This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1992
According to Im Yŏng Sŏn, a former North Korean Army lieutenant who defected to South Korea on 11 August 1993, North Korea attempts to hide a dismantled nuclear reactor from IAEA inspectors. Im says he heard that hundreds of North Korean engineers died in the underground accident.
—“2 N. Korean Missile Bases Allegedly Target Japan,” Jiji Press, 24 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 24 August 1993, in “Defector Claims DPRK Coup Attempt, Executions,” FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23; Kim Hŭi Ch’ŏl, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 August 1993, in “Says Long-Range Missile Bases Built,” FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23.

6 January 1992
North Korean Ambassador Chŏn In Chan informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement before the end of January 1992.
—“Investigation into German – Korean Link,” Nuclear Engineering International, James Varley, ed., February 1992, vol. 37, no. 451, pp. 7-8.

6 January 1992
US President George Bush and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announce that they will cancel the Team Spirit joint military exercises if North Korea “fulfills its obligation” to the IAEA and South Korea for inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—David E. Sanger, “In Nuclear Deal, Seoul Halts War Game with U.S.,” New York Times, 7 January 1992, p. A8.

7 January 1992
North Korea formally expresses its intention to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korean Ambassador Chŏn In Ch’an says Pyongyang will sign the agreement by the end of the month.
—Paul Shin, “North Korea To Sign Nuclear Safeguards,” Associated Press, 7 January 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Pukhan, Chunae Haekhyŏpchŏng Sŏ’myŏng/Chu Austria Taesa Onŭl Palp’yohaltŭt,” Chosun Ilbo, 7 January 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Im Tong Myŏng, “Puk, Wŏlmal Haekhyŏpchŏng Sŏ’myŏng/Chuodaesa Hoeg’yŏn/Sach’alshigi IAEA Hyŏb’ŭi Kyŏlchŏng,” Chosun Ilbo, 8 January 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “Haekkyŏpchŏng 29~30 Ilkke Sŏ’myŏng/Chubin Pukhandaesa Hoe’gyŏn,” Segye Ilbo, 8 January 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

7 January 1992
South Korea’s Ministry of Defense announces that the joint military exercise Team Spirit will be cancelled this year.
—“‘Team Spirit’ Chungji/Kukpangbu Palp’yo/Pukch’ŭk ‘Haeksŏ’myŏng-Sach’alsuyong’ Allyŏwa,” Taehan Maeil, 8 January 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

21 January 1992
US-North Korean high-level political meetings commence at the US Mission to the United Nations in New York. The North Korean delegation is headed by Korea Workers Party Secretary for International Affairs Kim Yong Sun. The US delegation is lead by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter. Kanter’s “talking points” have been approved in advance by a US State Department interagency committee, as well as by the South Korean and Japanese governments. These points include urging North Korea to permit IAEA inspections and to give up its nuclear weapons option. North Korea responds by agreeing to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 266-267.

30 January 1992
North Korea signs the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korea’s Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy Industry Hong Gŭn P’yo says that North Korea will abide by the agreement fully. [Note: North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly does not ratify the agreement until 9 April 1992. The IAEA inspections process comprises four distinct phases. The first requires North Korea to submit an official report of its existing nuclear facilities. During the second phase, the IAEA will conduct a series of ad hoc inspections to verify the aforementioned list, as well as gather some initial data about the nuclear program. Third, North Korea and the IAEA will sign various subsidiary agreements and attachments to the accord describing inspection procedures for specific facilities. And fourth, the IAEA will begin routine inspections designed to ensure that the nuclear facilities are not being used for military purposes.]
—Steven R. Weisman, “North Korea Signs Accord on Atom-Plant Inspections,” New York Times, 31 January 1992, p. 2; Ken Olsen, “North Korea Signs International Nuclear Accord, But Concerns Remain,” Associated Press, 30 January 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “‘Pukhan Haeksach’al’ Ŭddŏn Chŏlch’a Palbna/Palhyo 30 Illae Hyŏnhwangbogo Ŭimu,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, 30 January 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Im Tong Myŏng, “Pukhan, Ŏje Haekhyŏpchong Sŏ’myŏng/Puktaep’yo ‘1 Nyŏnnae Pijun’,” Chosun Ilbo, 31 January 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

February 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix presents his three-year campaign to achieve “universal adherence to treaties blocking additional countries from obtaining nuclear weapons” to the UN Security Council.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.N. Agency Launches Drive to Halt Nuclear Proliferation,” Washington Post, 18 February 1992, p. A14.

February 1992
US satellite imagery reveals that North Korea is digging “deep tunnels” around the nuclear complex in Yŏngbyŏn. Some analysts believe this is part of a program to harden the facility against possible South Korean or US attacks. Others believe the tunnels may be part of a program to hide materials or components from IAEA inspectors. South Korea’s ambassador to the United States, Hyŏn Hong Chu, cites North Korea’s extensive missile production as “corroborative evidence” that North Korea is determined to develop nuclear weapons.
—Bill Gertz, “North Korea Digs Tunnels for Nuclear Arms,” Washington Times, 21 February 1992, p. A9.

February 1992
According to a US expert, “the North Korean missile development program proceeded in parallel with the nuclear development program,” and “therefore, we assume that a weapon ultimately would be mated with a missile delivery system.” Some Bush administration officials believe North Korea may be only months away from acquiring a nuclear bomb. Some also believe that North Korea might export it.
—Dan Oberdorfer, “N. Korea Seen Closer To A-Bomb; U.S. Officials Say Weapon Capability May Come in Months,” Washington Post, 23 February 1992, pp. A1, A26.

February 1992
Nuclear Engineering International reports that, following a tip-off from the CIA, the German BND intelligence service is investigating engineering company Leybold AG for allegedly supplying five specialized industrial furnaces to North Korea for use in its suspected nuclear weapons program. Two furnaces are electron beam furnaces, two are “laboratory furnaces,” and the fifth is described as a “small laboratory furnace.” The BND suspects that the first four furnaces reached North Korea via India or Pakistan while the fifth is believed to have arrived through East Germany.
—“Investigation into German – Korean Link,” Nuclear Engineering International, James Varley, ed., February 1992, vol. 37, no. 451, pp. 7-8.

3 February 1992
North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Pak Kil Yŏn says that North Korea will likely ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement within six months.
—“North Korea Says It Will Allow Nuclear Inspections Soon,” Associated Press, 3 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 1992
North Korea officially approves the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” that was signed by the North and South Korean Prime Ministers in December 1991.
—“Nambuk Pihaekhwasŏn’ŏn/Pukhan, Kongshikchŏk Sŭng’in,” Joongang Ilbo, 6 February 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

Mid-February 1992
US officials meet with North Korean diplomats in Beijing. It is believed that the United States informs North Korea that it has until June 1992 to accept international inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—Edward Neilan, “U.S. Gives Ultimatum to N. Korea on Nukes,” Washington Times, 25 February 1992, p. A8; Kelley Smith Tunney, “Sources: U.S. Urges June Deadline in Nuclear Dispute,” Associated Press, 24 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic University, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 February 1992
The North Korean Standing Committee agrees that the IAEA safeguards agreement should be ratified.
—Gamini Seneviratne, “Inspections Could Start in June, North Korean Envoy Tells IAEA,” Nucleonics Week, 27 February 1992, p. 6.

