This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
Pakistani officials are seen in North Korea examining a prototype model of the Nodong-1. [Note: This report is unsubstantiated.]
--Bill Gertz, "Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles," Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3.
North Korea imports 35 Styx anti-ship missiles from Russia. [Note: North Korea reportedly ordered the missiles in 1979 but did not receive them after the breakup of the Soviet Union.]
—SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armament and Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Citing US government sources, Japan's Yomiuri Shinbum reports that North Korea will probably be able to develop and deploy its new 1,000km-range missile within two years. According to the report, the missile is called a "Scud-D" or "Nodong-1." The report says that a flight test of the missile in June 1991 failed.
—"Pukhan, Shinhyŏng Missile Kukpigaebal," Joongang Ilbo, 4 January 1992, <http://www.joins.com>.
In testimony before the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, CIA Director Robert Gates states that, "North Korea's [nuclear and ballistic missile] programs are our most urgent national security threat in East Asia. North Korea has invested heavily in the military and depends on arms sales for much of its hard currency earnings." North Korea has sold indigenously produced Scud-Cs to Iran and Syria, and is not far from having a more advanced missile with a range of at least 1,000km (Nodong-1).
—Legislative Report for the 102nd Congress (unofficial), testimony of CIA Director Robert Gates before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, 15 January 1992; Bill Gertz, "Threat Forces N. Korea Ship to return Home with Scuds," Washington Times, 24 January 1992, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
According to Western intelligence sources, Iran and North Korea sign a financial agreement for the development of the Nodong-1 missile. A Pentagon analyst speculates that North Korea will need "a substantial input of foreign technology," especially with regard to guidance technology, in order to complete development of the new missile.
—Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Mednews, 21 December 1992, pp. 4-5; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, vol. 33, no. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >.
According to US administration officials, the North Korean ship Tae Hŭng Ho departs North Korea bound for Syria with an unknown number of Scud-C missiles and associated production or assembly equipment, such as machine tool "parts." The shipment is worth a reported $100 million and is part of an overall missile sale worth $250 million.
—Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Tracks a Korean Ship Taking Missile to Syria," New York Times, 21 February 1992, p. A9; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3; "Pukhan, Scud Missile Syria Ro Susongjung—New York Times Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 22 February 1992, <http://www.joins.com>.
US satellite imagery reveals that North Korea is digging "deep tunnels" around the nuclear complex at Yŏngbyŏn. Some analysts believe this is part of a program to harden the facility against possible South Korean or US attacks. Others believe the tunnels may be part of a program to hide materials or components from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. South Korea's ambassador to the United States, Hyŏn Hong Chu, cites North Korea's extensive missile production as "corroborative evidence" that North Korea is determined to develop nuclear weapons.
—Bill Gertz, "North Korea Digs Tunnels for Nuclear Arms," Washington Times, 21 February 1992, p. A9.
Anatoliy Rubtsov, a Russian solid-state physicist who, according to ITAR-TASS (Russian News Agency), is posing as a Russian government official, begins efforts to recruit strategic weapons specialists in Miass for employment abroad, including in North Korea, offering wages of $1,500 to $4,000 per month. The Russian engineers are sought to "modernize North Korean missiles in a short period of time." The number of Russian specialists eventually involved is at least 60. Ten from this group made an initial visit to North Korea in August 1991.
—Evgeni Tkachenko, "Korea Tried To Employ Russians To Modernise Its Missiles," ITAR-TASS, 10 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
According to a US expert, "the North Korean missile development program proceeded in parallel with the nuclear development program," and "therefore, we assume that a weapon ultimately would be mated with a missile delivery system."
—Don Oberdorfer, "N. Korea Seen Closer To A-Bomb: U.S. Officials Say Weapon Capability May Come in Months," Washington Post, 23 February 1992, pp. A1, A26.
Defense News reports that North Korea has configured the Scud-C to accurately deliver a chemical warhead.
