The general consensus on North Korea’s Hwasŏng-5 is that it is an indigenously reverse-engineered and improved version of the Soviet Scud-B (R-17). However, several questions remain about the Hwasŏng-5 program, including when the program was initiated and when North Korea first acquired Scud-Bs to begin a reverse-engineering program. The latter issue is significant because the length of time from the start of the program until successful flight testing and mass production could be a good indication of Pyongyang’s success in acquiring foreign technology assistance for the program.
The earliest that North Korea reportedly received any Scud-B missiles is 1972, but this report is unconfirmed.[1] An anonymous North Korean defector claims that the Soviet Union provided 20 Scud-Bs in 1972 in exchange for access to the intelligence equipment on the USS Pueblo captured in 1968. Although there are no other open source reports of this transfer, and the source’s credibility is uncertain, the number of missiles and the timing of the reported transfer would support the hypothesis that the Hwasŏng-5 is a reverse-engineered missile produced with little or no outside assistance. However, any covert cooperation during the early 1970s also suggests that Pyongyang could have obtained extensive Soviet and/or Russian assistance from that time, either with or without Moscow’s approval.
An alternative hypothesis is that the Hwasŏng-5 was produced with comprehensive Soviet assistance, or even under license, in North Korean factories.[2] There is one report, although unsubstantiated, that Pyongyang received 240 Scud-B missiles from Moscow from 1985 to 1988.[3] This suggests that Pyongyang could have simply provided a “screw-driver plant” and transshipment location for Soviet missiles that were assembled in North Korea. A third possibility is that Pyongyang could have acquired different missile production technologies from various foreign sources, and then incorporated those technologies to produce the Hwasŏng-5 and other missiles.[4] Although of historical impact, these alternative explanations are relevant for current policy issues. For example, even if North Korea now has an independent capacity to produce the Hwasŏng-5, the development path could be similar for current missile systems under development, which would have implications for policies aimed at constraining Pyongyang’s missile development program.
|
Source
|
First Scud Imports |
Initial
Production |
Flight
Test |
First
Exports |
|
Joseph S.
Bermudez
|
1979-1980
|
1984
|
1984
|
1987
|
|
Chang Chun Ik
|
1980
|
|
1984
|
1987
|
|
Federation of American Scientists
|
1976
|
|
|
|
|
DPRK Defector Kim Kil Sŏn
|
1981 or earlier
|
1984
|
|
|
|
Anonymous
DPRK defector
|
1972 (USSR)
|
|
|
|
|
Ministry of
Unification
|
1976
|
|
|
|
|
SIPRI
|
1985-1988 (USSR)
|
1980 (unlicensed?)
|
|
|
|
Hajime Ozu
|
1981
|
|
1982
|
| Key Sources for Table:
Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999); Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org>; CNS defector interview data; SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000 Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000).
It is difficult to determine exactly when and how North Korea acquired the capability to produce the Hwasŏng-5. However, the development timeline appears to be almost impossible to achieve without extensive foreign assistance. Pyongyang has received foreign assistance from several sources, including Russia, China, Egypt, and Iran. Foreign assistance has ranged from Iranian financial support and Chinese technical training in aerospace engineering, to the pro-North Korean General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Choch’ongnyŏn) providing Japanese semiconductors. There is also strong evidence that North Korea acquired foreign-made precision machine tools that are needed for missile manufacturing.
The Number Seven Factory, which apparently is also known as the “San’ŭm-dong or San’ŏp-dong Research and Development Center,” was almost certainly the producer of the first prototypes that rolled off the line around 1984.[5] The Number Seven Factory, which is subordinate to Second Natural Science Academy, under the National Defense Commission, is responsible for the production and testing of missile prototypes prior to the initiation of production at other plants.
North Korea’s first reported flight test of an “indigenously modified Scud” was in April 1982. Hajime Ozu of Japan has reported this test as a failure, but the report has not been substantiated by any other sources.[6] The first confirmed flight tests occurred in April and September 1984 at the Musudan-ri Missile Test Site along the northeast coast.[7] There were reportedly three failures and three successes during the two testing periods, but the distribution of the test results over the two periods is unclear. Nevertheless, the small number of flight tests is very unusual, unless North Korea received substantial foreign assistance and data that could substitute for testing that would be required in any ballistic development program.
