The DPRK ranks among the world's largest possessors of chemical weapons. If official reports and testimonies from North Korean defectors are to be believed, the DPRK military possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons (it is unclear if this amount includes only CW agents or agents and munitions). The DPRK's chemical arsenal allegedly include four of the five major classes of CW agents, including phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister), and sarin (nerve agent) (it does not appear to possess nervous system incapacitants such as BZ). However, a 2002 report by the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, General Thomas A. Schwartz, suggests that DPRK is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents such as phosgene, lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the modern nerve agents.[1] Reports and documentary evidence from North Korean defectors suggest that the regime tested chemical agents on humans, especially prisoners, as recently as 2002. One witness describes how he stole transfer authorizations for prisoners, stating: "Each document gives sparse biographical details of an individual and authorises his or her transfer from a prison specifically for the purpose of 'human experimentation of liquid gas for chemical weapons testing in live experiments.' Forms are dated as late as July 2002."[2]

Since the DPRK's establishment in 1947, its CW program had uneven success in obtaining and weaponizing CW agents. However, in the last two decades DPRK appears to have increased its CW agent production capacity and been able to develop and deploy a variety of delivery systems. According to defector accounts, DPRK 's long-range missiles such as the Nodong, and other ballistic rockets and artillery pieces with calibers larger than 80 mm, are capable of delivering CW agents. North Korea appears to be continuing to improve its CW delivery capability, as evidenced by development of the KN-2 short-range missile in 2007.[3] Despite DPRK's moribund economy, the quantity and quality of new artillery placed near the DMZ have increased over the last several years, to include platforms such as multiple launch rocket systems of up to 320 mm. These systems pose threats to heavily populated Seoul and the entire Korean peninsula.[4]

Background

As early as 1947, a Korean People's Army (KPA) manual addressed at least the theory of CW operational doctrine. By 1954, the KPA had established nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense units. It appears that these were developed according to the Soviet model, and that the chemical weapons program relied heavily on Chinese assistance. Kim Il Sung's 1961 "Declaration for Chemicalization" called for the further development of a chemical industry to support chemical weapons production. It was during this time that DPRK established the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau.[5]

In 1966, for reasons that are unclear, DPRK turned to the Soviets for assistance in its CW development, which was provided mostly in the form of training manuals and small quantities of nerve and mustard agents. Following this period of Soviet-led assistance, DPRK made substantive gains in the CW area.[6] Still, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in May 1979 that DPRK had only a defensive capability in CW. It assumed, however, that the development of an offensive program would follow. By the late 1980s, sources reported that the DPRK was capable of producing CW agents in large quantities, and had deployed large numbers of chemical weapons munitions. In January 1987, the South Korean MND ireported that the DPRK possessed up to 250 metric tons of chemical weapons, including blister (mustard) and some nerve agents. (This estimate is varies somewhat from that made above by General Schwartz, but we have no way to determine which is correct.) Since then, MND estimates of DPRK chemical ordnance have increased to the thousands of tons, probably based on information provided by North Korean defectors, including former members of DPRK military and NBC defense organizations.[7] In 2006, the MND estimated that DPRK possessed 2,500 to 5,000 metric tons of chemical agents, including nerve agents.[8]

The Suspected DPRK Chemical Weapons Arsenal

The DPRK is believed to possess mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-series nerve agents. Dr. Cho'ng Yo'ng-sik from the Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology has estimated that DPRK is capable of producing an annual 5,000 metric tons of CW agents in times of peace. According to him, the DPRK could increase this production to 12,000 metric tons should the country be placed on war footing.[9] While an unknown quantity of CW agents is stored in bulk, reportedly a significant portion of the DPRK stock of BW agents is loaded into artillery shells and rocket warheads. Due to the DPRK having limited indigenous sources for precursors of CW agents, it is believed to be concentrating on producing as much as it can of phosgene, mustard, sarin, and V-agents.[10]