—Dennis Gormley, "Prevent a Ballistic Missile Fire Sale," Defense News, 17 February 1992, pp. 31-32.
The German Sunday paper Welt am Sonntag reports that North Korea and Libya are to build a missile test site as part of an effort to jointly develop a new 1,000km-range intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) based on the Scud missile.
—Hwang Pyong Tae, Hankook Ilbo (Seoul), 17 February 1992, p. 1, in "North Reportedly to Develop Missiles with Libya," JPRS-TND-92-005, 3 March 1992, p. 4.
The Iranian freighter, Iran Salam, which is suspected of carrying North Korean missile-related cargo, is being tracked by US intelligence between Singapore and the Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini.
—Bill Gertz, "Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3.
The North Korean freighter Tae Hŭng Ho docks at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas with what is believed to be a load of Scud-C missiles and missile equipment. The missiles are unloaded and will allegedly be airlifted to Syria. The ship evaded a US naval task force in the Arabian Sea assigned to "dissuade" the ship from delivering its cargo. A report says the shipment includes 24 missiles bound for Syria, and the contract is for North Korea to deliver 150.
—Barton Gellman, "U.S. Failed to Detect Ship," Washington Post, 12 March 1992, pp. A1, A23; Douglas Waller, et al., "Sneaking in the Scuds," Newsweek, 22 June 1992, pp. 42-46; "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to BAe Pull-Out," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31; Im Hang, "Pukhan Taehŭngho Sagŏn Anp'akk/Han'gye Tŭrŏnan Mi Wihyŏp," Kukmin Ilbo, 11 March 1992, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/ >; "Missile Chŏkchae Pukhwamulsŏn/Iran Hang'e Iphang," Joongang Ilbo, 11 March 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The Tae Hŭng Ho departs Bandar Abbas and travels through the Suez Canal to Tartus, Syria, where it reportedly delivers manufacturing equipment for underground Scud missile factories that the United States says Syria is building in Hama and Aleppo. There are two fuel plants at Hama: one liquid-fuel plant for Scud-type missiles and one solid-fuel plant for M-9 type missiles. Other reports indicate that there is a plant near Hama dedicated to guidance systems. The Tae Hŭng Ho cargo off-loaded at Bandar Abbas in Iran is reportedly destined for the Syrian liquid-fuel plant.
—George Lardner Jr., "Probe Ordered in Failure to Track N. Korean Ship," Washington Post, 14 March 1992, p. A17; Douglas Waller, et al., "Sneaking in the Scuds," Newsweek, 22 June 1992, pp. 42-46; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles," Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3; Neal Sandler, "Israeli Concern over Syrian 'Scud' Tests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 August 1992, p. 1; "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to BAe Pull-Out," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31.
The Donga Ilbo reports that the United States is really not sure about the contents of the Tae Hŭng Ho's cargo. According to the South Korean daily, some sources are saying that there have been secret contacts between the United States, North Korea, Iran, and Syria, and that the parties have assured the United States that the ship's cargo does not contain missiles. The report says that Israeli officials told the United States that the ship is transporting missiles, and that US Defense Department officials are intentionally spreading the rumor.
—Nam Ch'an Sun, "Pukhan Hwamulsŏn/Mi Kŏmsaek'anhaettna Mothaettna," Donga Ilbo, 11 March 1992, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
A source in Macao reveals that North Korea has been evading the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) by using an agent in Macao. North Korea is said to be using a Macao branch of the Bank of China and paying in cash to acquire tracking instruments for missiles, underwater communications equipment and night vision goggles. North Korea is said to have spent $100 million on these purchases late last year. [Note: The article uses "ch'ujŏk changch'i," or "tracking," instead of "yudo changch'i," or "guidance."]
—"Pukhan, Macao T'onghae Mugiguip," Joongang Ilbo, 11 March 1992, <http://www.joins.com>.
