This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1994
Pakistan's former Prime Minister M. Qureshi states that Pakistan obtained "comparable systems" from China between 1989 and 1992 after a few scud missiles were launched from Afghanistan towards Pakistan.
—Pravin Sawhney, "Chinese Missile Technology Transfer Alleged," Asian Age (New Delhi), 27 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960827000380, 27 August 1996.

1994
An arrangement is made between Pakistan, China, and North Korea whereby China will provide technical assistance to Pakistan for the establishment and expansion of ballistic missile infrastructure within Pakistan while maintaining its pledges to the United States. According to the arrangement, China will provide Pakistan with soft technology and engineering for a new Pakistani Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) called Ghauri. North Korea will act as an agent for the transfer of Chinese technology and will provide Pakistan with hardware and components from its Nodong and Taepodong missile programs. China is believed to have agreed to supply components like the guidance systems, the areas in which North Korea does not have sufficient technological capability.
—Joseph Bermudez, "A silent partner," Jane's Defense Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey), 20 May 1998.

11-14 March 1994
A visit by US State Department officials to China fails to break the Sino-US impasse on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The US delegation indicates that Washington is willing to lift sanctions on China if Beijing signs the MTCR and "comes to an understanding" concerning future missile and missile technology transfers to Pakistan. However, China would prefer that the United States lift sanctions before it signs the MTCR. In a subsequent statement, US Undersecretary of State for International Security Lynn Davis says that the United States is closely watching China and is willing to impose stricter sanctions on China.
—Inside the Pentagon, 24 March 1994, pp. 9-10; Defense Daily, 23 March 1994, p. 436; Arms Control Today, April 1994, p. 28.

22 March 1994
US Undersecretary of State Lynn E. Davis says that the Clinton administration is willing to provide Pakistan with F-16 combat aircraft if Pakistan agrees to cap its nuclear weapons program.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Proposes Sale of F-16s to Pakistan; Deal Would Require Islamabad to Cap Its Nuclear Weapons Program," Washington Post, 23 March 1994, First Section, p. A27; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 March 1994, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

April 1994
North Korean Foreign Ministry delegation led by Pak Chung Kuk travels to Iran and Pakistan.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.

April 1994
US satellite imagery detects M-11 missile canisters at the Sargodha Air Force base in Pakistan; the canisters are similar to the ones seen at the M-11 ballistic missile plant in China. However, US intelligence assesses that the canisters are probably mock ups.
—Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 1999), p. 268.

8 April 1994
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto indicates that Pakistan will reject the Clinton administration's proposal of providing Pakistan with F-16 fighter planes in return for a cap on Pakistan's nuclear program because it does not require India to do the same. Pakistan has already paid $658 million for the planes, but their shipment is blocked due to a law that prohibits military aid to Pakistan unless the president can state that Pakistan is not developing a nuclear weapons program.
—John Ward Anderson, "Pakistan Rebuffs U.S. On A-Bomb; Bhutto Says Plan Would Favor India," Washington Post, 8 April 1994, First Section, p. A30; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 April 1994, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1994
A US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report states that "Pakistan has ordered a further payment to China on the 1988 M-11 deal, and Chinese engineers plan soon to provide further M-11 training to the Pakistani army. Though we continue to receive reports that M-11s are in Pakistan, the Army has made no plans for field deployment and is just beginning to formulate an operational doctrine for the system. Pakistan, on 22 August [1994], made arrangements to pay China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation $15 million for the 1988 contract for M-11 missiles, launchers, and support equipment, according to special intelligence. We have no indication of upcoming shipments or other events that would explain the timing of this payment. The last known payment on this contract—$83 million—was in late 1992 for unspecified 'goods' shipped at that time; subsequent reporting has provided strong evidence that missiles were part of the cargo.

A Chinese team is expected to arrive at Pakistan's Sargodha missile facility in September to provide training on the M-11, probably on the handling of spare parts, according to special intelligence and a clandestine source. This team is probably separate from one that reportedly will arrive later this year—once the Sargodha facility is complete—to unpack and assemble M-11s. The latter team's arrival has been repeatedly delayed by the Pakistanis, ostensibly because of the need to complete construction at Sargodha, but almost certainly because of the greater likelihood of US detection of the missiles once assembled.

