian efforts to purchase the system. Whether or not an agreement was signed is unknown, however, following considerable U.S. pressure the PRC agreed in 1989 not to sell the M-9 to Libya. Following this abrupt turn of events Syria (which had also concluded an M-9 agreement with the PRC) and Libya entered into negotiations with the DPRK for the purchase of the Hwasong 6.

During the late 1980s Libya is reported to have acquired a small number of short-range Tochka (SS-21, Scarab) missiles and TELs from the Soviet Union. These systems were apparently acquired to replace some of its aging FROG-7s. By the late 1990s, however, the status of SS-21s was unclear and the systems haven't appear in routine Libyan parades or public displays. Later, during the 1990s, as the Libyans sought Ukrainian and Serbian technical assistance with their missile programs there were reports that it also sought to acquired SS-21 spare parts and additional missiles from them.

Infrastructure Development

In order to firmly establish an indigenous capability to develop and produce advanced weapons (including chemical agents and ballistic missiles) Libya, during the mid 1980s, initiated construction of several specialized weapons complexes. The first was located 60 km south of Tripoli near the town of al-Rabta and became known as the al-Rabta (a.k.a., al-Rabta I, or al-Rabitah) "Technology Center." Firms from West Germany, Italy, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, and other countries facilitated construction of the al-Rabta project. The second facility was located at Tarhuna, 65 kilometers southeast of Tripoli. This facility was similar in composition to the al-Rabta "Technology Center" and has sometimes been identified as "al-Rabta II." As opposed to the original facility which was constructed above ground the Tarhuna complex consists of three linked tunnels which are each 150 meters long, 11 meters wide, and 6 meters high. It was constructed with extensive assistance from the PRC and like the al Rabta complex makes extensive use of Western and Japanese duel use technologies.[18]

By 1989 the al-Rabta "Technology Center" was capable of manufacturing a wide variety of weapons including chemical agents, artillery shells, mines, ballistic missile components, and MELs. International concern and pressure concerning the production of chemical agents at the facility escalated dramatically during early 1990 and Libya believed that the U.S. and its allies were preparing to launch an attack on the installation. Then, in March 1990, U.S. intelligence sources announced that a massive fire had occurred at the complex. Initially it was believed that the fire had caused serious damaged and that it was unlikely that it be able produce chemical weapons or ballistic missiles for a year or longer. This development resulted in a rapid decline in U.S. and Western concern and political pressure. Subsequent analysis, however, revealed that the fire was a hoax and that much of the chemical agent production was subsequently transferred to the Tarhuna complex.[19]

By the mid 1990s, both facilities were engaged in the production of sub-components, systems, and supporting equipment for the various missile programs. Included within this was the assembly of DPRK provided Hwasong 6 missiles and possibly several TELs/MELs.

Acquisitions of Ballistic Missile Technologies

Building on similar activities during the 1980s Libya, throughout the 1990s and until today, has pursued a very active covert WMD acquisition program in circumvention of the international arms embargo against it. This is especially true with regards to its various missile projects, especially the al-Jadid (improved Scud) and al-Fatah efforts. Despite some notable Western successes Libya was repeatedly able to covertly acquire Western missile related technologies through "dummy" trading companies and "cut-outs" in Europe and Asia. For example,

In January 1992 Germany at the request of the U.S. prevented the shipment of laser equipment to Libya. The equipment which was manufactured by the Oriel Corp. in the U.S. was duel-use in nature and could have been used in the construction of ballistic missiles. This fear was reinforced by the fact that it was being shipped to a Libyan entity known to be involved in missile development. The equipment was ordered through the Dutch trading company Eurabic International BV. Which, in turn, ordered it through Oriel's Dutch distributor Fairlight BV.[21]

