During the 1950s, North Korea was reportedly supplied with sarin (GB, nerve agent) from
the USSR, while also utilizing Soviet technology to build CW agent production
facilities. Nothing more is known of actual importation of CW agents or chemical
weapons into North Korea since then.
In 1997, then Foreign Minister of Israel David Levy
claimed that China and North Korea were implicated in exporting "terrible
chemical weapons" to Syria. Israeli reports also allege that North Korea has
been assisting Syria in the development of chemical warheads for Scud missiles,
including the Scud-B. Currently, the same sources continue, Syria is largely
self-sufficient in producing chemical warhead technology, partly due to
assistance from the DPRK.
Some estimates have considered the dual-use nature of
chemical imports from Japan, and the roles these could have played in the North
Korean CW program. In the 1970s, significant quantities of industrial chemicals
were imported from Japan to the DPRK, including 1.6 million tons in 1976, 2
million tons in 1977, 1.8 million tons in 1978, and 3.1 million tons in 1979. It
is reported that since the 1980s, North Korea has continued to import chemical
precursors from Japan, using these raw intermediates or converted civilian
compounds to produce CW agents. For example, one ROK source indicates
that
North Korea imported from Japan and some other places
large amounts of chemical materials involving organic chlorine, organic
oxidizers, and insecticides that can be easily used in the production of
substances that can act on blood and the nervous system.
However, the exact nature of these transferred
chemicals is not clear, and it is not likely that North Korea would have gone to
the trouble of converting modern pesticides, for example, into CW agents. The
reference in the above quotation to organochlorines is no doubt a reference to
DDT, chlordane, or a similar agrochemical (insecticide) compound. None of these
has particularly high toxicity to mammals, and the use of these as precursors
for modern CW agents is extremely unlikely. The same can be said for organic
oxidizers (peroxides, such as the benzoyl or cumene), although these can
certainly be hazardous (explosive). Some insecticides could plausibly be used as
weapons in their concentrated form (parathion, for example), but this is a very
crude option. Furthermore, converting organophosphate insecticides into
compounds that are much more toxic to mammals (i.e., military nerve agents) is
theoretically possible, but is hardly an efficient or desirable method.
Therefore, previous reports that North Korea's CW capabilities could have been
based on the import of pesticides are dubious. In 1996, an ethnic Korean
in Japan was caught exporting 50kg of sodium fluoride to North Korea by way of
cargo vessels bringing food aid to the DPRK. Ostensibly, this chemical was
intended for use by a North Korean entity for electroplating uses. Sodium
fluoride is also a precursor for sarin and soman nerve agents, and consequently
the Japanese authorities arrested the individual (himself a Japanese citizen)
for trading in a controlled substance. The relatively small amount (50kg) of
this chemical, however, has little consequence in terms of producing militarily
significant amounts of nerve agent.
A more serious episode occurred in September 2003, when North Korea successfully
imported more than 100 tons of sodium cyanide from a South Korean businessman
via China. As a dual-use chemical, sodium cyanide could be used to prepare both
blood (hydrogen cyanide) and nerve (tabun) agents, although the North Korean
government claimed the material would be used for peaceful purposes only. The
incident underscores the challenge associated with preventing the proliferation
of equipment and materials associated with chemical weapons. But these incidents
also point to a serious problem faced by North Korea, namely the lack of
domestically manufactured chemical precursors.
North Korea also actively seeks
to procure equipment related to chemical weapons manufacturing, especially from
neighboring nations. In particular, North Korea has mobilized the Chosen Soren,
an organization of Japanese residents of North Korean origin, to obtain
materials and technology from its more advanced neighbor. In 2003, Japanese
authorities reported that several Japanese trading firms linked to North Korean
residents received orders from North Korea for specialized equipment, including
gas chromatography analyzers, vacuum freeze dryers, and constant incubation
tanks, which could be used to assist the manufacture of chemical weapons. North
Korea operates beyond Japan; in 2007 Taiwanese authorities investigated a
Taiwanese trading firm on suspicion it had illegally exported an industrial
filtering device (which has several potential dual-use applications) to North
Korea.
Key Sources:
Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "CW: North
Korea's growing capabilities...", Jane's
Defence Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 2, 14 January 1989,
p. 54; Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has
the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?"
Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655;
"South Says North Korea Has 1,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons," Yonhap news agency,
Seoul, 21 March 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; "[Thirty] Planeloads of
Iranian Arms to Hezbollah Since April: Levy,"
Agence France Presse, 3 February 1997; Ze'ev Schiff,
"Interview with Major General Moshe Ya'alon, IDF Intelligence Chief,"
Ha'aretz, 11 May 1997; "Six Japanese Firms Received
Orders for WMD-Related Materials from DPRK," Sankei Shimbun
(Tokyo), 19 May 2003, OSC Document JPP20030520000099; Katsuhisa Furukawa,
"Japanese Authorities Target Illicit North Korean Technology
Procurement," WMD Insights, November 2007, p. 23,
www.wmdinsights.com; Debby Wu, "Taiwan Investigates Company for
Allegedly Selling Nuclear-Related Equipment to North Korea," Associated
Press, 27 November 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com.
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Updated July 2008 |
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