The Taepodong-2 is a two-stage missile project , which is to use a Nodong missile as the second stage. The Taepodong-2 has yet to be flight-tested, and it would likely be tested in a space-launch configuration, and possibly with a third stage. The first reported sighting of the Taepodong-2 occurred in February 1994 when US reconnaissance satellites detected a mock-up at the San'ŭm-dong Research and Development Center.[1] [Note: This is probably the same facility that is known as the "Number Seven Factory" in Yongsŏng-kuyŏk, Pyongyang.] In June of the same year, US reconnaissance satellites detected static engine tests for both the Paektusan-1 [Taepodong-1] and Taepodong-2.[2]
The Second Natural Science Academy, formerly the Academy of Defense Sciences, is responsible for the research and development of all weapons systems in North Korea. The Second Natural Science Academy ostensibly has designed and has been developing the Taepodong-2. North Korea demonstrated the ability to launch a two-stage missile when it attempted, but failed, to place a small satellite into orbit with the Paektusan-1 on 31 August 1998. The second stage of the Taepodong-2 is believed to be a Nodong ballistic missile, which is also the first stage of the Paektusan-1.
North Korean engineers have been conducting a number of engine tests for the Taepodong-2 in recent years, but it is uncertain if the missile is ready for flight-testing.[3] US intelligence sources estimate that the missile could be tested at any time, and that a three-stage version might be capable of reaching the west coast of the continental United States[4] The accuracy of the Taepodong-2 used in such a ballistic missile mode is uncertain, and North Korea has not yet demonstrated the capability to produce a re-entry vehicle. Hence, North Korea may not be able to deliver a warhead accurately to a specific target in the United States or elsewhere within the system's range.
The second stage of the Taepodong-2, the Nodong, was apparently flight-tested at the Musudan-ri Missile Test Site in May 1990, but US satellite imagery indicates the test was a failure (see Nodong Overview and Assessment).[5] In late May 1993, North Korea conducted its only successful flight-test of the Nodong from Musudan-ri.[6] The development timeline of the Taepodong-2 and its second stage, the Nodong, appears to be almost impossible to achieve without extensive foreign assistance. Pyongyang has received foreign assistance from several sources, including Russia, China, Egypt, and Iran. Foreign assistance has ranged from Iranian financial support and Chinese technical training in aerospace engineering, to the pro-North Korean General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Choch'ongnyŏn) providing Japanese semiconductors. There is also strong evidence that North Korea acquired foreign-made precision machine tools that are needed for missile manufacturing.
It is unclear whether North Korea will export the Taepodong-2, but the Yong'aksan Trading Company under the Second Economic Committee's External Economic Bureau handles Pyongyang's missile exports, and the Ch'anggwang Credit Bank receives payment from buyers.[7] The foreign exchange earnings from missile exports have enabled Pyongyang to continue or expand its procurement of components and technology from abroad in order to continue the missile development program. Unfortunately, there is no credible open source information about North Korea's internal budget or expenditures on the Taepodong-2 or other ballistic missiles.
One has to assume that this missile is similar to the Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) technical design. At present, there are not enough reliable data to establish the history of this missile, including the connections to other programs. However, there are a number of indications for a Soviet origin in the mid-1950s.
The missile resembles a typical two-stage guided liquid rocket. It consists of large first stage, a smaller second stage, probably a separate guidance compartment and a separable, cone-shaped warhead with a blunt nose.
The basic construction material is stainless steel along with probable air frame structural elements made of aluminum alloy.
The propulsion systems of both stages are liquid rocket engines probably using the storable propellant combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acrid (IRFNA) and kerosene. Ignition is accomplished by a hypergolic (self-igniting) start fuel designated Tonka—the WW II German designator for this propellant—filled into the fuel line at the main fuel valve. The propellant feed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The start and shut down valves are one shot devices, actuated by pyrotechnic charges. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in a high-pressure bottle heated by the turbine exhaust gases.
