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This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
According to Korean Central Television in Pyongyang, Japan mobilizes about 100 physicists to develop nuclear weapons. [Note: The North Korean media often cite a nuclear threat from Japan, which could be used as a pretext for North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons.]
—Cho Chŏng Chin, “Il P’aemangjŏn Hŭngnamsŏ Wŏnp’okshil’ŏm,” Segye Ilbo, 22 December 2001, p. 31, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Chŏng Yŏn Uk, “Pukhan ‘Ilbon 1945 Nyŏn Haekshil’ŏm’ Chujang,” Donga Ilbo, 22 December 2001, <http://www.donga.com/>.
The Enola Gay, a US Army Air Corps B-29 bomber, drops the atomic bomb “Little Boy” on Hiroshima.
—Richard Rhodes, “Tongues of Fire,” Chapter 19 in The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
According to Korean Central Television in Pyongyang, Japan tests an atomic bomb off the coast of Hŭngnam (興南市), South Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡南道), which is now part of North Korea. [Note: The North Korean media often cite a nuclear threat from Japan, which could be used as a pretext for North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. The City of Hŭngnam was incorporated into the City of Hamhŭng (咸興市) in 1950.]
—Cho Chŏng Chin, “Il P’aemangjŏn Hŭngnamsŏ Wŏnp’okshil’ŏm,” Segye Ilbo, 22 December 2001, p. 31, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Chŏng Yŏn Uk, “Pukhan ‘Ilbon 1945 Nyŏn Haekshil’ŏm’ Chujang,” Donga Ilbo, 22 December 2001, <http://www.donga.com/>.
Bock’s Car, a US Army Air Corps B-29 bomber, drops the atomic bomb “Fat Man” on Nagasaki.
—Richard Rhodes, “Tongues of Fire,” Chapter 19 in The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
Japan unconditionally surrenders to the United States, ending World War II. Korea is liberated from Japanese colonial rule. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, later issues General Order Number One, which includes a provision for Soviet and US military forces to accept Japanese surrender on the northern and southern sides of the 38th parallel. Although the surrender arrangements are intended to be temporary, two separate states emerge on the divided peninsula.
—Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 457; Carter Eckert, et al., Korea Old and New: A History (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), pp. 327-343; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 5-7; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.117-126; Donald Stone MacDonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 44-50; “General Order No. 1, September 7, 1945 [Excerpt],” in The United States and the Korean Problem: Documents 1943-1953 (New York: AMS Press, 1976), p. 3.
The USSR surveys North Korea’s monazite mines with the assistance of “Dr. Chao Yang.” Soon the Soviets expanded the mines and began to import large quantities of monazite. Production was suspended during the Korean War, but is believed to have restarted after the armistice was signed in 1953.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “N Korea—Set To Join the ‘Nuclear Club’?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 12, 23 September 1989, p. 594.
The Soviet Union sends engineers and technicians to North Korea to conduct surveys for uranium deposits. North Korea ships about 9,000 tons of uranium to the USSR during this period.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 114; Hong Yun O, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The Pyongyang Engineering College is established. In January 1951, the name is changed to “Kim Chaek University of Technology (金策工業大學).” The school later establishes departments in nuclear engineering, precision machinery, and nuclear electronics. A research academy and graduate school are established at the university in 1956.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 103.
Ch’oe Hak Kŭn (최학근) departs to study at Moscow University. Ch’oe also studies later at the United Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. Ch’oe is appointed minister of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry in December 1986.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 113-114.
According to the Pyongyang Times, which cites “newly declassified documents,” President Harry Truman “reveals his intention to use atomic bombs in Korea.”
—Kim Un A, “US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea,” Pyongyang Times, 24 August 2002, <http://www.times.dprkorea.com/>.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivers a speech before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., and says that South Korea is outside the US defense perimeter in East Asia. Many people have interpreted the speech as a signal that the United States would not intervene in the case of a southward invasion on the Korean peninsula, and thus a “green light” to Kim Il Sung to launch the Korean War.
—Dean Acheson, “Crisis in China—An Examination of United States Policy,” Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, 23 January 1950, pp. 111-118; Bruce Cumings, “‘The Speech’: Achesonian Deterrence at the Press Club,” Chapter 13 in The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 408-428; Donald Stone MacDonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 50.
According to the Pyongyang Times, which cites “newly declassified documents,” President Harry Truman “reveals his intention to use atomic bombs in Korea.”
—Kim Un A, “US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea,” Pyongyang Times, 24 August 2002, <http://www.times.dprkorea.com/>.
The Korean People’s Army crosses the 38th parallel to start the Korean War.
—Bruce Cumings, “Who Started the Korean War? Three Mosaics,” Chapter Eighteen in The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 568- 621; Stanley Weintraub, “Day One,” Chapter Three in MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 24-37; Carter Eckert, et al., Korea Old and New: A History (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), pp. 344-346; Donald Stone MacDonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 50.
According to the Pyongyang Times, which cites “newly declassified documents,” General Douglas MacArthur “stresses the need to use atomic bombs in a secret phone call to President Truman.”
—Kim Un A, “US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea,” Pyongyang Times, 24 August 2002, <http://www.times.dprkorea.com/>.
General Douglas MacArthur tells US Army Department officials in Tokyo about his plan for an amphibious invasion behind enemy lines and to “destroy North Korea.” MacArthur also says he sees “a unique use of the atomic bomb—to strike a blocking blow” in case China entered the war.
—Bruce Cumings, “Introduction: The Course of Korean-American Relations, 1943-1953,” in Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), p. 53.
According to the Pyongyang Times, which cites “newly declassified documents,” the “US National Security Council meets in a special session and discusses the use of atomic bombs in Korea.”
—Kim Un A, “US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea,” Pyongyang Times, 24 August 2002, <http://www.times.dprkorea.com/>.
During a press conference, President Truman is asked if the United States would consider using the atomic bomb in Korea, and he replies, “There has always been active consideration of its use. I don’t want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing to do with this military aggression—that happens when it’s used.” The statement is very controversial, and draws strong international criticism, even from US allies.
—Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 257-259; Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3, Winter 1988/1989, pp. 65-66; Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 11.
