An examination of open-source data finds varying assessments concerning North Korea and its purported capabilities in biological weaponry. These estimates can range from North Korea having a rudimentary biological warfare (BW) program, to actual possession of biological weapons already deployed. One recent South Korean Ministry of Defense analysis released to the public in 2006 concluded that North Korea has weaponized the causative agents of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera. The United States government also suspects that North Korea possesses a biological weapons capability. General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), stated in a testimony before the U.S. Senate in March 2002 that "...North Korea has the capability to develop, produce and weaponize biological warfare agents." In May 2002, John R. Bolton, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, described North Korea's biological weapons capabilities as "a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability" and claiming that the DPRK "has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the [Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention." Bolton further noted that the "leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to do so, and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these deadly weapons."

Other assessments of the DPRK BW program note that North Korea has likely developed a nascent biotechnology infrastructure, but is sorely deficient in advanced equipment and expertise. Strengthened export control and sanctions regimes have inhibited North Korea's ability to import dual-use equipment and supplies, but the country has proven resourceful in its efforts to secure materials from abroad. In 2006, for example, Japanese authorities discovered that North Korea had obtained a freeze dryer - which could be used to produce biological weapons - from a Tokyo-based trading company in 2002. In addition, indigenous production of growth media—agar, peptone, yeast extract (from breweries)—in North Korea is probably sufficient to culture large quantities of BW agents. Less clear are North Korea's capabilities in weaponization and delivery of these agents.

Several unconfirmed reports state that North Korea has engaged in human testing as recently as 2002 to assist its chemical and biological weapons development efforts. As noted by the U.S. Department of State in its 2007 International Religious Freedom Report, these allegations are extremely difficult to verify due to the closed nature of the North Korean state.

History

Noting that "poisonous gas and bacteria can be used effectively in war," North Korean leader Kim Il Sung (d. 1994) ordered the "concentrated development of biological weapons" in the early 1960s. Following this directive a program was established within the Academy of National Defense. However, the results from this period of development were lackluster. An estimated 10-13 different types of pathogens were investigated during the early development process, including the etiological agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox, and yellow fever. It is also reported that the DPRK imported anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), plague (Yersinia pestis) and cholera (Vibrio cholerae) bacteria, presumably obtained from culture collections in Japan. Typhoid (i.e., causative bacterium Salmonella typhi) is also mentioned as a prototypical BW agent in the North Korean development program, although this may be due to confusion with typhus and its causative agent (Rickettsia prowazekii).

Actual production of BW agents, including the causative bacteria of cholera, typhus (rickettsia), tuberculosis, and anthrax is reported to have begun in the early 1980s. Unlike North Korea's history with CW development, biological weapons development in the DPRK has been mostly indigenous.

Suspected BW Agents in North Korea

BW agents are reportedly cultured in both civilian and military-related research institutes in North Korea. According to various accounts, diseases and their causative BW agents allegedly researched and developed by the DPRK include:

Disease Causative infectious agent

• Anthrax Bacillus anthracis
• Botulism (botulinum toxin) Clostridium botulinum
• Plague Yersinia pestis
• Yellow fever Yellow fever virus
• Typhoid Salmonella typhi
• Cholera Vibrio cholerae (01)
• Hemorrhagic fevers Korean hemorrhagic fever virus (?)
• Tuberculosis Mycobacterium tuberculosis
• Typhus Rickettsia prowazekii
• Smallpox Smallpox virus (variola)

Disease Causative agent

• Anthrax Bacillus anthracis
• Botulism (botulinum toxin) Clostridium botulinum
• Plague Yersinia pestis

According to recent estimates from the ROK Ministry of National Defense the DPRK's arsenal is composed of several BW agents, including anthrax, smallpox, and cholera. North Korean biological weapons scientists have reportedly treated anthrax spores with a form of microencapsulation, thereby protecting the organisms from UV light, and have been compared to the Soviet version of weaponized anthrax. Unconfirmed reports indicate that North Korea has cultures of the causative pathogen for smallpox (variola major).