Allegations of Chemical Agent Experimentation on Humans

In 2004, the BBC produced a documentary, entitled "Access to Evil," which alleged that the DPRK had used political prisoners as test subjects for its chemical weapons. The documentary featured the testimony of a former North Korean prison officer who witnessed entire families being gassed. In addition, documentary evidence in the form of prisoner "letter of transfer" forms that had been smuggled out of DPRK by an engineer at the February 8 Vinalon Complex in Hamhung, was presented to corroborate the officer's story. Other defectors have made similar claims previously (and since), but trustworthy documentary evidence to support these claims has not been available. Of course, Pyongyang denies charges made by defectors and it must be noted that the ROK government generally expresses skepticism of defector claims.[11] As observed by the U.S. Department of State in 2007, defector allegations are extremely difficult to verify rigorously due to the DPRK being a closed society.[12]

Delivery Systems

Over half of DPRK's 1.2 million-man army, supported by thousands of artillery systems, is deployed within 90 miles of the DMZ. Possibly because chemical agents are best delivered by larger caliber artillery shells and rockets, beginning in 2002 the DPRK has acted to substantially increase the number of long-range multiple rocket 280 mm and 320 mm launching systems near the DMZ. The country's arsenal includes thousands of artillery of various calibers, hundreds of forward deployed Scud-B, Frog-5, and Frog-7 missiles, as well as Scud-C missiles capable of being fitted with chemical warheads. The ROK government has asserted that half of the DPRK's long-range missiles and almost one-third of its other artillery weapons are capable of delivering either biological or chemical agents,[13] although the effectiveness of these weapons are not known. In October 2007, a South Korean lawmaker, citing intelligence data, claimed that the DPRK had developed a new short range missile, the KN-2, which reportedly is a modified version of the Russian SS-21. The solid fuel-propelled KN-2 reportedly has a 120 km range, is capable of delivering a 500 kg payload, and can carry a chemical warhead.[14]

According to the MND 2008 Defense White Paper, DPRK deployed a new intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2007. The white paper also states that the DPRK is believed to be continuing to develop its Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile which is estimated to have a range of 6,700 kilometers. The MND notes further that the the missile's maximum range could be extended if the DPRK reduces the missile's weight or adds a third propulsion rocket.[17] The implications of these developments for CW are not yet known, but it is wise to assume that these new missiles are designed to carry a variety of warheads, including a chemical one.

Source: the Republic of Korea 2000 Defense White Paper (Ministry of National Defense)

Facilities

In 2001, an estimated 12 facilities in DPRK produce and/or store raw chemicals, precursors, and CW agents. ROK government officials, relying partly on aerial photographs, determined that the DPRK has eight chemical weapons production facilities, which are located in Hamhung and Hungnam, South Hamgyong Province; Ch'ongjin and Aoji, North Hamgyong Province; Sinuiju, North P'yongan Province; Manp'o, Chaggang Province; and Anju and Sunch'on, South P'yongan Province. In addition, reportedly there are four research and seven storage facilities.[19] Two facilities located proximal to the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly equipped to undertake the final preparation and the filling of CW agents into artillery shells. The testing of agents reportedly is also performed at these two locations, possibly in very large underground facilities.[20] The Hamhung Chemical Engineering College appears to be responsible for much of the training of the KPA personnel in CW defense.

Status

During the 1990s, a scarcity of precursors required for the manufacture of nerve agents forced the DPRK to look for foreign sources. In 1996, an ethnic Korean possessing Japanese citizenship and residing in Japan was caught exporting 50 kg of sodium fluoride to North Korea by way of cargo vessels bringing food aid. Supposedly, this chemical was intended for use by a North Korean enterprise for electroplating purposes. But because sodium fluoride is also a precursor for sarin and soman nerve agents, Japanese authorities arrested the individual and charged him for the crime of illegally trading in a controlled substance. The relatively small amount of this chemical involved in this case would have allowed the DPRK to produce militarily insignificant amounts of nerve agent, but the act might have been a test run for subsequent large smuggling or precursors.[21]