General Douglas MacArthur “requests commander’s discretion to use atomic weapons.”
—Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 750.
General Douglas MacArthur sends a list of targets to the Pentagon and asks for 34 atomic bombs to create “a belt of radioactive cobalt across the neck of Manchuria so that there could be no land invasion of Korea from the north for at least 60 years.”
—Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 263-264; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 750; Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 9-10.
China sends scientist Wang Gan Chang to North Korea to “collect radioactive material.”
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “N Korea—Set To Join the ‘Nuclear Club’?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 12, 23 September 1989, p. 594.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff ask President Truman to authorize the deployment of “non-nuclear components to forward areas” in Pacific theater bases under US control (Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, and Okinawa) in case the security situation worsened in East Asia.
—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.
North Korea establishes the Academy of Sciences (朝鮮科學院).
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 47, 455.
North Korea’s Academy of Sciences holds its first general meeting.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 455.
North Korea’s Academy of Sciences holds its opening ceremony.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 42, 455.
North Korea establishes the Atomic Energy Research Institute (原子力硏究所) under the Academy of Sciences (朝鮮科學院). The institute begins to conduct research on radioactive isotopes for use in industry, agriculture, and medicine. The institute is placed under the administrative control of the Cabinet’s Atomic Energy Bureau (原子力總局) in January 1974.
—ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414; Hong Yun O, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
China sends scientist Wang Gan Chang to North Korea to “collect radioactive material.”
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “N Korea—Set To Join the ‘Nuclear Club’?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 12, 23 September 1989, p. 594.
27 January 1952
In a private hand-written memorandum, President Truman considers the possibility of using nuclear war to end the stalemate in the cease-fire talks in Panmunjom. “This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Darien, Odessa, Stalingrad and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated.” The memo becomes publicly available in 1972.
—“Truman, in 1952 Memos, Considered Nuclear Strike,” New York Times, 3 August 1980, p.22, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
18 May 1952
In a private hand-written memorandum, President Truman addresses his concerns over the failure of the Korean truce talks. “Now do you want an end to hostilities in Korea or do you want China and Siberia destroyed? You may have one or the other; whichever you want, these lies of yours at this conference have gone far enough. You either accept our fair and just proposal or you will be completely destroyed.” This memo becomes publicly available in 1972.
—“Truman, in 1952 Memos, Considered Nuclear Strike,” New York Times, 3 August 1980, p. 22, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff ask President Truman to authorize the deployment of “non-nuclear components to forward areas” in Pacific theater bases under US control (Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, and Okinawa) in case the security situation worsened in East Asia.
—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.
North Korea establishes the Academy of Sciences (朝鮮科學院).
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 47, 455.
North Korea’s Academy of Sciences holds its first general meeting.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 455.
North Korea’s Academy of Sciences holds its opening ceremony.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 42, 455.
North Korea establishes the Atomic Energy Research Institute (原子力硏究所) under the Academy of Sciences (朝鮮科學院). The institute begins to conduct research on radioactive isotopes for use in industry, agriculture, and medicine. The institute is placed under the administrative control of the Cabinet’s Atomic Energy Bureau (原子力總局) in January 1974.
—ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414; Hong Yun O, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
According to the Pyongyang Times, which cites “newly declassified documents,” President Dwight Eisenhower “insists on the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War.”
—Kim Un A, “US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea,” Pyongyang Times, 24 August 2002, http://www.times.dprkorea.com/.
31 March 1953
During a Special National Security Council Meeting, President Eisenhower outlines two goals if atomic weapons are to be used during the Korean War. Despite the lack of good tactical targets, using atomic weapons will be worth the cost if the US can “achieve a substantial victory over the communist forces, and get to a line at the waist of Korea.” President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles agree that the taboo surrounding nuclear weapons would have to be destroyed.
—“For Eisenhower, 2 Goals if Bomb Was to Be Used,” New York Times, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
8 April 1953
According to a Special Intelligence Advisory Committee Estimate, the communist forces would recognize the use of atomic weapons as “indicative of Western determination to carry the Korean War to a successful conclusion.” However, the report is unable to conclude whether or not this would be sufficient to coerce the communist forces to make the concessions necessary for reaching an armistice arrangement. The report says, “We believe the communist reaction would be in large part determined by the extent of damage inflicted.”
—“For Eisenhower, 2 Goals if Bomb Was to Be Used,” New York Times, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
13 May 1953
During a National Security Council Meeting, Generals Bradley and Hull recommend that the use of atomic weapons would be necessary if military operations are expanded outside of Korea. President Eisenhower expresses his belief that using tactical atomic weapons against Chinese Communists in dugout bunkers will be more cost effective than current conventional weapons.
—“For Eisenhower, 2 Goals if Bomb Was to Be Used,” New York Times, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
20 May 1953
During a National Security Council Meeting, President Eisenhower concludes that if the US wishes to pursue a more positive action on North Korea, the war will need to be expanded beyond Korea and it will be necessary to use atomic weapons. Eisenhower expresses concern about the Soviet response, but dismisses any Chinese retaliation as “the blow would fall so swiftly and with such force as to eliminate Chinese Communist intervention.”
—“For Eisenhower, 2 Goals if Bomb Was to Be Used,” New York Times, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
21 May 1953
US Secretary of State Dulles meets with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. During talks, he says that if the Korean armistice negotiations fail, “the United States would probably make a stronger, rather than a lesser military exertion, and that this might well extend the area of conflict.” This veiled threat is expected to be relayed to the Chinese.
—Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Papers Tell of ‘53 Policy to Use A-Bomb in Korea,” New York Times, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The Korean War Armistice is signed, but South Korean President Rhee Syngman refuses to sign the document. Some people believe that President Eisenhower’s implicit threats to use nuclear weapons result in the armistice. North Korea later accuses the Eisenhower administration of developing “22 plots to use atomic weapons against North Korea and other socialist countries.” [Note: The armistice fails to define the military demarcation line off the west coast, and the UN Command later unilaterally extends the line between western islands controlled by the UN Command and South Korean forces, but North Korea has not officially recognized this line. This disputed area has witnessed several naval clashes between the North and South Korean navies.]