North Korean Vice President Lee Chong Ok says that the Tae Hŭng Ho does not have missiles in its cargo.
—"'Taehŭngho Scud Anshil'ŏtta'/Lee Chong Ok Pukhan Pujusŏk/Mi'gukjjok Chujang Maengbi'nan," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 13 March 1992, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
The Iran Salam, which US officials believe is carrying Scud missiles from North Korea, docks and unloads its cargo at the Iranian port of Char Bahar.
—"Syria Blasts U.S. Over Missile Affair," Facts on File World News Digest, 2 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Eric Schmitt, "North Korea Ship Delivers to Iran," New York Times, 18 March 1992, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Clark states that North Korea is now the only country selling complete missile systems that exceed Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) parameters to the Third World. He also states that North Korea will most likely test its Nodong-1 missile early this year, and that it may already be trying to make advance sales in the Middle East.
—Statement of Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, Before the Joint Economic Committee Subcommittee on Technology and National Security, 13 March 1992; Reuters, 13 March 1993, in Executive News Service, 16 March 1992.
According to a CNN broadcast, North Korea is assisting in the construction of Scud missile production facilities in Egypt, Iran, Libya, and Syria. North Korea is said to be supporting the construction of a "Scud-D" production facility in Libya.
—"Pukhan, Arab Kukdŭl'e Scud Kongjang Kŏnsŏlchiwŏn," Joongang Ilbo, 14 March 1992, <http://www.joins.com>.
US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney says that the United States has been unable to confirm whether the North Korean ship Tae Hŭng Ho unloaded missiles at an Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. US intelligence officials believe the ship was carrying missiles, but US Navy vessels were never given permission to board the ship.
—"Cheney: U.S. Not Sure if DPRK Ship Carried Scud Missiles," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 17 March 1992, Item No: 0317103, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Puk Missile Sŏn Kangje Susaekhaeya/Mi Chŏ'nŏlchi," Kukmin Ilbo, 18 March 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
The United States announces the imposition of sanctions on Iran and North Korea on grounds that the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and the North Korean firms Ryonggaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Ch'anggwang Credit Corporation have been involved in "missile technology proliferation." The sanctions will last for two years beginning 6 March 1992.
—Federal Register, vol. 57, no. 67, 7 April 1992, pp. 1167-1168.
Russia 1 TV reports that Iraq's medium-range ballistic missiles appear to be Iraqi, but were actually purchased from North Korea and then modified to extend their range. The report does not say when the missiles were transferred or how many were acquired from North Korea.
—"Iraq, Pukhanŭrobut'ŏ Chunggŏri Missile Kumae," Joongang Ilbo, 13 April 1992, <http://www.joins.com>.
Meeting with a Carnegie Endowment delegation visiting Pyongyang from 28 April 1992 to 4 May 1992, North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam states, "Other countries have associated themselves with it [the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)]—why not us? It would be no problem for our country to associate itself with such a regime because we oppose the proliferation of missiles."
—"Preliminary Report: Carnegie Endowment Delegation Visit to Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 28 April 1992– 4 May 1992."
North Korea signs an agreement with the V. P. Makayev engineering design office to develop "a small carrier that would put commercial communications satellites into orbit." The Russian Ministry of General Machine Building and the Ministry of Security allegedly approve the agreement, but 20 Makayev engineers are later stopped at the Sheremetyevo-2 Airport as they attempt to travel to North Korea in December 1992. The design office is to be paid $3 million for the initial period of work, and the engineers are told that the carrier could be manufactured in Russia after completion of its design.
—"Russian Scientists Accused of Wanting to Help North Korea Become a Nuclear Power," Moscow News, 2 April 1993; Daniel Sneider, "The Trail of N. Korea's Nuclear Bid," The Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >.
According to an anonymous high-level source in the US State Department, North Korea has concluded another contract to sell Scud missiles in the Middle East. Furthermore, the source says that North Korea is also trying to reach an agreement to sell the new missile it is developing to the Middle East. However, the source did not reveal the countries in the Middle East.