North Korean Biological Warfare (BW) Agents and Their Delivery

Some U.S. military intelligence estimates indicate that North Korea has weaponized BW agents for a limited number of missiles, although it does not appear to possess advanced biological delivery systems. However, U.S. officials were also quoted in the late 1990s as saying that many are concerned that a North Korean operative could come onto a U.S. base "carrying a portable BW sprayer on his back" and silently launch "a devastating anthrax attack." (See Plague Wars, 1999, p. 327)

In contrast to the DPRK's diverse capability to deliver CW agents, it is much less clear what comparable ordnance is available to the DPRK in terms of biological weaponry. ROK estimates that half of North Korea's long-range missiles and 30 percent of its artillery pieces are capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads. Little is also known about the biological warfare program and organization in North Korea, although one author suggests that it follows in similar lines with the DPRK CW infrastructure. (See Bermudez 2001) If this is the case, then the Second Economic Committee and its subsidiary Fifth Machine Industry Bureau would fulfill requirements for biological weapons set by the North Korean military. The latter organizations are directed by the National Defense Commission and the Ministry of People's Armed Forces.

Facilities

One account in the South Korean media alleged that the existence of more than 10 facilities responsible for producing biological weapons - some disguised as electrical engineering firms. In December 2001, a ROK MND-produced handbook on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) contained a map listing suspect BW facilities in North Korea. These included three BW production and six BW research facilities. While little detail was given on the research facilities, the three production sites were reported to be located at Chongju, Munchon, and along the Sohae coast.

According to defector Ch'oe Ju Hwal, a former sergeant in the Korean People's Army, there exists a "Joint Research Institute" that is responsible for biological weapons development. This institute is placed within the military-medical department, under command of the General Rear Service Bureau of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. Another report suggests a biological research facility associated with the North Korean BW program is located in Sŏngch'ŏn County (成川畈), South P'yongan Province, perhaps near Onjŏng-ri (溫井郲) (also the reported location of a Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau training site since 1992). Growth media is reportedly supplied (200 tons per annum) by a facility in Munch'on, Kangwon Province.

North Korea and the 1972 Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC)

North Korea acceded to the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 13 March 1987. It has denied developing any biological weapons, although as noted previously other nations, particularly the United States, doubt this claim. The U.S. government has repeatedly accused North Korea of violating its BTWC obligations.

Heightened concerns regarding North Korea's efforts in nuclear weaponry, however, as well as its ongoing missile development and export program have overshadowed much of the ongoing discussions (to the extent that these have occurred at all) concerning the BTWC and the DPRK.

Map by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (2001);
green markers indicate biological weapons-related facilities.

North Korea and the 1972 Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC)

North Korea acceded to the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 13 March 1987. It has denied developing any biological weapons, although as noted previously other nations, particularly the United States, doubt this claim. The U.S. government has repeatedly accused North Korea of violating its BTWC obligations.

Heightened concerns regarding North Korea’s efforts in nuclear weaponry, however, as well as its ongoing missile development and export program have overshadowed much of the ongoing discussions (to the extent that these have occurred at all) concerning the BTWC and the DPRK.

Key Sources:
Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 8; John R. Bolton, "Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction," Heritage Lectures, No. 743, p. 3; FBIS report, "DPRK's Microbiology Institute Profiled," 11 August 2000, in FBIS Document ID: KPP2000811000089; Yi Chae-sung, "Pukhannul Umjiginun T'ek'unok'uratu" ("Technocrats Who Move North Korea)," 25 August 1998, pp. 180-197, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19991006001519; Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, defense white paper, 2000, <www.mnd.go.kr>; Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001) p. 231; "South Korea Says North Has Biological, Chemical Weapons," Kyodo News Service, 23 October 1992.; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999) p. 329. Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Hwasaengbang Misail Olmana Algo Kyesimnikka? 10 December 2001, p. 32, in FBIS Document KPP20020103000062; Hwang Jang-jin, "S. Korea, U. S. To Develop Strategy On North's Weapons," Korea Herald, 5 March 2002; George Wehrfritz and B. J. Lee, "Pyongyang's Arsenal Is Scarier Than You Think," Newsweek, 25 October 1999, p. 68; "DPRK Biological Research Institute's Developments in 'Germ Weapons' Detailed," Choson Ilbo (Internet version), 3 December 2001, in FBIS Document KPP20011203000106, <www.fas.org>, Original source: South Korea: Monthly on DPRK Weapons of Mass Destruction: FBIS-EAS-98-325, 21 November 1998; Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea, National Defense White Paper, 2000, <www.mnd.go.kr>; Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001) p. 231; US Department of State, Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Commitments, August 2005, p. 26; Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea, 2006 Defense White Paper (English translation), May 2007, p. 74, <www.mnd.go.kr>; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2007, 14 September 2007, <www.state.gov>.

	Updated July 2008