—“Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea,” signed at Panmunjŏm, 27 July 1953; Rosemary J. Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3, Winter 1988/1989, pp. 92-93; Rosemary J. Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1985), pp. 204-231; Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 12-16; “Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Nuclear Strategy for Aggression,” Korean Central News Agency, 16 March 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/>; “Migug’ŭi Ch’imnyakchŏkhaekchŏllyag’e Taehae P’ongno/Rodongshinmun,” Korean Central News Agency, 16 March 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/>; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 115.
During the second plenary session of the North Korean Academy of Sciences, the decision is made to establish the “Atomic and Nuclear Physics Research Institute (原子 및 核物理學硏究所).”
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; Kim T’ae U, Haeg’ŭl A’nŭn Taet’ongnyŏng’i P’ilyohada (Forthcoming).
Six representatives from the North Korean Academy of Sciences participate in an Eastern European scientific conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; Michael J. Mazaar, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 25; So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 405.
North Korea conducts national nuclear defense exercises for military forces in rear areas.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 38.
North Korean nuclear specialists begin training in the USSR. Most of the specialists study at institutes of higher education including the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, the Bauman Higher Technical School, and the Moscow Energy Institute. The most qualified of the North Korean specialists work at the nuclear scientific research facilities in Dubna and Obninsk. Over 300 nuclear specialists, including 20 with doctorate degrees, and more that 150 advanced specialists are believed to have been trained during the period of cooperation between North Korea and the USSR.
—Gregory Karouv, “A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations,” in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 17; So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
North Korea establishes the “Radiochemistry Research Institute” (放射化學硏究所), which is also known as the “Radioactive Chemistry Institute” or the “Radioactive Chemistry Research Institute.”
—Hong Yun Ho, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.com>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 43.
The United States begins to deploy nuclear weapons to bases in Guam, Hawaii, and Okinawa.
—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.
North Korea signs the founding agreement and charter of the USSR’s “United Institute for Nuclear Research,” which is established in the city of Dubna to serve as an international research center for socialist countries. [Note: The official name of the institute is the “Joint Institute for Nuclear Research.”]
—Alexander Zhebin, “Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation,” Chapter Four in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 28-29; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
North Korea and the Soviet Union sign an agreement on the organization of “joint nuclear research (聯合核硏究所 組織에 關한 協定).” The agreement enables about 30 North Koreans to go to the USSR for training in nuclear technology. Pyongyang also decides to establish the Radiochemistry Research Institute (放射化學硏究所). [Note: One source, Kim Wŏn Hong of the Taehan Maeil, says the agreement was signed in February 1956.]
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116; Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 458; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; “‘Pukhaek’ Twi’e Sum’ŭn 4 Kae Chŏnsul/Hŏman (T’ŭkpyŏl’gigo),” Donga Ilbo, 23 March 1994, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea becomes a participating member of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, which opens in Dubna, near Moscow.
—Hong Yun O, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 41.
The Eisenhower administration approves NSC 5702/2, which includes a provision for the stationing of nuclear weapons in South Korea.
—Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 478.
The United States deploys 288-mm nuclear artillery and Honest John nuclear missiles to South Korea.
—Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 479.
The USSR helps North Korea establish the “Atomic Weapons Training Center” in or near Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province, under the Korea People’s Army.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 38.
The United States deploys nuclear weapons to South Korea for the first time. The weapons are in the form of “atomic artillery, Honest John missiles, bombs, and atomic demolition munitions.”
—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30; Michael J. Mazaar, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, May 1995), p. 20.
North Korea and the Soviet Union sign a nuclear cooperation treaty whereby the USSR agrees to provide technical assistance in the establishment of a nuclear research center in North Korea. [Note: The center is later established in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, North P’yŏng’an Province.]
—Alexander Zhebin, “Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation,” Chapter Four in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 30; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, pp. 404-411; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77.
The US Air Force deploys a squadron of Matador nuclear cruise missiles to South Korea. The missiles have a range of 1,100km.
—Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 479.
The United Nations Command in Seoul reveals that the United States has stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116.
North Korea signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with China, and additional protocols on the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the USSR.
—Harry Gilman and Norman Levin, The Future of Soviet and North Korean Relations (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, October 1984), p. 2; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>.
North Korea concludes an agreement with the USSR on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 432, 461; Lee Shin U, “Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Tŏp’ch’in Sae ‘Kinjangbogo’,” Kukmin Ilbo, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
According to the Rodong Sinmun, which cites “an official US document,” the Japanese government approves the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Japanese territory.
—“Japan Urged to Think Twice over Consequences,” Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2000, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/>; “Vietnam Chŏnjaengshigi Ilbon’ŭi Haengmugibanipsŭng’insashil’u Ronp’yŏng/Rodongshinmun,” Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2000, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/>.
Near the end of the Eisenhower administration, the United States has about 600 nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. There are about 800 at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa.
—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.
North Korea begins basic research and experiments in the field of atomic energy.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>.
The split in Sino-Soviet relations encourages North Korea to increase domestic production and to implement import substitution programs for weapons. North Korea establishes factories in sectors with extensive defense applications such as metallurgy, machine tools, precision machinery, automobiles, tractors, communications equipment, and shipbuilding. [Note: Indications of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations first begin to emerge in 1960.]
—ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), pp. 177-178.
North Korean technicians learn plutonium-reprocessing techniques while receiving training at Soviet plutonium separation facilities and laboratories. At the same time, the Soviet Union provides a number of hot cells as part of the agreement to supply the IRT-2000 research reactor.
—Mark Hibbs, “North Korea Thought to Have Separated PU in the 1970s With Soviet Help,” Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 17, No. 13, 22 June 1992, pp. 15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
North Korea begins construction of the Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun (寧邊郡), North P’yŏng’an Province (平安北道).
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>.
In Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev and Kim Il Sung sign the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Article One of the treaty provides that “Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.”
—“Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” signed in Moscow, 6 July 1961.
In Beijing, Chou En Lai and Kim Il Sung sign the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Article Two of the treaty provides that “In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting party shall immediately render military assistance by all means at its disposal.”
—“Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” signed in Beijing, 11 July 1961.