A more serious incident occurred in September 2003, when DPRK purchased more than 100 metric tons of sodium cyanide from a South Korean man and then successfully imported it via China. Although the DPRK government claimed that the chemical would be used for only peaceful purposes, it is well recognized that sodium cyanide is a dual-use chemical that could be used to manufacture both blood (hydrogen cyanide) and nerve (tabun) agents. The incident underscores the challenge associated with controlling the international trade of dual-use equipment and materials that could be applied to acquire chemical weapons. But these incidents also point to a serious problem faced by DPRK, namely having a low capability to domestically manufacture chemical weapon agents precursors, even relatively simple ones such as sodium cyanide.[22]

While it would appear as if the ready availability of oil-derived intermediates makes the large-scale manufacture of CW agents such as the ones listed above well within the capabilities of the DPRK, it is not clear to what extent it is able to manufacture large quantities of CW agents and associated munitions given its limited financial resources.[23] It would appear as if having to choose between acquiring nuclear weapons, short and long-range missiles, and/or chemical weapons, the last would probably have the lowest value to the DPRK government.

North Korea and the Chemical Weapons Convention

In the early 1990s—according to reports from North Korean defectors—the DPRK Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces debated over whether the country should join the CWC. Although the Foreign Ministry apparently was in favor of doing so, the military was opposed. Kim Jong-Il apparently sided with the latter.

Beginning in 1997, the ROK government tried to convince the DPRK to join the CWC, but to no avail. The DPRK has also rebuffed similar efforts on the part of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Japanese government. North Korea's accession to the CWC could have long-term economic advantages by giving the DPRK access to trade in treaty-controlled chemicals and technology. In the short term, however, North Korea is not likely to reap immediate benefits by joining the CWC regime. [24]

It bears noting that DPRK has refused to acknowledge having chemical weapons as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which was passed in October 2006 following North Korea's test of a nuclear device.[25]

