30 May 2005: UNITED STATES ASSISTS MOLDOVAN CUSTOMS, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
On 30 May 2003, the United States donated 34 VAZ vehicles to the Moldovan Customs Department as part of the U.S. Department of State-funded Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program.[1,2] The vehicles will be used to enhance security and prevent smuggling and illegal trafficking of arms and drugs along the Moldovan side of the Dniester River.[1] The United States has provided over $1 million worth of equipment to Moldovan border guards, customs, and emergency services through the EXBS program, including vehicles, computers, cellular phones, radios, bulletproof vests, and night vision goggles. In the next few years, the U.S. government will supply an additional $2 million worth of equipment to Moldova through the EXBS program.[1]
In addition, on 10 June 2003, the United States donated 57 Chevrolet trucks worth a total of $321,000 to the Moldovan Ministry of Defense. These vehicles follow a 1999 donation of 15 vehicles to the Moldovan military.[3]
Editor’s Note: Situated on the left bank of the Dniester River and predominantly populated by non-Moldovan population (mostly Russian and Ukrainian,) the Transdniester region is a secessionist part of the Republic of Moldova. Reacting to Moldova’s declaration of sovereignty of 23 June 1990, the communist leaders declared the formation of the Transdniester Moldovan Republic (Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika or PMR) on 2 September 1990. The Transdniester separatists began to assume control over the local administration and the first clashes with Moldovan police units were reported in November 1990. Following the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991, the Moldovan Parliament issued a declaration of independence from the Soviet Union on 27 August 1991, which prompted the Supreme Soviet of the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic to vote to join the USSR on 2 September 1991. Beginning in December 1991, the tensions started to escalate culminating in a wide-scale military confrontation in June 1992 in which the Moldovan armed forces were driven out from the left bank and from the strategically important city of Bendery on the right bank of the Dniester River. According to numerous reports, throughout the conflict the paramilitary forces of separatists enjoyed open support from the Russian 14th Army positioned on the left bank. The conflict ended with a ceasefire agreement mediated by the Russian Federation and signed in Moscow on 21 July 1992. The agreement established demilitarized security zone extending for 10 kilometers on both sides of the Dniester River, which has been patrolled by the peacekeeping forces consisting of Russian, Moldovan and Transdniestrian units since 29 July 1992.[5] However, the efforts to resolve the conflict spearheaded by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) thus far have led to a political stalemate. The Russian Federation began the phased withdrawal of its 14th Army from Transdniestria in spite of vigorous opposition from the separatist government. In accordance with the decisions made at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, the Russian Federation committed itself to withdraw the 14th Army from the Transdniester region by the end of 2002. The deadline for the complete withdrawal was later extended to 31 December 2003.[6] With the industrial facilities inherited from the Soviet times and the vast ammunition depots of the 14th Army, the unrecognized Transdniester Republic remains a lawless enclave, which has been recently described as one of the major international hubs of arms trafficking and other criminal activities.[7]
Sources:
[1] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 30 May 2003; in “US Assists Moldova in Strengthening Border Protection,” FBIS Document CEP2003030000240.
[2] For a concise description of the EXBS program see: “United States Export Control Initiatives,” NIS Export Control Observer, No. 7, July 2003, p. 7, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
[3] “Mezhdunarodnoye sotrudnichestvo” [International cooperation], MRTsDS Moldova, 1 June 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru>.
[4] Moldova,” CIA World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/md.html>.
[5] OSCE Mission to Moldova, “Transdniestrian Conflict: Origins and Issues,” 10 June 1994, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Vienna, Austria; online version at the U.S. Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13611.pdf>. [6] “Russia Continues to Withdraw Military Property from Transdniestria,” RIAN, 15 March 2003; Pravda on-line edition (Pravda.ru), <http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2003/03/15/44461.html>.
[7] Peter Landesman, “Arms and the Man,” The New York Times Magazine, 17 August 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/17/magazine/17BOUT.html>.