24 February 1992
Douglas H. Paal, a senior advisor to President George Bush, meets with South Korean government officials to discuss North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program. He announces that the United States has set June 1992 as the deadline for North Korea to open its nuclear facilities to international inspections. US Congressman Stephen Solarz suggests that the United States may have to use force to coerce North Korea to allow international inspections. In a commentary printed in Rodong Sinmun, North Korea writes off Congressman Solarz’s remarks as “absurd remarks” meant to aggravate tension over the nuclear issue.
—Edward Neilan, “U.S. Gives Ultimatum to N. Korea on Nukes,” Washington Times, 25 February 1992, p. A8; Kelley Smith Tunney, “Sources: U.S. Urges June Deadline in Nuclear Dispute,” Associated Press, 24 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 24 February 1992, in “North Korea Condemns US Congressman’s “Gibberish” on Nuclear Inspection,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 1992
An IAEA official announces that the IAEA is close to reaching an agreement with North Korea to allow a team of experts to visit North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Although North Korea has not ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement, O Ch’ang Rim, North Korean Ambassador to the IAEA, says, “There is no possibility that it will be rejected.” O says that North Korea will ratify the agreement in early April and inspections will probably be able to begin in June.
—Rupert Cornwell and Michael Wise, “Pyongyang ‘Months off Nuclear Bomb’,” The Independent (London), 26 February 1992, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “‘Puk 4 Wŏl Haekpijun-6 Wŏlbut’ŏ Sach’al’/Pukhandaep’yo Ilchŏng Ch’ŏt Konggae,” Joongang Ilbo, 26 February 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

25 February 1992
CIA Director Robert Gates announces that North Korea’s nuclear program is so advanced that it could produce a nuclear weapon in as little as two months. Speaking to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Gates claims that North Korea is already operating a nuclear facility with the apparent sole purpose of producing plutonium, and a fuel reprocessing plant capable of separating weapon-grade plutonium is nearing completion.
—Rupert Cornwell and Michael Wise, “Pyongyang ‘Months off Nuclear Bomb,’” The Independent (London), 26 February 1992, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, “N. Koreans to Have Bomb in Months, CIA Warns,” Vancouver Sun, 26 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 1992
The IAEA Board of Governors reaffirms its right to conduct special inspections of undeclared nuclear sites. It says that inspections will only occur on “rare occasions.” The IAEA has not yet performed such an inspection. IAEA spokesman David Kyd announces that the Board has agreed on a plan that requires all nations with full-scope safeguards agreements to begin submitting preliminary designs of nuclear facilities to the IAEA once the decision to construct them is made. At its next meeting in June 1992, the Board will discuss a plan for mandatory reporting of imports and exports of nuclear material and sensitive non-nuclear equipment.
—Michael J. Wise, “UN Agency Tightens Rules for Nuclear Inspections,” The Independent (London), 27 February 1992, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 February 1992
A “US official” says that “large trucks have been ‘hauling things away’ from a facility that US intelligence officials believe is designed to make plutonium.” [Note: This is probably a reference to the “Radiochemistry Laboratory” in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]
— R. Jeffrey Smith, “N. Koreans Accused of Arms Ploy; Trucks Reported Hauling From A-Site,” Washington Post, 28 February 1992, p. A29, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 1992
According to North Korean Ambassador to IAEA O Ch’ang Rim, international inspectors may start examining North Korean nuclear facilities by May 1992. The United States believes that North Korea is removing items from its plutonium production facility. —R. Jeffrey Smith, “North Koreans Accused of Arms Ploy; Trucks Reported Hauling From A-Sit,” Washington Post, 28 February 1992, p. A29.

3 March 1992
While talking with South Korean soldiers, US Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg
suggests that North Korea might be relocating nuclear installations from Yŏngbyŏn-kun. Gregg states, “Some satellite pictures show trucks and trains coming in and out of Yŏngbyŏn. It would be easier to hide things in North Korea than in Iraq.”
— Cayman Kim, “U.S. Steps Up Pressure on N. Korean Nuclear Plan,” Japan Economic Newswire, 7 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 1992
During a three-day visit to Seoul, US Assistant Secretary of Defense James Lilley says that the UN may have to become involved if North Korea does not allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities by June. In a meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok, Lilley reiterates the US position that it will not remove any troops from the Korean Peninsula until North Korea resolves the issue of nuclear inspections. He also claims that North Korea should allow South Korea inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—“Seoul Accuses North Korea of Stalling Nuclear Inspections,” Associated Press, 4 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cayman Kim, “U.S. Steps Up Pressure on N. Korean Nuclear Plan,” Japan Economic Newswire, 7 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 March 1992
North Korea announces that its Supreme People’s Assembly will ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement in April 1992. North Korean Ambassador to IAEA, O Chang Rim, says that international inspections will begin “most probably at the beginning of June 1992.”
—“North Prepares to Ratify Nuclear Safeguards Accord; Denounces U.S.,” Associated Press (Tokyo), 8 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Asia’s Powerful Upstarts,” The Economist, 14 March 1992, p. 47; “Pukhan Naedal 8 Il Haekpijun/Chung’angt’ongshin Podo,” Kukmin Ilbo, 9 March 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

11 March 1992
In a press release given at the United Nations, North Korea reiterates that it has “neither the capacity nor the intention to develop nuclear weapons.” North Korea also states that it will ratify the nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA and allow inspectors at the earliest possible date. —“DPRK Reaffirms Stand on Nuke Weapons,” Xinhua News Agency, 11 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 March 1992
North and South Korea reach an agreement to conduct mutual inspections of their nuclear facilities. The agreement, reached after three months of negotiations at the border village of Panmunjom, marks the first time North Korea accepts a specific timeframe for the implementation of inter-Korean nuclear inspections. The agreement stipulates that the two countries will create a Joint Nuclear Control Commission on 19 March at which they will “make joint efforts” to work out the details and procedures for mutual inspections by 19 May. According to the agreement, the two countries will commence mutual inspections within 20 days of finalizing a document on the procedures.
—“Two Koreas Vow To Check Each Other’s Nuclear Facilities,” Japan Economic Newswire, 14 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “South Korea Signs Nuclear Accord; North To Sign,” Associated Press, 16 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 March 1992
Quoting a 1990 top secret KGB document submitted by Former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Russian Weekly Argumenty I Fackty reports that in 1990, the KGB received reliable information that North Korea had successfully developed a nuclear detonative device at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. The KGB document also stated that all nuclear development was conducted under the direct command of Kim Jong Il.
—“1990 KGB Report Hints N. Korea Completed Nuclear Bomb,” Japan Economic Newswire, 15 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-March 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix says, “In a place like North Korea with no nuclear power stations, it’s hard to see a legitimate use for a reprocessing plant. It’s also hard to see, anywhere, a legitimate economic reason for building uranium enrichment plants. Adding such capacity adds to the proliferation risk.”
—Tom Wilkie, “Inspectors on Korean Bomb Hunt,” The Independent (London), 22 March 1992, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 March 1992
The United States informs North Korea that it will impose sanctions if North Korea does not allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. The United States and South Korea believe that North Korea is stalling inspections in order to move its nuclear facilities underground. According to the United States, several convoys of trucks have left Yŏngbyŏn.
—“Sanctions Threat to North Korea on Nuclear Arms,” Daily Telegraph (London), 17 March 1992, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 March 1992
South Korea announces that it will urge North Korea to accept expanded powers of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) when the commission convenes for the first time on 19 March. South Korea wants the JNCC to be able to conduct forced inspections of facilities suspected of hiding nuclear-related material or technology even if the facility is not declared.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 March 1992, in “South Korea Wants Forced Inspection of North’s Nuclear Sites,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 March 1992
During a visit to Seoul, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev confirms that Russia has halted all financial and technical support to North Korea for nuclear plants.
—“Kozyrev Asks Japan-Russia Cooperation on N. Korea Nukes,” Japan Economic Newswire, 21 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Hallŏ Puk Haeksach’al Kongdongnoryŏk/Oemuhoedam/Uhojoyak Yeltsin Panghanddae Ch’e’gyŏl,” Donga Ilbo, 28 March 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

19 March 1992
North and South Korea hold the first meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) at Panmunjon. The commission, consisting of seven delegates from each country, is headed by North Korean Foreign Ministry Ambassador at large Ch’oe U Jin and South Korean Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security Chancellor Kong Ro Myŏng. At the meeting, South Korea presents a proposal calling for regular inspections of declared nuclear sites in addition to challenge inspections of undeclared sites. The North Korean proposal focuses on getting international guarantees for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and calls for inspections of US military bases located in South Korea. The two sides fail to reach an agreement on the procedures of mutual inspection and decide to meet again on 1 April.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 March 1992, in “First Inter-Korean Nuclear Control Committee Meeting Reveals ‘Divergent Views’,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Joint Nuclear Control Commission Formed,” Xinhua News Agency, 19 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 March 1992, in “South Korea Wants Forced Inspection of North’s Nuclear Sites,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 March 1992
According to South Korean Prime Minister Chŏng Wŏn Shik, the issue surrounding international inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities cannot be resolved solely through pressuring North Korea; countries must also engage Pyongyang through dialogue.
—“Japan, S. Korea Agree More Top-Level Talks Necessary,” Japan Economic Newswire, 26 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

April 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs North Korea that if it does not declare its “radiochemical facility,” he will request the UN Security Council to demand special inspections of the site. [Note: This is a reference to the “Radiochemistry Laboratory.”]
—Ann Maclachlan, "Noth Korea Files Initial Report With IAEA; Declares Reprocessing Facility," Nucleonics Week, 7 May 1992, pp. 8-9.