Sources:
[1] Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, 05 March 2002, www.shaps.hawaii.edu/ security/ us/ schwartz_ 2002.html.
[2] Jasper Becker, "North Koreans Take Revenge on Chemical Tests Whistleblowers," The Independent (London), 08 February 2004, www.independent.co.uk/ news/ world/ asia/ north- koreans- take- revenge- on- chemical- tests- whistleblowers- 569230.html.
[3] Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655; Kim Min-seok, JoongAng Ilbo / Brian Lee, "North Korea Develops New Missile," JoongAng Ilbo (Internet version) 10 October 07, OSC document KPP20071010971166.
[4] Andy Oppenheimer, ed., "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 2008-2009," August 2008, pp. 30-31, janes-store.ihs.com/ pdf/ Nuclear- Biological- and- Chemical- Defence- 2008-9.pdf; "The CBRN Threat: Assessing Asian Capabilities," Asian Military Review, September 2008, www.asianmilitaryreview.com/ upload/ 200809221211521.pdfhtml.
[5] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes," in "North Korea's Weapons Programmes: a Net Assessment," 21 January 2004, p. 56, www.iiss.org/ EasysiteWeb/ getresource.axd? AssetID= 1869& type= full& servicetype= attachmenthtml.
[6] Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655.
[7] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (BCW) Programmes" in North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, 21 January 2004, www.iiss.org/ publications/ strategic- dossiers/ north- korean- dossier/ north- koreas- weapons- programmes- a-net- asses/ north- koreas- chemical- and- weapons- cbw-prog/ html.
[8] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2006 Defense White Paper (English translation), May 2007, p. 74, www.mnd.go.kr; "South Estimates DPRK Has 5,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons, Mostly Sarin," Sinmun (Seoul), 15 April 1995, p. 1, in BBC Summary of World Broadcast.
[9] "Sankei Shimbun: DPRK Manufactures Chemical Weapons," Sankei Shimbun, 10 June 2000, in OSC document JPP20000610000025; "North Korea's Military Science and Technology (Part 2)," Kunsa Nontan, 26 Aug 2005 - 31 Aug 2005.
[10] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program," The Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, February 2008, p. 49, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdffiles/ PUB842.pdf; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes," in North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, 21 January 2004, p. 56, www.iiss.org/ EasysiteWeb/ getresource.axd? AssetID= 1869&type= full&servicetype= attachmenthtml.
[11] Bertil Lintner, "North Korea and the Poor Man's Bombs," Asia Times Online, 9 May 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IE09Dg01.html; Antony Bartnett, "Revealed: the gas chamber horror of North Korea's gulag," The Guardian, 01 February 2004, www.guardian.co.uk/ world/ 2004/ feb/01/ northkoreahtml.
[12] U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "International Religious Freedom Report 2007," www.state.gov/ g/ drl/ rls/ irf/ 2007/ 90140.htmhtml.
[13] Andy Oppenheimer, ed., "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 2008-2009," August 2008, pp.30-31, janes-store.ihs.com/ pdf/ Nuclear- Biological- and- Chemical- Defence-2008-9.pdf; "The CBRN Threat: Assessing Asian Capabilities," Asian Military Review, September 2008, www.asianmilitaryreview.com/ upload/ 200809221211521.pdfhtml.
[14] Kim Min-seok, JoongAng Ilbo / Brian Lee, "North Korea Develops New Missile," JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul), 10 October 2007, in OSC document KPP20071010971166.
[15] Trefor Moss, "Launch preparations are for communications satellites, says Pyongyang," 02 March 2009, www.janes.com/ news/ defence/ triservice/ jdw/ jdw090302_1_n.shtml; Mail Foreign Service, "North Korea sparks fears of strike on U.S. with 'rocket' launch," 24 February 2009, www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/ worldnews/ article- 1153771/ North-Korea- sparks-fears- strike- U-S- rocket- launch.html.
[16] "U.N. Chief Voices Concern over N. Korean Rocket Launch," Yonhap (Seoul), 29 March 2009, OSC document KPP20090329971018.
[17] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, "Korea Publishes Defense White Paper 2008," 11 March 2009; www.mnd.go.kr/ webmodule/ htsboard/ template/ read/ engbdread.jsp? typeID= 16&boardid= 88&seqno= 743html. (An English version of the full 2008 White Paper has not been released as of the time of this writing.)
[18] "N. Korea's Missile Capability Improves," Korea Times Online, 06 April 2009, OSC document KPP20090406107005.
[19] Yi Kyo-kwan, "NK Report - North Korea Finishes Deploying Chemical Weapons in Forward Units," Choson Ilbo, 05 November 2002, in OSC document KPP20021105000236; "Defector Describes Various DPRK Arms Factories," Kin Seinichi no Himitsu Heiki Kojo (Tokyo), 25 November 2001, in OSC document KPP20021009000119; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Program," in North Korea's Weapons Programs: a Net Assessment, 21 January 2004, p. 56, www.iiss.org/ EasysiteWeb/ getresource.axd? AssetID= 1869& type= full& servicetype= attachmenthtml.
[20] "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," Joseph Bermudez, Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1994, pp. 74-79, cited at Hungnam information page at www.globalsecurity.org/ wmd/ world/ dprk/ hungnam.htm; "DPRK Chemical Warfare Facilities," in Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 225.
[21] "Trader Nabbed for Illegal Chemical Exports," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 8 April 1996, www.lexisnexis.comhtml.
[22] Park Chan-kyong, "ROK Says Sodium Cyanide Shipped to North Korea via China Sep 2003," Agence France Presse, 24 September 2004, in OSC Document JPP20040924000085.
[23] "DPRK Manufactures Chemical Weapons," Sankei Shimbun, 10 June 2000, in OSC document JPP20000610000025; "North Korea's Military Science and Technology (Part 2)," Kunsa Nontan, 26 Aug 2005 - 31 Aug 2005.
[24] "Why the Discrepancy Between ROK, DPRK Joint Communiqué Regarding Military Authorities Talks," Yonhap, 08 April 2002, in OSC document KPP20020408000065; "Actual Problems of Chemical Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Convention after the First Review Conference," Masaryk University (Brno), 12 April 2005, in OSC document GRY20070108000026.
[25] "Security Council condemns nuclear test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, unanimously adopting Resolution 1718 (2006)," SC/8853, Security Council 5551st Meeting (PM), 14 October 2006, www.un.org/ News/ Press/ docs/ 2006/ sc8853.doc.htmhtml.

	Updated June 2009