This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
May 2005: “DIRTY BOMB” ROCKETS AGAIN REPORTED FOR SALE IN TRANSNISTRIA
On 8 May 2005, the London Times reported that an arms dealer in Bender, Transnistria, had offered to sell three Alazan rockets equipped with radioactive warheads to a Times reporter posing as a representative of an Algerian militant group.[1] [Editor’s Note: The Alazan was originally designed by Soviet scientists as a weather control rocket to prevent hail. After the weather control experiment failed, the rocket was used for military purposes. It has a maximum length of 1.4 meters and range of 10 km.][2,3]
Transnistria, also known as Dniester or Transdniester, declared its independence from Moldova in 1991, but it has not been recognized as an independent country by its neighbors. [Editor’s Note: For an overview of the origins of the Transnistrian conflict, see the 1994 OSCE background paper available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13611.pdf>.] Lacking an established border, the region does not have effective border controls and has been a haven for smuggling and illegal arms sales. The largest source of revenue for Transnistria elites (based in the region’s principal city, Tiraspol) is reportedly the production of armaments and illegal weapons trafficking.[4] Some studies recount that criminal organizations and even secret services from various countries are involved in the arms traffic in Transnistria. These armaments include not just pistols and guns but also automatic rifles, plastic explosive, and Stinger missiles.[5]
The possibility that Alazan rockets may have been modified to carry radioactive materials was first suggested in 2001, when the Institute for Policy Studies in Chisinau, Moldova, obtained documents allegedly written by Colonel V. Kireyev, a civil defense commander in Transnistria, indicating his concern about radiation given off by weapons in storage in Transnistria. The Washington Post, which was given access to the Kireyev documents in 2003, cited them as describing 38 “isotopic radioactive warheads of missiles of the Alazan type,” including 24 warheads that were attached to rockets.[6] Conventional Alazan rockets have been used in conflict zones in the former Soviet Union for years, from Nagorno-Karabakh to Chechnya. However, the Institute for Policy Studies’ documents appear to be the only documents suggesting that Alazan warheads have been converted to disperse radiological materials.
In a May 2005 interview, however, William Hill, the head of the Moldovan mission of the OSCE, questioned the London Times report, noting that earlier probes by the OSCE and various countries into similar reports had not resulted in the confirmation or denial of the existence of such rockets.[7]
In the most recent incident involving the London Times reporter, the would-be arms smuggler offered to allow an individual with a Geiger counter to check the weapon to verify that it contained radioactive material (which the smuggler identified as strontium-90 and cesium-137). However, the Times withdrew from the deal rather than make a substantial payment to the smuggler.[1] On 12 June, the Moldovan general prosecutor opened a criminal case to investigate the allegations made in the Times article. However, according to Russian military forces in Transnistria (who have remained in the region as peacekeepers and to guard a former Soviet arms depot), there are no Alazan rockets remaining in Russian depots in the territory. Transnistria’s deputy minister of security, Major General Oleg Gudymo, said that the Times article was a “canard, designed to blacken the name of Transnistria and the peaceful role of Russia and Ukraine.”[8] Nevertheless, officials in Transnistria installed new radiation detection equipment on the region’s borders, reportedly in order to help clear the region of the “unfounded accusations on the part of Chisinau.”[9] [Editor’s Note: Given the small size and presumably rapid deployability of the Alazan, its range of 10 km is more than enough to attack large urban targets from close in, without the prospect of detection. However, assuming that the rockets contain or had contained radioactive material, effectively dispersing such material could be very technically challenging.]
