Exports
In 1997, then Foreign Minister of Israel David Levy claimed that China and North Korea were implicated in exporting "terrible chemical weapons" to Syria. Israeli reports also allege that North Korea has been assisting Syria in the development of chemical warheads for Scud missiles, including the Scud-B. Currently, the same sources continue, Syria is largely self-sufficient in producing chemical warhead technology, partly due to assistance from the DPRK.

Chemical precursors: Imports
Some estimates have considered the dual-use nature of chemical imports from Japan, and the roles these could have played in the North Korean CW program. In the 1970s, significant quantities of industrial chemicals were imported from Japan to the DPRK, including 1.6 million tons in 1976, 2 million tons in 1977, 1.8 million tons in 1978, and 3.1 million tons in 1979. It is reported that since the 1980s, North Korea has continued to import chemical precursors from Japan, using these raw intermediates or converted civilian compounds to produce CW agents. For example, one ROK source indicates that

North Korea imported from Japan and some other places large amounts of chemical materials involving organic chlorine, organic oxidizers, and insecticides that can be easily used in the production of substances that can act on blood and the nervous system.

However, the exact nature of these transferred chemicals is not clear, and it is not likely that North Korea would have gone to the trouble of converting modern pesticides, for example, into CW agents. The reference in the above quotation to organochlorines is no doubt a reference to DDT, chlordane, or a similar agrochemical (insecticide) compound. None of these has particularly high toxicity to mammals, and the use of these as precursors for modern CW agents is extremely unlikely. The same can be said for organic oxidizers (peroxides, such as the benzoyl or cumene), although these can certainly be hazardous (explosive). Some insecticides could plausibly be used as weapons in their concentrated form (parathion, for example), but this is a very crude option. Furthermore, converting organophosphate insecticides into compounds that are much more toxic to mammals (i.e., military nerve agents) is theoretically possible, but is hardly an efficient or desirable method. Therefore, previous reports that North Korea's CW capabilities could have been based on the import of pesticides are dubious.
In 1996, an ethnic Korean in Japan was caught exporting 50kg of sodium fluoride to North Korea by way of cargo vessels bringing food aid to the DPRK. Ostensibly, this chemical was intended for use by a North Korean entity for electroplating uses. Sodium fluoride is also a precursor for sarin and soman nerve agents, and consequently the Japanese authorities arrested the individual (himself a Japanese citizen) for trading in a controlled substance. The relatively small amount (50kg) of this chemical, however, has little consequence in terms of producing militarily significant amounts of nerve agent.

	Updated March 2003

Key Sources:
Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "CW: North Korea's growing capabilities...", Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 2, 14 January 1989, p. 54; Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655; "South Says North Korea Has 1,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons," Yonhap news agency, Seoul, 21 March 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; "[Thirty] Planeloads of Iranian Arms to Hezbollah Since April: Levy," Agence France Presse, 3 February 1997; Ze'ev Schiff, "Interview with Major General Moshe Ya'alon, IDF Intelligence Chief," Ha'aretz, 11 May 1997.