Nuclear
According to International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who led a December 2003 inspection team to Libya, Libya's nuclear weapons program was in the initial stages, about three to seven years away from producing a nuclear weapon. Libya admitted having secretly imported raw uranium and the necessary equipment to convert it for enrichment into weapons-grade material but added that the enrichment plan had been dismantled and that no highly enriched uranium had been produced over the past decade. IAEA inspectors did not find either, though they did find imported equipment and technology at a number of previously secret nuclear facilities in and around Tripoli. Libya acquired most of its nuclear materials and equipment through A. Q. Khan’s black market network. During 2004, the IAEA investigated this clandestine network through which Libya acquired the material and equipment for its nuclear weapons program. North Korea and several South African, German, and Swiss nationals have been implicated in providing restricted training and technologies to Libya.

In his announcement on December 19, 2003, Gaddafi pledged to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Libya ratified in 1975, and to sign the Additional Protocol, which occurred on March 10, 2004. IAEA chief El Baradei indicated that signing the Protocol would ensure IAEA oversight over Libya’s transition to a peaceful civilian nuclear program.

Previously, Libya had signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in November 2001 which it ratified in January 2004. Also, following its signature in 1996, Libya finally ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba in March 2005, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, which is yet to enter into force. Following the disclosure and subsequent removal of sensitive nuclear related equipment and material from the country, Libya presently possesses a Soviet-supplied 10MW IRT-1 research reactor in Tajura. In late 2003, the Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was merged with Libya’s Water Desalination and Treatment Research Center and the Solar Studies Center to create the Renewable Energies and Water Desalination Research Center (REWDRC).

In 2005, Libya signed a bilateral cooperative agreement with the United States to facilitate joint research on non-power applications of nuclear technology. This cooperative framework continues today, and in 2007, American scientists even assisted Libya in restarting the Tajura reactor, after it had been converted for use with LEU fuel. Also, in December 2007, Libya signed a cooperation agreement with France, covering the development of civilian applications of nuclear energy and the supply of reactors for sea-water desalination. Further developments on this framework with France are awaited.

Biological
In 2003, Libya admitted its previous intentions to acquire equipment needed to produce biological weapons (BW). In October and December 2003, Libyan officials took U.S. and UK experts to a number of medical and agricultural research centers that had the potential to be used in BW research. The country acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on 19 January 1982. There are allegations that the alleged chemical weapon (CW) plants at Rabta and Tarhunah could contain BW research facilities as well. Prior to Libya's 19 December 2003 announcement to abandon its WMD programs, U.S. intelligence agencies alleged that Qadhafi had attempted to recruit South African scientists to assist in the acquisition of BW, and that Libya had started to develop pathogens and toxins for weapons use.

See Libya Biological Profile

Chemical
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there was extensive open-source discussion of Libya’s effort to develop and produce chemical weapons. Libya constructed and operated a chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) near the town of Rabta located in the Sahara Desert about 120km southwest of Tripoli. It is reasonably well documented that Libya employed mustard gas bombs against Chad, its southern neighbor, in 1987. Until 2003 there was considerable uncertainty regarding the true scale and capability of the Libyan CW efforts. However, in December 2003, following extensive secret discussions, the Libyan government reached an agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States under which it undertook to eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In subsequent months Libya revealed that between 1980 and 1990, it had produced some 25 tons of sulfur mustard at the Rabta facility (which the CIA had long ago identified), produced shells for more than 3,300 chemical bombs, and tried to make a small amount of nerve agent. The clear implication was that the program had essentially been inactive since the early 1990s.

In January 2004 U.S. and U.K. officials visited Libya to inspect CW facilities and assist with preparations for Libyan accession to the CWC. On 5 February 2004 the CWC entered into force for Libya since when Libya has declared its past production of CW and commenced the process of destruction required by the convention. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) immediately sent inspectors to verify the destruction of all unfilled CW munitions including 3,300 aerial bombs. In March 2004 Libya submitted its initial declaration to the OPCW listing its CW infrastructure as approximately 23 metric tons of mustard gas, 1,300 metric tons of nerve gas precursor chemicals, an inactivated chemical weapons production facility, and two chemical weapons storage facilities. In November 2004 the OPCW granted a Libyan request to convert the chemical weapons production facilities (CWPF), Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 1 and Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 2 (Phase II), into a pharmaceutical plant to produce low-cost vaccines and medicines to treat AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis for distribution to the African market. In December 2006 Libya was granted an extension of the deadline for the final complete destruction of its CW stockpiles to December 2011.

Missile
Libya first acquired Scud-B missiles in the early 1970s from the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, Libya accelerated its efforts to obtain a longer-range ballistic missile with the al-Fatah missile program, with an envisioned range of about 950km. Former engineers of the German firm OTRAG and China allegedly provided technical and material assistance to the al-Fatah program, but the missile system was never completed. After the lifting of the 1999 sanctions, Libya received increased technical and structural assistance from countries like Iran, North Korea, China, India, and Russia.

In 2003, U.S. experts were given access to Libya's missile arsenal and to a number of missile research facilities. In December 2003, Libya pledged to eliminate ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than 300km with payloads of 500kg. Libya is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

In April 2004, Libya told American officials that it plans to convert hundreds of its Scud-B missiles into short-range defensive weapons and discontinue all military trade with North Korea. In October, the U.S. State Department announced that it had verified the complete dismantling of Libya's WMD programs, including its MTCR-class missiles. Libya’s current missile arsenal is very outdated, comprising mostly of Soviet era Scud B and FROG 7 systems acquired in the 1970s. Also, Libya’s missile brigades remain in a state of disrepair, lacking any organization, contemporary equipment, and capable personnel.