The guidance system basically resembles that of the A4/V2 arrangement with body-mounted free gyros, however with the modification of an additional gyro for accuracy improvement. Prior to launch, the missile is orientated such that the trajectory plane hits the target and the guidance systems keeps the missile in this plane. Two of the three body-mounted gyros are used for attitude and the third one lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed measurement. The fins are fixed and thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes.
The missile is equipped with a separable warhead. Although at present no further information on the warhead is available, it is assumed that the general design is based on a conventional HE load. However, the relative small mass for a conventional explosive (or bio-chemical weapon) points to an early nuclear warhead of the late 1950s.
[1] Barbara Starr, "N Korea Casts a Longer Shadow with TD-2," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 March 1994, p. 1; R. Jeffrey Smith, "CIA Confirms North Korea's New Missiles," Washington Post, 18 March 1994, p. A24; Yu Yong Won, Chosun Ilbo, 20 March 1994, p. 4, in "Reporting on Status of Missile Development," JPRS-TND-94-008, 1 April 1994, pp. 12-13; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 28; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 293, 295; Yu Yong Wŏn, "Puk Shinhyŏngjidaeji 'Taepodong12ho' [sic]Saqjŏnggŏri 2Ch'ŏn ~ 3Ch'ŏn5Baek km," Chosun Ilbo, 20 March 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
[2] Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 295; Yu Yong Wŏn, "Puk Taepodong 1-2 Ho Punsashihŏm/6 Wŏl Chungsun," Chosun Ilbo, 1 July 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
[3] Kyodo News Service, 28 February 2003, in "N. Korea Tests Ballistic Missile Booster in Jan.: Paper," FBIS Document ID: JPP20030228000015; Park Tu Shik and Yu Yong Wŏn, "Mi, Puk Missile Kamshich'ejero," Chosun Ilbo, 6 February 2002, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Report: N. Korea Preparing New Long-Range Missile Test," World Tribune.com, 7 February 2002, <http://www.worldtribune.com/>; Kyodo News Service, 6 February 2002, in "N. Korea Conducts Engine Tests for Long-Range Missile: Report," FBIS Document ID: JPP20020206000070.
[4] Director of Central Intelligence, "DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing," 11 February 2003, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/%20dci_speech_02112003.html>; John J. Lumpkin, "Intelligence Officials Voice Concerns Over N. Korea," Washington Post, 12 February 2003, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>.
[5] Bill Gertz, "Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles," Washington Times, 4 June 1991, p. 4; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 186; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 280-281; "Pukhan, Sae T'ando Missile Saengsan-Haekt'apchae Kanŭng," Joongang Ilbo, 5 June 1990, <http://www.joins.com/>; "Pukhan Kaebal T'ando Missile Ch'otshihŏmbalsa--Mijŏngbogigwandŭl Punsŏk," Joongang Ilbo, 6 July 1990, <http://www.joins.com/>.
[6] Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 14 June 1993, in " DA: DPRK 'Appears' to Have Tested Missile," FBIS-EAS-93-112, 14 June 1993, p. 5; David E. Sanger, "Missile Is Tested by North Koreans," New York Times, 13 June 1993, p. 7; Kim Yong Kol, Hankook Ilbo, 16 June 1993, p. 4, in "Israel Makes Gesture to North Korea for Improvement of Relations," FBIS-EAS-93-114, "Possible Israeli Aid to DPRK Viewed," 16 June 1993, p. 20; "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 June 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; "North Korea Seen Successful in Test of Nodong-1 Missile," Aerospace Daily, 29 June 1993, pp. 538-539; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 203; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 17, 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, pp. 186-189; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 283-286, 291; Yu Yong Wŏn, "'Puk Changgŏrip'o Chŏnbang Chŭnggang'/Kukpangbu, Rodong 1 Ho Palsasŏnggong Ch'ŏt Kongshikhwag'in," Chosun Ilbo, 25 June 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
[7] Lee Kyo Kwan, "[NK Report] Pukhan Missile Such'ul Ŏddŏhke Hana?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, <http://www.chosun.com/>; Yi Kyo-kwan, "How Does North Korea Export Missiles?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, in "DPRK Said to Export Body, Main Parts of Missiles Separately," FBIS Document ID KPP20020305000112.
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Updated July 2004 |
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