At least some of the M-11s that had been dispersed at military locations throughout Pakistan are now being stored at Sargodha, according to a clandestine source. But we have yet to see operational missiles on imagery. April imagery showed canisters at Sargodha similar to ones seen at the M-11 production facility in China. But a missile-handling exercise was under way at Sargodha at that time, and the canisters were assessed to be mock-ups for use in that exercise."
—Document cited in, Bill Gertz, Betrayal: Howe the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 1999), p. 268.

September 1994
A North Korean delegation, led by chairman of the North Korean State Commission of Science and Technology, travels to Pakistan.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.

8 September 1994
The political counselor at the Pakistani embassy in Washington, DC, Zamir Akram, says that Pakistan has made no secret of its purchase of M-11 ballistic missiles from China. Zakram adds that the M-11 imports are a reaction to India's ballistic missile program, and Pakistan has no choice in this regard. Zakram also insists that the M-11s do not meet the range requirements spelled out in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and hence are not subject to any restrictions under the regime.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 8 September 1994, First Section, P. A32; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 September 1994, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Simon Beck, "New 'Evidence' of Pakistan arms sale," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 8 September 1994, China, p. 16; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 September 1994, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 September 1994
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and US Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy meet to resolve the dispute regarding China's transfer of M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. The preliminary negotiations are expected to set the stage for meetings between Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher in November 1994.
—Patrick E. Tyler, "China ready to End Feud on Missiles," New York Times, 27 September 1994, p. A7; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 September 1994, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 October 1994
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen tells reporters that China has not violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by transferring M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. Qichen adds that "China's policy on arms sales is a very responsible one...[and] China does not engage in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which may produce instability and conflict in regions concerned." Qichen also tells US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that the M-11 sales do not violate MTCR; he also objects to US sales of F-16s to Taiwan.
—Bill Gertz, "U.S., China clash over missile deal; Beijing argues arms sales to Pakistan don't violate treaty," Washington Times, 4 October 1994; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 October1994, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 October 1994
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher sign the "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation," in which China promises not to "export ground-to-ground missiles featuring the primary characteristics of the [MTCR]...that is, inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300km with a payload of at least 500kg." The agreement also states, "this Chinese commitment represents a global ban on exports, and goes beyond the requirements set forth in the MTCR, which call for a strong presumption of denial, for such missile exports." By signing this agreement, China accepts the US argument that missiles are to be restricted if they have the "inherent capability" to be modified to a capability covered under MTCR guidelines, "regardless of its demonstrated or advertised combination of range and payload." China and the United States also agree to "hold in-depth discussions" on the MTCR and the possibility of China's eventual membership in the regime.
—"Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation, 4 October 1994; Jon B. Wolfsthal, "U.S., China Reach New Accords On MTCR, Fissile Cut-Off Issues," Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 28; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress, CRS Issue Brief, 16 November 1995, p. 12.

5 October 1994
The United States agrees to lift economic sanctions imposed on Chinese entities for exporting M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. A US State Department statement says, "Once the sanctions are waived, China will not export ground-to-ground missiles featuring the primary parameters of the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime]...this Chinese commitment represents a global ban on exports, and goes beyond the requirements set forth in the MTCR." The Sino-US agreement that was signed on 4 October also calls for the automatic imposition of new economic sanctions if new M-11s are discovered in Pakistan. A US State Department official explains that the agreement with China signals that the United States has accepted the M-11 transfer to Pakistan.
—Bill Gertz, "China will stop missile sales; U.S. will lift sanctions; Pakistan was recipient of M-11s," Washington Times, 5 October 1994; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 October 1994, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 December 1994
Pakistan's President Farooq Ahmad Leghari, on a week-long visit to China, states that Pakistan has not received any M-11 missiles from China nor has China sold any M-11 missiles to Pakistan. He, however, adds "We have obtained some missiles which are within the MTCR parameters."
—"Pakistan president urges closing of China trade gap," Agence France Presse, 5 December 1994, International News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 December 1994, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early 1995
Pakistani agents try to obtain laser measuring equipment from Hungary but the shipment is stopped by British authorities.
—Andrew Koch, "Pakistan persists with nuclear procurement," Jane's Intelligence Review (Coulsdon, Surrey), March 1997.