During the Korean Workers’ Party Fourth Party Congress (第4次大會), Professor To Sang Rok, the so-called “father of the North Korean nuclear program,” emphasizes that North Korea should conduct research and develop specialists in the field of atomic energy.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 110; ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), pp. 104, 113.
North Korea establishes atomic energy research institutes in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and Pakch’ŏn-kun, North P’yŏng’an Province.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77.
North Korea procures an IRT-2000 research reactor from the USSR.
—Lee Chŏng Hun, “Haek Chaech’orishisŏl Lee Chong Hun’i Pulbut’igo Chang Yŏng Shik’i Mulkkiŏntta,” Shindonga, September 2002, <http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/200209/
nd2002090130.html>.
North Korea begins construction for the installation of a Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 123; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>.
Kim Il Sung says the whole nation should be “turned in to a fortress...as a guarantee of survival against nuclear attack.”
—So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
The Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party adopts a policy to strengthen the military along “four lines.” The party seeks to: 1) improve political and technical discipline in the military; 2) modernize the military; 3) “arm” all the people with “class conscientiousness and military technology”; and 4) fortify the “whole country.” The military modernization program is a response to the modernization program in South Korea that followed the 1961 military coup d’état. The North Korean military modernization program includes expanded missile procurement and import substitution plans for arms production in general.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 246; ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), pp. 160-161; 262-263.
Construction of the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor begins in Yŏngbyŏn under the supervision Soviet nuclear scientist Vladislav Kotlov.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 41.
North Korea establishes a nuclear engineering department at the National Defense College in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. [Note: This report is unsubstantiated.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 38.
The P’yŏngsŏng Institute of Science begins to offer a course in nuclear physics.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 39.
During the graduation ceremony for the 7th class of the Kim Il Sung Military College (金日成軍事綜合大學), Kim Il Sung says, “We don’t have nuclear weapons. But we can stop [the attack of] nuclear weapons by digging and going underground.”
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116; So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
China assists North Korea in conducting a uranium mining survey of the entire country, revealing large deposits of commercial grade uranium ore near “Unggi-kun (웅기郡),” North Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡南道); Hamhŭng (咸興市), South Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡南道); Haegŭmgang-ri (海金剛里), Kosŏng-kun (高城郡), Kangwŏn Province (兩江道), and P’yŏngsan-kun (平山郡), North Hwanghae Province (黃海北道). [Note: According to North Korea, the survey revealed four million tons of commercial grade ore, but Bermudez believes the claim to be “undoubtedly exaggerated.” “Unggi-kun” is an old name for a section of what is now known as the “special administrative city of Nasŏn (羅先直轄市), which borders on Russia.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, pp. 406, 411; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, pp. 38, 41; Lee Shin U, “Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Tŏp’ch’in Sae ‘Kinjangbogo’,” Kukmin Ilbo, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
North Korea constructs and opens its “Nuclear Physics Research Institute (核物理學硏究所)” in Yŏngbyŏn-kun (寧邊郡), North P’yŏng’an Province (平安北道). The institute begins research on nuclear materials and fuel, physics, and engineering with a specific focus on nuclear reactors.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
The Kim Chaek University of Technology (金策工業大學) establishes courses related to nuclear technology.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, “Scud Missile Such’ullo ‘Oehwa’bŏr’i’/Mugi (Pukhanŭi San’ŏp),” Segye Ilbo, 11 March 1992, p. 12, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
The nuclear research complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, North P’yŏng’an Province is completed.
—Hong Yun O, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Lee Shin U, “Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Tŏp’ch’in Sae ‘Kinjangbogo’,” Kukmin Ilbo, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
With the assistance of Soviet nuclear specialists, North Korea opens its Nuclear Research Complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, North P’yŏng’an Province.
—ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 406; Michael J. Mazaar, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 25; So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
North Korea establishes the “Nuclear Physics Research Institute,” which is also known as the “Atomic Energy Research Institute and College of Physics.” [Note: According to South Korea’s Atomic Energy Research Institute, this institute was established in 1964.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 43.
According to Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., who cites a South Korean report, North Korea establishes the “Radioactive Isotope Utilization Research Institute” in Ch’ŏngjin, North Hamgyŏng Province. [Note: This is probably a reference to the “Isotope Production Laboratory (同位原素生産加工硏究所)” in the Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Center, or possibly the “Nanam Branch of the Atomic Energy Research Institute (原子力硏究所),” which is in Nanam-kuyŏk (羅南區域), Chŏngjin, (淸津市).]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 37.
North Korea begins to operate its IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor that it received from the Soviet Union.
—Kim Byŏng Ku, et al., Pukhaekkisulch’ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea completes the installation of a Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun (寧邊郡), North P’ŏng’an Province (平安北道). The 2MW(th) IRT-2000 research reactor is a pool-type reactor that has the capacity to use highly enriched uranium as fuel. At about the same time, the USSR also supplies North Korea with a small 0.1MW critical assembly for the same location. The reactor undergoes two years of testing before beginning regular operations in 1967. [Note: North Korean engineers later increase the reactor’s capacity from 2MW(th) to 4MW(th), and then to 8MW(th).]
—Gregory Karouv, “A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations,” in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 16; Alexander Zhebin, “Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation,” in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 31; ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 406; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” March 1999, <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>; Hong Yun O, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
Dr. Lee Sŭng Ki (이승기) is named the director of the Atomic Energy Research Institute. [Note: Lee is best-known for his work in chemistry, and he is the inventor of the synthetic fabric “vinalon.” Lee is named director of the Academy of Sciences, Hamhŭng Branch in April 1984. This branch of the academy is a suspect chemical weapons R&D facility.]
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 150.
The Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor in Yŏngbyŏn goes critical. The reactor’s capacity is 2MW(th). [Note: The date is noteworthy as the 20th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 41.
According to Ko Yŏng Hwan, who defected from North Korea in 1991, Pyongyang obtains nuclear equipment from Austria and France for its underground nuclear facility in Pakch’ŏn-kun, (博川郡), North P’yŏng’an Province (平安北道). [Note: Pakch’ŏn-kun is also the site of a North Korean air base.]
—“North Korea Suspected of Building Second Nuclear Arms Base,” Agence France Presse, 29 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; KBS Television (Seoul), 13 September 1991, in “In Less than Five Years North Korea Will Collapse from Within,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 September 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Kim Il Sung issues directive to develop nuclear warheads for missiles.