—"'Pukhan, Chungdong Such'ulyong Shinhyŏng Missile Kaebal'/Mi Kungmubu Kwalli," Segye Ilbo, 31 May 1992, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Pukhan, Shinhyŏng Missile Kaebal/Taejungdong Such'ulyong...Sagŏri 1 Ch'ŏn 5 Baek km," Taehan Maeil, 31 May 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Pukhan, Sae Missile Kaebal/Tae Chungdong Such'ulyong'ŭro," Hankook Ilbo, 31 May 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Pukhan, Taejungdong Such'ulyong Shinhyŏng Missile Kaebal," Joongang Ilbo, 1 June 1992, <http://www.joins.com>.
According to unnamed military sources in Tokyo quoted by the Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun, North Korea conducts an unsuccessful test firing of the Nodong-1 missile. However, the test may have actually been cancelled.
—Reuters, 24 March 1993, in Executive News Service, 24 March 1993; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 186.
The JANA international affairs editor denies a report alleging that Libya is attempting to acquire the Nodong-1 and to establish an indigenous production capability for the missile. [Note: JANA is the official Libyan news agency.]
—JANA (Tripoli), 2 June 1992, in "Report on DPRK 'Nodong-1' Missile Deal Denied," JPRS-TND-92-018, 10 June 1992, pp. 9-10.
North Korea exports a few Nodong-1 prototypes to Iran.
—"Puk, Nodong 1 Ho Iran Chaegong/Sajŏnggŏri 1 Ch'ŏn km Sugi/Mi Ŭihoe Pogosŏ," Chosun Ilbo, 17 July 1993, <http://www.chosun.com>.
The CIA Nonproliferation Center provides information to US policymakers confirming that the cargo delivered by the North Korean ship Tae Hung Ho consisted of "missile manufacturing components" that were subsequently transferred to Syria from Tehran by Syrian aircraft. The shipment is allegedly valued at $100 million. Other information indicates that in exchange for allowing the transshipment, Iran is to be permitted to supply weapons to Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. The deal is enabling Syria to build two missile-propellant production facilities at Hamah; one plant will produce liquid fuel, and the other will produce solid fuel.
—Bill Gertz, "Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles," Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3; Terrence Kiernan, "N. Korea Considers Scud Export Boost," Defense News, 26 April-2 May 1993, p. 3.
North Korean Deputy Premier Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam visits Syria (27-30 July), Iran (30 July-3 August), and Pakistan (4-7 August). Missile cooperation and North Korean sales of the Hwasŏng-6 and possibly Nodong missiles are on the agenda.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.
Syria conducts two tests of Scud-C missiles acquired from North Korea via Iran. North Korean military personnel are present in Syria for the tests. Israel claims that these tests are the last tests before the missile becomes operational.
—Bill Gertz, "Israelis Say Syrians Test-Fired New Scud," Washington Times, 14 August 1992, p. A25; Neal Sandler, "Israeli Concern over Syrian 'Scud' Tests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 August 1992, p. 11; "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to Bar Pull-Out," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31; Allison Kaplan and David Makovsky, "Rabin Blasts Proposed US Arms Sales to Saudis: PM Rejected US Deal," Jerusalem Post, 13 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >; "Syria, Ch'oech'ŏmdan Missile Saengsandan'gye/Israel Chŏn'yŏk Sajŏng'gwŏn'e," Chosun Ilbo, 14 August 1992, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Pukhanje Scud Missile/Syria, Shilhŏmbalsa Sŏnggong," Donga Ilbo, 14 August 1992, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korean deputy Premier Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam travels to Pakistan, where missile cooperation and the Nodong missile are on the agenda.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 21.
North Korean engineers are said to be assisting Syria with the construction of two Scud-C production plants. Reports say one plant will produce missiles and the other will produce guidance equipment.