1 April 1992
North and South Korea hold the second meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). South Korean Co-Chairman Kong Ro Myŏng claims that South Korea cannot accept the North Korean demand that in return for inspections at its facility in Yŏngbyŏn, North Korean inspectors should have full access to US military bases located in South Korea. Kong says, “We have already offered the North a comprehensive idea on mutual nuclear inspection that the North could easily agree to if only it really meant to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.”
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 April 1992, in “South Korea Loses Interest in Pilot Nuclear Inspection,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 April 1992
North Korea’s envoy to the United Nations, Han Shi Hae, informs Japanese reporters that North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) will ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement soon.
—“Jiang and Miyazawa Go Bump,” The Economist, 11 April 1992, pp. 31, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 April 1992
North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly ratifies the IAEA safeguards agreement. According to IAEA regulations, North Korea is required to allow international inspections of its facilities within 90 days. It is also required to list all of its nuclear facilities within 30 days of the last day of the month after it ratifies the safeguards agreement. William Dirks, IAEA Deputy Director General, says that the IAEA will go to the UN Security Council if North Korea fails to list all of its nuclear facilities for inspection.
—Mark Hibbs, “Pyongyang Still Not Reporting Reprocessing Unit at Yŏngbyŏn,” Nucleonics Week, 23 April 1992, pp. 15-16; David E. Sanger, “North Korea Assembly Backs Atom Pact,” New York Times, 10 April 1992, p. A3.

10 April 1992
North Korea presents the safeguards agreement to IAEA Director General Hans Blix at the Agency’s headquarters in Vienna.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 267; “‘6 Wŏlbut’ŏ Haeksach’al Patketta’/ Pukhan Chŏn In Ch’an Taesa,” Segye Ilbo, 12 April 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

11 April 1992
The Korean Central News Agency reports that Russian scientists have assisted North Korea’s Institute of Atomic Energy in constructing a nuclear cyclotron, a device used for accelerating and separating charged subatomic particles.
—“Russia Helped Build North Korea’s Nuclear Cyclotron: KCNA,” Agence France Presse,” 11 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 April 1992
In a rare interview with an American reporter, North Korean President Kim Il Sung claims that North Korea “does not have any nuclear weapons . . . And, what is more, we don’t need nuclear weapons.” He also says that North Korea is willing to receive international inspectors at its nuclear facilities and all that needs to be arranged is the procedural formality of informing the IAEA.
—Mark Lerner, “Leaders Rethink Isolation to Ease Economic Binds,” Washington Times, 15 April 1992, p. A11; “‘We Don’t Need Nuclear Weapons’,” Washington Times, 15 April 1992, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 April 1992
According to Ch’oe Chong Sun, head of the North Korean Ministry of Atomic Energy’s Foreign Affairs Bureau, three nuclear facilities in North Korea will be opened for international inspection. The facilities include a 5MW research reactor built in 1986, and the 50MW and 200MW reactors, which are currently under construction. Ch’oe denies that North Korea has a reprocessing plant. On 9 April, IAEA Director General Hans Blix suggested that if North Korea does not declare the facility, “then the [IAEA] can turn to the United Nations Security Council for help.”
—Bill Lamp, “N. Korea Says It Is Studying A-Bomb Process,” United Press International, 14 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Tamotsu Tsukuda, “North Korea to Open 3 N-Plants to IAEA Checks,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 April 1992, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, “North Korea Assembly Backs Atom Pact,” New York Times, 10 April 1992, p. A3.

Mid-April 1992
North Korean television shows parts of the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex and reports that three nuclear plants will be open for IAEA inspections. The report, however, denies that there is a reprocessing plant at the complex.
—Nate Thayer, “Leader Kim Feted for Birthday; Reportedly Wants to Open U.S. Embassy,” Associated Press, 15 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1992
A meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) between North and South Korea breaks down without even an agreement on when to meet next. According to a South Korean official, the North Korean delegation “opposed our offer for inspections based on reciprocity and demanded unilateral full inspections. They further refused special inspections.” The official also claimed that the North Korean delegation introduced the demand that the tow countries “jointly cope with external nuclear threats.” The North Korean delegation did not respond to the South Korean proposal for more JNCC meetings to be held on 24 and 28 April.
—“Seoul Official Sees Pyongyang Deception,” United Press International, 23 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Stalemate Continues at South-North Korea Nuclear Talks,” United Press International, 23 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Acdemic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Haek Sanghosach’al I’gyŏn Motchophyŏ/Nambuk Haekkongdong’wi 3 Ch’ahoeŭi,” Taehan Maeil, 22 April 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

4 May 1992
Twenty-five days ahead of schedule, North Korea provides the IAEA with a 150-page “initial declaration” of its nuclear facilities and materials. The report says “gram quantities” of plutonium were separated from damaged spent-fuel rods in 1990 at an industrial-scale reprocessing facility still under construction. Although the IAEA does not release the report, it reportedly includes the following facilities and materials: nuclear material and design information; a research reactor and critical assembly at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (under IAEA safeguards); a sub-critical facility at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang; a fuel rod fabrication plant and storage facility in Yŏngbyŏn-kun; a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor; a “Radiochemistry Laboratory” under construction in Yŏngbyŏn-kun; a 50MW(e) nuclear plant under construction in Yŏngbyŏn-kun; a 200MW(e) plant under construction in T’aechŏn-kun, North P’yong’an Province; and a plan to build three 635MW(e) nuclear reactors. Two uranium mines and two facilities for uranium milling are also listed. This list closely matches Western estimates of the scope of North Korea’s nuclear program.
—“Inspections Under Full-Scope Safeguards Agreement Proceed: Safeguards Inspection to DPRK,” IAEA Newbriefs, Vol. 7, No. 3, June-July 1992, p. 3; Mark Hibbs, “North Korea Thought to Have Separated PU in the 1970s with Soviet Help,” Nuclear Fuel, 22 June 1992, pp. 15-16; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 83; David Albright, “How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, <http://www.thebulletin.org>; “Pukhan Haekshisŏl Ch’ŏt Pogosŏ Chech’ul,” Hankryoreh Shinmun, 5 May 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

7 May 1992
As a means of ensuring that the IAEA team does not “miss anything” during inspections, US officials provide IAEA Director General Hans Blix and his top aides intelligence briefings in September 1991, March 1992, and 7 May 1992. During the last briefing, Blix is given a “virtual reality” tour of the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. US officials place a great deal of emphasis on the reprocessing facility, which North Korea has identified as a “radiochemical laboratory.”
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 268-269.