• In April 1993 Ukrainian authorities seized 80 metric tons of ammonium perchlorate which is used in the production of solid rocket fuel. The ammonium perchlorate was being shipped from Russia by the Moscow company "Pavoks Foreign Economic Association," through the Ukraine to the Belgrade company Rudnap Export-Import. Rudnap would then ship it to Libya. One report suggests that from here, at least some, would be forwarded to Iran.[22]
• During December 1994 Walter Ziegler, the director of the German firms "Globesat" and "Polytec," was arrested by German Federal authorities for violating German export laws having supplied "electronic high technology to support Libya's missile program." Much of this assistance went into the al-Fatah program.[23]
• During 1995 a unconfirmed report suggested that Libya had acquired two SS-25s ICBMs for $10 million cash during the second half of 1994. This report was erroneous and confused two separate events. First, Russia was actively attempting to export the SLV version of the SS-25 to Libya and Brazil. Second, Libya had acquired a radar system that was sometimes associated with the SS-25.[24]
• During 1996 U.S. intelligence sources revealed that Serbia was secretly providing technical support to Libya's ballistic missile program. This assistance was part of a $30 million contract concluded between the Serbian company JPL Systems and Libyan officials in July 1995. Exactly what assistance JPL Systems was to provide is unclear since Serbia has little expertise in ballistic missile development. Some sources suggest that its role was to function as a middleman for the acquisition of technology and equipment from Eastern Europe and Russia.[25]
• In December 1996 reports appeared indicating that Ukraine's President, Leonid Kuchma, had concluded an agreement to provide Libya with short-range ballistic missiles and service its Russian-made submarines and surface vessels.[26] The Ukraine acknowledged contacts between itself and Libya but denied that any contracts were signed between the two countries.[27]
• In 1997 two Italian firms Tecnica Export and An Ma attempted to export a "flow-forming machine" to Libya. The machine was purchased in Germany, shipped to Austria and then on to Italy. Here it was stored in a warehouse near the city of Parma. It was subsequently dismantled and its various components concealed in three shipping containers. In early June as the three containers were transported to the port of La Spezia for shipment to Libya. Italian authorities stepped in seized the containers and arrested the parties involved.[28]
• On June 25, 1999 Indian customs officials detained the DPRK merchant vessel Ku-wol San after it had offloaded 13,000 metric tonnes of sugar at the port of Kandla and its captain had declared that it was carrying 177 tonnes in 148 crates of machinery parts to Malta. These machinery parts were being shipped by the Korean Chongchengang Trading Corporation to the Malta Economic Trade Corporation. Customs inspectors found, however, that the captain had mis-declared his cargo, the end user was fictitious, and that the 148 crates contained ballistic missile related production designs and equipment. This equipment included: 18 boxes of machinery of non-civilian use; blueprints detailing methods of launching ballistic missiles from railcars and trucks; designs, drawings, reports, and notebooks detailing missile manufacturing (some of which had "Scud B" and "Scud C" written in English); digital micron soldering device; forged sheets and surface plates; heavy duty hydraulic press; heavy duty lathe machines; measuring equipment; plate bending machine with three rollers; reinforcing cones ; round bars of specialized steel alloys of different lengths and diameters; three electronic weighing machines; torroidal air bottles; two sets of theodolides and tripod stands; and water refining and filtration machinery. Although the shipment was originally believed to be destined for Pakistan further investigation revealed that the end recipient was to be Libya.[29]
• On November 24, 1999, British customs and intelligence personnel at Gatwick Airport seized an illegal consignment of "Scud" missile parts bound for Libya. The parts were discovered packed in 32 crates disguised as automobile spare parts when they arrived on a British Airways flight at Gatwick bound for Tripoli via Malta. The shipping records seized with the consignment indicated that it both originated with a subsidiary of the textile firm Nan Liang Company based in Taiwan and that similar consignments had previously been shipped to Libya through Great Britain. The initial investigation suggested that the components originated in the DPRK and where transshipped through Hong Kong using false documentation. The DPRK origins were subsequently confirmed when components for the Nodong engine where identified among the seized missile parts.[30]
• In April 2000 Swiss authorities announced the arrest of a Taiwanese businessman on suspicion of attempting to smuggle Scud components to Libya. Swiss airport police discovered components in the man's luggage that were later identified as belonging to the propulsion system of a Scud. The man had just arrived on a flight from Hong Kong and was planning to take a flight to Tripoli. Subsequent investigation indicated that the man's company had on several previous occasions delivered what were believed to be Scud components to Libya. These previous deliveries passed both through Switzerland and other countries.[31]

• Developing chemical warefare capabilities, including ballistic missile warheads.
• Provide training to Libyan ballistic missile units.
• Transfer of ballistic missile components, production technologies and possibly complete systems.