In a related development, just two weeks before the Times article, the Russian journal Politicheskiy zhurnal published an interview with Mikhail Bergman, former commandant of Russian military forces in Tiraspol, who said that in the mid-1990s, the Russian 14th Army discovered that two tactical weapons with “nuclear explosion imitators” as well as “nuclear suitcase” weapons had disappeared from storage areas in the region. According to Bergman, the nuclear explosion imitators create powerful explosions and a mushroom cloud, but no radiation is released.[10] The Moldovan Foreign Ministry, in response, requested that the Russian Foreign Ministry investigate Bergman’s claims.[11]
Editor’s Note: Recently, Moldova and Ukraine have jointly requested that the European Union (EU) create a monitoring system on Ukraine’s border with Transnistria, including a computer network, surveillance video cameras, and night vision equipment. An EU delegation is expected to go to Ukraine in late June 2005 to begin work on a framework for such a program.[12] At the same time, Ukraine has initiated a new process to settle the status of Transnistria. Under the Ukrainian plan, Transnistria would eventually be granted a special status within Moldova, Russian peacekeepers would be replaced by an OSCE-led force, and military factories in Transnistria would be placed under international monitoring.[13] On 16-17 May 2005, officials from Transnistria, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE met in Vinnytsya, Ukraine, to discuss the Ukrainian initiative. In a sign of progress, Tiraspol’s representatives agreed to Moldovan requests that future settlement talks include officials from the EU and the United States.[14]
Sources:
[1] Brian Johnson Thomas and Mark Franchetti, “Radioactive Rockets ‘For Sale’ in Breakaway Soviet Republic,” Times (London) online edition, 8 May 2005, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk>.
[2] “Alazan-5 Antihail Product,” V. I. Chapayev Production Association website, <http://www.rti.chuvashia.com/alazan5.htm>.
[3] “Trnasdniestr: Missing Missiles Raising Fears of ‘Dirty Bombs’ For Sale”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/12/sec-031210-rferl-171503.htm>.
[4] Ceslav Ciobanu, “Moldova: The Dniester Moldovan Republic,” William R. Nelson Institute Research Report, July 2003. This research report describes the mechanisms used for money laundering via Tiraspol banks, corruption, and illegal trafficking of various goods is described in detail. An earlier report done by the institute, in 2001, examined the creation of false documents and false identities in Moldova and Transnistria. To receive a copy of the report, please contact the William R. Nelson Institute for Public Affairs, Bowerssr@jmu.edu.
[5] Zaur Borov and Stephen Bowers, “Illegal Weapons Traffic in Eastern Europe,” Nelson Institute Research Report, 2002. To receive a copy of the report, please contact the William R. Nelson Institute for Public Affairs, Bowerssr@jmu.edu.
[6] Joby Warrick, “Dirty Bomb Warheads Disappear,” Washington Post online edition, 7 December 2003, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.
[7] “Vlasti Pridnestrovya usilili radiatsionnyy kontrol na granitse posle obvineniy so storony Kisheneva o prodazhe ‘gryaznykh yadernykh bomb” [Transnistria authorities strengthen radiation controls on the border after Chisinauaccusations regarding the sale of ‘dirty nuclear bombs’], ITAR-TASS, 18 May 2005.
[8] Veniamin Demidetskiy, “Genprokuratura Moldavii rassleduyet dostovernost obvineniya gazety ‘The Sunday Times’ o popytke vyvoza iz Tiraspolya ‘radioaktivnykh raket” [Moldova’s general prosecutor investigates allegations in ‘The Sunday Times’ on the attempted export of ‘radioactive rockets’ from Tiraspol], ITAR-TASS, 12 May 2005; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>. [9] Veniamin Demidetsky, “Radioactivity Control Tightened in Dniester Region,” ITAR-TASS, 18 May 2005; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[10] Aleksey Nesterenko, “Mikhail Bergman: ‘Nikto ne znayet, kuda delis takticheskiye rakety s imitatorami yadernogo vzryva” [Mikhail Bergman: No one knows what happened to the tactical weapons with imitation nuclear charges], Politicheskiy zhurnal online edition, 25 April 2005, <http://www.politjournal.ru>.
[11] Yevgeniy Shestakov and Lyudmila Feliksova, “Rakety optom – sledim za situatsiyey” [Rockets wholesale – we are following the situation], Rossiyskaya gazeta, 11 May 2005; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[12] Vitaly Makarchev, “Ukraine Insists on Special Monitoring System on Dniester Border,” ITAR-TASS, 15 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[13] Veniamin Demidetsky, “Tiraspol Upholds Ukraine’s Initiatives on the Dniester Settlement,” ITAR-TASS, 16 May 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[14] Flux (Chisinau), 24 May 2005; in BBC Worldwide Monitoring; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
March 2005: REPORT ON EXPORT CONTROL OF DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT AND GOODS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Sergiu Spataru, director of the Center for Nonproliferation of the Republic of Moldova, published a report on exports, imports, transit, and in-country transfers of equipment and material related to biological weapons in Moldova in the March 2005 issue of the NIS Export Control Observer.