11-16 May 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix arrives in Pyongyang prior to the IAEA inspection team to meet with North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk, Minister of Atomic Energy Ch’oe Hak Kŭn and first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sŏk Chu. Blix is reassured that the inspectors will be allowed access to any site in North Korea regardless if it is listed in the initial declaration submitted on 4 May 1992 to the IAEA. In the course of the meetings, Blix visits the unfinished nuclear reprocessing laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. After seeing the site, he reports that North Korea is building a nuclear reprocessing facility capable of processing spent fuel into plutonium. He says that North Korea has already produced a “tiny quantity” of plutonium. However, the quantity is much less than what is required to build a nuclear weapon. According to North Korea, the reprocessing plant will be used to produce mixed-oxide fuel for future fast-breeder reactors. North Korea also expresses interest in building gas-graphite reactors because it can do so indigenously.
—David Albright, “North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp. 36-40; “Inspections Under Full-Scope Safeguards Agreement Proceed: Safeguards Inspection to DPRK,” IAEA Newbriefs, Vol. 7, No. 3, June-July 1992, p. 3; Ann Maclachlan, “Blix Says North Korean Laboratory Could Become Reprocessing Plant,” Nucleonics Week, 21 May 1992, pp. 7-8; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 79; T.R. Reid, “N. Korean Plutonium Plant Cited; Pyongyang Building Reprocessing Facility,” Washington Post, 17 May 1992; Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 114.

12 May 1992
The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) meets for the fourth time. Unlike past meetings, North and South Korea make progress in finalizing a document of procedures for mutual inspections by the set date of 19 May. North Korea withdraws its demand that the two sides adopt a separate protocol based on the pledges to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula before negotiating an inspections regime. South Korea agrees to alter the language regarding the subjects of inspections from “sites suspected of nuclear capabilities” to “nuclear weapons and nuclear bases.” The two sides agreed to begin drawing up the text of the agreement on 15 May.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 May 1992, in “South’s JNCC Chairman Says Both Sides Compromised on Nuclear Inspection,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Acts Putting Brake on Resolution of Nuclear Issue,” Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 11 May 1992, in “North Korean Media on ‘Pressing’ Need To Inspect US Bases,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 May 1992, in “South Korea Plans To Compromise in Nuclear Inspection,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-May 1992
Following a meeting between IAEA Director General Hans Blix and North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk and Minister of Atomic Energy Ch’oe Hak Kŭn, North Korea says that it is willing to consider eliminating certain elements of its nuclear program if foreign countries provide “the required assistance.” Blix says that he is concerned about North Korea’s nuclear program and the possibility that it will develop a nuclear bomb with special emphasis on reprocessing spent reactor fuel into plutonium. Yon denies that North Korea is interested in nuclear weapons. However, he says that North Korea is interested in using modern light water reactors rather than the heavy water reactors (whose by-products can be more easily reprocessed to produce plutonium).
—Jeffrey Smith, “North Korea May Consider Reducing Atom Program,” Washington Post, 20 June 1992, p. A14.

13-15 May 1992
During North Korean-Japanese normalization talks, Japan demands that North Korea immediately implement IAEA inspections. A deadlock in the talks arises from Japanese demands over the reprocessing facility in North Korea. The talks are conducted by North Korean chief negotiator Lee Sam Ro and Japanese Ambassador Noboru Nakahira. Following the talks, IAEA Director General Hans Blix travels to Japan to prepare for the 25 May 1992 inspections of North Korea’s facilities. While in Japan, Blix informs officials that North Korea used hot cells to separate plutonium in 1990. He tells Japanese Science and Technology Minister Kanzo Tanigawa that the IAEA team will verify whether North Korea actually used the cells. North Korean officials have told Blix that the “Radiochemistry Laboratory” was completed in 1987 and that a “very small amount” of plutonium had been separated there. According to Blix, the reprocessing lab that he saw during his earlier visit was missing some equipment. However, no facilities were under construction during his visit.
—Naoaki Usui, “Reprocessing Issue Sets Up Road Block to Japanese-North Korean Talks,” Nuclear Fuel, 25 May 1992, pp. 13-14; Sheryl Wudunn, “North Korean Site Has A-Bomb Hints,” New York Times, 17 May 1992, p. A1.

15 May 1992
North and South Korea hold working-level talks on drafting an agreement on the procedures for a inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime but fail to make any progress. Reneging on the concession it made earlier in the week, North Korea once again insists that the two sides must finalize an agreement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula before negotiating an inspection regime. According to Pan Ki Mun, the chief South Korean delegate, North Korea “also insists on a detailed report on where and how many US nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea, if indeed they have been been pulled out.”
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 15 May 1992, in “North-South Talks Fail To Make Progress on Nuclear Inspection Issue,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May – 7 June 1992
IAEA inspectors conduct the first round of nuclear inspections in North Korea. During the inspections of facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, the team is able to verify the location of fissionable materials as stated in North Korea’s “initial declaration,” which was submitted to the IAEA on 4 May 1992. In doing so, they visit the “Radiochemistry Laboratory.” The team discovers that the building is only 80 percent complete, and that the equipment inside is only 40 percent ready for full-scale production. According to one IAEA official, “the works inside the building are ‘extremely primitive’ and far from ready to produce quantities of plutonium needed for a stockpile of atomic weapons.” The IAEA team also inspects a 5MW(e) research reactor that came online in 1986, and a 50 MW(e) power plant under construction. According to Blix, earlier reports, which stated that there is electrical equipment around the nuclear reactor, are false. Rather, he saw “poles on which lines could be mounted.” The North Koreans informed him that they are attempting to develop a civil nuclear power program using natural uranium and graphite. IAEA inspectors discover an isotope production laboratory, which was not included in North Korea’s initial declaration to the IAEA. North Korean officials, saying that the laboratory is used solely to separate isotopes for medical purposes, allow the IAEA to inspect the facility. Inspectors discover seven hot cells within the facility.
—David Albright, “North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp. 36-40; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 268-269; “North Korea/U.S.,” Nucleonics Week, 11 June 1992, pp. 11-12; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, pp. 78-79; “IAEA Sach’aldan Ipkuk,” Kukmin Ilbo, 23 May 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

27 May 1992
The fifth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission fails to produce any agreement between North and South Korea on mutual nuclear inspections. The two sides even fail to set the date for the next meeting, making it practically impossible to conduct mutual inspections by the original deadline of mid-June. The South Korean delegation proposes that the next meeting be held on 29 May in order to keep alive the possibility of conducting mutual inspections by mid-June. The North Korean delegation, however, rejects the proposed date because of the on-going IAEA inspections, and proposes the next JNCC meeting be held on 16 June. South Korea does not agree to this, and the two sides decide to set the date through contacts between the inter-Korean liaison offices in Panmunjom.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 May 1992, in “Fifth JNCC Fails to Set Date for Next Round of Talks,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Summer 1992
North Korea constructs a third nuclear waste storage facility at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79.

June 1992
Defector Kim Tae Ho reportedly hears that North Korea has used “red mercury from the Soviet Union” to reprocess 6-10kg of plutonium. Kim, who defects in April 1994, says he heard this information from the “import-export director (輸出入課長)” of the “Korea Sixth Equipment Trading Company (朝鮮第6設備輸出入會社),” which Kim says imports materials and equipment for North Korea’s nuclear program. [Note: Kim made no mention of this until three years after he defected in 1994, and there are inconsistencies in Kim’s testimony.]
—Kim Min Sŏk, “‘Puk, 93 Nyŏn Chŏp’okchŏon Haekshilhŏm Sŏnggong’/94 Nyŏn Kwisun Kim Tae Ho Ssi Chŭng’ŏn,” Joongang Ilbo, 9 June 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kyodo News Service, “N. Korea Has Missile Base Targeted at Tokyo: Defector,” Japan Economic Newswire, 9 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Hong Sŏng Ch’ŏl, “‘Puk Haek Missile Kiji Kŏnsŏl’/Kwisun Kim Tae Ho Ssi Shin’angganjŭngsŏ Palghyŏ,” Donga Ilbo, 9 June 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Chŏn Chae U, “‘Puk, Chŏp’okchŏon Haekshilhŏm Sŏnggong’/Haekt’andu 2 Ki Chejoga’nŭng Plutoniumdo Hwakpo,” Kukmin Ilbo, 9 June 1997, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kyodo News Service, “N. Korea Has Missile Base Targeted at Tokyo: Defector,” Japan Economic Newswire, 9 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “N. Korea Aims Missiles at Tokyo: Defector,” United Press International, 9 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

June 1992
At the IAEA annual meeting, the North Korean representative informs the IAEA that North Korea’s reprocessing facility should be retained “for the sake of the country’s prosperity and economic growth.”
—R. Jeffrey Smith, “N. Korea May Consider Reducing Atom Program,” Washington Post, 20 June 1992, p. A14.