Between 1985 and 1987, North Korea began regular factory production of the Hwasŏng-5, probably at either the Man’gyŏngdae Electric Machinery Factory or the No. 125 Factory, or possibly at both facilities, in the Pyongyang area. The Second Economic Committee, under the National Defense Commission, was responsible for production of the Hwasŏng-5, which is said to have reached about 8-12 missiles per month during 1987 and 1988—the period that coincides with the beginning of Hwasŏng-5 exports to Iran.[8] Tehran then re-named the missiles the “Shehab-1.” Iran’s financial assistance and willingness to purchase the Hwasŏng-5 are thought to be a critical reason that Pyongyang could proceed with the program. For example, the two sides reached a $500 million agreement in 1987 that included the North Korean export of 90-100 Hwasŏng missiles and other military hardware to Iran.
On 10 December 2002, Spanish and US naval ships intercepted the North Korean ship Sŏsan en route to Yemen. The Sŏsan cargo included 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads, and 85 drums of “inhibited red fuming nitric acid,” which is used as an oxidizer for Scud missile fuel. North Korea declared the interception of the Sŏsan an “act of piracy” and has demanded “compensation for the losses and personal trauma experienced by the crew members.”
The Yong’aksan Trading Company (龍岳産貿易商社) under the Second Economic Committee’s External Economic Bureau handles missile exports, and the Ch’anggwang Credit Bank (創光信用銀行) receives payment from buyers.[9] The foreign exchange earnings from missile exports have enabled Pyongyang to continue or expand its procurement of components and technology from abroad in order to continue the missile development program. Unfortunately, there is no credible open source information about North Korea’s internal budget or expenditures on the Hwasŏng-5 or other ballistic missile programs.
While North Korea was establishing its own production lines for the Hwasŏng-5 in the 1980s, Pyongyang was also arranging to provide equipment and technology transfers for the establishment of production facilities abroad. In 1985, Pyongyang and Tehran reached an agreement whereby North Korea would assist Iran with the construction of a Hwasŏng-5 assembly plant.[10] The plant reportedly became operational in 1988.[11] There is also a report of North Korea providing Egypt with assistance to establish a Scud-B production plant in 1987, but this could have been for a facility used in the maintenance of Egypt’s Scud-B inventory.[12] It is noteworthy that Hwasŏng-5 deployments in North Korea did not precede exports or the establishment of production plants abroad.
By the mid-1980s, the North Korean Air Force Construction Department under the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Construction Bureau had broken ground on the construction of Hwasŏng-5 missile bases, including a base in Shin’gye-kun, North Hwanghae Province.[13] The first deployments of the Hwasŏng-5 had occurred by 1988 at the base in Shin’gye-kun. This is the same year that North Korea established a Hwasŏng-5 regiment and began development of the “Hwasŏng-6,” or “Scud-C.”
North Korea has an “inventory of over 500 Scud missiles of various types,” but the distribution of Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 missiles among this 500 is not clear.[14] On 29 April 2002, Lieutenant General Daniel R. Zanini, Commander Eighth United States Army, said that North Korea’s missile inventory “approaches 1,000” during a speech at a Korea Institute for Defense Analyses seminar in Seoul.[15] Zanini’s statement was widely misquoted in the press as “North Korea possesses 1,000 missiles” or “over 1,000 missiles.” However, considering Nodong and possible Paektusan deployments, “approaching 1,000” is a credible rough estimate.
The North Korean Hwasŏng-5 is reportedly a "reverse-engineered" version of the Soviet-designed and produced R-17/Scud-B and, as such, shares the technical features of the origin system.[16] This assessment therefore focuses on the Soviet missile because the Hwasŏng-5 performance characteristics and operation would not differ substantially.
