Nuclear
In its 19 December 2003 announcement that it was eliminating all materials, equipment and programs proscribed by the international community, Libya took the unusual step of first publicly revealing its nuclear weapons program, then renouncing it.  Libya then invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the elimination of nuclear weapon related activities in-country.

According to International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who led a December 2003 inspection team to Libya, Libya's nuclear weapons program is in the very initial stages, about three to seven years away from producing a nuclear weapon. Libya admitted having secretly imported raw uranium and the necessary equipment to convert it for enrichment into weapons-grade material but added that the enrichment plan had been dismantled and that no highly enriched uranium had been produced over the past decade.  IAEA inspectors did not find either, though they did find imported equipment and technology at a number of previously secret nuclear facilities in and around Tripoli. It has been revealed that Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan is responsible for providing Libya with its nuclear warhead plans, raw uranium and enrichment centrifuges through his black market network.

In his 19 December 2003 announcement, Qadhafi pledged to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Libya ratified in 1975, and to sign the Additional Protocol, which it did on 10 March 2004. IAEA chief El Baradei indicated that signing the Protocol would ensure IAEA oversight over Libya’s nuclear transition from weapons creation to peaceful purposes.

Previously, Libya signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in November 2001 and ratified it in January 2004. In 1996, it had signed the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Besides previously secret nuclear sites disclosed in late 2003, Libya possesses a Soviet-supplied 10MW research reactor in Tajura. With the lifting of UN sanctions in 1998, Russia renewed its nuclear cooperation with Libya, providing funding for renovations to the Tajura nuclear complex.

As of October 2004, the IAEA continues to investigate the clandestine network through which Libya supplied its nuclear weapons program. North Korea and several South African, German, and Swiss nationals have been implicated in providing restricted training and technologies to Libya.

Biological
In 2003, Libya admitted its previous intentions to acquire equipment needed to produce biological weapons (BW). In October and December 2003, Libyan officials took U.S. and UK experts to a number of medical and agricultural research centers that had the potential to be used in BW research. The country acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on 19 January 1982. There are allegations that the alleged chemical weapon (CW) plants at Rabta and Tarhunah could contain BW research facilities as well. Prior to Libya's 19 December 2003 announcement to abandon its WMD programs, U.S. intelligence agencies alleged that Qadhafi had attempted to recruit South African scientists to assist in the acquisition of BW, and that Libya had started to develop pathogens and toxins for weapons use.

See Libya Biological Profile

Chemical
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there was extensive open-source discussion of Libya’s effort to develop and produce chemical weapons. Libya constructed and operated a chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) near the town of Rabta located in the Sahara Desert about 120km southwest of Tripoli. It is reasonably well documented that Libya employed mustard gas bombs against Chad, its southern neighbor, in 1987. Until 2003 there was considerable uncertainty regarding the true scale and capability of the Libyan CW efforts. However, in December 2003, following extensive secret discussions, the Libyan government reached an agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States under which it undertook to eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In subsequent months Libya revealed that between 1980 and 1990, it had produced some 25 tons of sulfur mustard at the Rabta facility (which the CIA had long ago identified), produced shells for more than 3,300 chemical bombs, and tried to make a small amount of nerve agent. The clear implication was that the program had essentially been inactive since the early 1990s.

In January 2004 U.S. and U.K. officials visited Libya to inspect CW facilities and assist with preparations for Libyan accession to the CWC. On 5 February 2004 the CWC entered into force for Libya since when Libya has declared its past production of CW and commenced the process of destruction required by the convention. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) immediately sent inspectors to verify the destruction of all unfilled CW munitions including 3,300 aerial bombs. In March 2004 Libya submitted its initial declaration to the OPCW listing its CW infrastructure as approximately 23 metric tons of mustard gas, 1,300 metric tons of nerve gas precursor chemicals, an inactivated chemical weapons production facility, and two chemical weapons storage facilities. In November 2004 the OPCW granted a Libyan request to convert the chemical weapons production facilities (CWPF), Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 1 and Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 2 (Phase II), into a pharmaceutical plant to produce low-cost vaccines and medicines to treat AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis for distribution to the African market. In December 2006 Libya was granted an extension of the deadline for the final complete destruction of its CW stockpiles to December 2011.

Missile
Libya first acquired Scud-B missiles in the early 1970s from the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, Libya accelerated its efforts to obtain a longer-range ballistic missile with the al-Fatah, reportedly with a range of 950km. Germany and China allegedly provided technical and material assistance to the al-Fatah program. The al-Fatah missile system has not been completed and remains untested. In November 2000, as part of a $600 million agreement, Libya allegedly acquired the first shipment of a total of 50 North Korean Nodong ballistic missiles, including launch capabilities. North Korea also allegedly provided more than 10 scientists to work on the Libyan missile program. This complemented other missile component shipments that reportedly began in 1999. Also, after the lifting of the 1999 sanctions, reports of increased technical and structural assistance from countries like Iran, North Korea, China, India, and Russia have raised concerns over Libya's growing ability to manufacture ballistic missiles.

In 2003, U.S. experts were given access to Libya's missile arsenal and to a number of missile research facilities. In December 2003, Libya pledged to eliminate ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than 300km with payloads of 500kg. Libya is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

In April 2004, Libya told American officials that it plans to convert hundreds of its Scud-B missiles into short-range defensive weapons and discontinue all military trade with North Korea. In October, the U.S. State Department announced that it had verified the complete dismantling of Libya's WMD programs, including MTCR-class missiles.