This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
5 August 2003: NEW CHAIRMAN IS APPOINTED TO THE MOLDOVAN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMISSION ON EXPORT CONTROLS
On 5 August 2003, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin signed an edict, appointing Marian Lupu minister of the economy. Previously, Lupu was deputy minister of the economy and supervised external economic relations, including export controls. Due to his new position, Lupu also assumes the position of chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission on Export Controls.
Currently, the Commission includes the following members:
Marian Lupu Minister of the Economy, Chairman of the Commission
Victor Gaiciuc Minister of Defense, Deputy Chairman of the Commission
Sergiu Spataru Director of Dual-Use Goods Circulation Control Division of the Ministry of the Economy, Secretary of the Commission
Ion Stavila Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vladimir Botnari Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs
Valdimir Cravcenco Deputy Minister of Industry
Anatolie Gozun Deputy Director of the Service of Information and Security
Vitalie Slipenchi Deputy General-Director of the Department of Customs
Leonid Bolocan Director of the Division of Special Problems of the State Chancellery
The composition of the Commission was originally approved by Government Decision No. 1039 on 3 October 2001. This decision provides for the nomination of new members without a new government decision.
The Commission performs the following functions:
• reviews proposals with regard to signing or adhering to international, bilateral, and multilateral agreements on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other strategic goods;
• implements controls on fulfilling Moldova’s obligations pursuant to international and intergovernmental agreements on nonproliferation and the control of movements of weapons of mass destruction and other strategic goods;
• deliberates and makes decisions with regard to issuing export, re-export, import, and transit authorizations of strategic goods through the territory of the Republic of Moldova; and
• makes decisions on suspending export, re-export, import, and transit licenses for strategic goods, if license holders violate the existing legal provisions, or if the suspension is required by international agreements or national policy decisions.
The Commission may establish working groups, including representatives from other ministries and agencies, in order to review and draft proposals and solve problems that might arise in conducting the control of export, re-export, import, and transit of strategic goods. The activity of the Commission is supported by the Dual-Use Goods Circulation Control Division within the Ministry of the Economy.
The Commission may convene whenever necessary, but no less than twice a year. In general, however, the Commission holds meetings once a month. The Commission’s resolutions are adopted by a simple majority of votes and are recorded in protocols. All resolutions are binding on all government agencies and economic agents of the Republic of Moldova.
Source:
"New Chairman is Appointed to the Moldovan Interdepartmental Commission on Export Controls," NIS Export Control Observer, August 2003, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
30 May 2003: United States Assists Moldovan Customs, Ministry of Defense
On 30 May 2003, the United States donated 34 VAZ vehicles to the Moldovan Customs Department as part of the U.S. Department of State-funded Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program.[1,2] The vehicles will be used to enhance security and prevent smuggling and illegal trafficking of arms and drugs along the Moldovan side of the Dniester River.[1] The United States has provided over $1 million worth of equipment to Moldovan border guards, customs, and emergency services through the EXBS program, including vehicles, computers, cellular phones, radios, bulletproof vests, and night vision goggles. In the next few years, the U.S. government will supply an additional $2 million worth of equipment to Moldova through the EXBS program.[1]
In addition, on 10 June 2003, the United States donated 57 Chevrolet trucks worth a total of $321,000 to the Moldovan Ministry of Defense. These vehicles follow a 1999 donation of 15 vehicles to the Moldovan military.[3]
Editor’s Note: Situated on the left bank of the Dniester River and predominantly populated by non-Moldovan population (mostly Russian and Ukrainian,) the Transdniester region is a secessionist part of the Republic of Moldova. Reacting to Moldova’s declaration of sovereignty of 23 June 1990, the communist leaders declared the formation of the Transdniester Moldovan Republic (Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika or PMR) on 2 September 1990. The Transdniester separatists began to assume control over the local administration and the first clashes with Moldovan police units were reported in November 1990. Following the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991, the Moldovan Parliament issued a declaration of independence from the Soviet Union on 27 August 1991, which prompted the Supreme Soviet of the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic to vote to join the USSR on 2 September 1991. Beginning in December 1991, the tensions started to escalate culminating in a wide-scale military confrontation in June 1992 in which the Moldovan armed forces were driven out from the left bank and from the strategically important city of Bendery on the right bank of the Dniester River. According to numerous reports, throughout the conflict the paramilitary forces of separatists enjoyed open support from the Russian 14th Army positioned on the left bank. The conflict ended with a ceasefire agreement mediated by the Russian Federation and signed in Moscow on 21 July 1992. The agreement established demilitarized security zone extending for 10 kilometers on both sides of the Dniester River, which has been patrolled by the peacekeeping forces consisting of Russian, Moldovan and Transdniestrian units since 29 July 1992.