Soviet work on the missile began in approximately 1958 under the responsibility of SKB-385, now known as the Makayev Design Bureau State Rocket Center. The Scud-B is usually viewed as the successor to Scud-A (Soviet designator R-11) due to the identical diameter and other very similar dimensions. Unlike the Scud-B, however, the Scud-A had a pressure fed engine driven by two liquid fuelled gas generators, and thus the propulsion systems are quite different. At present, the limited amount of reliable, open-source information does not allow for a thorough history of this missile, including the initial activities and connections to other programs.
The missile in general resembles a typical guided liquid rocket design that is comparable to other missiles. It consists of a main engine, two separate propellant tanks, a separate guidance compartment, and a conical warhead.
The basic construction material is stainless steel plus some air frame structural elements made of aluminum alloy.
The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine using the storable propellant combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acrid (IRFNA, AK-27I Russian designation) and kerosene (TM-185 Russian designation). AK-27I consists of 73 percent HNO3 and 27 percent N2O4 (plus a small amount of inhibiter).
Ignition is accomplished by a hypergolic start fuel designated Tonka or TG-02 (the former is the WW II German designator while the latter is the Russian designator) filled into the fuel line at the main fuel valve. Tonka consists of 50 percent triethylamine and 50 percent xylidiene. The propellant fed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The start and shut down valves are one shot devices, actuated by pyrotechnic charges. For improving the accuracy the engine is equipped with mechanical controls for correct thrust level and mixture ratio. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in high-pressure bottles in the missile's tail section, which are heated by the turbine exhaust gases.
The guidance system basically resembles that of the A4/V2 arrangement, however, with some modifications for accuracy improvement. Prior to launch, the missile is orientated such that the trajectory plane hits the target and the guidance systems keeps the missile in this plane. Three body-mounted gyros are used for attitude and lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed control. Thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes.
Warhead weight consists of some 80 percent explosive material, plus structure. The crush or g-sensors in the fusing system are capable of activating the warhead upon impact at a number of different angles. The missile also contains a safety fuse that is part of the Scud's self-destruct system and is independent of the impact fusing system.
The missile is transported and launched by the Soviet MAZ 543 erector and launcher.
This missile was the most successful Soviet guided missile with respect to the number of manufactured units. After initial operational capability in 1962, it was deployed with the Soviet armed forces in large quantities and exported to nearly 30 countries; the overall produced volume between 1960 and the mid-1980s may have exceeded 10,000 units.
There are reports that the North Korean Hwasŏng-5 is actually an improved/longer-range version of the original Scud-B/R-17. Thus, one often sees the designation for the North Korean missile as Scud-Mod B or Scud PiP (product improvement). The origin or even existence of such a missile is rather unclear. In April 1988, Iran's First Deputy Defense Minister Colonel Rahimi stated that, "We have also succeeded in manufacturing missiles with a range of 320km." Given that Iran was then launching "North Korean-made" Scuds against Iraq, it was therefore believed that Pyongyang had actually increased the range of the missile.
Increasing the range of the standard Scud-B to 320km requires an increase in engine burn time of 1.1 seconds, such that the overall burn time is 63.1 seconds. This compares to the overall propellant load of 65.2 seconds; therefore, the propellant reserves are still approximately 2 seconds, which in most cases would be sufficient for mission completion. In addition, the inputs into the counter in the missile's PIGA (which effects engine cut-off) would have to be changed accordingly.
Therefore, it is technically feasible to increase the range without any development work on the Scud-B, such as "improving" the engine's performance. However, CNS has no reliable information--such as a radar track of a flight test--indicating that North Korea, in fact, increased the Scud's range in this manner. Indeed, there are other reasons not to believe the Iranian statement noted above, most simply that the 320-km claim was simply disinformation. There were numerous examples of this type of disinformation during the war (for example, Iraq claimed it had increased the range of the Styx missile when this in fact was not true).
[1] Interview with North Korean defector by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 1 November 2000, Seoul.
[2] Robert H. Schmucker, “3rd World Missile Development—A New Assessment Based on UNSCOM Field Experience and Data Evaluation,” paper for the 12th Multinational Conference on Theater Missile Defense, Edinburgh, Scotland, 1-4 June 1999.
[3] SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 256.