1 June 1992
During US-North Korean consular-level talks in Beijing, North Korea claims that it has produced a small amount of plutonium, but it will stop reprocessing plutonium if the IAEA provides light water reactor technology and enriched uranium to be used solely for industrial uses. According to a North Korean official, Pyongyang made the same offer to IAEA Director General Hans Blix.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 7 June 1992, in “Korean Nuclear Issues; Yonhap Reports North Korean Offer to USA Over Plutonium Production,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1992, in “South Wants Yongbyon Facility ‘Scrapped’; Joint Nuclear Talks to Resume,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1992
Reporting on his May trip to North Korea and the results of IAEA inspections, IAEA Director General Hans Blix claims that the nuclear fuel reprocessing facility under construction in North Korea is a factory, not an experimental laboratory. Blix quotes a North Korean official as saying that “without a guarantee for the introduction of advanced technology from abroad and stable supplies of nuclear fuel, we cannot give up our present nuclear policy.” According to Blix, North Korea “responds favorably” to the IAEA’s proposal that it switch its nuclear program from graphite-moderated to light-water reactors. Blix also says that “the North Korean side had explained that the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which is at issue, is aimed at the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle for the purpose of supplying their own nuclear fuel and that it had already started research on a fast-breeding reactor and composite nuclear fuel.”
—Choe Maen Ho, Donga Ilbo, 11 June 1992, p. 1, in “Blix Reports on May DPRK Nuclear Inspections: North Intent on Current Policies,” FBIS-EAS-92-113, 11 June 1992, p. 14; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1992, in “South Willing to Share Technology,” FBIS-EAS-92-113, 11 June 1992, pp. 14-15; “Pukhanhaek Chaech’ŏrishisŏl/Taehyŏnggongjang Kyumoyŏtta,” Kukmin Ilbo, 11 June 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

11 June 1992
South Korea announces that it is willing to share nuclear technology with North Korea if Pyongyang accepts South Korean nuclear inspectors and abandons its reprocessing facility. According to Kim Chae Sŏp, director-general of international organizations at the Foreign Ministry, “The Government policy is that Seoul will promote exchanges and cooperation with Pyongyang depending on the progress of inter-Korean relations and nuclear negotiations.”
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1992, in “South Willing to Share Technology,” FBIS-EAS-92-113, 11 June 1992, pp. 14-15.

15 June 1992
At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, member states discuss North Korea’s nuclear situation. The Board agrees that all nuclear-related facilities must be reported at least 180 days prior to construction. Previous regulations required 60 days prior notice.
—Roland Prinz, “U.N. Agency Report: North Korea Not Close to Making Nuclear Bomb,” Associated Press, 15 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “North-IAEA Conclude Nuclear Inspection Accord,” Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 10 July 1992 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-92-133, 10 July 1992.

15 June 1992
According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the North Korean technology that the IAEA saw in Yŏngbyŏn-kun was “30 years old.” North Korea’s nuclear facilities have shoddy designs, and the radiation shielding systems, cranes, protective devices, waste disposal sites and safety control systems are “seriously defective.” Therefore, the IAEA disagrees with CIA reports that North Korea will be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the very near future. However, before making an accurate assessment, the IAEA must conduct additional inspections.
—Roland Prinz, “U.N. Agency Report: North Korea Not Close to Making Nuclear Bomb,” Associated Press, 15 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Choe Maen Ho, Donga Ilbo (Seoul), 15 June 1992, p. 1, in “IAEA Finds DPRK Nuclear Safety ‘Defective’,” FBIS-EAS-92-115, 15 June 1992, pp. 20-21.

15-19 June 1992
At the IAEA Board of Governor’s meeting in Vienna, 22 of the 35 Board members support South Korea’s demand that North Korea allow inter-Korean inspections of nuclear facilities.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 June 1992, in “Yi Sang-ok Says Inspection Basis for Nuclear Aid,” FBIS-EAS-92-119, 19 June 1992, pp. 14-15.

16 June 1992
The IAEA reports that there is a possibility of conducting special inspections on undeclared nuclear facilities in North Korea. The report follows statements given by IAEA director General Hans Blix at the Board of Governors’ meeting that he had obtained North Korea’s agreement to accept inspectors at unreported nuclear facilities.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 June 1992, in “Nuclear Issues; Yonhap Says North Agrees to IAEA Inspection of Unreported Facilities,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1992
The South Korean government decides not to provide light water reactor technology with North Korea because Pyongyang’s establishment of a reprocessing capability at the “Radiochemistry Laboratory” is in violation of the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
—“Haekpalchŏn Kyŏngsuro Kisul/Chŏngbu, Puk’e Chegong Anhae,” Kukmin Ilbo, 16 June 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

18 June 1992
At a press conference following the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, O Chang Rim, head of the North Korean delegation, advocates continued bilateral negotiations between the North and South as stipulated by the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC). According to O, the major obstacle to the North-South talks is South Korea’s refusal to allow North Korean inspections of US military bases in the South. North Korea fears that these bases may house nuclear weapons. O also says that North Korea will continue to cooperate with the IAEA on inspections, but that construction of the Yŏngbyŏn Radiochemistry Laboratory will continue despite international concern.
—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 21 June 1992, in “IAEA Governors Meet; Delegation Attends: Chief Delegate Gives Speech,” FBIS-EAS-92-120, 22 June 1992, pp.17-18; Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 21 June 1992, in “Holds News Conference,” FBIS-EAS-92-120, 22 June 1992, pp. 18-19; Chu Sŏp Il, “‘Yŏngbyŏn Haekshisŏlgongsa Chungdanmothanda’/Pukhandaep’yo Hoe’gyŏn,” Segye Ilbo, 19 June 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

19 June 1992
South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok announces that until North Korea accepts inter-Korean bilateral nuclear inspections, South Korea will not give it any nuclear-related technical assistance. “Pyongyang’s acceptance of ad hoc inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is positive, but it must accept inter-Korean inspection as well in order to completely dispel the global suspicion and concern about its nuclear arms development.”
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 June 1992, in “Yi Sang-ok Says Inspection Basis for Nuclear Aid,” FBIS-EAS-92-119, 19 June 1992, pp. 14-15.

19 June 1992
A South Korean source claims that South Korea is considering omitting military facilities as subjects of challenge inspections in the proposed inter-Korean nuclear inspections regime. According to the source, South Korea will present a revised proposal at the upcoming meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC).
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 June 1992, in “Seoul Considering Excluding Bases,” FBIS-EAS-92-119, 19 June 1992, p. 15.

21 June 1992
An anonymous South Korean official announces that Russia has informed the United States and South Korea that it is considering a plan to stop supplying North Korea with any military equipment, including defensive weapons. According to the official, Russia is taking this measure in order to put more pressure on North Korea to resolve questions about its nuclear capabilities and allow inter-Korean inspections. The official also claims that Russia is considering completely abandoning its military alliance treaty with North Korea.
—Ko Tae Yong, KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 21 June 1992, in “Russia Reportedly To Stop Arms Supply to DPRK,” FBIS-EAS-92-120, 22 June 1992, pp. 23-24.