[5] However, the efforts to resolve the conflict spearheaded by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) thus far have led to a political stalemate. The Russian Federation began the phased withdrawal of its 14th Army from Transdniestria in spite of vigorous opposition from the separatist government. In accordance with the decisions made at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, the Russian Federation committed itself to withdraw the 14th Army from the Transdniester region by the end of 2002. The deadline for the complete withdrawal was later extended to 31 December 2003.[6] With the industrial facilities inherited from the Soviet times and the vast ammunition depots of the 14th Army, the unrecognized Transdniester Republic remains a lawless enclave, which has been recently described as one of the major international hubs of arms trafficking and other criminal activities.[7]
Sources:
[1] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 30 May 2003; in “US Assists Moldova in Strengthening Border Protection,” FBIS Document CEP2003030000240.
[2] For a concise description of the EXBS program see: “United States Export Control Initiatives,” NIS Export Control Observer, No. 7, July 2003, p. 7, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
[3] “Mezhdunarodnoye sotrudnichestvo” [International cooperation], MRTsDS Moldova, 1 June 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru>.
[4] Moldova,” CIA World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/md.html>.
[5] OSCE Mission to Moldova, “Transdniestrian Conflict: Origins and Issues,” 10 June 1994, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Vienna, Austria; online version at the U.S. Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13611.pdf>.
[6] “Russia Continues to Withdraw Military Property from Transdniestria,” RIAN, 15 March 2003; Pravda on-line edition (Pravda.ru), <http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2003/03/15/44461.html>.
[7] Peter Landesman, “Arms and the Man,” The New York Times Magazine, 17 August 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/17/magazine/17BOUT.html>
This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
28 March 2003: TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR WASTE THROUGH MOLDOVA
On 28 March 2003, the Parliament of Moldova adopted Law No. 152-XV ratifying the four-party Interagency Agreement on Cooperation in the Sphere of Transportation of Nuclear Materials between the Russian Federation and Bulgaria through the Territories of Moldova and Ukraine. The Agreement was signed years earlier by Bulgaria, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, in Sophia, on 28 November 1997.
Prior to ratification of the Agreement, the Moldovan Parliament adopted amendments to existing legislation that had prohibited transit of nuclear materials through the territory of Moldova. Law No. 145-XV of 27 March 2003 introduced amendments to Law No. 1515-XII of 16 July 1993, On the Environment, and Law No. 1163-XIV of 26 July 2000, On Export Control, supplementing anti-transit clauses with the following sentence: “Exceptions are made for transport of nuclear materials between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Bulgaria through the territory of the Moldova Republic and the territory of Ukraine.”
Law No. 145-XV also introduced amendments to Law No. 1194-XIII of 21 May 1997, On Transport. The amendments required that transport of nuclear materials through Moldova be approved by a government decree.
Opposition parliamentarians spoke against ratification of the Agreement, saying that it conflicted with the Constitution of Moldova, which guarantees Moldovan citizens the right to a safe environment. These parliamentarians argued that radioactive freight may become a target of a terrorist attack or theft.[1]
Environmental organizations in Moldova also opposed the ratification. The main concern of such groups was a provision in the Agreement that provides that any damage caused by a possible accident is the responsibility of the country in which the accident occurred. The inclusion of this provision, in their view, indicates that accidents are likely and that the Moldovan government’s assurances that transit is not dangerous are unfounded.[2]
Ratification of the Agreement will allow Moldovan Railway and other state-run institutions to obtain substantial revenue for freight transportation and security. In addition, Moldova will receive support from Bulgaria for joining the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, and Bulgarian visa fees for Moldovan citizens may be reduced.