[4] North Korea has cooperated to exchange missile technology with several countries, including China, Egypt, and Iran.
[5] Interview with Kim Kil Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 10 April 2001, Seoul; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10.
[6] Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95.
[7] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, August 1990, pp. 343-345; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1995, pp. 184-185; Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in “Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful,” FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; Yu Yin-taek, Pukan, No. 6, June 1985, pp. 132-141, in “North’s Military Reorganization, Mobilization Analyzed,” JPRS-KAR-85-070, 31 October 1985, pp. 1-9; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 266-267; Yu Yin-taek, Pukan, No. 6, June 1985, pp. 132-141, in “North’s Military Reorganization, Mobilization Analyzed,” JPRS-KAR-85-070, 31 October 1985, pp. 1-9; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Lee Jŏng Hun, “FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game,” Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 10-11.
[8] Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 11; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK” paper presented at the Research Institute on National Security Affairs (RINSA) International Symposium, National Defense University, Seoul, 1 September 1994, p. 24; “Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves,” International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Kim Chun Pŏm, “Pukhan’ŭi Haek-Missile Kisulsujun Ŏddŏn’ga,” Joongang Ilbo, 19 March 1992, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, August 1990, pp. 343-345; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 12; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270; “Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves,” International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Acacemic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
[9] Lee Kyo Kwan, “[NK Report] Pukhan Missile Such’ul Ŏddŏhke Hana?” Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, <http://www.chosun.com/>; Yi Kyo-kwan, “How Does North Korea Export Missiles?” Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, in “DPRK Said to Export Body, Main Parts of Missiles Separately,” FBIS Document ID KPP20020305000112.
[10] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—Iran’s Medium-Range Missiles,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, April 1992, p. 147; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Iran’s Missile Development,” in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: the New Suppliers’ Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 53-55.
[11] Andrew Rathmell with contributions by James Bruce and Harold Hough, “Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report No 6, 1995, p. 20; Kenneth Timmerman, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs,” Mednews, 21 December 1992, pp. 4-5; Tehran Domestic Service, 14 April 1988, in “Radio Phone-In Program with Defense Officials,” FBIS-NES-88-073, 15 April 1988, p. 51.
[12] Lee Chae Hak, “Kkorimunŭn Pukhan Scud Such’ul/Shimsangch’anh’ŭn Taechungdong P’anmaesŏl,” Joongang Ilbo, 13 July 1991, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
[13] Interview with North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 14 December 2001, Seoul.
[14] “Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 8, <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/
statemnt/2002/Schwartz.pdf>; “Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte, USA Nominee for the Position of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea,” April 2002, <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/
statemnt/%202002/April/LaPorte.pdf>.
[15] “US Commander Warns of NK’s Enhanced Missile Capabilities,” Korea Times, 30 April 2002, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/>; “North Korea Possesses 1,000 Ballistic Missiles says Zanini,” Joongang Ilbo, 1 May 2002, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 2002, in “Eighth US Army Commander Reportedly Notes DPRK’s ‘Big Increase’ in Missiles,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020429000092; Yu Yong Wŏn, “[Mi 8 Kunsaryŏnggwan] ‘Pukhan, Kosŏngnŭng Missile 1000 Kiboyu’,” Chosun Ilbo, 29 April 2002, <http://www.chosun.com/>; Sŏng Dong Ki, “‘Puk Missile 1000 Yŏgae Poyu’ Mi 8 Kun SaryOnggwan Palghyŏ,” Donga Ilbo, 29 April 2002, <http://www.donga.com/>; Kim Min Sŏk, “Puk, T’ando Missile 1 Ch’ŏnbal,” Joongang Ilbo, 30 April 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
[16] The question of how North Korea actually developed the Hwasŏng-5 and, hence, the origin of the North Korean missile program, is a controversial one. For a brief alternative explanation to the "reverse-engineering" theory, see Timothy V. McCarthy, "North Korean Ballistic Missile Programs: Soviet and Russian Legacies?" in Michael Barletta, ed., WMD Threats 2001: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration, CNS Occasional Paper No. 6, pp. 9-12, <http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/msl/cap/%5C1>.
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Updated May 2003 |
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