—"'Pukhan'gisulchadŭl Chiwŏn Syria, Missile Saengsan'/Pul Pigaroji Podo," Segye Ilbo, 16 August 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Scud Saengsan'gongjang Kŏnsŏl/Syria, Pukhan Toumbada," Hankook Ilbo, 16 August 1992, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Vladimir Usachev leads 10 Russian scientists from the Machine Design Bureau in Miass [Makeyev Design Bureau] on a visit to North Korea to hold discussions on "modernizing North Korean missiles" and "investigate the potential working situation." One of the scientists later says, "The Koreans wanted us to teach, to train students about durability, pressure, dynamics...they never talked about nuclear weapons, about missiles." The plan is to have the scientists work in a "research institute." Some of the scientists are specialists in missile design and production, as well as warhead production. Anatoliy Rubtsov began to recruit the strategic weapons specialists in February 1992.
—Evgeni Tkachenko, "Korea Tried To Employ Russians To Modernise Its Missiles," ITAR-TASS, 10 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Yevgeniy Tkachenko, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 10 February 1993, in "DPRK Reportedly Sought Russian Scientists to Modernize Missiles," FBIS-SOV-93-026, 10 February 1993, pp 11-12; Daniel Sneider, "The Trail of N. Korea's Nuclear Bid," Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Chŏng Ju Yŏng, presidential candidate of the United People's Party and honorary chairman of the Hyundai Group, says that North Korea has completed the development of its 1,000km-range ballistic missile. Chŏng makes the comments following a luncheon on the 23rd with General Riscassi and other military officials at Suwŏn Airbase, where they discussed North Korea's missile capabilities.
—"Pukhan, Sajŏnggŏri 1 Ch'ŏn km Missile Kaebal—Kungmin Chung Taepyo Palgyŏ," Joongang Ilbo, 24 August 1992, <http://www.joins.com/>.
About 10 Russian nuclear physicists are prevented from traveling to North Korea.
—Yonhap News Agency, 21 December 1992, in "Scientists Barred From Leaving Moscow," JPRS-TND-93-002, 15 January 1993, p. 6.
According to the Chelyabinski Rabochij newspaper, more than 60 Russian researchers attempt to leave for North Korea, but they are detained at the Sheremetyevo-2 Airport near Moscow. The group includes more than 40 researchers from the Machine Design Bureau in Miass. The paper quoted officials in the Russian security ministry as saying the group is capable of designing a nuclear warhead for a missile. The Christian Science Monitor later reports the number of scientists is 64. The Hankook Ilbo later reports the engineers are nuclear specialists that have been approached to design a nuclear warhead for ballistic missiles.
—ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 February 1993, in "Defense Workers Reportedly Tried to Go to DPRK," JPRS-TND-93-005, 12 February 1993, pp. 14-15; Daniel Sneider, "The Trail of N. Korea's Nuclear Bid," Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >; "Pukhanhaeng Rŏ Kwahakcha/Haekt'anjejo Chŏnmun'ga/Rŏ Ilganji Podo," Hankook Ilbo, 9 February 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Rŏ Kukpangyŏn'guwŏn 60 Myŏng/Changnyŏn 10 Wŏl Ipkuk Shido," Kukmin Ilbo, 5 February 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Yonhap News Agency, quoting Komsomolskaya Pravda (Communist Youth's Truth), reports that 36 Russian engineers, many of them rocket specialists, are detained at Sheremetievo Airport near Moscow as they attempt to go to North Korea. The engineers were recruited by Anatoly Rubtsov, a Russian solid-state physicist and member of North Korea's Academy of Sciences, after North Koreans approached Rubtsov at a Beijing seminar in April 1991. Nevertheless, the Yonhap News Agency report says more than 20 Russian scientists have made their way to North Korea via China by April 1994. The engineers and scientists are paid $3,000-4,000 a month, and others are said to be providing information to North Korea through e-mail.