March 1995
US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation in State Department, Robert Einhorn, comments that the United States may have no choice but to impose Missile Technology Control Regime Category I sanctions against China if enough evidence is gathered to prove that it sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan.
—Pushpindar Singh, Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), May 1995, p. 83.

April 1995
US reconnaissance satellites apparently photograph M-11 missile canisters at a Pakistani facility in Sargodha.
—Bill Gertz, "Pakistan Deploys Chinese Missiles," Washington Times, 12 June 1996, pp. A1, A14.

May 1995
US authorities warn that Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) is attempting to obtain equipment and materials for producing ballistic missiles. SUPARCO has approached several European nations with requests for "composites, specialist alloy, and a range of production and testing equipment." SUPARCO tries to acquire electron-beam-welding equipment from a Cambridge-based company in the United States. The request is rejected and was reported to the Britain's Department of Trade and Industry's Export Control organization.
—"USA warns of Pakistan missile plan," Flight International, 17 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 May 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

May 1995
Pakistan's Defense Production Board comprehensively reviews the impact on Pakistan's security due to India's missile program and decides to expand the range of Hatf and Anza missiles.
—"Daily Urges Military Buildup To Counter India," Jang (Karachi), May 9 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000322, 9 May 1995.

5 May 1995
Chief of the Awami Qiyadat Party and former Commander-in-Chief of Pakistani Army General Mirza Aslam Beg says Pakistan has stopped producing M-11 missiles with Chinese assistance and adds that Pakistan has acquired the technology to make M-11 missiles from China.
—"Editorial Voices Concern Over Military, India," Khabrain (Islamabad), 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950505000103, 5 May 1995.

31 May 1995
Pakistan's President Farooq Ahmad Leghari says Pakistan has the capability to protect itself against India's missile threat and urges India not to initiate the second phase of its missile production and deployment. President Leghari says India's Prithvi missile is "Pakistan-specific" and says India's actions are pushing Pakistan to pursue an arms race. President Leghari says that Pakistan desires a "zero missile level" in the region and he proposes holding missile talks between India and Pakistan in a bilateral or multilateral setting.
—"Leghari Addresses Indian Missile 'Threat'," The Nation (Lahore, Islamabad), 31 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950531000576, 31 May 1995.

June 1995
The US Central Intelligence Agency concludes that China exported components for missile systems to Pakistan during the last three months of 1995. The Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency John D. Holum says, "We have serious questions about China's missile-related exports to Pakistan and Iran, and we are in a position where we have to consider the question of sanctions....There are substantial indications of continued missile related transactions in both countries. We need clarification from the Chinese of what is under way. But as of now, that has not been possible." However, since China has shipped components as against complete missile systems, a debate has emerged within the Clinton administration whether the latest Chinese exports constitute violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and attract penalties under US law.
—Elaine Sciolino, "C.I.A. Report says Chinese sent Iran Arms Components," New York Times, 22 June 1995, Section A, P. 1, Column 3, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 June 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 June 1995
China describes reports of its delivery of missile components to Iran and Pakistan as "groundless." Pakistan denies acquiring components of M-11 missiles from China and a Pakistani foreign ministry spokesperson says the United States does not have any evidence to support the claim. The spokesperson also says that Pakistan has not violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
—Tony Walker and Jurek Martin, "China rejects reports of missile parts supply," Financial Times (London), 23 June 1995, p. 8; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 June 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pakistan Denies Receiving Missile Parts from China," Xinhua, 22 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970417001372, 22 June 1997.

24 June 1995
Pakistan's President Farooq Ahmad Leghari describes India's missile program as "tension multiplier" and says it is forcing Pakistan to keep its options open.
—"President Calls Indian Missile Program 'Tension Multiplier'," PTV Television Network, 24 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950624000008, 24 June 1995.

25 June 1995
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali calls US policy on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) with regard to Pakistan as "discriminatory." He points to the fact that last year's sanctions against China have been lifted but sanctions against Pakistan still remain. He states that Pakistan has never violated any international agreement on missile technology and has acted within "its four corners."
—"Foreign Minister's Remarks on MTCR," The News (Karachi), 25 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950625000006, 25 June 1995.