30 June 1992
North and South Korea meet for the sixth JNCC talks and once again fail to make any progress on an inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime. Insisting that suspicions of North Korean nuclear activities had grown since IAEA inspections, the South Korean delegates claim that inter-Korean relations cannot improve until North Korea resolves remaining questions about its nuclear program. The two sides do agree to meet again on 21 July.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 30 June 1992, in “North Reacts ‘Fiercely’ to Linkage of Nuclear And Other Issues,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 30 June 1992, in “North’s Nuclear Committee Chairman on ‘Deadlocked’ Talks,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

July 1992
According to Lee Ch’ung Kuk, a North Korean defector who worked at the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau, three North Korean military officers visit Russia and Ukraine. The officers visit nuclear and chemical warfare facilities and observe three nuclear explosions. According to Lee, who claims to have prepared a report of the team’s observations, the nuclear tests are used to test the performance of North Korean-made “equipment for automatically monitoring nuclear explosions.” [Note: President Yeltsin had ordered a freeze on all nuclear tests in light of improving diplomatic relations with the United States, so this report is dubious].
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in “Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations,” FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 39.

4 July 1992
In an interview published by Yonhap News Agency, US Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg says that the United States would open military bases in South Korea to inspections if North Korea reciprocates. Gregg states, “We Americans would open our military bases to North Korean inspection in return for their opening installations in the North to South Koreans.” Gregg’s statement marks the first time the United States indicated that it might open its military bases to North Korean inspectors.
—“Report: U.S. To Open Military Bases to North Korean Inspections,” Associated Press, 4 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 July 1992
IAEA inspectors arrive to begin a second round of international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The inspections will focus on the reprocessing facility in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. The team will also investigate the status of North Korea’s plutonium production, storage operations, and reactor safety. The second round of IAEA inspections will continue through 17 July.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 6 July 1992, in “IAEA Starts Second Nuclear Inspections in North Korea,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6-16 July 1992
IAEA inspections conduct the second round of nuclear inspections in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—“Pukhaek 2 Ch’asach’al Wallyo/Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkigu,” Donga Ilbo, 17 July 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

10 July 1992
North Korea accepts a subsidiary arrangement to the April safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea has not yet approved attachments to the agreement. The purpose of the attachments is to specify the facilities that will be routinely inspected and the length and frequency of the inspections.
—“North-IAEA Conclude Nuclear Inspection Accord,” Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 10 July 1992 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-92-133, 10 July 1992.

21 July 1992
The seventh meeting of the JNCC fails to make any progress in establishing an inter-Korean nuclear inspections regime. North Korean delegates continue to complain about the South’s insistence on resolving the suspicions of the North’s nuclear activities, but Kong Ro Myŏn, South Korean Chairman to the JNCC, states that South Korea will not alter its principle of “nuclear solution first, economic cooperation later.” This issue is highlighted by the fact that North Korean Deputy Premier Kim Dal Hyŏn is currently touring industrial facilities in the South. The next JNCC meeting is set for 31 August.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 July 1992, in “North Complains about South’s Nuclear-Economic Cooperation Link,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 July 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the IAEA “would not have any hesitation” in identifying North Korea’s reported Radiochemistry Laboratory as “a reprocessing plant in the terminology of the industrialized world.”
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “North Korea’s Plutonium Puzzle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp. 36-40.

August 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix, testifying before the US Congress, says that North Korea has “emphatically denied” separating additional amounts of plutonium.
—Mark Hibbs, “IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance,” Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1993, pp. 16-17.

23 August 1992
South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok meets with his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen in Beijing. According to Qian, China has repeatedly asked North Korea to allow IAEA inspections.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 23 August 1992, in “South Korean Foreign Minister Holds ‘Friendly’ Talks in Beijing,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 24 August 1992, in “No Tae-u Speaks on Normalizing Ties,” FBIS-EAS-92-164, 24 August 1992, pp. 17-18.

28 August 1992
A South Korean Foreign Ministry source says that China has informed South Korea that Beijing will not provide North Korea with any support for the development of nuclear energy or nuclear weapons.
—“Chungguk, Pukhan’e Haekchiwŏn Anhanda/Mu’gigaebal-Wŏnjaryŏkpalchŏnkkaji/Han’guk’e Yaksok,” Joongang Ilbo, 28 August 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

31 August 1992
The eighth JNCC meeting fails to make significant progress towards a mutual nuclear inspections regime on the Korean Peninsula, but the North Korean delegation changes its position and agrees to discuss inspection regimes before anything else. The North Korean delegation also expresses interest in inspections of military installations. However, disagreements persist over the reprocessing plant located in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. South Korea continues to demand that North Korea dismantle the facility immediately, but North Korea claims that recent IAEA inspections have cleared up any remaining suspicions.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 1 September 1992, “Pyongyang Shows ‘Unprecedented Flexibility’ at Nuclear Meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 September 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Korean Joint Control Commission Remains Deadlocked,” United Press International, 31 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Nambuksanghohaeksach’al/Kyujŏng Tŭng Chŏlch’ung Shilp’ae/Haekt’ongjegongdong’wi,” Joongang Ilbo, 31 August 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

31 August-15 September 1992
IAEA inspectors conduct the third round of inspections in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. IAEA spokesman David Kyd says that the IAEA’s inspections will focus on North Korea’s plutonium reprocessing program. In preparation for the visit, North Korea hurriedly installed transmission lines and other related equipment at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor. During the inspection, the team is given limited access to two suspected nuclear-related sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. North Korea had not declared the sites in the initial declaration submitted to the IAEA in May 1992. One of the sites is a two-story building that has been partly covered by large mounds of earth and landscaping prior to the inspectors arrival so as to appear as a one-story building. However, US satellite imagery captured the construction of the building prior to the inspection, and it revealed that the first-story of the building contained thick-walled vaults made of reinforced concrete, which is suitable for nuclear waste storage. When the IAEA inspection team requests access to this portion of the building, the North Koreans inform them that it does not exist. They are permitted limited access to the second-story of the building, which is found to house heavy weapons, including tanks and missiles on mobile carriages. The North Koreans refuse to allow a formal and thorough inspection of the building based on grounds that it is a military site and thus exempt from inspection. The IAEA, however, does not accept such exemptions. [Note: The building has been designated as “Building 500” by US intelligence, and reportedly contains large nuclear waste storage cells on the first floor.] During the inspection, the North Korean government denies access to some facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, and also blocks direct communication between IAEA headquarters and its representatives in North Korea.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 78; Mark Hibbs, “Pyongyang Again Stalling IAEA Safeguards Implementation,” Nucleonics Week, 10 September 1992, pp. 13-14; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 274-275; “IAEA Pukhaeksach’al/Onŭlbut’ŏ Yŏlhŭltong’an,” Kukmin Ilbo, 31 August 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

September 1992
At a press conference in Vienna, North Korean ambassador-at-large O Ch’ang Rim refuses to answer questions about the status of the reprocessing plant in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. When asked whether the facility has been test-operated, O replies only that it is “under construction” without elaboration.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “North Korea’s Plutonium Puzzle,” Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, vol. 48, no. 9, November 1992, pp. 36-40.

14 September 1992
A South Korean official announces that Seoul is willing to go ahead with limited economic cooperation with North Korea before the two countries resolve the issue of mutual nuclear inspections. This announcement signifies a change in the previous South Korean principle of “nuclear solution first, economic cooperation later.”
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 September 1992, in “Seoul Eases Conditions on Economic Cooperation with North,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 September 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 July 1992, in “North Complains about South’s Nuclear-Economic Cooperation Link,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 September 1992
O Ch’ang Rim, North Korean Ambassador to the IAEA, claims that North Korea will agree to inter-Korean nuclear inspections only if US military facilities in South Korea are also subject to inspection. He also states that North Korea will continue construction on a reprocessing plant.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 September 1992, in “North To Continue Work on Nuclear Plant,” FBIS-EAS-92-181, 17 September 1992, p. 26.

18 September 1992
According to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities. Regardless, verification that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program will be difficult to attain. The IAEA believes that construction at an alleged nuclear reprocessing plant has been stopped. However, the IAEA Board of Governors says that “suspicion of nuclear development remains.”
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 September 1992, in “IAEA’s Blix Speaks on Verification,” FBIS-EAS-92-183, 21 September 1992, p. 14.