After disclosure of its WMD capabilities in December 2003, Libya abandoned all of its missile-related efforts, and pledged to eliminate ballistic missiles with more than a 300 km range and 500 kg payload.

In December 2003, Spanish media reported that a North Korean cargo ship carrying Scud missiles arrived in Libya in December 2002. In April 2004, Libya told American officials that it planned to convert hundreds of its Scud-B missiles into short-range defensive weapons and discontinue all military trade with North Korea. In October, the State Department announced that it had verified the complete dismantling of Libya's WMD programs, including MTCR-class missiles.

Key Sources and Notes:
[1] Judith Miller, "Libya Discloses Production of 23 Tons of Mustard Gas," The New York Times online edition, March 6, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com.
[2] The word Jamahiriya means "state of the masses."
[3] "Scientist Linked To Supplying Missile Know-How to Libya," Focus, September 2, 1997, pp. 106-107; "OTRAG Ends Libyan Launch Work," Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 14, 1981; and "OTRAG Missile Firm to Hold Tests in Libyan Desert," DPA, September 19, 1980, as cited in FBIS.
[4] Some sources credit Libya with a much smaller FROG-7 inventory.
[5] "Libya Wants Return of Missile 'Lent' to Iran," KUNA, June 1, 1987, as cited in FBIS; Schweid, Barry. "Washington News," Associated Press, January 9, 1986; "Iraq Breaks Diplomatic Relations With Libya," Associated Press, June 26, 1985; Haddad, Subhy. "Iraq Says it Has Pinpointed Iranian Missile Launching Base," Reuters, March 29, 1985; and "Libya delivered USSR–made Scud B missiles to Iran via Turkey," Al Khaleej, March 28, 1985, p. 1, as cited in FBIS.
[6] Military facilities on the island included a U.S. Coast Guard LORAN station, USAF SIGINT installation, and an Italian Air Force base.
[7] "Libyan Scud B Attack on Lampedusa Island," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 26, 1986, p. 739; "Italy Commands Lampedusa LORAN," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 14, 1986, p. 1094; Jenkins, Loren. "Italy Takes Over U.S. Base Coast Guard Navigation Site on Island Threatened by Libya," Washington Post, June 2, 1986, p. 20; and Jenkins, Loren. "Italy Expels Consul in Continuation of Crackdown on Libya," Washington Post, May 14, 1986, p. 30.
[8] "Libya's Gaddafi Says Clinton Not An Enemy," Reuters, December 31, 1995.
[9] The U.S. Air Force maintained a communications installation near Iraklion, eastern Crete, and the U.S. Navy maintained a refueling area for the 6th Fleet at Suda Bay.
[10] "Gadhafi Pondered '86 Attack on U.S. Bases," Washington Times, May 9, 1990, p. A2; and "Gadhafi," Associated Press, May 8, 1990.
[11] "Gadhafi-Nuclear," Associated Press, April 21, 1990.
[12] Ibid.
[13] "Libya's Gaddafi Says Clinton Not An Enemy," Reuters, December 31, 1995.
[14] Ittisalat means "network" or "compound."
[15] Ahmad Mahmoud Swai was a Libyan military officer who reportedly had received Scud training in the Soviet Union.
[16] Information concerning the reorganization of the Libyan missile program and its sub-components is sparse. What is presented here is based upon the best available analysis of available "open source" information, some of which will inevitably prove to be inaccurate. "Missile Parts Sale Revealed," Sunday Correspondent, October 15, 1989, p. 3.
[17] Gertz, Bill. "Serbia is Helping Libya with Ballistic Missiles, CIA says," Washington Times, November 12, 1996, p. A3; and "Weapons Sales Top $1 Trillion, Paced by South Asia Market," Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 28, 1989, p. 34.