—Yonhap News Agency, 23 April 1994, in "Russian Scientists Assisting DPRK in Nuclear Program," JPRS-TND-94-011, 16 May 1994, pp. 51-52.
A group of Israeli officials, including Foreign Ministry Deputy Director General Eitan Bentsur, visits Pyongyang, where he is given assurances that in exchange for economic assistance, North Korea will not sell missiles. According to one report, North Korea invited Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to visit at this time, but he declined. North Korean representatives also reportedly request assistance in mining gold. Israel offers to help raise $1 billion in funds for foreign investment from American Jews if North Korea would stop its plans to export Nodong missiles to Iran.
—Korea Times, 16 June 1993, p. 2, in "Seoul 'Concerned' With Israel-DPRK Contacts," FBIS-EAS-93-114, 16 June 1993, p. 20; Kim Yong Kol, Hankook Ilbo, 16 June 1991, p. 4, in "Israel Makes Gesture to North Korea for Improvement of Relations," FBIS-EAS-93-114, 16 June 1993, p. 20; Jon B. Wolfsthal, "U.S. Prods Israel to Halt Talks With North Korea on Missile Sales," Arms Control Today, September 1993, p. 24; Steve Rodan, "All Eyes Are On Israel's North Korean Connection," Jerusalem Post, 25 March 1994, p. 3B, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >; Abraham Rabinovich, "Surly Pyongyang warms up to Jerusalem," Jerusalem Post, 18 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >.
The South Korean Ministry of National Defense releases its Defense White paper 1992-1993. According to the ministry, North Korea has the capacity to produce more than 100 Scud missiles per year and has exported an improved version of the Scud to countries in the Middle East, such as Iran. The report also says that North Korea has developed a new ballistic missile, the so-called Nodong, with a range of 1,000km.
—The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, Defense White paper 1992-1993 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, October 1992), p. 72.
Russian security officials prevent 64 Russian scientists from traveling to "another country that had hoped to use them to create missile systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads." Russian Security Minister Viktor Barannikov makes this comment in an address before the Russian legislature in early December 1992.
—"Paper: Russia Stopped Weapons Experts on Jet To North Korea," Associated Press, 19 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Russians Detain Atomic Experts Headed for North Korea: Report," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Japan's Sankei Shimbun reports that North Korea has begun a search for a country that will test its new 1,000km ballistic missile. North Korea is unable to test the missile to its full range because of geographic constraints.
—"Pukhan, Sajŏng 1 Ch'ŏn km Missile Shilhŏmjangso Mulsaek—Sankei Shinmun Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 14 October 1992, <http://www.joins.com/>.
A group of 32 Russian engineers planning to fly to North Korea to assist in the modernization of ballistic missiles is intercepted by Russian police at Moscow International Sheremetyevo-2 Airport. Most of the engineers were from the Makeyev Design Bureau in Miass, which is responsible for submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and Scud tactical ballistic missiles. The recruiting agent was Anatoliy Rubtsov, a Russian posing as a government official, who was actually employed by North Korea.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 21 December 1992, in "Missile Technicians Held in Moscow," JPRS-TND-93-001, 7 January 1993, p. 6; UPI, 10 February 1993, in Executive News Service, 10 February 1993; Evgeniy Tkachenko, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 24 February 1993, in "Missile Designers Explain Attempt to Work in DPRK," FBIS-SOV-93-035, 24 February 1993, pp. 11-12; Steven Zaloga, "Russian Reports," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1993, p. 17.
A North Korean ship laden with up to 100 Scud-C missiles departs North Korea, likely bound for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas; half of the delivery is to be transported overland to Syria, the other half is to go to Iran.
—Charles Fenyvesi, ed., "Washington Whispers: North Korea Sends Another Scud Cargo to Iran, Syria," US News & World Report, 9 November 1992, p. 30.
Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy Director-General Eitan Bentsur reportedly meets in secret with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to protest North Korea's Scud-C missile sales to Syria.
—David Makovsky, "Top Diplomat Secretly Visits North Korea," The Jerusalem Post, 5 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >; Leslie Susser, "Peres: Korea-Bound?" The Jerusalem Post, 15 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >; "Israel-Pukhan Su'gyo Pimilchŏpch'ok," Hankook Ilbo, 5 November 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/ >; "Puk Israel Pimilhoedam/Su'gyonon'ŭi Kanŭngsŏng," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 5 November 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/ >.
North Korea supplies Iran with 220 Scud missiles, and a few early model Nodong missiles.
—"Puk, Nodong 1 Ho Iran Chaegong/Sajŏnggŏri 1 Ch'ŏn km Sugi/Mi Ŭihoe Pogoso," Chosun Ilbo, 17 July 1993, <http://www.chosun.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 16 July 1993, in "U.S. Report on DPRK-Iran Missile Deal Cited," FBIS-EAS-93-138, 21 July 1993, p. 33.
A second group of Russian missile technicians is stopped from flying to North Korea. This group brings the total number of missile technicians detained to 64.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 21 December 1992, in "Missile Technicians Held in Moscow," JPRS-TND-93-001, 7 December 1993, p. 6.
Kim Tal Hyŏn leads a delegation to Iran for the signing of a military agreement worth several hundred million dollars to develop a new missile that is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The agreement stipulates that Iran will provide North Korea with $500 million to "jointly develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles." The agreement also provides for missile flight tests in Iran and the cooperation of Libya in the acquisition of Western electronics systems from Libya's al-Fatah program. The al-Fatah program is reported to have the support of German firms and technical experts.
—"Puk, Nodong 1 Ho Iran Chaegong/Sajŏnggŏri 1 Ch'ŏn km Sugi/Mi Ŭihoe Pogoso," Chosun Ilbo, 17 July 1993, http://www.chosun.com; Yonhap News Agency, 16 July 1993, in "U.S. Report on DPRK-Iran Missile Deal Cited," FBIS-EAS-93-138, 21 July 1993, p. 33.
Twenty members of the V. P. Makayev engineering design office are detained at the Sheremtyevo-2 Airport when they attempt to travel to North Korea. The group is supposed to work on a rocket code-named "Zyb," and the contract was supposedly offered at the end of 1992. The details of the project were not clear, but according to one of the engineers, there was "talk about developing a small carrier that would put a commercial communications satellite in orbit." The Russian Ministry of General Machine Building and the Ministry of Security allegedly approve the invitation for the engineers to work in North Korea. For the initial period of the contract, the design office was to be paid $3 million. The engineers were told that the design office could receive an order to manufacture the carrier in Russia upon the completion of its design.
—"Russian Scientists Accused of Wanting to Help North Korea Become a Nuclear Power," Moscow News, 2 April 1993; Chang Haeng Hun, "Puk Ch'wiŏpkido Rŏ Kwahakcha Interview/Moscow News Podo," Donga Ilbo, 1 April 1993, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Russia Ch'ulshin Kwahakcha Puk Missile Chejoch'amyŏ," Joongang Ilbo, 1 April 1993, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea invites Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to North Korea to discuss aid in exchange for abandoning its missile program. On 14 June 1993, Peres says that he wants to visit North Korea to dissuade them from selling missiles to Iran.
—Korea Times, 16 June 1993, p. 2, in "Seoul 'Concerned' with Israel-DPRK Contacts," FBIS-EAS-93-114, 16 June 1993, p. 20.
Russian special forces board a jet before it is to take off from a Moscow airport and arrest 36 "senior weapons scientists" as they attempt to travel to North Korea. The scientists are said to be from a "number of nuclear weapons research institutes, including the top secret Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 facilities in the Urals." North Korea offered to pay the scientists between $1,500 and $3,000 a month.