Sources:
[1] “Parlament ratifitsiroval Soglasheniye o tranzite otkhodov yadernogo topliva cherez Moldovu” [Parlament Ratified the Agreement on Transit of Spent Nuclear Fuel through Moldova], Infotag News Agency, 28 March 2003, <http://www.press.try.md/view.php?id=26881&iddb=Main>.
[2] According to experts at the Moldovan Department on Emergency Situations, transportation of spent nuclear fuel is the safest phase of the nuclear cycle. Transportation containers are extremely safe and cannot be damaged even upon collision with an object at a speed of 100km per hour. It has also been noted that nuclear waste has been transported between Russia to Bulgaria for the past 20 years without incident.The Moldovan government also agreed to engage IAEA experts in examining the route along which nuclear wastes travel. See “Yadernyye otkhody, nalogovyye kanikuly i finansovyye proverki” [Nuclear Waste, Tax Holidays and Financial Audits], Logos-Press, No. 8 (504), 7 March 2003 or “Deputaty vystupili s zayavleniyem” [Deputies Release a Statement], Logos-Press, No. 11 (507), 28 March 2003, <http://logos.press.md>.
This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
7 March 2003: NEW ARTICLE ADDED TO MOLDOVAN CRIMINAL CODE
Amendments to the Moldovan criminal code, adopted by the parliament of Moldova on 7 March 2003, include a new article that calls for criminal prosecution of individuals engaged in the production, storage, transport, and use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Punishment for violation of this article is set at 7-15 years of imprisonment and increases to 15-25 years if the crime is repeated, is committed deliberately by a group of people, or resulted in particularly severe consequences. According to members of Moldovan parliament, the new article is designed to promote fulfillment the country's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[1,2]
Sources:
[1] "Parlament Moldavii vvel nakazaniya za izgotovleniye, khraneniye, transportirovku i primineniye oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya," Interfax, 7 March 2003.
[2] "parlament ustanovil ugolovnuyu otvetstvennost za izgotovleniye i primineniye oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya," PRESS-Obozreniye, 15 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru/>. {Entered 24 March 2003 AD}
February 2003: Development of Moldova’s Export Control System
The first legal act pertaining to export controls in Moldova was Government Decision No. 283, On licensing the import and export of special goods and scientific dual-use goods, transfer of special shipments and military goods crossing the territory of the Republic of Moldova (10 May 1995). This document was temporary and focused on weapons, munitions, and corresponding delivery systems. This law however did not cover nuclear technology. A 1993 law, On Protecting the Environment, prohibits the import and transit of nuclear weapons, spent nuclear fuel, and other radioactive materials.
In 2000, the Ministry of Economy developed a more comprehensive law, in cooperation with other Moldovan ministries and agencies, and with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Law No. 1163-XIV, On Export, Re-export, Import and Transit Control of Strategic Goods was approved by the Parliament on 26 July 2000. This law establishes the legal foundation for the control of strategic goods (dual-use goods and technologies, weapons, and munitions), defines the purview of the Parliament and Government, identifies controlled goods, and clearly articulates the main principles underlying export controls (protection of national security interests, fulfillment of international commitments and agreements, verification of end use of strategic goods, to name a few). The law also includes a “catch-all” provision.
In August 2001, the Division of Dual-use Goods Trade Control was created within the Ministry of Economy to serve as the licensing authority. The main responsibility of the Division is to develop an efficient export/import licensing procedure by coordinating the examination of license applications with other government agencies and by holding specialized consultations with exporters.
