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Updated January 2010
Introduction
Prior to Col. Muammar Qadhafi's 19 December 2003 renunciation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Libya possessed programs to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Allegedly, Libya is one of the few states to have employed chemical weapons in a conflict (Chad, 1987). Libya likely began its WMD and ballistic missile programs out of a desire to increase its influence in both the Middle East and Africa, and in response to other regional players' (and especially Israel's) unconventional weapons programs. After agreeing to disclose and dismantle all WMD programs in 2003, Qadhafi's government fully cooperated with American and British experts to do so, with dismantlement of the nuclear program completed and verified by the IAEA in 2004.
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Nuclear
Libyan interest in nuclear weapons dates at least as far back as Qadhafi’s assumption of power in 1969. Its clandestine nuclear weapons program only came to an end after Qadhafi’s 2003 pledge to renounce all WMD programs and adhere to the commitments Libya had previously made with its 1975 ratification of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed El-Baradei, who led a December 2003 inspection team to Libya, Libya's program was approximately three to seven years away from the ability to produce a nuclear weapon. To ensure sufficient IAEA oversight of the dismantlement of the program, Libya signed the Additional Protocol on 10 March 2004, disclosing the existence of numerous previously undeclared nuclear facilities. Libya also ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in January 2004, and the Treaty of Pelindaba (or African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone) in March 2005. The IAEA investigation discovered that Libya had acquired most of its nuclear materials and equipment through the A. Q. Khan network. In 2008, El-Baradei announced that Libya had fully cooperated with the IAEA and that future agency activities in Libya will be strictly routine in nature. Libya presently possesses a Soviet-supplied 10MW IRT-1 research reactor at the Renewable Energies and Water Desalination Research Center (REWDRC) and is actively seeking foreign assistance to develop its sea water desalination capabilities and other peaceful applications of nuclear technology.
Biological
In 2003, Libya admitted its previous intentions to acquire equipment needed to produce biological weapons (BW). In October and December 2003, Libyan officials took U.S. and UK experts to a number of medical and agricultural research centers that had the potential to be used in BW research. The country acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on 19 January 1982. There are allegations that the alleged chemical weapon (CW) plants at Rabta and Tarhunah could contain BW research facilities as well. Prior to Libya's 19 December 2003 announcement to abandon its WMD programs, U.S. intelligence agencies alleged that Qadhafi had attempted to recruit South African scientists to assist in the acquisition of BW, and that Libya had started to develop pathogens and toxins for weapons use.
Chemical
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there was extensive open-source discussion of Libya’s effort to develop and produce chemical weapons. Libya constructed and operated a chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) near the town of Rabta located in the Sahara Desert about 120km southwest of Tripoli. It is reasonably well documented that Libya employed mustard gas bombs against Chad, its southern neighbor, in 1987. Until 2003 there was considerable uncertainty regarding the true scale and capability of the Libyan CW efforts. However, in December 2003, following extensive secret discussions, the Libyan government reached an agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States under which it undertook to eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In subsequent months Libya revealed that between 1980 and 1990, it had produced some 25 tons of sulfur mustard at the Rabta facility (which the CIA had long ago identified), produced shells for more than 3,300 chemical bombs, and tried to make a small amount of nerve agent. The clear implication was that the program had essentially been inactive since the early 1990s.
In January 2004 U.S. and U.K. officials visited Libya to inspect CW facilities and assist with preparations for Libyan accession to the CWC. On 5 February 2004 the CWC entered into force for Libya since when Libya has declared its past production of CW and commenced the process of destruction required by the convention. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) immediately sent inspectors to verify the destruction of all unfilled CW munitions including 3,300 aerial bombs. In March 2004 Libya submitted its initial declaration to the OPCW listing its CW infrastructure as approximately 23 metric tons of mustard gas, 1,300 metric tons of nerve gas precursor chemicals, an inactivated chemical weapons production facility, and two chemical weapons storage facilities. In November 2004 the OPCW granted a Libyan request to convert the chemical weapons production facilities (CWPF), Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 1 and Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 2 (Phase II), into a pharmaceutical plant to produce low-cost vaccines and medicines to treat AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis for distribution to the African market. In December 2006 Libya was granted an extension of the deadline for the final complete destruction of its CW stockpiles to December 2011.
Missile
Libya first acquired Scud-B missiles in the early 1970s from the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, Libya accelerated its efforts to obtain longer-range ballistic missiles with the al-Fatah missile program, which had an envisioned range of approximately 950km. Engineers formerly working for China and the German firm OTRAG allegedly provided technical and material assistance to the al-Fatah program, but the missile system was never completed. After the United Nations suspended sanctions against Libya in 1999 (which had been imposed in 1992 over the bombing of Pan Am 103), Libya received increased technical and structural assistance from countries such as Iran, North Korea, China, India, and Russia. In conjunction with its December 2003 agreement to renounce WMD, Libya pledged to eliminate ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than 300km with payloads of 500kg. In October 2004, the U.S. State Department announced that it had verified the complete dismantlement of Libya's WMD programs, including its MTCR-class missiles. Libya's current missile arsenal is outdated, consisting primarily of Soviet-era Scud B and FROG 7 systems acquired in the 1970s. Also, Libya's missile brigades remain in a state of disrepair, lacking organization, contemporary equipment, and capable personnel. However, Libya plans to upgrade its missile forces and is in negotiations with countries such as France and Russia to do so. Libya is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