—Matthew Campbell, "Russians Storm Jet to Stop Korean Bomb," Sunday Times, 20 December 1992; "Paper: Russia Stopped Weapons Experts on Jet To North Korea," Associated Press, 19 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Russians Detain Atomic Experts Headed for North Korea: Report," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; KBS-1 Radio (Seoul), 20 December 1992, in "Pyongyang Attempt to Hire Russian Scientists," FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, p. 32; Yonhap News Agency, 21 December 1992, in "Plans to Recruit Nuclear Scientists," FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, p. 32; Yonhap News Agency, 21 December 1992, in "Hong Kong Paper Cited," FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, pp. 32-33; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 21 December 1992, in "Missile Technicians Held in Moscow," JPRS-TND-93-001, 7 January 1993, p. 6; Ostankino Television First Channel Network (Moscow), 2 April 1993, in "Controls Stepped Up to Halt Scientists Leaving for DPRK," FBIS-SOV-93-064, 6 April 1993, pp. 27-28; "Puk-Rŏ Oe'gyo'mach'alshimhwa/Missile Chŏnmun'ga Ch'ulguk/Russia Chŏngbu Chŏjiro," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 26 January 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Rŏ Pukhan Oe'gyo'mach'al Shimhwa/ Missile Chŏnmun'ga P'yŏngyanghaengjŏji Panbal," Taehan Maeil, 26 January 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Puk Russia Oe'gyo'mach'al Shimhwa/Rŏ Missile Chŏnmun'ga PukhanHaeng Kŭmjissago Taerip," Joongang Ilbo, 25 Janaury 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea denies recent reports of Russian scientists attempting to travel to North Korea to assist with its nuclear and missile development programs.
—Korean Central News Agency, 25 December 1992, in "Reports Labeled as 'Rumor'," JPRS-TND-93-002, 15 January 1993, p. 6.
Iran is attempting to extend the range of the Silkworm missile to 400km at a Silkworm assembly facility near Bandar Abbas. Iran began to assemble Silkworm missiles here in 1988 under Chinese supervision.
—Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Mednews, 21 December 1992, pp. 4-5.
According to Im Yŏng Sŏn, a former North Korean Army lieutenant who defected to South Korea on 11 August 1993, North Korea executes 10 general officers for a failed coup attempt. According to Im, the Security Bureau of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces discovered the coup plans.
—Yonhap News Agency, 24 August 1993, in "Defector Claims DPRK Coup Attempt, Executions," FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23; Jon Swain, "Crisis in the Land of Fear," Sunday Times, 5 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >; Terry McCarthy, "North Korea 'Coup' Fuels Security Fears; Defector's Story of Failed Military Takeover Adds to Speculation over Pyongyang's Regional Ambitions," The Independent, 26 August 1993, p. 15, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >.
According to the German news agency ADN, the freighter MS Waalhaven is seized on its way to Syria from Hamburg. In Sicily, German experts board the ship and discover 27 crates of German "machine parts" that were to be delivered to a North Korean firm involved in the export of North Korean Scud-C missiles. The shipment is said to include at least one flow forming machine without special mandrels, a revetting machine, and equipment for salt bath hardening. All of the equipment is dual use, but together it appears to be applicable for ballistic missile production. There are reportedly four German firms involved with the shipment, and two are requested "to distance themselves from further deliveries."
—PRAP confidential interview data, ADN News Agency, 16 January 1993, in "North Korea: German Firms Allegedly Involved in Syrian-North Korean Weapon Production," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>. Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Agency) reports that North Korea commissioned three international shipping companies to transport "special metals" acquired on Berlin's gray market for the production of missile "launch pads," and that the materials have been shipped.
—Focus (Munich), 22 March 1993, p. 15, in FBIS-WEU-93-053, "BND Reports DPRK Purchases Missile Materials," 22 March 1993, p. 6.