October 1992
According to the Chelyabinski Rabochij newspaper, over 60 Russian researchers attempt to leave for North Korea, but they are detained at the Sheremetyevo-2 Airport near Moscow. The group includes over 40 researchers from the Machine Design Bureau in Miass. The paper quoted officials in the Russian security ministry as saying the group was able to design a nuclear warhead for a missile. The Christian Science Monitor later reports the number of scientists is 64. The Hankook Ilbo later reports the engineers are nuclear specialists that have been approached to design a nuclear warhead for ballistic missiles.
—ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 February 1993, in “Defense Workers Reportedly Tried to Go to DPRK,” JPRS-TND-93-005, 12 February 1993, pp. 14-15; Daniel Sneider, “The Trail of N. Korea’s Nuclear Bid,” Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Pukhanhaeng Rŏ Kwahakcha/Haekt’anjejo Chŏnmun’ga/Rŏ Ilganji Podo,” Hankook Ilbo, 9 February 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “Rŏ Kukpangyŏn’guwŏn 60 Myŏng/Changnyŏn 10 Wŏl Ipkuk Shido,” Kukmin Ilbo, 5 February 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

8 October 1992
At a press conference following the US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting held 7-8 October in Washington, DC, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney says that there is intelligence of “sufficient quality” to suggest that North Korea is close to developing a nuclear weapon. Cheney adds that the United States will not remove any more of the 37,400 troops from South Korea until the North stops developing nuclear weapons. After Cheney’s statements, South Korean Lieutenant General Kim Chae Ch’ang says that previous IAEA inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities have raised “serious and clear” suspicions that North Korea is nearing completion of a reprocessing plant that would supply enough nuclear material for a bomb.
—Jane A. Morse, “DPRK Nuclear Weapon Capability Remains Top US, ROK Concern,” United States Information Agency, 8 October 1992, in Federation of American Scientists News, <http://fas.org/news/dprk/1992/index.html>; Reuters, “U.S., in Pact with South Korea, Delays Further Troop Withdrawal,” New York Times, 9 October 1992, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Chuhanmi’gun 2 Dan’gyech’ŏlsu Yubo/Puk Haekp’ogi Anh’ŭlddaen,” Taehan Maeil, 8 October 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “‘Team Spirit’ Chaegae/Han-Mi’gunsawi/Pukhan ‘Haek’ P’ogiddaen Chungdan,” Kukmin Ilbo, 8 Ocotber 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

14 October 1992
A working-level meeting of the JNCC fails to make any substantive progress on inter-Korean nuclear inspections. The two sides continue to disagree on what type of facilities will be subject to inspections. According to a South Korean official, Seoul is prepared to take other measures if Pyongyang continues with its “delaying tactics.”
—“Government Shelves North-South Economic Talks,” United Press International, 14 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 October 1992, in “North And South Fail To Agree on Nuclear Inspections,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Haeksach’al Taesang Chŏlch’ungshilp’ae/Ŏje nambuk Haekt’ong’wi Chŏpchok,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, 15 October 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

22 October 1992
A meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) fails to make any progress on setting up a mutual nuclear inspection regime between North and South Korea. According to the Chairman of the South Korean delegation Kong No Myong, the two sides do “not even mention” specifics about the inspections regime. Instead, discussions focus on the US-South Korean decision to resume the Team Spirit joint military exercises. The North Korean delegation demands that South Korea cancel Team Spirit before it will discuss mutual inspections, and the South Korean delegation insists that they will continue to make preparations for the military exercise unless the JNCC makes substantial progress in setting up an inter-Korean inspections regime.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 22 October 1992, in “Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks Stall as North Demands Halt to Team Spirit,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Inter-Korea Nuclear Talks See No Progress,” United Press International, 22 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Sangho Haeksach’al Shilshidoemyŏn Team Spirit Chungji Kŏmt’o/Hyŏn Ch’ongni Taebuksŏhan,” Joongang Ilbo, 22 October 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

29 October 1992
During working-level talks of the JNCC, North Korea reiterates the threat to withdraw from all inter-Korean dialogue unless Seoul cancels preparations for the Team Spirit military exercises by December. Due to this impasse, the two sides fail to make any progress on setting up a bilateral nuclear inspection regime on the Korean Peninsula.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 29 October 1992, in “Nuclear Talks Fail as North Renews Call for Cancellation of Team Spirit,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

November 1992
The Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists reports that IAEA officials are unenthusiastic about the prospects of North and South Korean bilateral inspections. They fear that a mutual inspection regime, with inferior technical information, could eventually be considered as an alternative to IAEA safeguards. The report quotes a senior German official, who supports the IAEA’s position and is against any proposed inter-Korean regime that would ban plutonium reprocessing, as saying, “Both uranium enrichment and plutonium [separation and] recycling are legitimate civil nuclear activities. It should suffice to put any such facilities [in both Koreas] under IAEA safeguards.” The report also states that IAEA experts believe North Korea is capable of processing “much larger amounts of nuclear material” than it is currently admitting. In order to verify the declared amount of reprocessed plutonium, the IAEA has requested samples of nuclear fuel from North Korea. North Korea, however, denied the request because it reportedly cannot provide any samples until the fuel is unloaded from the reactors in early 1993.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “North Korea’s Plutonium Puzzle,” Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, vol. 48, no. 9, November 1992, pp. 36-40; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 5 December 1992, in “IAEA ‘Having Difficulty’ with Nuclear Inspections in DPRK,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 November 1992
The North Korean foreign ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea may stop IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities if South Korea and the United States do not terminate their joint Team Spirit military exercises.
—“Pukhan, Kukchehaeksach’al Kŏbudo Shisa/Oegyobu Sŏngmyŏng,” Joongang Ilbo, 3 November 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

3 November 1992
South Korea announces that it will consider canceling the upcoming Team Spirit military exercises scheduled for Spring 1993 if inter-Korean nuclear inspections occur before the December round of prime ministers’ talks. According to Kong Ro Myŏng, the South Korean spokesman for negotiations with North Korea, “if mutual nuclear inspection is realized before the coming round of the South-North [sic] Prime Ministers’ talks scheduled to start in Seoul on 21 December, we could consider shelving Team Spirit again next year. If the deadline is to be met, regulations for mutual inspection must be worked out by the end of this month. If the North does not respond it will be inevitable for us to conduct the exercise.”
—James Kim, “Seoul Says Team Spirit Exercise Could Be Shelved,” United Press International, 3 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Seoul May Call Off Exercises If Nuclear Checks Realized,” Japan Economic Newswire, 3 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 November 1992, in “South Offers To Cancel Team Spirit If Mutual Inspections Held by December,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Pukhanhaengmunje Hae’gyŏlha’myŏn Team Spirit Chungdan’gŏmt’o/Kong Ro Myŏng Namjjok Taebyŏn’in,” Hankryoreh Shinmun, 4 November 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

12 November 1992
During the fourth round of IAEA inspections, IAEA Director General Hans Blix telephones chief inspector Willi Theis at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. According to Blix, the IAEA possesses indisputable evidence that a trench had been dug and later covered up between the reprocessing plant and the “one-story building” whose basement is believed to be a nuclear waste storage facility. He also informs Theis that there is clear evidence that North Korea has attempted to camouflage a nearby outdoor nuclear waste facility. He instructs Theis to inform the North Koreans that they must declare these sites as nuclear facilities and permit inspections. Theis immediately summons two senior nuclear officials at the Yŏngbyŏn complex and attempts to work with them on amending North Korea’s initial declaration to the IAEA. They cooperate with the intention of including the waste sites in the report with as little admission of error as possible.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 275; Kelley Smith Tunney, “North Koreans Said Trying to Hide Nuclear Building,” Associated Press, 1 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 November 1992
The North Korean senior nuclear officials who have been working with IAEA chief inspector Willi Theis accuse him of being “an agent of the CIA” and performing inspections “on the basis of instructions from the US State Department.” They then refuse to cooperate further with Theis.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 275.