In October 2001, the Interagency Commission on Control of Export, Import, and Transit of Strategic Goods was created. The Commission is headed by the Deputy Prime-Minister, who is also the Minister of Economy, and includes representatives, at the deputy minister level, from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Defense, as well as from the Service of Information and Security and the Customs Administration. The Commission reviews proposals regarding Moldova’s participation in international agreements, implements controls on fulfilling international obligations, makes decisions regarding the issuance of export, import, and transit licenses, and has the authority to suspend licenses in case of violations.
On 15 May 2002, Government Decision No. 606 was passed to ensure the implementation of Law No. 1163-XIV by approving the following:
• The Statute of the Interagency Commission (Annex I);
• The Statute on the Process for Controlling the Export, Re-export, Import, and Transit of Strategic Goods (Annex II); and
• The National Control List of Strategic Goods (Annex III).
The National Control List was based on the list of dual-use items developed by the European Union as part of its dual-use export control system and the military list developed by the European Union to which the EU code of conduct is applied. The National Control List is composed of two parts: the first includes dual-use goods and technologies; the second lists weapons and munitions.
Recently, export control documents issued by the Division of Dual-use Goods Trade Control under the Ministry of the Economy have been standardized by Order No. 40 of 6 August 2002. The Division now uses standard forms for license applications, licensing of strategic goods for export/import/transit, international import certificates, delivery verification certificates, and end-user certificates.
In 2003, the Government of Moldova plans to further develop its export control system by approving new amendments to the Criminal Code and Administrative Code to increase the severity of sanctions for the violation of export control regulations.
To facilitate implementation of export control regulations, the Ministry of Economy will create an official website on export controls in Moldova designed for government officials and exporters/importers. The website will include the national control list and full-text of all export control regulations. Parts of the website will be password-protected to allow the members of the Interagency Commission to find on-line all the documents required for the Commission’s sessions. In addition, a brochure listing Moldova’s export control regulations and control list will be published for government officials and exporters/importers. Finally, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Commerce, a seminar on Moldova’s licensing procedures and national control list will be organized for customs officials and industry representatives in spring/summer 2003.
In the future, the Moldovan government wishes to further improve its export control system by establishing an industry internal compliance program; creating an automated licensing system; and adhering to multilateral control regimes (currently Moldova is not a member of any regime, but the goods controlled according to these regimes are already included in its National Control List). Moldova also plans to reinforce its position in the international community by participating in international events in the field of nonproliferation and export control and establishing closer relations with export control and customs authorities in neighboring countries through information exchange and joint training projects.
Source:
Sergiu Spataru, "Development of Moldova's Export Control System," NIS Export Control Observer, February 2003, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
17 January 2003: MOLDOVA CONSIDERS SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSIT THROUGH ITS TERRITORY
A joint Bulgarian-Moldovan declaration, signed during a visit by the Bulgarian President to Moldova on 16-17 January 2003, committed Moldova to promote ratification of the quadripartite agreement on cooperation in the field of nuclear material transportation, which provides a legal framework for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel from Bulgaria (Kozloduy NPP) to Russia through the territories of Moldova and Ukraine.[1,2] Despite opposition from some environmentalists, the Moldovan government says that transit of nuclear materials has been going on for three decades and is not a threat to Moldova's environment.[1] According to Virdzhiliyu Andreyev, press-secretary of the Moldovan President, ratification of the above agreement will be considered after IAEA experts give their evaluation of the safety of nuclear fuel transit through Moldovan territory.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Prezidenty Respubliki Moldova i Bolgarii prinyali sovmestnuyu deklaratsiyu," PRESS-Obozrenie, 18 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru/>.
[2] "Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya Prezidenta Respubliki Moldova i Prezidenta Respubliki Bolgariya," Nezavisimaya Moldova, 17 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru/>.
[3] "Moldova gotova rassmotret vopros ratifikatsii Soglasheniya o tranzite cherez territoriyu respubliki iz Bolgarii otrabotannogo yadernogo topliva," Nezavisimaya Moldova, 17 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru/>. {Entered 23 January 2003 AD}
15 January 2003: MOLDOVA DEVELOPS NEW AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEM
According to Vladimir Molozhen, General Director of Moldova's Department of Information Technology, Moldova has launched the Frontiera automated information system as a pilot project at the Kishinev International Airport. In the future the system will be installed throughout the Republic of Moldova. The Frontiera system is designed to collect, update, and analyze data about people, vehicles, and cargo on Moldovan territory, which will help combat the illegal trafficking of goods and forgery of documents. The system will also facilitate the restriction of illegal migration, as well as the detection of fugitives, stolen vehicles, drugs and psychotropic substances, poisonous and radioactive materials, and weapons.