—Interview with North Korean defector by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 1 November 2001, Seoul.
The Soviet-supplied 2MW(th) IRT-2000 research reactor begins regular operation. The reactor is used to produce radioactive isotopes for medicine, industry, and scientific research.
—Alexander Zhebin, “Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation,” in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 31; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 406; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
The total number of US nuclear weapons deployed in the Pacific theater peaks at about 3,200 weapons, with about 2,600 of them in South Korea and Okinawa.
—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.
North Korea procures a “25 Mev Betatron.”
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 44.
The USSR supplies North Korea with a 0.1MW critical assembly. The critical assembly is installed in Yŏngbyŏn.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 41.
Thirty-one North Korean commandos secretly cross the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on a mission to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee. The commandos approach within about 800m of the presidential residence, but fail to assassinate Park. All but one of the commandos are eventually killed or commit suicide. Thirty-one South Koreans die in the fire fights, and 44 are wounded. North Korea later denies it is responsible for the attack, claiming the perpetrators are South Korean citizens rising up against the government.
—Chuck Downs, Over the Line (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 121-122; 124.
North Korea captures the USS Pueblo off Wŏnsan on North Korea’s east coast. North Korea claims the ship was in North Korea’s territorial waters, but the United States claims it was in international waters. One American crewman dies and 82 are captured by the North Korean Navy. North Korea releases the crew exactly 11 months later.
—Chuck Downs, Over the Line (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 122-146; “U.S. Warned Not to Forget Lesson from ‘Pueblo’ Incident,” Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Migug’ŭn <Pueblo> Hoŭi Kyohun’ŭl Itchi Mar’aya Handa/Oegug’indŭl’ŭi Panhyang,” Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Anti-U.S. Education Intensified in DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Chosŏn’esŏ’ŭi Panmi’gyoyang,” Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.
The North Korean Air Force shoots down a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane in international air space over the Sea of Japan, killing all 31 crewmembers.
—Chuck Downs, Over the Line (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 146-148.
North Korea begins geological surveys in North P’yŏng’an Province, South P’yŏng’an Province, North Hamgyŏng Province, and North Hwanghae Province. Survey teams are later able to confirm the existence of uranium deposits in Musan-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province; P’yŏngsan-kun, North Hwanghae Province; Sunchŏn, South P’yŏng’an Province; and P’yŏngwŏn-kun, North P’yŏng’an Province.
—ROK National Intelligence Service, “Pukhanŭi Uranium Kwang Kaebal Shilt’ae,” 27 April 1999, <http://www.nis.go.kr>; Yonhap News Agency, Chapter Eight “Kunsa,” in 2002 Pukhan Yŏn’gam (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 2002).
North Korea begins to construct its “science town” in the city of P’yŏngsŏng (平城市), South P’yŏng’an Province. Construction is completed in 1983. [Note: P’yŏngsŏng is later incorporated into the City of Pyongyang.]
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 62.
North Korea begins “nuclear fuel-related” research.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea uses indigenous technology to expand the capacity of the IRT-2000 research reactor to 4MW(th).
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea “apparently builds an isotope processing facility with Soviet assistance.” The facility has a total of seven “hot cells.” [Note: This is a reference to the Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79.
North Korea begins developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. In order to expand knowledge of nuclear science and create the intellectual framework necessary for a nuclear weapons program, North Korea establishes several research institutions during this time. Among the institutions created during the early 1970s were the Nuclear Research Center in Yŏngbyŏn, the Nuclear Energy Research Institute, and the Radiological Institute. [Note: The “Nuclear Research Center in Yŏngbyŏn” could be a reference to the “Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Center (寧邊原子力硏究센터),” which was established in 1964. The “Nuclear Energy Research Institute” could be the “Atomic Energy Research Institute (原子力硏究所)” in Yŏngbyŏn. The “Radiological Institute” could be the “Radiation Protection Research Institute (放射線防護硏究所)” or the “Radiochemistry Research Institute (放射化學硏究所),” which are both in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]
—Valery I. Denisov, “Nuclear Institutions and Organizations in North Korea,” in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 22-23; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 406-408.
South Korean Central Intelligence Agency Direct Lee Hu Rak secretly visits Pyongyang and meets with Kim Il Sung. The two sides discuss the eventual unification of Korea, and Kim tells Lee to convey his apology for the attempted assassination of Park Chung Hee in January 1968, saying he was unaware of it. Kim blamed the attempt on “leftist chauvinists” who were purged following the incident.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 23-26; “South-North Joint Communiqué,” 4 July 1972, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr>.
North Korean Deputy Premier Park Sŏng Ch’ŏl pays a secret visit to Seoul and meets with Park Chung Hee and South Korean Central Intelligence Director Lee Hu Rak.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 23-26; “South-North Joint Communiqué,” 4 July 1972, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr>.
Dr. Kim Kyŏng Ha, “a famous atomic bomb specialist,” leaves Canada and enters North Korea to work on the development of nuclear weapons.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 117.
North and South Korea sign a joint communiqué that declares three principles for Korean unification: 1) unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference; 2) unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, without resorting to the use of force against each other; and 3) a great racial unity as one people shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. The communiqué also provides for the establishment of a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang to prevent the inadvertent outbreak of military conflict. [Note: Following the signing of the joint communiqué, both Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee are able to push through constitutional revisions that concentrate power in the executive.]
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 23-26; “South-North Joint Communiqué,” 4 July 1972, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr>.
During an address regarding North Korea’s economic development plan, Kim Il Sung gives instructions to promote research for the development of atomic energy, semiconductors, and electronics.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 54.
Kim Il Sung University establishes a nuclear physics department. Kim Ch’aek University of Technology establishes departments in “nuclear and electrical engineering (核電氣工學), nuclear fuel engineering (核燃料工學), and atomic reactor engineering (原子爐工學).”
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>.
North Korean engineers expand the capacity of the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 reactor from 2MW(th) to 4MW(th).
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 123.
North Korean engineers expand the capacity of the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 reactor from 2MW(th) to 4MW(th).