3 July 1995
Pakistan's embassy in Washington, DC says that the Pakistani government "categorically rejects the baseless allegations that Pakistan received M-11 missiles or their components from China. The Government of Pakistan has consistently maintained that Pakistan has not acquired M-11 or any other missiles from China that violate the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR]." The embassy's statement adds, "Pakistan has advocated the creation of a zero-missile zone in South Asia and supports the American efforts to avoid a missile race in the region."
—Syed Rifaat Hussain, Minister of Information, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, DC, Letter to the Editor," New York Times, 1 July 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 July 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 July 1995
US intelligence officials say that satellite photographs, intercepted communications, and human intelligence have led them to incontrovertibly conclude that China has exported complete M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan; the missiles have been in Pakistan since 1992. Pakistan's military has also been observed building storage facilities for the missiles and their mobile launchers, as well as maintenance facilities and housing for the missile crews. Furthermore, Pakistani soldiers have practiced "simulated launches" with aid and advice of Chinese missile experts. US officials believe that the storage crates at Pakistan's Sargodha Air Force base contain 30 or more M-11 ballistic missiles—missiles that could someday be armed with nuclear warheads. However, despite the accumulating evidence, the Clinton administration has dragged its feet on imposing sanctions on China as penalties stipulated by US laws could seriously hurt Sino-US trade. Senior administration officials have suggested that the United States is unlikely to act unless China or Pakistan admits to the missile transaction or the US intelligence community presents more direct evidence such as the photograph of a missile outside its storage crate. A US State Department official acknowledges that this approach of setting the bar so high has made the US intelligence community "unhappy in the extreme."
—R. Jeffrey Smith, David B. Ottaway, "Spy Photos suggest China Missile Trade; Pressure for Sanctions builds over evidence that Pakistan has M-11s," Washington Post, 3 July 1995, p. A01; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 July 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 September 1995
Chairman of Pakistan Ordinance Factories (POF) Maj. Gen. Mehmud Ali Durrani claims that POF can produce missiles if ordered by the government.
—"Official Details Arms Made at Ordnance Factories," Business Recorder (Islamabad), 5 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950905000568, 5 September 1995.

October 1995
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani announces that his forces will conduct 38 exercises in the Persian Gulf over a period of five months and hold joint maneuvers with Pakistan and "another neighboring country." The exercises will be the most intensive military exercises in the Gulf and will involve the use of cruise and anti-ship missiles.
—James Bruce, "Iran steps up Gulf exercises," Jane's Defence Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey), 1 January 1996, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 October 1995
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali says Pakistan will build its own indigenous defense against India's missile threat. He says Pakistan needs to match India's capabilities without violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines.
—"Minister Advocates Indigenous Missile Defense," PTV Television Network, 4 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951004000130, 4 October 1995.

4 October 1995
US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis says the United States will not impose any new sanctions on China unless it acquires incontrovertible proof that China has violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines by selling M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. According to Davis, the M-11 transaction may have occurred before China announced its intention to adhere to the MTCR in September 1994. Davis adds, "We have no reason to doubt that the Chinese are carrying out the pledge, as well as their original pledge to abide by the commitments of the MTCR."
—Bill Gertz, "Limits to be Loosened on Supercomputers; Clinton Waits on Sanctioning China," Washington Times, 5 October 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 October 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late November 1995
Marshall Ch'oe Gwang, vice chairman of the National Defense Commission and minister of the People's Armed Forces, leads a North Korean delegation to Pakistan. Ch'oe is believed to have visited missile production facilities in the Faisalabad-Lahore area and possibly Jhelum. The visit is believed to have resulted in the conclusion of an agreement for North Korea to provide Pakistan with key components like fuel tanks and rocket engines from the Nodong and/or Taepodong missile programs, about 12 to 25 Nodong missiles, and at least one transporter erector launcher (TEL) or mobile erector launcher (MEL). The items included in the agreement will be produced by the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau of the 2nd Economic Committee and sent to the Khan Research laboratories in early 1996 by Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (North Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation/Bureau).
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 23-24; Joseph Bermudez, "A silent partner," Jane's Defense Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey), 20 May 1998.

	Updated November 2003