18 November 1992
The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) once again fails to make any progress on mutual nuclear inspections between North and South Korea. North Korea continues to threaten suspension of all negotiations between the two countries, including the prime ministers’ talks in December, if South Korea does not cancel the Team Spirit military exercises scheduled for spring 1993.
—John Burton, “N. Korea Threatens To Quit All Talks,” Financial Times (London), 19 November 1992, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Korea Nuclear Talks See No Progress,” United Press International, 18 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 November 1992
During a meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), North Korea repeats its demand that South Korea cancel the US-South Korean joint military exercise Team Spirit before Pyongyang will discuss any specifics on a inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime. Chairman of the South Korean delegation Kong Ro Myŏng insists that North Korean must open at least one site to inspections before Seoul will consider cancellation of the military exercises.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 November 1992, in “Inter-Korean Mutual Nuclear Inspection Talks Fail,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 November 1992
North Korean Minister of the Atomic Energy Ch’oe Hak Kŭn, Ambassador O Ch’ang Rim, and other North Korean officials meet with IAEA Director General Hans Blix to discuss North Korea’s implementation of its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Blix is believed to notify North Korea that it has not declared all of its nuclear facilities and asks the North Korean officials to “sincerely implement the nuclear agreement.” [Note: Many analysts suspect that North Korea has hidden nuclear facilities because it refused to allow an IAEA special inspection team to enter the country right after the fourth round of inspections was completed.]
—Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 3 December 1992, in “IAEA’s Blix Says Talks with DPRK Beneficial,” FBIS-EAS-92-234, 4 December 1992, p. 19; Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 1 December 1992 in “IAEA Said to Uncover Unreported Nuclear Facilities in DPRK,” FBIS-EAS-92-231, 1 December 1992.

December 1992
The IAEA team conducts its fifth inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
—Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 4 December 1992

December 1992
North Korea’s Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau begins constructing a nuclear/chemical warfare training site in Onjŏng-ri, Sŏngch’ŏn-kun, South P’yong’an Province. [Note: In 1991, the Bureau began annual training exercises for senior officers to deal with a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.]
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in “Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations,” FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 40.

December 1992 to March 1993
According to North Korean defector Lee Ch’ung Kuk, the director of the Machine Supplies Department of the Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau, and the chief of the Machine and Equipment Manufacturing Section of the “Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Atomic Analysis Team” travel abroad to observe nuclear facilities and purchase parts necessary for North Korea’s nuclear program.
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in “Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations,” FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 39.

Early December 1992
According to North Korean defector Lee Ch’ung Kuk, Marshall Ch’oe Kwang, chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, announces the decision to construct a “Nuclear Watch Guard Post” in Solbong and an “Integrated Command Post for Nuclear Warfare” at Mt. Chidang.
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in “Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations,” FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38.

Early December 1992
Kim Dal Hyŏn leads a delegation to Iran for the signing of a military agreement worth several hundred millions of dollars to develop a new missile that is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The agreement stipulates that Iran will provide North Korea with $500 million to “jointly develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.” The agreement also provides for missile flight tests in Iran, and the cooperation of Libya in order to obtain western electronics systems from Libya’s al-Fatah program. The al-Fatah program is reported to have the support of German firms and technical experts.
—“Puk, Nodong 1 Ho Iran Chaegong/Sajŏnggŏri 1 Ch’ŏn km Sugi/Mi Ŭihoe Pogosŏ,” Chosun Ilbo, 17 July 1993, <http://www.chosun.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 16 July 1993, in “U.S. Report on DPRK-Iran Missile Deal Cited,” FBIS-EAS-93-138, 21 July 1993, p. 33.

2 December 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix presents the fourth inspection report to the Board of Governors. The report suggests that several nuclear sites in North Korea were not originally disclosed. Blix states that the inspection team inspected seven reported nuclear sites, two nuclear storage sites, and two unreported sites that were selected at random.
—Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 3 December 1992, in “IAEA’s Blix Says Talks with DPRK Beneficial,” FBIS-EAS-92-234, 4 December 1992, p. 19.

4 December 1992
At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, 17 countries including the United States, Russia, and Britain urge North Korea to accept unconditional IAEA inspections and simultaneous mutual inspections with South Korea. Referring to a statement issued by the North Korean Foreign Ministry in November, the countries also stated that they would not accept any attempt to link nuclear inspections with the Team Spirit military exercises. North Korean Ambassador at large Ch’oe Chang Im assures the IAEA that North Korea will accept inspectors even if Team Spirit is not cancelled. The Board of Governors decides unanimously to discuss the North Korean nuclear situation as a separate agenda item at the next board of Governors meeting to be held in February 1993.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 5 December 1992, in “North to Accept Nuclear Inspection,” FBIS-EAS-92-235, 7 December 1992, p. 20; “Taebuk Sangho Haeksach’al Ch’okku/’T’imhullyŏn Tŭng Chŏngch’imunje Yŏn’gye Pulyong,” Hankook Ilbo, 5 December 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

8 December 1992
Russian special forces board a jet before it is to take off from a Moscow airport, and arrest 36 “senior weapons scientists” as they attempt to travel to North Korea. The scientists are said to be from a “number of nuclear weapons research institutes, including the top secret Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 facilities in the Urals.” North Korea offered to pay the scientists between $1,500 and $3,000 a month. [Note: No author and no article title on SCMP piece.]
—Matthew Campbell, “Russians Storm Jet to Stop Korean Bomb,” Sunday Times, 20 December 1992; South China Morning Post, 21 December 1992, p. 1; KBS-1 Radio (Seoul), 20 December 1992, in “Pyongyang Attempt to Hire Russian Scientists,” FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, p. 32, Yonhap News Agency, 21 December 1992, in “Plans to recruit Nuclear Scientists,” FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, p. 32, Yonhap News Agency, 21 December 1992, in “Hong Kong Paper Cited,” FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, pp. 32-33; “Rŏ, Haekchŏnmun’ga 36 Myŏng Pukhanhaeng Chŏji/Pukhansŏ Koyongch’och’ŏng,” Taehan Maeil, 21 December 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

10 December 1992
The twelfth session of the JNCC fails to produce any progress towards mutual nuclear inspections on the Korean Peninsula. The US-South Korean decision to resume Team Spirit in spring 1993 continues to be the main point of contention. The North Korean delegation insists that Seoul and Washington cancel Team Spirit by 15 December, while the South Korean delegation claims that Team Spirit will be cancelled if Pyongyang agrees to allow the first mutual inspection before the prime ministers’ alks scheduled for 21-24 December.
—“Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks Bog Down,” Agence France Presse, 10 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Korean Sides Meet on Nuclear Controls,” Xinhua News Agency, 10 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 December 1992, in “JNCC Joint Contact 14th December Contacts may Be Suspended,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 December 1992
IAEA inspectors arrive in North Korea for the fifth round of nuclear inspections.
—“Puk Haeksach’aldan P’yŏngyang’e,” Kukmin Ilbo, 15 December 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

17 December 1992
The thirteenth session of the JNCC fails to make any progress on an inter-Korean nuclear inspections regime due to contentious debates over the Team Spirit military exercises scheduled for spring 1993. The North and South Korean delegations fail to even agree on the date of the next meeting.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 December 1992, in “Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks “Virtually” End for Year,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Inter-Korea Nuclear Talks Remain Deadlocked,” United Press International, 17 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late December 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix requests “visits” to clarify the nature of the two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and to conduct tests.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 276.

Late 1992
According to Im Yŏng Sŏn, a former North Korean Army lieutenant who defected to South Korea on 11 August 1993, North Korea executes 10 general officers for a failed coup attempt. The Security Bureau of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces reportedly discovered the coup plans.
—Yonhap News Agency, 24 August 1993, in “Defector Claims DPRK Coup Attempt, Executions,” FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23; Jon Swain, “Crisis in the Land of Fear,” Sunday Times, 5 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Terry McCarthy, “North Korea ‘Coup’ Fuels Security Fears; Defector’s Story of Failed Military Takeover Adds to Speculation over Pyongyang’s Regional Ambitions,” The Independent, 26 August 1993, p. 15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

	Updated April 2003