—Kim Byŏng Ku, et al., Pukhaekkisulch’ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korean engineers expand the capacity of the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor to 8MW(th).
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 41.
North Korea’s Atomic Energy Act (原子力法) is enacted. The law establishes one research complex, one research academy, and two committees for nuclear-related research. The Atomic Energy Research Institute (原子力硏究所) is placed under the administration of the Cabinet’s Atomic Energy Bureau (原子力總局).
—ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414.
During his trip to Beijing, Kim Il Sung asks Chou En Lai’s assistance to establish a North Korean nuclear program. Kim also asks for a security guarantee from China by being placed under China’s nuclear umbrella. Although China does not meet all of Kim’s requests, Beijing does provide training for North Korean nuclear scientists and engineers.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 408.
North Korea joins the IAEA.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 439; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
Ch’oe Hak Kŭn (최학근) is assigned as a counselor to North Korea’s office at the IAEA in Vienna. Ch’oe is stationed there for four years, and is said to acquire large amounts of information related to the design of nuclear reactors and other nuclear technologies in the IAEA library. [Note: Ch’oe is appointed Atomic Energy and Industry Minister in December 1986.]
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 114.
The Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn becomes operational.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 43.
North Korea establishes its “Isotope Processing Research Institute.”
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77.
North Korea begins plutonium extraction activity on a small scale. North Korea later reports that it reprocessed 300 milligrams at this time from the IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor’s spent fuel. The spent fuel is reprocessed at the Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn.
—David Albright, Kevin O’ Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2000), pp. 97, 121-122; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 117, 123, 129.
North Korea conducts “chemistry experiments” with uranium and plutonium. [Note: This is probably a reference to reprocessing that was done at the Isotope Production Laboratory.]
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea begins plans to expand its nuclear facilities, including the construction of a 30MW graphite-moderated reactor. Intelligence sources believe that reactor construction began in 1980. [Note: The reactor’s capacity is later rated at 5MW(e), which is about 20-25MW(th).]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 408.
North Korea and Romania are believed to have cooperated on nuclear matters. [Note: While the exact nature of the nuclear cooperation remains unknown, Bermudez believes that the nuclear assistance provided by Romania was quite limited due to Romania’s lack of experience with nuclear energy and the fact that they were pursuing Canadian CANDU technology. The assistance, however limited, ended in 1889 with the assassination of Ceausescu.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 410.
North Korea constructs its first nuclear waste storage site in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 44.
North Korea acquires two IRIS-50 computers from France. One is provided to the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, and the other to the Mathematics Research Institute (數學硏究所) under the Academy of Engineering and Science (工學科學院).
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 78.
The United States and South Korea hold the first Team Spirit joint military exercise. Team Spirit is an expanded and renamed version of an earlier joint exercise that began in 1969.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 76, 257.
North Korean soldiers use axes to kill two US Army officers in the Joint Security Area at P’anmunjŏm. The confrontation between a United Nations Command (UNC) work crew and North Korean soldiers takes place as the crew is beginning to trim a tree that was blocking the view of a guard post. The tree-cutting operation is completed three days later after UNC forces go on full alert and the two sides go to the brink of war.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.74-83; Chuck Downs, Over the Line (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 151-158.
North Korea and Pakistan sign a protocol on technical cooperation.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 442.
Kim Il Sung says, “We will have nothing to fear if others have nuclear weapons.”
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 117.
North Korea uses indigenous technology to expand the capacity of the IRT-2000 research reactor to 8MW(th).
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
During a visit to China, Korean Workers’ Party Secretary Kang Sŏng San visits the Lop Nur nuclear test and research facility. He later attends a reception hosted by the Seventh Machine Industry Ministry, which is responsible for China’s ballistic missile program.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 408.
A North Korean delegation that includes 27 “nuclear missile specialists” participates in a reception given by China’s Seventh Machine Industry Ministry (第7機械工業省). The delegation later departs for a nuclear test site in the Xinjiang (新疆) Uighur Autonomous Region. [Note: The site is almost certainly the “Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Site.”]
—“Pukkoe’sŏhaek Missile Yŏn’gu,” Donga Ilbo, 9 April 1977, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
North Korea and Libya sign a cooperative agreement on science and technology.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 442.
North Korea signs a INFCIRC/66 trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The agreement between North Korea, the USSR, and the IAEA allows the IAEA to monitor the Soviet-supplied 8MW(th) IRT-2000 research reactor and 0.1MW critical assembly located in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—Jared S. Dreicer, “How Much Plutonium Could Have Been Produced in the DPRK IRT Reactor?,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 8, 2000, p. 275; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea's Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1991, p. 406; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77.
North Korea’s Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 reactor comes under IAEA inspections.
—Kim Byŏng Ku, et al., Pukhaekkisulch’ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr>.
According to South Korean sources, North Korea establishes an “Atomic Energy Research Institute” or the “Nuclear Physics Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences” in Pyongyang. Bermudez claims the institute is also known as a “Radioactive Protection Research Institute,” the “Pyongyang Nuclear Research Institute” or the “Pyongyang Nuclear Power Institute,” and that it “is believed to be engaged in accelerator research.” Bermudez also reports that an “Atomic Energy Research Center” is established in Wŏnsan, Kangwŏn Province at this time. [Note: The “Atomic Energy Research Institute in Pyongyang” is probably the “Pyongyang Atomic Energy Research Academy (平壤原子力硏究院)” that was established under North Korea’s “Atomic Energy Act” on 23 January 1974; the “Wŏnsan Branch” of the Atomic Energy Research Institute was also probably founded under the same act.]
—ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, pp. 75-77; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 40.
North Korea begins construction of 5MW(e) “Research Reactor No. 1” in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>; Hong Yun O, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Ch’oe Maeng Ho, “Puk Haekkaebal Ŏnŭsujun’in’ga/IAEA Sach’allo Palghyŏjin Shilt’ae (Ch’ojŏm),” Donga Ilbo, 11 June 1992, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 41.
North Korea decides to build a fuel rod fabrication plant in Yŏngbyŏn. Construction begins in 1980-1981.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 43.
North Korea begins construction of a “fuel fabrication facility” in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79.