[18] Rufford, Nick; Rayment, Tim; Leppard, David and Burrell, Ian. "Gadaffi Builds Huge Poison Gas Arsenal at Rabta Plant," Times of London, April 5, 1992; "Libya Weapons," Associated Press, June 18, 1990; Gertz, Bill. "2nd Chemical Arms Plant Spied in Libya," Washington Times, June 18, 1990, p. A1; Gertz, Bill. "Libya Producing Weapons at Full Capacity," Washington Times, Monday, May 21, 1990, Bill Gertz ," p. A3; Gertz, Bill. "Libyan Plant Fire Injured Hundreds, Poisoning Likely," Washington Times, Monday, March 19, 1990, p. A3; and Gillette, Robert. "3rd World Missiles Linked to German, Italian Firms," Los Angeles Times, February 8, 1989, p. 1.
[19] Author interview data; Weiner, Tim. "Huge Chemical Arms Plant Near Completion in Libya, U.S. Says," New York Times, February 25 1996, p. 8; Barth, Karl Guenther; Hauser, Uli; Lambrecht, Rudolf; and Mueller, Leo. "Code Name 'Refinery'," Stern, July 13, 1995, pp. 90-93, as cited in FBIS; "BND Reveals German Know-How for Middle East Arms," Der Spiegel, September 26, 1994, pp. 54-58, as cited in FBIS; and Roux, Guy. "Export Controls and the Libyan Arms Market," International Review, Autumn, 1994.
[20] Author interview data; "North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles;" "North Reportedly to Develop Missiles With Libya," Hanguk Ilbo, 17 February 1992, p. 1, as cited in FBIS; "DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile;" Gertz, Bill, "Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles," Washington Times, June 4, 1991, p. 4; and "Qadhafi Financing Syrian Purchase of Scud-C Missile," Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, January 28–February 3, 1991, p. 2.
[21] Author interview data; "Germany Defends Relaxing Military Export Laws," Reuters, March 4, 1994; "Iran/Libya Seek North Korean Missile," Flight International, 13-19 January 1993; "Libya-Nuclear," Associated Press, January 23, 1992; and Vogel, Steve. "Libya-Bound U.S. Gear Seized in Germany," Washington Post, January 23, 1992, p. 19.
[22] "BND Reveals German Know-How for Middle East Arms," Der Spiegel, September 26, 1994, pp. 54-58, as cited in FBIS; Gordon, Michael. "U.S. Warns Russia on Missile Fuel Sales," New York Times, June 23, 1993, p. A8; "Chemical Shipment to Libya Halted," Kommersant Daily, April 15, 1993, p. 15, as cited in FBIS; "Ukraine Applies Embargo," Washington Post, April 14, 1993, p. A29; "Ukrainian Seize Libya-bound Russian Chemicals," AFP, April 12, 1993; and "Ukraine Says Libya-bound Cargo Detained," Reuters, April 12, 1993.
[23] "Firms Suspected of Selling Technology to Libya," Stern, December 1, 1994, p. 213, as cited in FBIS.
[24] Gertz, Bill. "U.S. Retaliates for Moscow's Violations of START Clinton Halts U.S. Exports of Satellites to Russia," Washington Times, May 9, 1995, p. A3; Sieff, Martin. "Treaty Can't Stop the Spread of Nukes Bomb Material Difficult to Track," Washington Times, April 19, 1995, p. A1; and Beichman, Arnold. "Ominous delivery to Libya?," Washington Times, February 2, 1995, p. A16.
[25] Fox, Robert. "Serbs 'Ship Weapons to Gaddafi'," Electronic Telegraph, 8 November 1996; "JANA Editor Refutes CIA Claims of Missile Manufacture," JANA, November 16, 1996, as cited in FBIS; and Gertz, Bill. "Serbia is helping Libya with ballistic missiles, CIA says," Washington Times, November 12, 1996, p. A3.
[26] Before the collapse of the Soviet Union Leonid Kuchma was director of the Uzmash missile production concern in Dniepopetrovsk eastern Ukraine. As such he played a leading role in the Soviet Union's enormous ballistic missile industry.
[27] "Kuchma Denies Charges of Arms Sales to Libya," Interfax, February 5, 1997, as cited in FBIS; Gertz, Bill. "NATO Candidates Armed Rogue States Polish Company Sold Tanks to Iran," Washington Times, Wednesday, February 19, 1997, p. A1; Sieff, Martin. "U.S. Officials Express Concern Over Ukraine," Washington Times, December 10, 1996, p. A13; "Ukraine Denies Selling Missiles to Libya," Washington Times, Wednesday, December 11, 1996, p. A15; "Libya Denies it Made Missiles Deal with Ukraine, Reuters, December 11, 1996; "Ukraine-US-Libya," Associated Press, December 10, 1996; "Ukraine-Libya," Associated Press, December 9, 1996; and Gertz, Bill. "Ukraine and Libya Forge 'Strategic' Alliance U.S. Fears Boost for Gadhafi's Arsenal," Washington Times, June 10, 1996, p. A1.