Source:
“Departament informatsionnykh tekhnologiy razrabatyvayet sistemu ucheta i kontrolya peresecheniya granitsy,” Nezavisimaya Moldova, 15 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 21 January 2003 AD}
5 September 2002: U.S. IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON TWO MOLDOVAN ENTITIES
On 9 May 2002, the United States imposed sanctions on Moldova's Cuanta company and its former head Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov, for transferring to Iran WMD and missile technology covered by international export controls.[1,2] The sanctions prohibit U.S. government procurement from and assistance to the entities as well as purchase by the entities of any item on the U.S. Munitions List or receipt of a license for items controlled under U.S. export regulations and the Export Administration Act of 1979.[1] Before it was liquidated in 2001 and turned into a state-run business, Cuanta produced radio control and tracing systems for ballistic missiles.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Iran I: U.S. Publishes List of Sanctioned Entities," Global Security Newswire, 16 May 2002, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <http://www.nti.org/>.
[2] "Iran: Sanctioned Moldovan Company is Gone," Global Security Newswire, 20 May 2002, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <http://www.nti.org/>. {Updated 16 August 2002 YP}
November 2002: Search for Orphan Sources in Georgia and Moldova Yields Cesium-137
The NIS media have echoed an article published in the Washington Post on 11 November 2002, reporting that the 10-month search for orphan radioactive sources in Georgia and Moldova conducted as part of the IAEA Technical Assistance Program yielded radioactive devices that were once used in a secret Soviet agricultural research project, code named “Gamma Kolos” (Gamma Ears). The research project was designed to measure the effects of radiation on plants and animals. Some of the tests simulated farming conditions after a nuclear strike.[1] For this purpose, the lead-shielded canisters containing cesium-137, with a 4,500 curie strength each, were mounted on tractors to irradiate seeds or were buried in fields to assess the effects of radiation on germination and crop yields.[1,2] Animals were typically exposed to cesium-137 in a special chamber, then transferred to a vivarium and monitored.[3] In Georgia, these sources were used by the Institute of Radiology of the Ministry of Agriculture.[4] In Moldova, cesium-137 was used on experimental fields of the University of Agriculture.[2] It is unclear when this research project ended and how these sources became orphaned. So far, five canisters have been found in Georgia, some of which were found at the former Soviet military base in Vaziani, close to Tbilisi.[5] Five canisters were also found at undisclosed locations in Moldova. The Gamma Kolos canisters contain cesium-137 in the form of cesium chloride, prepared as pellets or fine powder.[1,2,6] These devices are small and portable and could be used by terrorist groups to produce “dirty bombs.” The canisters found in these two republics are now being secured with assistance and funding from the U.S. Department of Energy.
Sources:
[1] Joby Warrick, “Hunting a Deadly Soviet Legacy,” Washington Post, 11 November 2002, p. A1.
[2] “Opposition Paper Confirms Radioactive Material in Moldova,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 November 2002 in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[3] CNS interview with U.S. Department of Energy official.
[4] CNS communication with Mr. Giorgi Nabakhtiani, Head of Inventory and Control Division of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service at the Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Georgia, 13 December 2002.
[5] Bryan Bender, “Radiological Weapons: Georgia Wraps Up Search for Radiological Sources,” Global Security Newswire, 23 October 2002, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_10_23.html>.
[6] According to the director of IAEA’s Division of Radiation and Waste Safety, Mr. Abel J. Gonzalez, Cesium chloride (CsCl) is a salt whose physical form is a highly dispersible powder similar to talc in its spreading properties. Abel J. Gonzalez, “Security of Radioactive Sources. The Evolving New International Dimensions,” IAEA Bulletin, No. 43, April 2001, p. 41.
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Updated March 2006 |
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