North Korea begins small-scale operations at a milling plant (정련공장) in Pakch’ŏn-kun, North P’yŏng’an Province. The facility produces “yellow cake” from uranium ore extracted at the Sunch’ŏn Uranium Mine.
—ROK National Intelligence Service, “Pukhanŭi Uranium Kwang Kaebal Shilt’ae,” 27 April 1999, <http://www.nis.go.kr>; Yonhap News Agency, Chapter Eight “Kunsa,” in 2002 Pukhan Yŏn’gam (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 2002).
US intelligence discovers that North Korea is building a nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—David Albright, “How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, <http://www.thebulletin.org>.
According to an “official report from one Western government completed in mid-November 1991,” Pakistan receives uranium-enrichment technology from Uranit GmbH, the German partner in URENCO’s centrifuge enrichment consortium. The technology is delivered through Switzerland and is possibly re-exported to North Korea.
—Mark Hibbs, “Agencies Trace Some Iraqi URENCO Know-How to Pakistan Re-Export,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 32, No. 48, 28 November 1991, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
North Korea begins construction of “a second nuclear reactor” in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. [Note: This is the 5MW(e) “Research Reactor No. 1.”]
—So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
According to intelligence sources, North Korea begins construction of a 30MW reactor in Yŏngbyŏn. [Note: This is a reference to the 5MW(e) reactor, which has a capacity of about 20-25MW(th).]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 408; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77; David Albright, “How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, <http://www.thebulletin.org>.
North Korea establishes a branch of the Nanam Atomic Energy Research Institute (나남 原子力硏究所) in Ch’ŏngjin, North Hamgyŏng Province.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea’s Chemical Bureau is renamed as the “Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau” under the General Staff Department of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng, (Seoul: Sŏmundang, 1999), p. 359.
(North) Korean Central Television reports that North Korea has an estimated 26 million tons of natural uranium deposits, of which about four million tons can be economically extracted.
—ROK National Intelligence Service, “Pukhanŭi Uranium Kwang Kaebal Shilt’ae,” 27 April 1999, <http://www.nis.go.kr>; Yonhap News Agency, Chapter Eight “Kunsa,” in 2002 Pukhan Yŏn’gam (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 2002).
North Korea starts construction on the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 117, 124; Lee Chŏng Hun, “Haek Chaech’orishisŏl Lee Chong Hun’i Pulbut’igo Chang Yŏng Shik’i Mulkkiŏntta,” Shindonga, September 2002, <http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/200209/
nd2002090130.html>.
North Korea sends 150 scientists to the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, near Moscow, for training.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea establishes the Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau under the General Staff Department of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. [Note: According to Chang Chun Ik, this agency was established in 1980.]
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in “Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations,” FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 40.
North Korea begins a long-term construction project to expand Kim Chaek University of Technology (金策工業大學). The project is completed in January 1993. [Note: The university has departments in nuclear engineering, precision machinery, and nuclear electronics.]
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 104.
Kim Jong Il visits the Nuclear Research Complex in Yŏngbyŏn for the first time, and the area around the complex is named “Pun’gang-chigu (分江地區).”
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkabal Kujo Mit Ŭiji,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea establishes nuclear physics colleges at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang and at the P’yŏngsŏng College of Science in P’yŏngsŏng, South P’yŏng’an Province.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, pp. 75-76; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, pp. 39-40.
A branch of the Atomic Energy Research Institute is established in Nanam-kuyŏk, Ch’ŏngjin, North Hamgyŏng Province. [Note: Bermudez says “Nanam is a city southwest of Ch’ŏngjin,” but it became a district (kuyŏk) of Ch’ŏngjin in October 1960.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 75; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 39.
North Korea establishes an Atomic Energy Research Institute in P’yŏngsŏng, South P’yŏng’an Province. Bermudez quotes South Korean sources as saying the institute has a staff of 5,000-6,000.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 75.
North Korea begins to operate its uranium milling facility in P’akch’ŏn-kun, North P’yŏng’an Province. According to South Korea’s Technology Center for Nuclear Control, the facility has a capacity of 210MTU per year, but is closed down in 1992. [Note: Bermudez refers to this facility as a “uranium concentrate facility.”]
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 132; Kim Byŏng Ku, et al., Pukhaekkisulch’ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr>; Ch’oe Maeng Ho, “Puk Haekkaebal Ŏnŭsujun’in’ga/IAEA Sach’allo Palghyŏjin Shilt’ae (Ch’ojŏm),” Donga Ilbo, 11 June 1992, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 77; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 40.
North Korea develops the first steps in the uranium enrichment process of converting UO2 to UF6.
—KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea completes construction of its “science town” in the city of P’yŏngsŏng (平城市), South P’yŏng’an Province. Construction began in late 1970. [Note: P’yŏngsŏng is later incorporated into the City of Pyongyang.]
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 62.
North Korea conducts about 70-80 high explosives tests that are believed to be part of its nuclear weapons development program. [Note: Reports are inconclusive about the exact number of tests, with reports citing both “about 70” and about “80.” It is also uncertain exactly when the testing stopped, but apparently the testing had been completed by November 1991. In March 1993, South Korea’s Defense Minister, Kwŏn Yŏng Hae, said that North Korea “had cleaned up its high explosive test site, and is trying to destroy all the evidence.”]
—ROK Ministry of National Defense, Taeryangsalsangmugi (WMD) Mundappaekkwa:Hwa Saeng Pang Missile Ŏlmana Algo Kyeshimnikka? (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2001), p. 93; “‘Pukhan, 2~3 Nyŏnnae Haengmujang’/Chaech’ŏrishisŏl Wansŏngdoemyŏn Yŏn 10 Yŏbal Chejo,” Taehan Maeil, 10 November 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kim Wŏn Hong, “Puk, Naenyŏnbut’ŏ Wŏnjat’an Pon’gyŏk Saengsandan’gye,” Taehan Maeil, 9 November 1991, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “‘Kinjanggojo Kunsadaebich’aek Majŏn’/Kwŏn Kukpang Kukhoebogo,” Chosun Ilbo, 17 March 1993, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
North Korea begins construction of its 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn. [Note: US intelligence satellites detect the reactor in early 1989.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 404-411; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 78; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 43; Kim Byŏng Ku, et al., Pukhaekkisulch’ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr>.