[28] "German Equipment Intended for Libyan Missiles Seized," Frankfurter Allgemeine, August 13, 1997, p. 4, as cited in FBIS; "Police Seize Missile-Production Machine Bound for Libya," Il Giornale, August 10, 1997, p. 10, as cited in FBIS; and "BRF--Italy-Libya," Associated Press, August 10, 1997.
[29] Warrick, Joby Warrick. "N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear Front Companies Step Up Efforts in European Market," Washington Post, August 15, 2003, p. A19; and Warrick, Joby Warrick. "On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory," Washington Post, August 14, 2003, p. A1; Coughlin, Con. "Missiles Deal Puts Israel in Gaddafi Sights," Sunday Telegraph, September 24, 2000; "N. Korean Yet to Challenge Indian Charge that its Ship was Carrying Missile Manufacturing Equipment," Express of India, May 25, 2000, as cited in FBIS; "Ghauri Missile Test Postponed Due to US Pressure," Hindustan Times, October 1, 1999; "Seoul Concerned About Alleged N.K. Attempt to Export Missile Parts," Korea Herald, July 21, 1999; Rahul Bedi. "India accounts for cargo seizure," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 21, 1999; "Possible DPRK-Pakistan Nuclear, Missile Tech Swap Feared," Korea Times, July 20, 1999; Mahalingam, Sudha, "Sensitive Cargo," Frontline, Volume 16, Issue 15, July 17 - 30, 1999, as cited in FBIS; "Report on Detained North Korean Ship Termed 'Distorted'," Hindustan Times, July 6, 1999, as cited in FBIS; and "India Detains Ship Carrying Tools for Missile Production," Hindustan Times, July 4, 1999, as cited in FBIS.
[30] Author interview data; MacAskill, Ewen and Norton-Taylor, Richard, "Protest at Libyan Missile Parts Find." Guardian Manchester, January 10, 2000, p. 5; "Taiwan Company Reaffirms No Involvement in Arms Shipment," Taiwan Central News Agency, January 10, 2000, as cited in FBIS; Rufford, Nicholas, "Parts for the Scud Missiles were Found at Gatwick Disguised as Automotive Parts," London Sunday Times, January 9, 2000, p. 1; Gertz, Bill, "China Assists Iran, Libya on Missiles," Washington Times, June 16, 1998, p. A1; "N. Korea as Nuclear Exporter?," p. A1; Gertz, Bill, "Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles," p. A4; "Syrian, Iranian Missile Developments Reviewed," Izvestiya, 13 November 1993, p. 3, as cited in FBIS; and "Possible Missile Threat From Middle East Neighbors Detailed," Turkish Daily News, 30 July 1993, pp. 1, 11, as cited in JPRS.
[31] "Taiwanese Probed for More Libya Scud Part Trips," Reuters, May 10, 2000; Gertz, Bill. "Beijing Delivered Missile Technology to Libya, U.S. Says," Washington Times, April 13, 2000, p. A1; and "Arrested Businessman Suspected of Smuggling Missile Parts," AFP, April 12, 2000.
[32] Author interview data; Gertz, Bill. "Beijing Delivered Missile Technology to Libya, U.S. Says," Washington Times, April 13, 2000, p. A1; Gertz, Bill. "China Summit Missile Pact Unlikely 'Incremental Progress' Not Ruled Out," Washington Times, June 21, 1998, p. A6; Gertz, Bill. "Clinton to discuss missiles in China Albright finds deals with Iran troubling," Washington Times, June 17, 1998, p. A1; Gertz, Bill. "China Assists Iran, Libya on Missiles New findings Contradict White House," Washington Times, June 16, 1998, p. A1; "China-Missiles," Associated Press, May 5, 1993; and Veigle, Anne. "Senate Ties Conditions to MFN for China," Washington Times, February 26, 1992, p. C1.
[33] "Libya Goes Ballistic In $13.5 Billion Deal With Iran," Worldtribune.com, accessed August 21, 2002 at http://www.worldtribune.com.

	Updated November 2007