North Korea completes a “uranium refinement facility” in P’yŏngsan-kun (平山郡), North Hwanghae Province (黃海北道) that can convert uranium ore into UO2. [Note: According to Bermudez, some sources claim the facility becomes operational in 1986, while others claim 1990.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 75.
According to a “German intelligence investigation,” Pakistan steals uranium melting technology from URENCO. According to the source, North Korea possibly receives the technology later from Pakistan. [Note: If Pakistan did obtain the technology, it was probably acquired from a consortium partner or subsidiary, and was more likely to have been purchased than stolen.]
—Mark Hibbs, “Agencies Trace Some Iraqi URENCO Know-How to Pakistan Re-Export,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 32, No. 48, 28 November 1991, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The 5MW(e) “Research Reactor No. One” in Yŏngbyŏn-kun goes critical. It begins regular operations in late 1986.
—Hong Yun O, “Haekshisŏl 18 Kos’e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng,” Hankook Ilbo, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
The construction of “a cylindrical smokestack and a reactor roof” are completed. [Note: This is probably a reference to the 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn.]
—So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
According to South Korean sources, North Korea establishes a “uranium enrichment facility in P’yŏngsan-kun, North Hwanghae Province. [Note: There is often confusion in the translation and meaning of the English words “enrichment, refining, and milling” and the Korean words “濃縮, 製鍊, and 精鍊.”]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 75.
North Korea possibly acquires dual-use annealing furnace equipment and uranium melting technology. The equipment is manufactured by the German firm Leybold, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Degussa AG, but is reportedly delivered to North Korea through third countries, probably India, Pakistan, and/or East Germany. [Note: Annealing furnaces can be used for the smelting/refining of uranium and for treating maraging steel rotors, which are used in gas centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU).]
—Mark Hibbs, “Agencies Trace Some Iraqi URENCO Know-How to Pakistan Re-Export,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 32, No. 48, 28 November 1991, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
North Korea carries out about 70 high explosives tests along the banks of the Kuryŏng River near the Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Complex. The craters from the explosions are detected by reconnaissance satellites, but North Korea claims the depressions are natural formations. Critics claim the tests are for the development of nuclear weapons. According to Bermudez, the site is “sometimes identified as the ‘Yongduk Dong Explosives Facility.”
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 44.
North Korea begins construction of the 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 125-126.
North Korea begins construction of a uranium milling facility near its uranium mine in P’yŏngsan-kun, North Hwanghae Province.
—Ch’oe Maeng Ho, “Puk Haekkaebal Ŏnŭsujun’in’ga/IAEA Sach’allo Palghyŏjin Shilt’ae (Ch’ojŏm),” Donga Ilbo, 11 June 1992, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
North Korea exports $6 billion worth of uranium ore (0.8 percent uranium) to the Soviet Union. Pyongyang invests $4 billion of the export earnings in the building of locks around the coastal city of Namp’o, and $2 billion in the construction of the Sunch’ŏn Vinalon Factory.
—KAERI, “Kit’a Pukhanŭi Haekkaebal Kwallyŏn Naeyong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>.
Vladimir Kumachev, of Russia’s Institute of National Security and Strategic Research, says the Soviet Union discovers that North Korea is enriching “more uranium than is necessary for non-military purposes, and that secret underground bases have been set up in the mountains.”
—“North Korea Has Nukes: Russian Defence Official,” Agence France Presse, 14 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “‘Pukhan Imi Haekshilhŏm’/Russia Anboyŏn’gomun/’Haengmugi Poyu Haekshil’,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, 15 February 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “‘Pukhan Haekt’andu Itta’/Rŏ Kukpangjŏllyakyŏ’guso Kowigwalli Palghyŏ,” Hankyoreh Shinmun, 15 February 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “Rŏ ‘Puk Kaekt’andu Poyu’/Kukpang’yŏn Pojwagwan/Africa’sŏ Imi Shilhŏm Wallyo,” Segye Ilbo, 15 February 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “Heangmugi-Unbansudan Puk Imi Poyujujang/Rŏ Chŏnmun’ga,” Taehan Maeil, 15 February 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
North Korea begins construction of its “radiochemistry laboratory” in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. This facility is also known as the “December Enterprise (12月企業所).”
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 117-118, 126.
North Korea establishes nuclear defense analysis teams at its Navy headquarters, and at the Fourth Corps near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in “Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations,” FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 40.
The “Fuel Fabrication Facility” in Yŏngbyŏn-kun becomes operational.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 43.
The 5MW(e) “Research Reactor No. One” in Yŏngbyŏn goes critical.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 41.
The 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn goes critical for the first time.
—Kim Byŏng Ku, et al., Pukhaekkisulch’ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr>; Ch’oe Maeng Ho, “Puk Haekkaebal Ŏnŭsujun’in’ga/IAEA Sach’allo Palghyŏjin Shilt’ae (Ch’ojŏm),” Donga Ilbo, 11 June 1992, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
North Korea signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the provisions of the NPT, North Korea has 18 months to negotiate and sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea later says it signed the treaty “to convert the unstable state of neither war nor peace on the Korean peninsula into solid peace, to eliminate the danger of nuclear...to implement its non-nuclear peace policy, to strengthen the nuclear weapons nonproliferation system, and to contribute to defending world peace and security.”
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 1991, p. 409; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 74; “Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 254; Korea Central Broadcasting Station, 18 September 1990, in “North Korea Explains Its Refusal to Sign Nuclear Safeguards Agreement,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 September 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
North Korea and the USSR sign an economic, scientific, and technical agreement during Premier Kang Sŏng San’s trip to Moscow. The agreement reportedly includes the Soviet provision of four light water nuclear reactors as a quid pro quo for Pyongyang’s signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—Ch’oe Ŭi Sŏk, “So, Pukhan Wŏnjŏn’gŏnsŏl Chiwŏn/Kerashimo’p’ŭ Taebyŏn’in,” Segye Ilbo, 3 March 1990, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “So, Pukhan Wŏnjŏn Kŏnsŏl Chiwŏn,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2 March 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; So Yong-ha, “Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in “North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed,” FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26; Joseph | | |
